Elecciones presidenciales de Chile 2025, en vivo | Comienza la votación de los chilenos en el exterior
Este domingo 14 de diciembre los chilenos deben volver a las urnas para elegir al nuevo presidente en una segunda vuelta que enfrenta a candidatos totalmente antagónicos. La candidata de la izquierda Jeannette Jara, y el postulante de la ultraderecha, José Antonio Kast, compiten por ser el sucesor del actual mandatario de izquierda, Gabriel Boric, que deja el cargo el 11 de marzo de 2026. Con esta elección, que se realiza con voto obligatorio para todos los chilenos habilitados en el padrón electoral, se pondrá fin a una extensa campaña que ha estado marcada por los temas de seguridad, economía y migración, además de las críticas a la gestión del Ejecutivo.
Seguir leyendo
Los candidatos y la salud
La salud figura entre las principales preocupaciones de la ciudadanía chilena, según diversas encuestas. Esto no resulta sorprendente: el sistema de salud chileno arrastra desde hace años una crisis estructural que ha dejado al Estado en deuda con la ciudadanía. Tal como señalamos en el capítulo de salud del Informe Anual de Derechos Humanos 2025, esta crisis es multicausal. Su origen está en un modelo segmentado y discriminatorio según sexo, edad y nivel socioeconómico, en la falta de sostenibilidad financiera, en la desigualdad entre los sectores público y privado, en el bajo énfasis en la Atención Primaria como puerta de entrada al sistema, y en la opacidad y débil fiscalización del sector asegurador. Estos factores generan inequidades en acceso y calidad y perpetúan una lógica de mercado que privilegia la capacidad de pago por sobre el derecho a la salud.
Seguir leyendo
Entrevista política en torno a una mesa: “La once nos pone en un pie de igualdad”
Canillo, hijo de una familia huilliche muy pobre, era muy flaco y nunca crecía; en su casa, sin embargo, había alimentos, pero desaparecían. Un día su familia se escondió y descubrió que Canillo era el que se comía todo. Se asustaron, creyeron que era el diablo y lo lanzaron al mar. Luego del crimen, o del intento de crimen, hubo una sequía que marchitó todas las plantas de la tierra y el mar. “La gente fue a entregar alimentos al abuelito Huentenao como ofrendas, pero Canillo voló hacia el sol y lo tapó con una rama de laurel. Para apaciguarlo, Huentenao le ofreció a su hija, si no la hambruna se esparciría. Luego de que Canillo contrajera matrimonio, el abuelito lo encerró en una roca para que no hiciera el mal”.
Seguir leyendo
Muere a los 86 años Abraham Quintanilla, padre y representante de la cantante Selena
El padre y representante de la popular cantante de la música tejana Selena, Abraham Quintanilla, ha fallecido a los 86 años, según ha dado a conocer su hijo, A.B. Quintanilla III, a través de sus redes sociales. “Con gran pesar les informo que mi padre falleció hoy”, publicó este sábado el músico en su cuenta de Instagram. Las causas de su muerte no han sido reveladas.
Seguir leyendo
La guerra entre los carteles en la frontera sur obliga a reforzar el despliegue militar en México y Guatemala
La onda expansiva del crimen organizado ha cruzado esta semana la frontera entre México y Guatemala con una serie de hechos delictivos que ha dejado agobio y tensión en los pobladores de la frontera sur. El lunes se produjo un enfrentamiento entre bandas criminales, una de estas una célula del Cartel de Sinaloa, que afectó comunidades en los departamentos guatemaltecos de Huehuetenango y San Marcos. El choque de los narcotraficantes con rivales del Cartel de Chiapas y Guatemala dejó como saldo un muerto y un militar guatemalteco herido. Pero el episodio recuerda también que hay una guerra de baja intensidad en la zona limítrofe entre ambos países.
Seguir leyendo
Five-month preemptive arrest for former Bolivian President Arce
Former Bolivian President Luis Arce Catacora has been placed under preemptive arrest at the San Pedro detention facility in La Paz for five months, pending a corruption inquiry regarding the mismanagement of funds intended for indigenous projects when he served as Economy Minister under Evo Morales (2006-2019).
Colombian guerrillas declare nationwide armed strike to protest US aggression
Bogotá, Colombia – The Colombian National Liberation Army (ELN) has declared a 72-hour nationwide armed strike beginning on Sunday in protest against increased US military activity in Latin America.
In a statement, the group warned Colombians not to travel via the country’s roadways or navigable rivers during the three day window; while the group said it would not harm civilians, armed strikes are enforced through violence, with previous iterations involving vehicle burnings and civilian casualties.
The action will be the first national-level armed strike since 2022 and comes amid an ongoing U.S. boat bombing campaign – which the Pentagon says has targeted ELN members – as well as White House threats of further intervention, including land strikes in Colombia.
“We, the peoples’ forces of Colombia, protest the threat of imperialist intervention in our country as a new phase of Trump’s neo-colonial plan, which aims to sink its claws even deeper into Latin American and Caribbean territories,” read a decree emitted on Friday by the ELN.
On multiple occasions, U.S. President Donald Trump has floated the idea of striking drug production targets within Colombian borders; Colombia is the world’s largest producer of cocaine and the ELN is known to be a key actor in the drug trade.
The communiqué said the strike would begin at 6:00 AM on Sunday, December 14 and last until the same time on Wednesday.
While it instructed civilians not to travel by road or river during the three day window, it maintained that its “road control units will respect civilians and their property,” but advised regular people not to mix with soldiers in order to “avoid accidents.”
Although the measures are purportedly national, analysts say they are unlikely to affect the whole country.
“In practical terms, this is a national announcement, but it has a limited impact because the ELN does not have a national presence,” Gerson Arias, investigator at the Ideas for Peace Foundation (FIP), a Colombian think-tank, told The Bogotá Post.
Arias said the bulk of the effect will be seen in areas of ELN control, especially in Colombia’s northeast and in the western departments of Cauca, Nariño and Chocó.
The last time the ELN implemented a nationwide armed strike was in 2022, with incidents across 17 departments including vehicle burnings and road blockages intended to protest the Ivan Duque administration (2018-2022).
But the ELN regularly uses smaller scale armed strikes to exert control over specific areas, usually in rural regions. Experts say that the guerrillas often use the actions as a guise to secure drug transit corridors and facilitate the movement of soldiers and contraband.
Rights groups criticize armed strikes for producing a host of deleterious effects on affected populations, with forced confinement impeding access to education, food, and healthcare.
While the ELN’s decree did not explicitly mention U.S. threats against Venezuela, the group is known to have a presence in the country and has recorded ties with the Nicolás Maduro regime.
Much of the guerrilla group’s territory lies on the border with Venezuela and any U.S. attack on Colombia’s neighbor would also threaten the ELN, according to FIP’s Arias.
“The ELN is well aware that it may be affected by some of the measures taken by the United States,” said the analyst.
The group has already been directly impacted by Trump’s boat bombing campaign, with U.S. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth saying an October 17 strike on an alleged drug vessel had killed three ELN members. The rebels denied the claim, insisting they do not smuggle drugs.
The ELN’s armed strike declaration underscores the complex panorama of armed groups in the region and their ties to government, drug trafficking, and border zones. While the impact of the action is yet to be seen, the announcement shows the far-reaching consequences of the White House’s mounting military pressure in the region.
This article originally appeared in The Bogotá Post and was republished with permission.
Featured image description: ELN fighters.
Featured image credit: Brasil de Fato via Flickr
The post Colombian guerrillas declare nationwide armed strike to protest US aggression appeared first on Latin America Reports.
U.S. Seizure of the Skipper Oil Tanker in the Caribbean: The Numerous Holes in Trump’s Line of Reasoning
The U.S.’s seizure of the oil tanker the Skipper in the Caribbean is just one more example of the inconsistencies, lies and ludicrous claims that characterize Trump’s justification for his actions against Venezuela. As Representative Gregory Meeks (NY), a ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee pointed out, the seizure clearly demonstrates that the bombing of the 42 boats by the Southern Command has nothing to do with drug trafficking. Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt describes the Skipper’s shipment as “black market oil” but that’s only because the U.S. sanctions don’t give Venezuela any alternative to export its oil. It’s like a judge who sentences a man to stop breathing and then when the man grasps for breath the judge declares he’s breaking the law.
Simultaneously, Trump sanctioned 6 more shipping companies that transport Venezuelan oil. The groundwork is being laid for more seizures. The Financial Times now states “fifty-five sanctions-hit tankers have participated in Venezuelan oil trades in the last year.” Why doesn’t the Turmp administration just come out and say it? The U.S. is blockading Venezuela.
On the other hand, the Trump administration states that it’s the Skipper company that is being targeted because it allegedly finances terrorist groups, specifically Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard. But the oil belongs to Venezuela, not the Skipper. According to that logic, the U.S. should return the oil to Venezuela. Not likely to happen.
Colombia stays silent on abstention in UN ‘kidnapped’ Ukraine children vote
Medellín, Colombia – The results of a UN forum, made public on December 3, revealed that Colombia abstained from taking a position on the statement urging Russia to guarantee the “immediate, safe and unconditional return of Ukrainian children who have been deported or forcibly removed” to Russian territory.
Despite 91 countries voting in favor of the document, Colombia, which will sit on the Security Council next year, joined 57 nations – including Brazil, El Salvador, and China – refraining from supporting the measure. Meanwhile, 12 countries voted against it.
The development has placed President Gustavo Petro’s government in the hot seat as opposition figures in Colombia criticize and question the decision while the administration, so far, refuses to comment publicly.
The United Nations statement, proposed by Ukraine with the sponsorship of Canada and the European Union, urged the return of thousands of Ukrainian children who were transferred from their homes to Russian territory over nearly four years of war.
The resolution also calls on the Russian Federation “to cease such actions without delay, and to end the practices of family separation and the ‘change of [children’s] personal status’ through citizenship, adoption, foster placement or indoctrination”, according to a UN press release on the approved resolution.

Source: https://x.com/sherwiebp/status/1996326527492075996
Backlash following the abstention
Colombia’s decision to abstain has drawn criticism from the opposition, who say it highlights inconsistencies in President Petro’s foreign policy.
These voices point to Petro’s outspoken stance as a defender of human rights and his historically active role in international affairs, whilst demanding clarification as to why the government has avoided taking a concrete stance on Russia’s invasion of a sovereign nation and the return of said Ukrainian children.
Members of Congress from the Centro Democrático, the leading opposition party, have taken to social media to raise their concerns.
Representative of the Democratic Center Andrés Forero, who urged, on X, that President Petro “must explain to the country why he ordered the Colombian delegation to the UN to abstain from voting on the motion urging Russia to return the thousands of Ukrainian children who have been kidnapped”.
Further dissent came from Senator Paloma Valencia who also took to X to question Petro’s government.
There has been no explanation offered by either President Petro or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
According to Brazilian media, the vote reinforces the Lula government’s position of equidistance in the conflict but raises questions about seeking a position as a global mediator over prioritizing human rights.
The Russian government has accused the UN of “distorting reality”.
In a Facebook post, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs lashed out at President of UN General Assembly Annalena Baerbock, accusing her of framing her speech in “Goebbels propaganda mould”.
Featured image description: United Nations Security Council.
Featured image credit: United Nations via Flickr.
The post Colombia stays silent on abstention in UN ‘kidnapped’ Ukraine children vote appeared first on Latin America Reports.
New Caribbean Music This Week: Sean Paul, Anthony B, Machel Montano, Fay-Ann Lyons & More Drop Fresh Releases

News Americas, NEW YORK, NY, Fri. Dec. 12, 2025: New Caribbean music continues to surge with purpose, rhythm, and global appeal as several of the region’s most celebrated and emerging artists release new tracks this week, spanning dancehall, reggae, soca, and world music.

Leading this week’s releases is Sean Paul, whose new single “Faith We A Keep” dropped today under Dutty Rock Productions, with exclusive licensing to Milk & Honey Records. Inspired by the resilience of the Jamaican people following Hurricane Melissa, the track delivers an uplifting message centered on perseverance, faith, and protection during challenging times. Blending emotional depth with Sean Paul’s signature delivery, the dancehall release is expected to resonate across radio playlists and inspirational programming.
“Faith We A Keep” was produced by Daramola and written by Sean Paul alongside Stephen “Di Genius” McGregor Henriques, Karen Amanda Reifer, and Abraham Olaleye. Recording took place at Paramount Studio and Dutty Rock Studio, with engineering by Kahlil “Tanned Jesus” Vellani and Andre “Suku Ward” Gray. The track is officially released on December 12, 2025.
LISTEN HERE
Veteran reggae and dancehall artist Anthony B also returns this week with his new single “Good Music,” now available on all major streaming platforms. Produced by GRAMMY Award-winning producer J-Vibe, the song delivers classic feel-good roots reggae vibes and marks the second release from Anthony B’s upcoming 2026 album on Ineffable Records. While Anthony B remains globally known for his iconic hit “World A Reggae Music,” his more recent track “Chill Out” from the 2023 album Bread & Butter has emerged as his top-performing digital release to date, signaling sustained audience demand for his sound.
Soca fans are also being treated to a high-energy collaboration as Voice, Machel Montano, and litleboy lsbeats767 team up on “Bam Bam,” a track already gaining traction ahead of the 2026 Carnival season. Produced by litleboy lsbeats767, Precision Productions, and Machel Montano, with additional production by Mega Mick, the single blends modern soca with infectious hooks designed for both stage and fete settings.
The song features writing contributions from Aaron St-Louis (Voice), Machel Montano, Art Raoul Travis Philip, Foster Marcel Xavier, and Kasey Phillips, with recording sessions split between Trinidad studios. “Bam Bam” is released under Monk Music and is available on streaming platforms and YouTube.
Meanwhile, Trinidad and Tobago’s soca powerhouse Fay-Ann Lyons teams up with producer GusBus on “Can’t Fling Mud To A Love Song,” a world-soca release blending lyrical reflection with melodic warmth. Written and performed by Lyons, the track is released under Bad Beagle with exclusive licensing to Diaspora Sound, continuing her tradition of pairing social commentary with Caribbean rhythms.
Adding to this week’s diverse offerings is the Guardians Riddim, released by Blackstarr Productionz under Larnox Global Entertainment Ltd, featuring a world and soca-driven soundscape designed for multiple artist interpretations.
Also new is “Earthquake” by YelloStone, released via Jahmari Records / Dimmie Joe Muzik, delivering contemporary Caribbean energy with crossover appeal.
Rounding out the week is rising Jamaican reggae artist Ras-I, who releases “Reggae Mountain (Feel No Way),” a modern take on uplifting roots reggae. The single marks the first release from his upcoming 2026 album on Ineffable Records. Ras-I, who won Best New Reggae Artist at the 2024 Caribbean Music Awards, continues to gain international attention following the selection of his song “Somewhere Wonderful” as the official theme for the Jamaica Tourist Board earlier this year.
Together, this week’s releases reflect the Caribbean music industry’s continued global influence – balancing heritage, innovation, and messages that resonate far beyond the region.
Haiti Needs to Lay New Tracks
By Jake Johnston
Research Associate, Center for Economic and Policy Research
It’s been nearly a decade since Haitians last went to the polls to elect a president. Even then, barely one in five participated. In a country with a majority of the population under 25 years of age, this means that, for most Haitians, voting for one’s leaders is a privilege never before experienced.
Haiti’s transition, precipitated by the assassination of Jovenel Moïse in July 2021, is ongoing. For the better part of four years, progress toward elections has remained elusive. But that all appeared to change this fall.
“The Haitians need to come to an election and elect a president,” the US Charge d’Affaires, Henry Wooster said in September. Security and other challenges must not be a “red herring for taking action,” he continued. Speaking directly to Haiti’s de facto authorities, he warned: “In other words, you can’t stay in those jobs for life.”
The reaction, in a country where the political class remains more responsive to Washington than the population in Haiti, was swift. Two months later, a new electoral law has been established and a vote scheduled for next August. But does this present Haitians with a path out of the multiple, overlaid crises affecting the country? More than half the country is facing food insecurity, the economy is about to wrap up its seventh consecutive year of negative growth, and insecurity continues to dominate daily life.
In 2023, when asked if they had trust in the electoral process, fewer than one in four Haitians responded yes. It is hard to imagine that number is higher today. Though few would be sorry to see the much-loathed leaders atop the transition fall, a vote is not a path out of the current crisis.
The quick response to Wooster’s threats was not so much about elections. It was about a date much closer on the horizon: February 7, 2026. That is when the mandate of the nine-member presidential council — which was put in place with a strong push from the Biden administration, CARICOM, UN, and the OAS 18 months ago — formally ends. For months, debate has raged over what should come next. The political class is auditioning, not with the ten-plus million citizens of Haiti, but with the foreign diplomats and multilateral entities they see as key to their own survival.
And if there was any doubt about who would ultimately decide, it was put to rest in mid-November. Amid an effort from some on the transitional presidential council to, once again, replace the prime minister, the US embassy stepped into the fight.
“If you and your family value your relationship with the United States, I urge you in the strongest terms to desist from initiatives to oust the PM and to instead publish the electoral decree … This is not the time to test U.S. resolve,” Wooster texted Fritz Jean, one of the councilors. Days later, Jean’s US visa was revoked and the State Department publicly accused him, without providing evidence, of supporting armed gangs. The effort to replace the PM was stopped — at least for now. The next week, the electoral decree was published.
The “plan” is coming into focus, and it is a familiar one: stability at all costs, no matter how rotten the foundation. To enforce this notion of stability and allow for elections, the US has been quick to assure that more security support is on the way.
In September, the UN Security Council approved a Gang Suppression Force (GSF). Authorized for up to 5,500 soldiers, it is currently little more than a rebranding of the Kenyan-led Multinational Support Mission (MSS) that the UN authorized in 2024. No new troops have arrived and, while this new mission will have some level of UN support, operationalizing any of it is expected to take the better part of a year.
The main difference then, for the 1,000 or so mostly Kenyan police on the ground in Haiti is that the rules of engagement have changed. The GSF, as its name suggests, is intended to be more “muscular,” by which its architects mean lethal. The newly drafted Concept of Operations outlines a mission with a simple goal: kill the bandits.
But while few have taken note, that has been the de facto authorities’ strategy for some time. So far this year, police forces have been responsible for well over half of the 4,500-plus killings in Haiti. Hundreds of civilians have been caught in the crossfire as police battle armed groups that exert influence over much of Port-au-Prince and have traumatized a nation. Drone attacks, led by a secretive police unit operating with Blackwater CEO Erik Prince’s private mercenaries, are also racking up civilian casualties and drawing growing condemnation.
The outspoken leaders of Haiti’s armed groups, however, only seem to continue to accumulate more power, political influence, and heavy weaponry. While some areas of the capital have seen tension ease, violence in the provinces is expanding by the day. Armed groups still control all the major arteries of the nation. More people are displaced today than at the height of the post-earthquake recovery.
The US has expressed its goal in Haiti as saving the state from imminent collapse, thereby avoiding mass migration or the further entrenchment of transnational criminal organizations. But while precious oxygen is consumed by raging debates over electoral timelines, transitional governance structures, and how quickly foreign soldiers can arrive, nobody has stopped to ask a basic question: is the current state worth saving?
The root of the tension that has paralyzed the country for much of the last decade is not a fight between violent gangs and the state. Simplistic narratives of good versus evil miss the mark. Rather, it is a fight over putting the train back on the tracks to save a rump state in the name of stability or to lay new tracks to create the foundations for a more representative state to rise from the ashes. It is not elections nor a foreign military force that will resolve this fundamental tension. In fact, history shows those two responses are more likely to consolidate the status quo.
The Haitian people need an opportunity to vote freely. They need to feel safe and secure in their communities. But what is missing is a plan to bring it all together, to begin restoring faith in a state that long ago lost the trust of the population; a plan to achieve peace, which is not just the absence of violence, but the presence of opportunity. What is missing is a vision that can inspire the population and bring the nation together around a common path forward.
A peace process can fill that gap. Such an endeavor does not mean legitimizing armed actors, condoning violence, or accepting impunity; rather, what it should mean is treating the situation holistically while centering the population and in particular victims of both state and non-state violence. A foreign military force and low-turnout elections are tracks Haiti has been down many times before. A peace process offers a chance at laying new ones. But first, what Haiti needs are political leaders responsive to the needs of the people and not simply to foreign embassies.
Brazil’s lower house passes bill to shorten Bolsonaro’s sentence amid chaos inside the chamber
São Paulo, Brazil — Brazil’s lower house of Congress on Tuesday approved a bill that aims to reduce sentences for those convicted of crimes involving the January 8, 2023 attacks on the country’s government headquarters in Brasília.
The bill would also apply to jailed former President Jair Bolsonaro, who is serving a 27-year sentence for plotting a coup.
The Chamber of Deputies approved the bill at 2:30 AM during an unusually late session by 291 votes in favor and 148 against. The bill still needs to pass the Senate.
Voting for the bill on Tuesday was not expected, and when the president of the Chamber of Deputies called it to the floor for a vote, chaos broke out in the chamber.
Glauber Braga, a left-wing congressman, protested against holding a vote on the bill by taking the Chamber president’s chair and refusing to leave – he was eventually taken away by congressional police.
Túlio Amancio, a reporter from a national TV station, witnessed the melee and said he saw colleagues being physically injured.
Amancio told Brazil Reports the press was brutally expelled from the plenary, and the live TV signal from within the Chamber of Deputies was turned off.
According to the reporter, a number of journalists, including a female, were assaulted; one, he said, needed to be taken to get medical attention inside the Chamber.
In September, Bolsonaro was convicted along with military and government officials for planning a coup to remain in power after he lost the 2022 election to President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. The plot allegedly included a plan to assassinate Lula. Bolsonaro has denied his involvement.
Since then, Bolsonaro’s lawmaker allies had been trying to negotiate an amnesty law to pardon the ex-president and all those convicted in the January 8 attacks, which caused millions of dollars in damage to Brazil’s Congress, Supreme Court and presidential palace.
The bill that passed through Congress on Tuesday is a lighter version of the amnesty law.
Maria do Rosário, a congresswoman from the center-left Worker’s Party, believes the Senate – which has a conservative majority – will most likely approve the bill.
Featured image credit:
Image: Discussion and voting on legislative proposals in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies
Source: Bruno Spada/Câmara dos Deputados
The post Brazil’s lower house passes bill to shorten Bolsonaro’s sentence amid chaos inside the chamber appeared first on Brazil Reports.
The post Brazil’s lower house passes bill to shorten Bolsonaro’s sentence amid chaos inside the chamber appeared first on Latin America Reports.
U.S. biotechnology company secures $5.9 million USD under Nova Indústria Brasil policy
MIT-based biotechnology company Harmony Baby Nutrition has secured $5.9 million USD (31.9 million Brazilian reais) from the joint FINEP-BNDES innovation fund, one of Brazil’s foremost partnerships promoting the country’s entrepreneurial ecosystem under the 2024 Nova Indústria Brasil policy.
With the funds, the startup is planning to create a new research and development center in the eastern city of Belo Horizonte, focused on developing a wide range of infant formulas- from everyday products to Harmony’s humanized solutions.
Nova Indústria Brasil was introduced in January 2024 as a way to “stimulate productive and technological development, expand the competitiveness of Brazilian industry, guide investment, promote better jobs, and boost the country’s qualified presence in the international market,” according to the Brazilian government.
The policy has allocated 3 billion reais ($555 million USD) to strengthen the nation’s domestic innovation capacity. Through it, the country selectively supports companies deemed capable of building large-scale research and development (R&D) infrastructure in Brazil.
As a method of reversing the country’s premature deindustrialization, Nova Indústria Brasil has called for coordinating a wide range of state instruments- including credit lines, non-refundable resources, regulatory and intellectual property actions, and public works policy- with incentives for the productive sector.
The selection of Harmony recognizes the company’s scientific leadership and global potential, as well as its capacity to become a key player in Brazil’s technological and industrial future.
Harmony developed the first human breastmilk-based infant formula on the market. Its mission of transforming infant nutrition with a human-inspired hypoallergenic formula is now crossing international borders, as it will now use its Brazilian development center to accelerate the development of biologically-aligned infant formula- that are hypoallergenic, too.
“There is currently no domestic infant formula industry in Brazil; the market has been dominated for decades by large multinational companies,” said Wendel Afonso, Founder and CEO at Harmony.
“This funding allows us to establish a world-class research and production ecosystem right here in Belo Horizonte. In doing so, we are also positioning Brazil as a global leader in humanized infant formula innovation,” he added.
Afonso himself is native to the State of Minas Gerais, where Belo Horizonte is located, and holds a Pharmacy degree and a Master’s in Food Science and Technology from the Federal University of Minas Gerais. It was here when he began researching protein hydrolysates for clinical nutrition.
The founder was inspired to innovate when he turned to instant formula after his second child showed an allergy to cow’s milk. Harmony’s first product, Melodi, is a specialized toddler formula that has demonstrated 61% higher sensory preference compared to standard hypoallergenic products.
One in six babies experience allergic reactions to cow’s milk based formulas, but available hypoallergenic options often have unpleasant tastes that children reject. Unlike traditional formulas- which also rely on added sugars and industrial cow’s milk derived ingredients- Harmony eliminates all unnecessary ingredients. Melodi, in fact, has no corn serum, table sugar or maltodextrin.
Beyond this, dairy cows and their manure produce substantial amounts of greenhouse gases to the atmosphere, and contribute to the conversion of a natural habitat to agricultural land due to the increasing demand for feed crops such as corn, alfalfa, and soy, as per the World Wildlife Organization. Brazil has the third-largest milk production in the world, and Minas Gerais is the largest producing state.
Harmony’s dairy-free innovation aims to dramatically cut emissions, while also improving user satisfaction and boosting the Brazilian productive sector. The startup expects to commence the implementation of its new innovation center in the first semester of 2026, with an expansion encompassing 250 square meters including laboratories and a state-of-the-art application plant.
The initiative foresees the recruitment of 25 professionals- of which at least five will be scientists- who will contribute across scientific, technical, administrative, and operational domains.
Research activities, on the other hand, will focus on the development and performance assessment of novel formulations tailored to diverse needs, as well as the investigation of bioactive ingredient properties.
Harmony is now also raising a community round on Wefunder as a way to engage more stakeholders in participating towards a redefinition of early-life nutrition through science and sustainability.
Image source: Del Afonso via LinkedIn
Disclosure: This article mentions a client of an Espacio portfolio company.
The post U.S. biotechnology company secures $5.9 million USD under Nova Indústria Brasil policy appeared first on Brazil Reports.
The post U.S. biotechnology company secures $5.9 million USD under Nova Indústria Brasil policy appeared first on Latin America Reports.
Ethiopians On TPS Given 60 Days To Leave US

News Americas, WASHINGTON, D.C., Fri. Dec. 12, 2205: The U.S. Department of Homeland Security, (DHS), today gave Ethiopian immigrants in the US on Temporary Protected Status, (TPS), 60 days to leave the country as they ended the program by concluding that country conditions no longer meet the statutory requirements for the humanitarian designation.

The decision was announced today by Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem following what DHS described as a careful review of current conditions in Ethiopia.
“Temporary Protected Status designations are time-limited and were never meant to be a ticket to permanent residency,” a U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, (USCIS,) spokesperson said in a statement. “Conditions in Ethiopia no longer pose a serious threat to the personal safety of returning Ethiopian nationals. Since the situation no longer meets the statutory requirements for a TPS designation, Secretary Noem is terminating this designation to restore integrity in our immigration system.”
TPS provides temporary relief from deportation and work authorization to nationals of countries experiencing armed conflict, environmental disasters, or other extraordinary conditions that prevent safe return. Ethiopia was designated for TPS amid concerns related to internal conflict and instability.
Under the termination order, Ethiopian nationals currently covered by TPS who do not have another lawful basis to remain in the United States will have 60 days to voluntarily depart the country.
DHS is encouraging individuals who choose to leave voluntarily to use the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s CBP Home Mobile App to report their departure. According to DHS, the voluntary departure process includes a complimentary plane ticket, a $1,000 exit bonus, and the possibility of future opportunities for legal immigration to the United States.
The department warned that enforcement actions will follow the conclusion of the grace period. After February 13, 2026, DHS may arrest and remove Ethiopian nationals who remain in the United States without legal status following the termination of TPS.
“If an alien forces DHS to arrest and remove them, they may never be allowed to return to the United States,” the agency cautioned.
Immigration advocates have historically raised concerns about TPS terminations, noting the potential impact on families, employers, and communities with long-standing ties to the United States. DHS, however, emphasized that TPS is intended as a temporary humanitarian measure and must be reassessed periodically based on current country conditions.
The termination of Ethiopia’s TPS designation comes amid broader efforts by the administration to tighten enforcement while promoting voluntary compliance with immigration laws.
The Weight Of A Word: Rethinking “Minority” In America

News Americas, NEW YORK, NY, Fri. Dec. 12, 2005: “In our country, we believe there should be no minority and no majority, just people.” – Steve Biko
The South African activist Steve Biko used these words to highlight how language itself can be a tool of division. Though Biko was speaking in the context of apartheid, his words hold relevance in the United States, where the categories of “minority” and “majority” remain central to how race is discussed and understood.

Few words in American racial discourse are as common or as unexamined as minority. The term appears in government reports, census categories, school curricula, corporate diversity statements, and daily conversation. Black Americans, along with Latinos, Asians, Indigenous people, and immigrants, are routinely described as “minorities.” The word is so deeply ingrained in the national vocabulary that it often goes unquestioned. Yet its history and social implications reveal a different story. Beneath its surface neutrality, minority operates as a marker of marginalization.
The English word minority originally referred to being smaller in number or lesser in status. In political contexts, it described groups with less representation or less authority, such as a minority party in a legislature. In this setting, the meaning was both numerical and hierarchical: fewer members translated into less influence.
In the United States, this logic made its way into racial discourse. By the early to mid-twentieth century, as government agencies and social scientists studied racial and ethnic groups, “minority” became a shorthand for those outside the white mainstream. The U.S. Census, for example, tracked populations according to racial categories, but policy discussions increasingly referred to these communities collectively as “minorities.” The label appeared in debates on education, employment, and voting rights.
This was more than description. It was categorization. To call Black Americans a minority was not only to note their numbers but also to assign them a social position. It implied less power, less visibility, and less belonging. Over time, the word solidified into a label that carried assumptions of inferiority.
The implications of this language extend far beyond statistics.
Defining by deficit. To be labeled a minority is to be defined by lack. It frames identity in terms of what is missing, population size, influence, resources, rather than what is present. For Black Americans and Caribbeans individuals, this framing compounds the legacy of slavery, segregation, and systemic exclusion, reinforcing a narrative of limitation.
Masking diversity. The category also obscures difference. By grouping together Black Americans, Latinos, Asians, those of Caribbean decent, Native peoples, and others under one label, the word erases the distinct histories and struggles of each. Black Americans, whose presence in the U.S. is rooted in enslavement and centuries of systemic discrimination, are placed in the same category as immigrant populations with very different experiences. The flattening of identity that results prevents deeper recognition of each community’s unique realities.
Sustaining hierarchy. The persistence of the word minority also reinforces a symbolic hierarchy. Even in places where Black and brown communities form the majority, cities like Detroit, Houston, or Atlanta, they are still labeled minorities. Nationally, demographic projections show that by mid-century, nonwhite populations will collectively outnumber whites, yet the label persists. This demonstrates that minority is less about numbers and more about social status.
The institutional use of “minority” has reinforced these implications. Civil rights legislation of the 1960s, while groundbreaking, often used the term “minority groups” to identify those entitled to protection. Affirmative action programs in higher education and employment were designed with “minorities” in mind. These policies addressed real inequities but also embedded the label into the structure of law.
In education, textbooks routinely referred to Black, Latino, and Asian students as minorities. For generations of children, growing up meant encountering a narrative that positioned them as small, lesser, and outside the center of American identity. The repetition of the label in classrooms normalized the idea of difference as deficiency.
In the workplace, “minority hiring” became a standard phrase. While meant to promote inclusion, it often created the impression that employees of color were tokens, exceptions granted space within institutions rather than central contributors. Again, the word framed belonging in terms of scarcity.
Perhaps the most damaging effect of the word minority is its internalization. Many Black Americans refer to themselves as minorities without questioning the label. Over time, this acceptance can subtly reinforce a sense of smallness.
Research in social psychology has shown that repeated exposure to deficit-based language can shape self-concept. Children labeled as minorities may come to see themselves as outsiders in their own country. Adults who internalize the term may carry an unspoken sense of limitation, even as they succeed. This is not because they lack confidence or capability, but because the language itself imposes boundaries on how they are imagined.
The damage here is not always visible. It operates quietly, through the drip of repetition, until it feels natural. When people embrace the label for themselves: “I’m a minority in this country,” they may unknowingly reinforce the very hierarchy that the term was designed to describe.
Despite its baggage, the term remains widespread. Bureaucracy plays a role. Government agencies and corporate diversity programs are still organized around categories like “minority representation.” Habit plays another role. Once embedded in textbooks, policies, and popular speech, words are difficult to uproot. Convenience also contributes. “Minority” is a single word that groups together diverse populations, offering an easy shorthand.
But convenience is not harmless. The continued use of minority allows the underlying hierarchy to remain unchallenged. It ensures that entire communities continue to be described, and therefore imagined in terms of what they are not.
Reconsidering the word is not about semantics for their own sake. It is about disrupting the ways language sustains inequality. Several alternatives have been proposed. “Marginalized groups” highlights the active process of exclusion rather than suggesting an inherent lack. “Communities of color” emphasizes shared experiences of racialization, though it still groups diverse populations together. “Underrepresented populations” draws attention to gaps in visibility and influence.
Some advocates use the phrase “global majority,” noting that people of African, Asian, Indigenous, and Latin descent make up most of the world’s population. This term flips the perspective, reminding us that Black Americans and other groups are not minorities in any global sense.
None of these terms is perfect, but each offers a way of framing identity without reducing communities to symbols of smallness.
Of course, changing language alone will not dismantle racial inequity. The structural barriers that Black Americans face, economic inequality, disparities in education and healthcare, systemic discrimination—require more than new vocabulary. But words matter because they shape the framework through which these realities are understood. Language is both a mirror and a mold. It reflects existing power structures while also helping to reinforce them.
Questioning the word minority is part of questioning the assumptions that sustain inequality. If Black Americans continue to be labeled as minorities, they are continually positioned at the margins of a society they helped build. Rejecting the term does not solve the problem, but it begins to shift the lens through which the problem is seen.
Steve Biko’s vision that there should be no minority and no majority, just people remains unfinished business in America. The word minority may appear neutral, but its history shows otherwise. For Black Americans, it has been less a description of numbers and more a marker of marginalization. It defines by deficit, erases diversity, sustains hierarchy, and quietly shapes self-perception.
The persistence of the word is a reminder of how deeply systems of inequality are embedded in everyday life. To keep using it uncritically is to accept a worldview where some people are always smaller, lesser, or secondary. To challenge it is to recognize that no group’s worth can be measured by numbers alone.
Reconsidering minority is not about erasing history or denying demographic reality. It is about refusing to let language dictate value. If the United States is to move toward genuine equality, it must begin with the recognition that no community is inherently minor.
EDITOR’S NOTE: Nyan Reynolds is a U.S. Army veteran and published author whose novels and cultural works draw from his Jamaican heritage, military service and life experiences. His writing blends storytelling, resilience and heritage to inspire readers.
Nearly half of Latin America hit by informality, ILO warns
The International Labour Organization (ILO) warned Thursday that informality continues to affect almost one out of every two workers in Latin America and the Caribbean, reporting a regional average of 47% in 2025.
A Tribute To Potters’ Queen Of Education – Teacher Gen

News Americas, NEW YORK, NY, Thurs. Dec. 11, 2025: Some lives arrive quietly, yet they leave whole generations glowing. Teacher Gen was such a life. In Potters Village in Antigua, she became our first library, our first lesson, our first understanding of discipline wrapped in devotion. For more than seventy years, she taught us not only how to read and count but how to stand tall in the world.
Her classroom felt like a living garden. Desks opened like fresh soil. Chalk drifted like soft pollen. And we, small and curious, blossomed beneath her care. She could correct you with a look, steady you with a word, or prune you gently with that well-known belt that somehow felt like love disguised as firmness. She knew the balance between shaping and sheltering.

She remembered every family. She remembered who raised you, who taught them, and how you were expected to carry that legacy forward. Her reminders could sting, yet they settled in the heart like seeds that later broke open into wisdom. Her lessons were not just instruction. They were inheritance.
I spent some of my primary years beneath her watchful eye. Her expectations carved lines of purpose into me. Her affection strengthened me. Even in her later years, when she drifted into brief classroom naps, she still sensed everything. A whisper. A shuffle. A thought of mischief. She woke with your name ready on her lips, as if teaching flowed through her even in rest.
When I became a teacher, I asked her for guidance. She spoke with quiet authority.
“Love the children. Their parents may test you, but do not allow rudeness. You are preparing them for life and for heaven. And go to class prepared. You are shaping destinies.”
I carry those words into every room where learning and leadership meet.
Teacher Gen embodied the mind, the heart, and the hands of true education. Her knowledge was deep. Her compassion was wide. Her influence was lasting. Every Independence poem, every Easter recitation, every Christmas program bore her touch. Our village grew because she planted confidence and character in every child.
Today we stand in the shade of the great tree she became. Her branches reach across generations. Her roots hold our memory steady. We honor more than a teacher. We honor a life of luminous service. She showed us that greatness grows quietly, nurtures patiently, and endures beautifully.
So we celebrate our Queen of Education, whose presence shaped us, whose memory steadies us, and whose legacy will continue to bloom long after us.
Editor’s Note: Dr. Isaac Newton is a strategist and scholar trained at Harvard, Princeton, and Columbia. He advises governments and international institutions on governance, transformation, and global justice, helping nations and organizations turn vision into sustainable progress.
Rethinking Caribbean Diplomacy In A Shifting Global Landscape

News Americas, NEW YORK, NY, Thurs. Dec. 11, 2025: Caribbean diplomacy must begin with a clear understanding of who we are and what we choose to become. Foreign policy is the outward expression of our identity. It carries our values, voice, and vision into the global arena. Strategy is the quiet discipline of listening beneath the noise of events and sensing change before it arrives. An asset is anything that grows in strength when used with intention. Transformation is the decision to rise into something greater than habit or history. When these ideas converge, foreign policy becomes the compass of national renewal and a foundation for a confident regional posture.

This vision resonates with the Right Hon. Dr. Denzil L. Douglas, one of the most accomplished statesmen in the modern Caribbean. A former four term Prime Minister and now Minister of Foreign Affairs, Economic Development, International Trade, Investment, and Commerce, he guides national engagement where domestic aspiration meets global possibility. His portfolio demands clarity, discipline, and forward-looking imagination. It is from this vantage that he reminds us, “Foreign policy must not simply describe our world. It must shape the world we wish to enter.”
The Caribbean operates in a world of shifting alliances, fragile norms, and competing ambitions. Powerful nations speak of rules while bending them and praise sovereignty while ignoring it when convenient. For small island states, this produces both vulnerability and opportunity for those who navigate with insight. Influence no longer depends on size but on resolve, relationships, and resonance. Caribbean diplomacy must move from reaction to deliberate direction, strengthening resilience, economic security, and regional standing.
Diplomacy reaches far beyond negotiating tables. It shapes the price of food, the strength of our borders, the health of our reefs, and the energy that powers our homes. Foreign policy becomes the bridge that determines whether opportunities land on our shores or drift elsewhere. To secure them, Caribbean ministries of foreign affairs must be at the center of national strategy, coordinating systems and sectors with focus and discipline rather than ceremonial visibility.
Looking outward, partnerships with nations such as Indonesia, Africa, India, Brazil, the Middle East, and other countries with shared needs and compelling interests provide practical paths to renewal. These regions read the sea, the land, and the global economy as teachers rather than boundaries. Shared efforts in marine stewardship, climate resilience, renewable energy, technology transfer, and skills training can lift livelihoods and expand national capacity. These are immediate frontiers where cooperation turns potential into progress. The decade ahead invites the Caribbean to embrace a future powered by clean energy, guided by science, enriched by sustainable oceans, and led by citizens equipped for a complex world. If we meet this moment with clarity and courage, our diplomacy becomes not a mirror of global change but the instrument through which transformation takes flight.
Editor’s Note: Dr. Isaac Newton is a strategist and scholar trained at Harvard, Princeton, and Columbia. He advises governments and international institutions on governance, transformation, and global justice, helping nations and organizations turn vision into sustainable progress.
Bolivia’s ex-President Luis Arce detained over corruption allegations
São Paulo, Brazil — Ex-President Luis Arce was detained by Bolivian police on Wednesday amid corruption allegations, according to a former member of his cabinet, María Nela Prada.
In a video shared on her Facebook account, the former Minister of the Presidency, who appeared crying in the seat of a car, characterized the arrest as a “kidnapping.”
“I want to announce to the Bolivian people and the international community that former President Luis Arce has just been kidnapped in Sopocachi, in the city of La Paz,” said María Nela Prada.
“At this moment, I am addressing the FELCC (Special Force for the Fight Against Crime), which is where we have learned, through unofficial means, that he has been taken,” she added.
State-owned channel Bolivia TV claimed Arce, who governed the country between 2020 and 2025, was being investigated for the handling of an Indigenous public fund while he served as Minister of Finance from 2006 to 2017, during the administration of former President Evo Morales.
According to Marco Antonio Oviedo, Bolivia’s current Interior Minister, the charges include facilitating illicit enrichment, issuing resolutions contrary to the Constitution and the laws, dereliction of duty, abuse of influence, and economic misconduct.
The damage of Arce’s alleged actions amounted to Bs 360 million (around USD$ 52 million), according to officials.
Born in La Paz in 1963, Arce studied Economics at Universidade Superior de San Andrés (UMSA) and earned a Master’s in the same field at the University of Warwick in the U.K.
He served for decades under Morales, a former union organizer and coca grower, and in 2019, after Morales was forced to resign amid allegations of electoral fraud, he followed the left-wing leader into a brief exile.
A year later, amid increasing frustration over the interim President Jeanine Áñez’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, Arce returned to Bolivia and won the presidency.
He lost a bid for reelection this year to center-right Rodrigo Paz amid increasing concerns over the deteriorating security situation in the country.
Featured image credit:
Image: Former Bolivian president Luis Parce
Source: Asamblea Legislativa Plurinacional
The post Bolivia’s ex-President Luis Arce detained over corruption allegations appeared first on Latin America Reports.
Petro suggests Maduro moves on to "transitional government"
Colombian President Gustavo Petro has intensified diplomatic pressure on his Venezuelan counterpart, Nicolás Maduro, calling for a "general amnesty" and the formation of a "transitional government with the inclusion of all" to resolve Venezuela’s protracted political crisis.
Former Bolivian President Arce arrested in corruption probe
Former Bolivian President Luis Arce Catacora was arrested in La Paz on Wednesday afternoon in connection with a major corruption case involving the now-defunct Indigenous Peoples Development Fund (Fondioc).
Honduran crisis deepens as elections remain undecided
Honduran President Xiomara Castro has escalated the political crisis surrounding the undecided November 30 presidential election, condemning what she termed "interference" by US President Donald Trump and claiming an "electoral coup" was underway.
Dutch Government issues another urgent Travel Warning for Venezuela
THE HAGUE – The Netherlands has issued an urgent warning advising against all travel to Venezuela due to a rapidly deteriorating security situation and rising geopolitical tensions. The Dutch government is also strongly urging Curaçao to avoid Venezuela and Venezuelan waters, citing increased security risks in the Caribbean Sea, including areas close to the island. […]
The post Dutch Government issues another urgent Travel Warning for Venezuela appeared first on New Jetpack Site.
The Multiple Dimensions of the US-Brazil Relations Crisis
By Lívia Peres Milani
Public Policy and International Relations Institute (IPPRI-Unesp)
National Institute of Science and Technology for the Studies of the United States (INCT-INEU)
President Donald Trump meets with Brazilian President Luís Inácio Lula da Silva during the ASEAN Summit at the Kuala Lumpur Convention Center. (Source: Wikimedia Commons)
On November 11th, the US announced a withdraw of the additional 40% tariffs it had imposed on many goods of Brazilian origin, including coffee, fruit, and beef. The tariffs, initially imposed on July 30th, are one among multiple dimensions of the current bilateral crisis. Besides commerce, the crisis also has a political dimension, initiated by the recent US decision to invoke the Magnitsky Act – an instrument ostensibly used to sanction corruption and human rights violations – against Alexandre de Moraes, one of the Brazilian Justices responsible for the conviction of ex-president Jair Bolsonaro over his attempted coup d’état. While the recent White House decision does not necessarily represent an end of the crisis, it represents a pause of sorts, and so, a timely moment to assess the relationship.
The imposition of tariffs
The White House’s initial imposition of tariffs may at first glance make little sense, since it appears to disregard its economic interests. The US enjoys a trade surplus with Brazil, and there is not sufficient production in the US of many of the tariffed products to meet national demand. That is the case for coffee, fruit, and a variety of industrial supplies. However, to understand the source of the crisis, it is necessary to consider its non-commercial dimensions. These include i) the transnational articulation of far-right movements, ii) Big Tech’s economic interests, and iii) US geostrategic considerations.
Brazilian and US far-right currents are deeply connected. Eduardo Bolsonaro, son of the former president, has worked to promote the Brazilian radical right abroad. During his father’s trial, he took a leave from Congress to launch a pressure campaign in the US against the Brazilian Supreme Court (STF) and the Lula government. With cooperation from sympathetic US leaders, he lobbied against the Lula administration, claiming that the trial was a “witch hunt,” his father was the victim of political persecution, and asking that the US government impose penalties on the Brazilian authorities responsible. This effort complicated Brazil’s relation with Foggy Bottom and the White House. Much of the language used by the White House to justify the new round of tariffs reflected this lobbying effort.
Another factor that explains US policy toward Brazil are the interests of Big Tech companies. Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court took up a case relating to the responsibilities of social media platforms for user-posted content, ruling that social media platforms should be civilly liable if they failed to remove undemocratic, discriminatory, or crime-inciting content. In response, the US Computer and Communication Industry Association (CCIA) welcomed the imposition of sanctions against Moraes. They argued that the ruling in Brazil violated “free expression,” a strategy often used by Big Tech actors, in conjunction with far-right political leaders, to oppose the regulation of social media in Brazil and elsewhere.
Finally, larger geostrategic considerations are also in play. The current US administration seeks to reassert US regional and global hegemony. Brazil, for its part, wants to promote its Global South leadership, framed as part of a “multipolar world order.” Promoting the BRICS forum is an important component of Brazil’s approach. The new tariffs were announced a few days after the BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro, with the US president also threatening to impose tariffs on other countries that associate themselves with the BRICS+ group. This timing illustrates US opposition to the BRICS and pressure on Brazil to align with Western countries instead of its Global South partners.
Tariffs backfire and the future of US-Brazil relations
However, the Trump administration’s aggressive strategy against Brazil has not led to the expected results. Brazil’s government managed to control the domestic narrative, framing US tariffs as an attack on Brazilian sovereignty, a strategy supported by public opinion, as polls show. The US approach also became an incentive for Brazil to shore up its relations with Global South leaders. Following the tariffs, Lula reached out to the presidents of China and India to discuss the expansion of trade relations. The tariffs also proved unpopular in the US, and harmful for the White House, since they drove up the cost of coffee and other products.
These several factors explain Trump’s subsequent decision to change direction. He opened a dialogue with Brazil, first announced at the UN General Assembly, and then confirmed his goodwill in a bilateral meeting in Malaysia. High-level negotiations, and the unpopular inflationary trend in the US, led to the recent removal of tariffs from many Brazilian products. It also signals an end to this most recent period of bilateral crisis.
Nevertheless, there might still be consequences over the middle and long term. US sanctions communicate to the Brazilian government that, while a global power, the US is not a trustworthy partner, even when it comes to such non-strategic, everyday issues as the export of coffee and fruit. At the same time recent events have helped to cement the transnational partnerships of far-right leaders while also serving to illustrate how these relationships are impacting US government decision-making.
On the other hand, the recent US decision to alleviate the tariffs is a signal for both partners that the US-Brazil bilateral relationship is an important one. Even if this relationship is imbalanced, given the US’s economy and global influence, the recent tariff episode illustrates that the US cannot simply dictate policy to Brazil, and that the two countries’ economic interdependence can function as a structural constraint upon the political will of far-right political actors.
Latino Sense of Belonging Decreases amid Racial Profiling, Detention, and a Fading American Dream
By Anjini K. Patel
A recent Telemundo survey reveals increasing pessimism from Latinos in the United States regarding their sense of belonging. Telemundo, in collaboration with Axios and Ipsos, surveyed a nationally representative sample of over 1,100 U.S. Latino adults from October 21 to 27, 2025. Conducted in both English and Spanish, the survey asked a variety of questions about their views on the American Dream, their sense of belonging in the US, and their optimism about the future of the country. Only 44% of respondents described the American Dream as achievable in 2025, a decrease from 61% in 2023. Similarly, 40% of 2025 respondents affirmed that the US makes them feel like they belong, and only 36% felt optimistic about the future of the US. This compares to 57% and 52%, respectively, in 2022. This survey provides an insight into the feelings of Latinos as they navigate the uncertainty of the current American political landscape.
The survey also asked respondents about their anxieties related to being Latino/Hispanic in the United States. Compared with 39% in June 2022, 53% of respondents in 2025 reported feeling worried about themselves or a loved one being attacked because of their ethnicity. Two out of three (2/3) Latinos who identify as Republicans say it is a good time to be a Latino in the United States, while only one in ten (1/10) Latino Democrats agree. Seventy-one percent (71%) of those aged between 18 and 29 and 57% of those who are 50 and older, said it is a bad time to be Latino.
Most respondents indicate that the Democratic Party, as compared to the Republican Party, better represents Latinos, cares more about them, and is better on economic and immigration policy. Additionally, most respondents agreed that the Republican Party takes Latino Americans for granted (39%) as compared to the Democratic Party (22%). Interestingly, more respondents describe the Republican Party as a good option for public safety compared to the Democratic Party, even in the face of increased fear and anxiety over being attacked for being Latino.
What do experts say?
Dr. Ernesto Castañeda, Director of the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies at American University, discussed this survey on Telemundo. As he states, the data from this poll are unsurprising given the very strong anti-immigrant rhetoric that Donald Trump and the Republican Party campaigned with and continue to use. Rather than focusing on people with violent criminal records, ICE raids and subsequent deportation, often without due process, have detained and deported people with all types of immigration statuses, and thus increased fear among Latinos. Castañeda points to comments by Justice Cavanagh and decisions by the conservative majority in the Supreme Court that made detaining someone based on their appearance and manner of speaking permissible, further blurring the lines between individuals with papers and those who are undocumented. In light of these violent mass deportations and detentions happening in public places, following stereotypes and racial profiling, it is no wonder that many Latinos report a decreased feeling of belonging in the United States.
Regarding the impacts of these recent events, Dr. Castañeda explains that the feasibility of immigrants achieving the American Dream is decreasing. While people still arrive in the United States with high hopes that “they can come and work hard, send remittances, enjoy a better life, and that their children can go to university, in the United States right now, we see high underemployment rates, and many people are afraid to go to work because of mass raids. We are seeing inflation. It is harder to pay for health insurance, housing, and to save.” In this way, the American Dream is stalled. Since the end of the pandemic, the U.S. had seen a rapid and strong economic recovery, which Dr. Castañeda attributes largely “to the people arriving, especially from Latin America, seeking asylum—Venezuelans, Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and others—which increased the US population by 1%, which was very significant.” With the border closing under the current administration and deportations by the dozens of thousands, businesses are unable to grow at the same rate. Dr. Castañeda underlines: “If there’s less migration, it doesn’t mean there will be more jobs for locals. It means there will be less work for everyone, and more people will lose their jobs because the demand for goods and services decreases, businesses cannot hire and grow, and therefore they stop hiring and start firing workers.”
Additionally, research shows that immigrants are much more likely to start businesses and hire more workers than businesses started by native-born citizens. Therefore, the lack of immigration has a negative impact on the overall economic growth of the United States. As Dr. Castañeda describes, “the fact that Latinos aren’t going to work here means there are fewer nannies. There are fewer construction workers, fewer lawyers, fewer nurses… it also makes many Latinos afraid. They don’t go to the markets, they don’t go to the malls, they are spending less, which has an impact, and many immigrants, seeing that there’s no American Dream anymore, aren’t going to bring their families or many of them are thinking about returning to their country.”
The decreased sense of belonging by the Latino/Hispanic community has affected numerous outlets that embrace these cultures. Some events honoring Hispanic Heritage Month were canceled. This hurt artists, folk dancers, and musicians, as well as the larger public, who did not have the opportunity to engage with these rich cultural traditions. “Latin restaurants are struggling,” Dr. Castañeda says. “Hundreds are closing because they can’t hire enough people; workers are afraid to go to work because food is so expensive. So, it’s no longer a profitable business for them. The decline of the Latino food business also means fewer dining options, fewer cultural spaces, and fewer opportunities for communities to enjoy Latino cuisine. This is a loss for the United States as a whole.”
Hope and Resilience in the Face of Uncertainty
How should the Latino community respond to the ever-changing political landscape in the United States? Dr. Castañeda urges people to “stay calm and continue with their daily lives. We often do this for our children and grandchildren, who, I truly believe, will have a good future. This storm is temporary. This will pass.” Importantly, he points out that nearly 80% of Americans view immigration positively. Mass raids are not popular, and vulnerable communities are witnessing peaceful protests carried out by citizens who are physically placing their bodies between immigration agents and migrants who are in the process of being detained. The November 2025 elections indicate that a majority of Americans reject the current administration’s extreme policies on immigration and the mismanagement of the economy. The anti-immigrant sentiment is driven primarily by the federal government under Donald Trump, not the American people. With a hopeful outlook, Dr. Castañeda says, “I think that once this nightmare is over, there will be a greater sense of belonging, so we have to have patience, have faith in your fellow citizens, and I do truly believe that this will pass and the future will be better for U.S.-born Latinos and those immigrants who are able to stay. There will be concrete actions that will tell Latinos that they belong because this is their home.”
Anjini K. Patel is a Sociology Research & Practice MA candidate at American University (AU) and works as a graduate research assistant at the AU Inequality, Social Justice, & Health Lab. Her research interests include immigration, criminal legal system & housing justice, and artivism & community building.
Luxury Mexico City Travel: The Capital’s Finer Side
High-end, luxury travel to Mexico City is made possible with a slew of private and VIP experiences.
The post Luxury Mexico City Travel: The Capital’s Finer Side appeared first on Luxury Latin America Blog.
"The Tree Within: The Mexican Nobel Laureate writer Octavio Paz’s Years in India" - Book by Indranil Chakravarty
The Mexican writer Octavio Paz was the most prominent Latin American to understand, analyze, interpret and promote India intellectually and culturally from a Latin American perspective in the twentieth century. He had first hand experience of India as a diplomat posted in New Delhi for seven years. He has written numerous poems and articles on India. His book "Vislumbres de la India" (In the light of India) is regarded as one of the best introductions to India among Latin American thinkers. Some cultural visitors from the Spanish-speaking world travel around the country with Paz’s book as an ‘intimate guide’. They see India through his eyes, trying to grasp the immense complexity of India.
The Trump Administration Denies That the Bombing of 21 Boats in the Caribbean Amounted to Murder. But Facts are Facts
The Washington Post has reported that Secretary of War Pete Hegseth gave the order to not only blow up a boat in the Caribbean back on September 2, but to kill all the men in them. Hegseth at first refrained from publicly denying the statement, though the Trump administration did. The New York Times is reporting that the boat on September 2 was struck at least twice. Military norms prohibit a second strike on a vessel that has been neutralized or shipwrecked and no longer represents a military threat. That’s because once the military objective is achieved, a second strike means certain death for survivors. Given the gravity of the accusation, it is incumbent on the Secretary of War to provide details of the transcripts of the orders that were given and other specifics. Instead, Hegseth jokes about the incident.
Actually, that the Department of War was out to kill the alleged drug traffickers on September 2 should not be a matter of debate. Not if you consider Trump’s famous statement on October 23: “I think we’re just going to kill people that are bringing drugs into our country. Okay? We’re going to kill them, you know, they’re going to be like, dead.”
There is a consensus among experts on international law (excluding those in the Trump administration) that the bombings of the now 22 vessels in the Caribbean amount to extra-judicial killing without any legal justification. It's not surprising that Hegseth did not go through legal channels. That’s because there is no such thing as "judicial killing.” No judge gives the order to kill someone and that's basically what the second strike amounted to. Even if it were proven (which it hasn't been) that the boats were carrying drugs, no judge would order killing the men on them. Indeed, “judicial killing” is an oxymoron.
Here is the statement in the New York Times article of November 29 titled “Trump Declares Venezuelan Airspace Closed:”
“On Thursday, The Washington Post reported that for the first strike, on Sept. 2, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth gave a verbal order to kill everyone on the boat. And CNN reported that after the military detected survivors, a second attack was carried out to kill them."
"In September, The New York Times reported there were multiple strikes during the first operation. The Times also reported that the boat that was struck had altered its course and appeared to have turned around before the attack started because the people onboard had apparently spotted a military aircraft stalking it.”
Democratic Party leaders beginning with Senate leader Chuck Schumer criticize the bombing of the boats on grounds that it represents an act of war and that the decision to go to war corresponds to Congress not the Executive. But Schumer’s statement falls far short of what needs to be said. The real issue is not legal but rather humanitarian. The Democrats need to center their critique on ethical and humanitarian grounds, not only legal ones.
“We Knew We Were Going with God”
Religion, Hope, and Perseverance
By Tabby Ford
Migration is often a difficult process for those who leave their home country, both physically and emotionally. Whether their migration was motivated by finances, safety, or better career and educational opportunities elsewhere, leaving is not easy. The dangerous conditions of the journey and the uncertainty of what lies ahead deter many and can be overwhelming for those who proceed. For some migrants, religious belief gives them courage and strength to push forward, despite the stressful and hazardous obstacles they may encounter.
Many migrants and asylum seekers attribute their safety and the safety of others in their group to prayer and “God’s blessing” despite the dangerous conditions they faced on their journey to the United States. Especially for those who emigrate from Central and South America, the journey may require travel through multiple countries, often on foot or by car, and obstacles such as rough terrain, gangs, and hostile immigration agents. In some cases, migrants’ faith protects them from the emotional toll of potential danger. As one migrant from Venezuela states, when asked if he felt like he was in danger during his journey north, “No, we weren’t afraid. I mean, we knew we were going with God.” His faith kept him going during the long journey.
Migrants who encountered dangerous obstacles also attribute their successful journey to God. For Arturo, from Venezuela, the journey was incredibly dangerous. He crossed a 60-mile stretch of dense rainforest, known as the Darién Gap, with strangers, enduring hunger and exhaustion. Armed groups are known to extort migrants at gunpoint in this remote area, and those unable to pay sometimes never return. “We saw other people being kidnapped… thank God they didn’t catch us,” he recounted, describing the terror of running through the forest with a child in his arms and the relief of making it through. Eduardo, from El Salvador, recounts being shot at by immigration authorities at one point in his journey and how many members of his group survived due to their prayers; “Thank God, praying to God and the Virgin Mary, we hid [from] them … God already performed the miracle.” For one Honduran immigrant, Alma, her migration journey was shaped largely by religion. While she was born in Honduras, she was brought to El Salvador as a teen to attend a high school run by Catholic missionaries. Her religion, education, and physical location have long been intertwined. Although she has needed to move a lot and now must adjust to living in yet another new country, she says, “things happen for a reason. I always say, sometimes you feel lost, but God is showing you something… You gotta, you know, go forward.” She attributes her prayers and God’s plan to where she is in life, especially her education and career. For many immigrants, even though their faith and belief in God did not shield them from life-threatening conditions and the challenges of immigrating, their faith fueled their courage, guiding them along the way.
Houses of worship often play an integral part in assisting migrants, especially in the first few months after arrival, by providing a space for community building and cultural events. They also become sources of mutual aid. For instance, this can be seen in local Mosques and Ukrainian churches, where Afghan and Ukrainian refugees, respectively, utilize resources. For example, Oleg, from Ukraine, reports a lack of restaurants that serve Ukrainian food in the region he settled in. Despite this lack of places to go out and eat Ukrainian food, he says that “usually, [he] can get something from the church.” Although he is able to make Ukrainian food at home, the local Ukrainian church is Oleg’s only option for connecting with the wider Ukrainian community over a meal. Another example is Latif, a refugee from Afghanistan, who also utilized resources from local churches and mosques. In his efforts to further his education in the United States, he learned that a local mosque “had some funds to help some refugees get an education.” He used these funds to enroll in an IT certificate program, which helped him find a job that aligned with his career goals.
In addition to getting material resources from local religious groups and congregations, many migrants also rely on faith in God’s plan to get through the difficult transition and settling process. Once in the United States, religious migrants use their belief system as motivation to create a new life in their new community. They are able to leverage their belief systems for community engagement and to establish a sense of belonging. Many migrants also report celebrating religious holidays in local congregations and communities with similar cultural backgrounds or with other immigrants from their home country. Faith helps to form the lens in which people see the world through. As one Mexican woman states, “I practice my faith, […] I’m Catholic, so I ground myself a lot in just the human dignity coming from something beyond me.” Arturo, an immigrant from Venezuela embodies this mindset well, as his faith has helped him in adjusting to his new life and feeling a sense of belonging. As he states, “We are all equal as the children of God, we are all equal.” His belief system has given him an optimistic attitude about his new home and how he has been received.
Although it is taking him time to learn English, Arturo also thanks God for his ability to pick up enough English to get by in his work as a delivery driver and for his work permit allowing him to make money to send home: “Right now at this moment thank God at least I have the work permit, I have my partner and I am about to find a way to get my papers together.” He implies that process of finalizing his immigration papers will involve lots of time, money, and effort, but is hopeful and thankful to God for where he is and that he at least has a work permit. Similarly, Silvia, who immigrated from El Salvador in her 20s, implies that God’s work helped her in finding a job when she first arrived in the United States, saying “It was almost not difficult for me, thank God, because a lady gave me a job who had a business selling pupusas.” Arturo and Silvia both thank God for where they are in life now and have trust in their religious beliefs to carry them where they need to be.
For many people who undertake the process of immigration to the United States, their faith and religious beliefs are as essential to their journey and adaptation as it is to every other aspect of their life. Religion plays an important role in maintaining hope and resilience throughout the danger and uncertainty of both the journey and the destination. Once arrived, religious communities, positive outlooks, and faith in a bright future help immigrants settle and feel like they belong in their new home country.
Tabby Ford is a Research Assistant at The Immigration Lab and a Sociology Research & Practice MA Candidate at American University
Edited by Quinn Pierson, Sociology Research and Practice MA Candidate at American University, Ernesto Castañeda, Director, and Chris Belden, Research Assistant at the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies and the Immigration Lab.
The Peru Michelin Key Hotels (With Our Longer Reviews)
In October of 2025, the Michelin tire company’s travel division announced which hotels in South America would be awarded a “Michelin Key” in their very first round of handing them out. Apparently our Luxury Latin America reviewers could have saved them some time with which places to consider, especially in Peru. All of the...
The post The Peru Michelin Key Hotels (With Our Longer Reviews) appeared first on Luxury Latin America Blog.
USA authorizes Plunder Sale of Venezuela’s CITGO to broker Vulture Fund Elliott
Caracas, December 2, 2025 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Delaware District Judge Leonard P. Stark has approved the sale of Venezuela’s US-based refiner CITGO to Amber Energy, an affiliate of Paul Elliott Singer’s Vulture Management Fund @ a discount price of US $5.9 billion. Stark issued a sale order Friday to close a protracted process that saw multinational […]
The post USA authorizes Plunder Sale of Venezuela’s CITGO to broker Vulture Fund Elliott appeared first on New Jetpack Site.
Caracas blocks Airspace for Iberia, TAP and Avianca airlines
The US military tensions have triggered a crisis in Venezuela’s air connectivity. On Wednesday, the Venezuelan government revoked flight concessions for Iberia, TAP, Turkish Airlines, Avianca, Latam Colombia and Gol, accusing them of joining the actions of terrorism promoted by the USA. Maiquetia International Airport in Caracas operated on Thursday with only seven scheduled departures […]
The post Caracas blocks Airspace for Iberia, TAP and Avianca airlines appeared first on New Jetpack Site.
THE REAL LESSONS OF YESTERDAY'S SHOOTING IN WASHINGTON DC
President Trump, true to form, misses the real lesson from the tragic shooting of two national guardsmen in Washington. Trump announced that in light of what happened he will call on the Department of Defense (that’s still its official name) to call up 500 more National Guardsmen to Washington. The refugee program is also being revamped in order to avoid incidents like this from happening in the future. Just hours after the incident, the Trump administration announced it had stopped processing immigration applications from Afghanistan. The shooter, Rahmanulla Lakanwal, is an Afghan who was trained by the CIA to fight the Taliban in one of their strongholds. Apparently, Lakanwal acted in reaction to the gutting of much of the refugee program.
Trump’s moves miss the real lesson. Throughout the twenty-first century the United States has been in permanent wars throughout the world. The U.S. public doesn’t even know about many of them. We bomb countries in Africa on a regular basis. We’re in a permanent war situation in the Middle East. We’re bombing boats -- in the process blasting fishermen to pieces on both sides of Latin America and the victims are people not only from Venezuela, but also Trinidad, Colombia, Mexico and Ecuador. In doing so we are creating Frankenstein’s both at home and abroad. Lakanwal is one of them. All studies indicate that most acts of terrorism in the U.S. are committed by people and groups on the Right and a very large number of the perpetrators served in the military and are war veterans. George Lincoln Rockwell, the founder of the American Nazi Party, is just one example of a phenomenon in which the chickens come home to roost. Another is Timothy McVeigh, the author of the Oklahoma City bombing that killed 167 people in 1995 who was a veteran of the Persian Gulf War.
This is the discussion we should be having, not one about retribution which is the one being raised by Trump and his MAGA followers. Unfortunately, we cannot count on the mainstream media, which is increasingly being taken over by the political Right and is becoming increasingly concentrated, to raise these issues.
Boat Rides to Patagonia Glaciers and Penguins in Chile
If you come to the bottom of Chile, you’ll probably take a boat ride or two at some point, getting up close to geographic features you don’t see back home, like Patagonia glaciers that date back to the last Ice Age and if you’re lucky, a few pengins too. For my travels as the...
The post Boat Rides to Patagonia Glaciers and Penguins in Chile appeared first on Luxury Latin America Blog.
The Battle for Venezuela @ Warp Speed
With US warships stationed off Venezuela’s coast and a new regional right-wing bloc forming under Washington’s tutelage, the Western hemisphere is entering a volatile phase. Yet today’s confrontation unfolds in a world very different from the one that allowed the US to dictate regional politics with little resistance in the past. China’s rise, the return […]
The post The Battle for Venezuela @ Warp Speed appeared first on New Jetpack Site.
Trump’s Provocations are a Boost for the Latin American Left
When Trump assumed the presidency in 2025, the Pink Tide governments in Latin America were losing ground. The approval rating of Brazil’s president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva reached the lowest of his three presidential terms while that of Colombia’s Gustavo Petro was a mere 34 percent. Furthermore, in the wake of the highly contested results of the July 2024 presidential elections in Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro found himself isolated in the region.
Now, less than a year later, the political landscape has shifted. Trump’s antics such as renaming the Gulf of Mexico, his weaponization of tariffs, and military actions in the Caribbean and Pacific have revitalized Pink Tide governments and the Left in general. Latin America has reacted to Trump’s invocation of the Monroe Doctrine with a surge of nationalist sentiment, mass demonstrations, and denunciations from political figures across most of the spectrum—including some on the center-right.
While the United States appears as an unreliable and declining hegemon, China positions itself as a champion of national sovereignty and a voice of reason in matters of international trade and investment. When Trump slapped a 50% tariff on most Brazilian imports in July, the Chinese stepped in to help fill the gap for the nation’s all-important soybean exports.
Lula versus Trump
Different scenarios are playing out in different nations, but with similar results: the strengthening of the Left and in some instances the weakening of the Right. One case is Brazil and Mexico, where Lula and President Claudia Sheinbaum have combined firmness with discretion, in contrast to Petro’s confrontational rhetoric.
In July, Lula responded defiantly to Trump’s attempt to strong-arm Brazil through punitive tariffs designed to secure the release of his ally and former president Jair Bolsonaro, jailed for involvement in coup and assassination plots. Unlike other heads of state, Lula refused to reach out to Trump, saying “I’m not going to humiliate myself.” Instead, Lula declared “Brazil would not be tutored by anyone,” at the same time that he recalled the 1964 Brazilian coup as a previous instance of U.S. intervention.
The face-off sparked mass pro-government demonstrations throughout the country which far outnumbered those called by the Right demanding the freeing of Bolsonaro. Lula’s supporters blamed the Right for the tariffs, and particularly Bolsonaro’s son Eduardo who campaigned for them after moving to Washington. Lula called Bolsonaro a "traitor" and said he should face another trial for being responsible for the so-called “Bolsonaro’s tax.” As a sign that Trump’s tariffs were a game changer and a boost for the Left, the 80-year old Lula announced he would run for reelection in October 2026, as his popularity reached the 50 percent mark.
Some analysts faulted Lula for having failed to use his 30-minute videoconference with Trump on October 6 to condemn Washington’s gunboat diplomacy in the Caribbean. According to this interpretation of the call, Lula displayed naivete and gutlessness by combining “concern and accommodation with US imperialism” and believing that “negotiations will be guided by a ‘win-win logic.’”
In fact, Lula has spoken out against the U.S. military presence as a “factor of tension” in the Caribbean, which he calls a “zone of peace.” Lula, though, undoubtedly could have gone further, as urged by the Landless Workers’ Movement (MST) – which backed Lula’s last presidential bid – by explicitly declaring solidarity with Venezuela.
But Lula can hardly be accused of being submissive in his dealings with Trump. Venezuela’s former Vice Minister for North America Carlos Ron told me that both Lula and Sheinbaum have shown that they “know how to handle Trump” as they have “gotten much of what they wanted.” Indeed, at the same time that Trump retreated from his tariff threats toward both nations, he took to praising the two heads of state.
A United Front in the Making
In Brazil and elsewhere in the region, a new alignment is emerging, drawing in forces both to the right and the left of the government in reaction to Washington’s posture. One notable example was Lula’s appointment of homeless workers movement activist and former presidential candidate Guilherme Boulos as Minister of the Presidency in October. Boulos belongs to the Socialism and Liberty Party, a leftist split-off from Lula’s Workers’ Party that endorsed Lula’s 2022 presidential candidacy but had ruled out holding positions in his government.
Boulos, who was instrumental in organizing the recent protests against Washington’s tariff hikes, spoke of the significance of his designation: "Lula gave me the mission to help put the government on the street… and listening to popular demands." His appointment signals a leftist turn in which, in the words of the Miami-based CE Noticias Financiera, “Lula showed that he is going into the 2026 election ready for war. A war in his own style, using the social movements.”
Venezuela is another example of political actors across much of the political spectrum converging on the need for a broad front to oppose U.S. aggression in the region. No other Pink Tide government has faced such a rapid succession of regime change and destabilization attempts as Venezuela under the Chavista (followers of Hugo Chávez) government of Maduro. The government’s response to these challenges has at times deviated from democratic norms and includes concessions to business interests, drawing harsh criticism from both moderate and more radical sectors of the Left.
One leader in the latter category is Elías Jaua, formerly a member of Chávez’s inner circle, whose leftist positions on economic policy and internal party democracy left him marginalized within the Chavista movement. In the face of the U.S. military threat in the Caribbean, Jaua has closed ranks with Maduro and decried the “psychological war” being waged against the President. He went on to say that in this critical moment it is necessary “to place the tranquility of the people above any ideological, political, or ulterior interest,” adding “the Homeland comes first.”
Other long-standing political figures who have supported Maduro’s call for a national dialogue to face the U.S. threat – while not letting Maduro off the hook for alleged undemocratic practices – include some on the center and even center-right of the political spectrum, including former presidential candidates Henrique Capriles, Manuel Rosales and Antonio Ecarri.
Others are moderate leftists who held important posts under Chávez and/or belonged to the moderate left party Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) in the 1990s. One of the latter is Enrique Ochoa Antich who presented a petition signed by 27 leading anti-Maduro moderates that stated “it is disheartening to see an extremist sector of the opposition” supporting sanctions and other U.S. actions. Ochoa Antich proposed a dialogue with government representatives “over the best way to foment national unity and defend sovereignty,” while adding “being realistic, I’m not going to ask that the party-state, which is the core of the Chavista project, be abolished.”
This stance, which views Maduro as a partner in resisting U.S. intervention, stands in sharp contrast to that of the Communist Party (PCV), which broke with his government in 2020 over its business-friendly orientation and its sidelining of sectors of the Left. In the same breath that it denounces imperialist aggression, the PCV points to the “authoritarian and anti-democratic nature of Maduro’s government.” While the PCV’s criticisms are worthy of debate, the party’s uncompromising hostility toward Maduro undermines efforts to face U.S. aggression. Indeed, the PCV’s position – supporting the Cuban government while denouncing Venezuela’s as undemocratic – appears inconsistent.
In Argentina, Trump came to the aid of the Right in what will most likely be a Pyrrhic victory. On the eve of the October 2025 legislative elections, Trump offered to bail out the Argentine economy to the tune of $40 billion but only under the condition that the party of right-wing president Javier Milei emerge victorious, which is precisely what happened. Trump’s blackmail was denounced as such by politicians from Peronist leaders linked to former Pink Tide governments to centrists who had been among their most vocal critics. Facundo Manes, leader of the centrist Radical Civic Union, was an example of the latter, declaring “the extorsion advances.” Meanwhile on the streets of Buenos Aires, protest banners denouncing Milei were marked by anti-U.S. slogans “Yankee go home” and “Milei is Trump’s mule,” as well as the burning of a U.S. flag.
This convergence around the need to confront Trump’s threats and actions creates an opportunity for progressives across the continent to unite. The call for such unity was taken up by the São Paulo Forum, a body that brings together over 100 Latin American leftist organizations that Lula helped found in 1990. At the outset of Trump’s first administration in 2017, the Forum drafted the document “Consensus for Our America” as a response to the neoliberal Washington Consensus and the escalation of U.S. interventionism in the hemisphere.
At the same time that it defended the pluralism of progressive movements and avoided the term “socialism,” the Consensus document foresaw the drafting of a more concrete set of reforms and goals. The expected step forward, however, never materialized. More recently, the Cuban ideologue Roberto Regalado lamented that, despite the urgent need for unity, “far from consolidating and expanding, the ‘Consensus for Our America’ has languished.”
Trump and the Latin American Right
Much of the Latin American right has tied its fortunes to President Trump. The right-wing presidents of Argentina, Ecuador and Paraguay are Trump followers, as are Bolsonaro, the Chilean presidential candidate José Antonio Kast and former president Álvaro Uribe in Colombia. In Venezuela, right-wing opposition leader María Corina Machado dedicated her Nobel Peace Prize to Trump.
Machado’s fellow Venezuelan rightist Leopoldo López co-founded the National Liberty Congress in 2022 dedicated to regime change in nations that happen to be considered adversaries by Washington. The idea is in line with the idea of an International of the Right promoted by Trump strategist Steve Bannon, among others. Bannon founded The Movement in 2016 to unite the European Right, but it has been largely snubbed by much of the continent’s right-wing.
The “internationalism” on the right is even less likely to flourish in Latin America. While in the U.S., Trump plays on patriotism – or a bogus form of it – in the case of Latin America, nationalist sentiment and support for Trump are oxymorons, specifically when it comes to tariffs, threats of military invasion and the brandishing of the Monroe Doctrine. In Venezuela, for instance, Machado’s popularity has declined and her opposition movement fractured as a result of popular repudiation of Trump’s policies.
In the U.S., Trump plays to his fanatic supporters while his popularity steadily declines. In Latin America the same is occurring, with the difference being that his popularity couldn’t be much lower than it is. Pew Research Center reports that just 8 percent of Mexicans have “confidence” in Trump.
Trump has contributed to a major shift in the Latin America’s political landscape now marked by political polarization and leftist inroads. In many countries, the Left—which for decades remained on the sidelines—has become a major point of reference, rallying around the banners of national sovereignty, if not, anti-imperialism.
In Chile, a Communist, Jeannette Jara, received a surprising 60.5 percent of the vote in the primaries to represent the main anti-rightist bloc in the upcoming presidential elections. In spite of the cautious tone of her discourse, Jara addressed Trump, saying “No U.S. soldiers will enter. Chile is to be respected, and so is its sovereignty.” In Ecuador, despite harsh repression, the followers of ex-Pink Tide president Rafael Correa have come close to winning the last three presidential elections. And in Colombia, Petro has reinvigorated his movement’s base through his forceful denunciations of U.S. military operations and by leading a drive, begun in October, to secure two million signatures for a national constituent assembly.
Polarization often refers to a scenario in which the extremes on both sides of the political spectrum gain ascendancy. That is not what is happening in Latin America – at least on the left. Instead, there is a convergence of progressives of different political stripes both domestically and among Pink Tide governments in their opposition to Trump and all that he represents. The challenge now is to translate this convergence into organized forms of unity – through united fronts at the national level as well as in the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) and other regional bodies.
This article was originally posted by Jacobin.
Steve Ellner is an associate managing editor of Latin American Perspectives and a retired professor at the Universidad de Oriente in Venezuela, where he lived for over forty years. He is the author of Rethinking Venezuelan Politics: Class, Conflict and the Chávez Phenomenon.
https://jacobin.com/2025/11/trump-latin-america-left-opposition
Another Trump Turnaround –on Venezuela -- but this Time not Bad!
Trump just announced, “We may be having some discussions with Maduro, and we’ll see how that turns out.” Just about two weeks ago, Trump deauthorized Richard Grenell, who was his special envoy who said that no military incursion was being planned and that talks with Maduro were continuing. Now Trump says he’d like to continue talks with Maduro, even though Maduro all along has publicly indicated that he is open to talks and negotiations.
I’m hesitant to criticize Trump for being so capricious since I very much hope that this represents a new line and a new approach which would result in the withdrawal of U.S. the naval presence just 100 miles from the Venezuelan coast and the presence of the USS Gerald R Ford aircraft carrier within striking distance of Venezuela. It may be that Trump’s strategy all along was to attempt to intimidate Maduro and the Venezuelan armed forces and since that didn’t work, Trump is going into a new gear, that is he’s downshifting. Hope that’s the case. If it is, it demonstrates how effective Maduro has been in facing a dismaying challenge by mobilizing Venezuela militarily and politically and calling on people throughout the region to support the defense of Venezuela's national sovereignty. Regardless of what people think of Maduro, the effectiveness of this response and his leadership capacity in this context have to be recognized.
Villa Rentals in Latin America’s Elite Communities
If you want to see what it would be like to live in a foreign country, in a development where you have access to golf, tennis, and restaurants, there are villa rentals waiting for you where all you have to do is book it and show up with a suitcase. In the elite communities...
The post Villa Rentals in Latin America’s Elite Communities appeared first on Luxury Latin America Blog.
Can Peru’s Democracy Recover?
By Cynthia McClintock*
Photographs from the early hours of the Generation Z protest in Peru, 2025
(Source: Wikimedia Commons)
Since 2021, democratic backsliding has been severe in Peru, and Peruvians are furious. Peru’s Congress is loathed. In 2025, the approval rating for Peru’s President, Dina Boluarte, fell below 3 percent and she became the most unpopular president on the planet. Finally, in October, Boluarte was impeached on the grounds of “permanent moral incapacity”; it was the fifth time since 2018 that a president had been impeached or had resigned upon imminent impeachment. Per Peru’s constitution, Boluarte was succeeded by the Congress Speaker, José Jerí. Presidential and Congressional elections are scheduled for early 2026.
Why are Peruvians so angry? What does their anger mean for the 2026 elections (with the Congressional elections and the first round of the presidential elections scheduled for April 12 and a likely runoff on June 7)? Is it possible that the elections can lead to a democratic recovery?
Why are Peruvians So Angry?
The key reason is not “the economy stupid,” but an escalation of organized crime and the perception that Peru’s political leaders are part of the problem rather than part of the solution.
Between 2019 and 2024 the number of homicides doubled and the number of reported extortions jumped sixfold. Extortion is hurting huge swathes of lower-middle class Peruvians. Transport workers have been particularly vulnerable; so far in 2025, approximately 50 bus drivers have been killed for refusing to make extortion payments.
The reasons behind the crime escalation are various. Demand for cocaine remains high and, over the last decade, Peru’s coca cultivation has increased. As the price for gold jumped, so did illegal gold mining. Peru’s gangs are fragmented—and therefore hard to track—and they have developed nefarious new strategies such as using WhatsApp for extortion.
But, Peruvians believe, the reasons also include the government’s complicity. In part because illicit operators have provided campaign finance, in 2024 approximately half of Peru’s legislators were under criminal investigation; these same legislators have passed laws to impede investigations and prosecutions. Boluarte herself is under investigation for various crimes, including illicit enrichment. She sported a Rolex watch priced at $19,000, despite no evident financial means for such extravagance.
Further, from the start large percentages of Peruvians did not deem Boluarte a legitimate president. In 2021-2022, Boluarte was Vice President under President Pedro Castillo. Leading a far-left party in fraught elections during COVID, Castillo was an accidental, unprepared president. He was virulently opposed by the dominant right-wing forces in Congress, in particular Fuerza Popular, the party of Keiko Fujimori, the daughter of former authoritarian President Alberto Fujimori. As Vice President, Boluarte had said that, if Castillo were impeached, she too would resign, triggering new elections. However, in the event of Castillo’s December 2022 impeachment, Boluarte stayed on, despite massive protests and ubiquitous calls for new elections.
As President, Boluarte appeared indifferent to Peruvians’ concerns. Between December 2022 and February 2023, 49 civilian protesters were killed by the security forces. Boluarte’s response was support for an amnesty law. And, amid an October 2025 transport workers’ strike, Boluarte’s advice to Peruvians worried about crime was that they should not open text messages from unfamiliar people—placing blame for crimes on the victims.
What Does Peruvians’ Anger Mean for the 2026 Elections?
Peruvians’ anger spells difficulties for its incumbent parties and advantages for parties that can claim an “outsider” mantle. Fujimori’s Fuerza Popular is widely considered the dominant party in the Congress, and it will struggle against this perception. Its presidential candidate, Fujimori, is running for the fourth time and is likely to have worn out her welcome.
Not surprisingly, demands for an “iron fist” against crime are strong. The current presidential frontrunner is Renovación Popular’s Rafael López Aliaga (aka “Porky”), a Trump-like far-rightist who placed third in the 2021 election and was subsequently elected Lima’s mayor. López Aliaga promises a hardline strategy against organized crime, including implementing similar imprisonment policies to those of El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele. But Renovación Popular holds the fourth largest number of seats in Congress and it will be difficult for López Aliaga to claim an “outsider” mantle.
A candidate likely to claim an “outsider” mantle is Mario Vizcarra, running as a proxy for his brother, former President Martín Vizcarra. As President in 2018-2020, Vizcarra confronted the dominant parties in Peru’s Congress, building his popularity but ultimately catalyzing his impeachment. After a strong showing in Peru’s 2021 legislative elections, he was disqualified from holding elected office for ten years. Yet, Vizcarra’s government was far from without fault. There are other candidates, including the popular former clown, Carlos Álvarez, who could seize the “outsider” mantle.
Can Peru’s 2026 Elections Lead to Democratic Recovery?
The challenges to Peru’s elections are serious. In recent years Fuerza Popular and other illiberal parties in Peru’s Congress have allied to skew the electoral playing field in their favor. Interim President Jerí is, of course, new to his position and his possible impact on the elections is unclear. (His first-month record was better than was first expected.)
As elsewhere in Latin America, Peru’s illiberal parties have strategized to achieve the disqualification of viable candidates. As indicated, this strategy is currently being used against Vizcarra; it could also be used against a rising new candidate.
Peru’s illiberal parties have calculated that a plethora of candidates is in their interest. Currently, 39 party lists are registered. Such a head-spinning number is problematic for journalists trying to cover the campaign and problematic for voters trying to identify their preferred candidate, especially because pre-election polls are more likely to be inaccurate. Yet, Peru’s Congress cancelled a provision for a preliminary round of voting, in which parties would have been required to secure 1.5 percent of the vote in order to qualify for the “first round.”
Still, there are grounds for optimism. The massive protests of recent years have shown that Peruvians want their political views heard. Peruvians recognize the importance of honest, capable leadership and want to find it.
*Cynthia McClintock is Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University.
Tequila Los Arango From Guanajuato
If you spend time in Mexican resort bars or browse around duty free shops, you’ve probably seen the Corralejo tequila in the tall, thin bottle. It stands out for its design and shape, but the company that makes it has several other brands that are actually more noteworthy if you’re a real tequila fan,...
The post Tequila Los Arango From Guanajuato appeared first on Luxury Latin America Blog.
US military squeeze on Venezuela might boomerang on Washington DC
The U.S. military buildup along South America’s northern rim is, Washington insists, aimed at Narco-Terrorists. A growing chorus of analysts aren’t convinced; they suspect what the Trump administration is really after is regime change in Venezuela. Nicolás Maduro, the country’s leader since 2013, is taking no chances. In recent weeks he responded to the Trump […]
The post US military squeeze on Venezuela might boomerang on Washington DC appeared first on New Jetpack Site.
Nicaragua, the “Republic of Poets” has become a “Republic of Clandestine Poets.”
Nicaragua, the “Republic of Poets” has become a “Republic of Clandestine Poets.”
One of the martyred heroes of the Sandinista revolution is Leonel Rugama, the young poet who died in combat at the age of 20. His poem "The Earth is a satellite of the Moon " has been considered by critics as one of the most widely distributed poems in Latin American poetry. It was a poet, Rigoberto Lopez Perez, who assassinated the first Somoza, at a ball in 1956, and was himself beaten and shot to death on the dance floor.
Nicaraguan newspapers used to feature literary supplements filled with poems from both luminaries and unknowns. Leading poets could be spotted, like movie stars, in certain cafes in the cities. In the university town of Leon, busts of Nicaraguan poets and plaques with quotations from their work fill the “Park of Poets,” while the main street, Calle Ruben Dario, is named for the country’s preeminent poet.
Ruben Dario, the poet and writer of Nicaragua is the most well-known in the world. He is considered as the father of the Modernist Movement in Spanish literature in the twentieth century. His book Azul (1888) is said to be the inaugural book of Hispanic-American modernism. He was a precocious poet and published his poem in a newspaper at the age of thirteen.
President Daniel Ortega is a poet, as is his wife, Rosario Murillo. When Ortega was a political prisoner from 1968 (at the age of 23) to 1974 during the dictatorship of Somoza, he wrote many poems, including the famous one titled “I never saw Managua when miniskirts were in fashion.” While in jail he received visits from Rosario Murillo, a poet. The prisoner and visitor fell in love; Murillo became Ortega's wife. She has published several books of poems. One of them is called as ¨Amar es combatir ¨- to love is to combat.
After the overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship in 1979, the victorious Sandinistas named one of the country’s most famous poets, Ernesto Cardenal, as minister of culture. He brought poets to all corners of the country to teach people to read and write poetry at a time when Nicaragua suffered a 70 to 95 percent illiteracy rate. It is still possible in villages to find people who are unable to read or write but can recite Dario’s poetry by heart. Poetry was used as a tool for political literacy, consolidating the country as a "Republic of Poets.”
Some of the ministers in the initial years of President Ortega's cabinet were poets and writers. Notable among these is Sergio Ramirez, Gioconda Belli and Ernesto Cardinal.
Since his reelection as President in 2007, Daniel Ortega has become authoritarian and has rigged the elections and the constitution to continue as president indefinitely. His wife Rosario Murillo has now become the Co-President after having been Vice-President for some years. The couple have betrayed the noble ideals of the Sandinista revolution and have created a corrupt family dictatorship, similiar to the Somoza dynastic dictatorship which had ruled for 42 years. Most of the writers and intellectuals who had nurtured the revolution eventually left the Sandinista party and started fighting against the dictatorial regime. They used poetry to fight back, just like they did during the revolutionary era against the Somoza dictatorship. The Ortegas have suppressed dissent and persecuted poets, intellectuals and journalists besides political leaders who resisted their dictatorship. The regime has imprisoned or exiled some of the dissidents, stripped their citizenship and even seized their assets and houses. The regime has become harsher after the large scale public protests in 2018. Many exiled poets and writes live in Costa Rica and Spain. The exiled poets include Sergio Ramírez, Gioconda Belli and Freddy Quezada. The regime has shut down thousands of NGOs and independent media outlets, including PEN Nicaragua and the Nicaraguan Academy of Language. One of the hardest blows to Nicaraguan literary culture came in 2022 with the cancellation of the Granada International Poetry Festival, created in 2005, which once brought together more than 1,200 poets from 120 countries. The regime revoked the legal status of the NGO that funded it, leading to its cancellation.
While accepting the Cervantes Prize for literature in April 2018, Ramírez dedicated his award to the young people then protesting Ortega’s government and to the memory of Nicaraguans who had recently “been murdered on the streets after demanding justice and democracy.”
The Ortega-Murillo dictatorship has driven the poetry underground. The poets hide themselves and their poems from the repressive regime which has been ruthlessly censoring literature and news. The poets write clandestinely expressing their frustration and resistance. The "Republic of Poets" has now become the "Republic of Clandestine Poets".
Crooked plow- Brazilian novel by Itamar Vieira Junior
Itamar Vieira is a young and upcoming Brazilian writer. Crooked Plow (Torto Arado) is his first novel. He has earlier written a short story collection.
"Small Earthquakes: A Journey Through Lost British History in South America” - book by Shafik Meghji
While the Spanish and Portuguese colonized Latin America, the British have played a significant role in slavery, wars of independence, politics, lending, investment, railways and football in the region. These have been brought out by the author of the book who has done extensive research and travelled through the South American countries which had been impacted by the British.
The Brazilian Supreme Court has done what its U.S. counterpart has tragically failed to do
The Brazilian Supreme Court has convicted (on 11 September) and sentenced ex-President Bolsonaro for his crimes of coup attempt, plot to assassinate political and judicial leaders and incitement of mobs to destroy the buildings of the Supreme Court, the Presidential palace, and the Congress, after he lost the elections in 2022. The court also sentenced seven other military and political accomplices of Bolsonaro. Earlier, the court had convicted more than 600 far right extremist followers of Bolsonaro who had vandalized the iconic government buildings of Brasila.
Bolsonaro has ignited a new gun culture in Brazil. His three politician sons have been fierce proponents of expanding gun ownership through policy proposals and social media posts. Eduardo Bolsonaro has spoken admiringly of the Second Amendment in the United States. He has lobbied to make the Brazilian market more attractive to foreign arms manufacturers, which he said would lower prices and provide gun buyers with more choices. Flávio Bolsonaro, a senator, made the promotion of gun manufacturing in Brazil the focus of his first project in the legislature. During his presidency, Bolsonaro had loosened gun control to make more firearms available easily to more of his followers. Gun ownership rocketed by 98% during Bolsonaro’s first year as President. Weapons newly available to the public now included semi-automatic rifles, previously only available to the army. In April 2020, Bolsonaro revoked decrees that existed to facilitate the tracing and identification of weapons and ammunition. One week later, he tripled the quantity of ammunition available for purchase by civilians, saying on record in a ministerial meeting, that he wanted “everyone” to carry guns.. Bolsonaro's signature favorite pose is gun shooting gesture. Bolsonaro reaffirmed in his inaugural speech, “Good citizens deserve the means to defend themselves through gun ownership”. His supporters in the Congress cheered and applauded him by pointing their fingers in the shape of a gun.
The Marxist school of Dependency Theory - An interview with Professor Jaime Osorio
Our present, however, is one of spiraling crises. Since the financial crash of 2008, the economic crisis converges with ecological collapse and the exhaustion of liberal democratic forms, reaching civilizational dimensions. In this context, the pandemic laid bare how, instead of disappearing, the divide between the center and periphery of the world system is as sharp and as meaningful as ever.
With neoliberal hegemony fractured, other ways of thinking and practicing politics have reemerged from their intellectual exiles. Among these, dependency theory stands out as an original and revolutionary contribution of Latin American critical thought, offering tools for understanding uneven capitalist development and imperialism both historically and today. For an introduction to this unique framework, we turn to Dr. Jaime Osorio.
When a military coup d’état in Chile overthrew the democratically elected government of Salvador Allende on September 11, 1973, Osorio had already been accepted to begin his doctoral studies at the University of Chile’s Center for Socio-Economic Studies (CESO, in Spanish). The dictatorship’s advance brought him instead to Mexico, where today he ranks as Distinguished Professor at the Autonomous Metropolitan University (UAM) in Xochimilico and as Researcher Emeritus by the National Council of Science and Technology (CONACYT). He is the author of many books, including Fundamentos del análsis social. La realidad social y su conocimiento and Sistema mundial. Intercambio Desigual y renta de la tierra.
In this interview, Osorio speaks with Jacobin contributing editor Hilary Goodfriend about the Marxist school of dependency theory, its origins and principles, and its present-day applications.
Dependency theory and its Marxist strain emerged from debates and dialogues about development, underdevelopment, and imperialism in the context of decolonization and the national liberation struggles of the twentieth century. What were the main positions and strategies in dispute, and how did Marxist dependency theorists position themselves in these arguments?
At the theoretical level, Marxist dependency theory [TMD, in Spanish] is the result of the Cuban Revolution’s victory in 1959. Latin American Marxism was moved by the island’s gesture. All the main theses about the nature of Latin American societies and the character of revolution came into question.
A little over a decade after that event, which sharpened the debates, TMD reached maturity. In those years, some of the proposals that fed theories of dependency emphasized the role of trade relations, such as the “deterioration of the terms of trade” thesis put forward by the [Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean] CEPAL, which referred to the cheapening of primary goods against the rising prices of industrial products in the world market.
Orthodox Marxists highlighted the presence of internal “obstacles” that impeded development, like idle terrain in the hands of landowners, which also blocked the expansion of wage relations. Generally, in these proposals, capitalism wasn’t to blame. In fact, it was necessary to accelerate its spread so that its inherent contradictions would heighten. Only then could a socialist revolution be proposed, according to this stage-based perspective prevalent in the Communist Parties.
For the Cepalinos, their horizon was achieving advanced capitalism, which would be possible by means of a process of industrialization. This would allow the region to cease exporting primary goods and food products and importing secondary goods, which would now be produced internally, sparking technological development and stemming the outflow of resources.
In both proposals, the industrial bourgeoisie had a positive role to play, be it in the medium or long term.
For Marxist dependency theory, the region’s so-called economic “backwardness” was a result of the formation and expansion of the capitalist world system, whose course produced development and underdevelopment simultaneously. Therefore, these divergent economic histories are not independent processes, nor are they connected tangentially. From this perspective, the fundamental theoretical and historical problem required explaining the processes that generated both development and underdevelopment in the same movement.
This problem demanded, furthermore, a response that accounted for how this process is reproduced over time since civilization and barbarism are constantly made anew by the world system.
Many of the acclaimed Marxist dependency theorists—Ruy Mauro Marini, Theotonio Dos Santos, Vania Bambirra—share a trajectory of flight from South American dictatorships and exile in Mexico. You were also subject to this forced displacement. How did these experiences of revolution and counterrevolution influence the construction of TMD?
Four names stand out in the development of TMD: André Gunder Fank, Theotonio Dos Santos, Vania Vambirra, and Ruy Mauro Marini. The first was a German-U.S. economist and the other three Brazilians, who shared readings and discussions in Brazil before the 1964 coup in that country. Subsequently, they found each other in Chile in the late 1960s in the Center for Socio-Economic Studies, until the military coup of 1973. During this period—at least in the case of the Brazilians—they produced their principals works with regards to TMD. I had the fortune of meeting and working with Marini in Mexico in the mid-1970s, before his return to Brazil.
TMD offers no concessions to the local ruling classes, holding them responsible for the prevailing conditions in which they manage to reap enormous profits in collusion with international capitals, despite [international] value transfers. For this reason, it was hard for these theorists to find spaces for their knowledge in the academic world.
The 1973 military coup in Chile meant that the principal creators of TMD appeared on the search lists of the military forces and their intelligence apparatus. And this coup in Chile, which was preceded by the coup in Brazil in 1964, was followed by many more in the Southern part of the continent, which dispersed and disbanded working groups and closed important spaces in those societies.
At the same time, this long counterrevolutionary phase, which was not limited to military governments, favored sweeping transformations in the social sciences, where neoliberal theories and methodological individualism came to reign supreme. TMD emerged in an exceptional period of recent history. However, subsequently and in general—saving certain moments and countries in the region—ideal conditions for its development and dissemination have not existed.
In his classic work, The Dialectics of Dependency, Marini defines dependency as a “relation of subordination between formally independent nations, in whose framework the relations of production of the subordinate nation are modified or recreated in order to ensure the expanded production of dependency.” What are the mechanisms of this expanded production, and how have they changed since Marini formulated his proposal in the 1970s?
When we talk about the processes generated by dependent capitalism, the “dependent” qualifier isn’t redundant. We’re talking about another way of being capitalist. That is to say that in the world system, diverse forms of capitalism coexist and are integrated, and they feed off each other and deepen their particular forms within the global unity of capital.
The heterogeneity of the system can be explained, then, not by the backwardness of some economies, not as prior states [of development], not as deficiencies. Each constitutes its full, mature form of capitalism possible in this system.
In this way, with the stroke of a pen, TMD destroyed the hopes of the developmentalists, who supposed that the dependent economies could achieve higher states of welfare and development within this order constituted by capital. For them, it was just a matter of taking advantage of windows that regularly open. There is nothing in the prevailing dynamic to suggest that things are moving in that direction. To the contrary, what is produced and continues to emerge is the “development of underdevelopment,” so long as capitalist social relations prevail.
The gap between underdeveloped and developed capitalism, or between imperialist and dependent capitalism is ever widening. Dependency deepens and more acute modalities are generated. In a world in which digital capitalism is gaining ground—the internet of things, artificial intelligence, robotics, as an example—this isn’t hard to understand.
Experiences like that of South Korea can’t be repeated at will. They are, instead, exceptions to the rule. Why did the IMF cut off and suffocate the Argentine economy and not extend its hand like imperialist capital did for South Korea after the 1952 war on the peninsula? It was the latter’s exceptional position in a strategic space, which was disrupted by the triumph of Mao’s revolution in China and the need to construct a barrier to prevent the expansion of socialism in Korea, that turned on the faucet of enormous resources, at least for Japan and the United States, and put blinders on those defenders of democracy and the free market when South Korea was governed by a succession of military dictatorships that ferociously applied state intervention, not the free market, to define plans and programs to define priorities for investment and loans.
Today, all a government in the dependent world has to do is establish some rules for foreign capital, and the whole clamor and propaganda of transnational media demand that communism be stopped, impeding international loans, blocking access to markets, and seeking to suffocate those alleged subversives.
The concept of superexploitation as a mechanism by which dependent capitalists compensate for their subordinate insertion in the international division of labor is perhaps Marini’s most original and polemic proposal. Some Marxists, for example, protest the possibility of the systematic violation of the law of value. This is a theme that you take up in your debate with the Argentinian researcher Claudio Katz. How do you define superexploitation, and why, or in what terms, do you defend its validity today?
With Marini’s short book, The Dialectics of Dependency, whose central body was written in 1972 and would be published in 1973, TMD reaches its point of greatest maturity. We can synthesize the nucleus of Marini’s thesis in the question: How is the reproduction of a capitalism that regularly transfers value to imperialist economies possible?
It’s possible because in dependent capitalism, a particular form of exploitation is imposed which means that capital isn’t just appropriating surplus value, but also part of workers’ consumption fund, which ought to correspond to their salaries, in order to transfer it to their accumulation fund. That’s what the category of superexploitation accounts for. If all capital eventually ends up being unpaid labor, in dependent capitalism, all capital is unpaid labor and the appropriated life fund [of the working class].
Marini’s response is theoretically and politically brilliant, because it allows us to explain the reasons for the multiplication of misery and the devastation of the workers in the dependent world, but also the reasons for which capital is unable to establish stable forms of domination in these regions, regularly expelling huge contingents of workers from its civilizational promises, thrusting them into barbarism and converting them into contingents that resist, revolt, and rise up against the projects of the powerful.
Superexploitation has consequences at all levels of Latin American societies. For now, we can emphasize that it accompanies the formation of economies oriented to foreign markets. Following the processes of independence in the nineteenth century, and under the guidance of local capitals, the region’s economies advanced on the basis of exports, initially of primary materials and foodstuffs, to which we can add, recently, the production and assembly of luxury industrial goods like cars, televisions, state-of-the-art cell phones—products equally distant from the general consumption needs of most of the working population. This is compatible with the dominant modality of exploitation, which seriously impacts salaries, reducing workers’ consumption power and reducing their participation in the formation of a dynamic internal market.
It’s relevant here to consider a significant difference with capitalism in the developed world. There, as capitalism advanced in the nineteenth century, it faced the dilemma that in order to keep expanding, which implied the multiplication of the mass of goods and products, it would need to incorporate workers into consumption. That was achieved by paying salaries with the purchasing power for basic goods such as clothing, shoes, utensils, and home furnishings. This balance was accomplished by introducing improved production techniques, which reduced the pressure to extend the working day by multiplying the mass of products thrown into the market. From there, we can understand the weight of relative surplus value in developed capitalism.
But in Latin America, things worked differently. Nineteenth-century capitalism didn’t see the need to create markets, because they had been available since the colonial period in the imperialist centers. In addition, English capitalism’s takeoff increased the demand for primary materials and foodstuffs. For this reason, there wasn’t any hurry to change the kind of use values and products put on the market. They continued to be foodstuffs and primary goods. In this way, the emergent capitalism in our region was under no pressure to do something qualitatively different. The mass of salaried laborers expanded, but they don’t comprise the principal demand for the goods being produced, which was in Europe, the United States, and Asia.
Through their insertion in the world market and when it comes time to sell products, Latin American economies transfer value [abroad] for the simple reason that the capitals that operate here have lower compositions and productivities than the capitals in economies that spend more on new machinery, equipment, and technology, allowing them greater productivity and the ability to appropriate value created in other parts of the world. This process is called unequal exchange.
It's important to note that unequal exchange occurs in the market, at the moment of the purchase and sale of commodities. Apart from their low organic composition, this concept doesn’t tell us much about how these commodities were produced, and above all, what allows for a capitalist process to be reproduced over time in such conditions. That’s where super-exploitation comes in.
That is the secret that makes dependent capitalism viable. And this calls all the more attention to the errors of people like Claudio Katz, who have formulated proposals that try to eliminate this concept and do so, furthermore, with grotesque arguments, like that Marx never mentioned it in Capital – he refers to [superexploitaiton] many times, in a variety of ways – because that would imply a dilution or a direct attack on his theoretical proposition since capitalism can’t annihilate its workforce.
I’m not going to repeat those debates with Katz. I will simply reiterate that Marx’s Capital is a book that is central to the study of capitalism and its contradictions. But no one can claim that it accounts for everything, or that capitalism, in its spread over time, can’t exhibit theoretical or historical novelties of any kind. That is a religious reading, but Capital is not a sacred text. Such a position, furthermore, is an attack on a central dimension of Marxism as a theory able to explain not only what has existed, but also that which is new. For this reason, the only orthodoxy Marxism can claim is its mode of reflection.
It's also argued that the spread of superexploitation to the central economies following globalized neoliberal restructuring invalidates its character as a process unique to dependent capitalism.
Superexploitation can be present anywhere that capital operates, be that in the developed or underdeveloped world, just like forms of relative surplus value and absolute surplus value. Of course, there is superexploitation in Brazil and Guatemala, just as there is in Germany and South Korea.
But that’s not the problem. What’s relevant is to elucidate the weight of these forms of exploitation, which can be present in any capitalist space, in capital’s reproduction. So the central issue is different, and so are the economic, social, and political consequences.
Setting aside periods of crisis, when the most brutal forms of exploitation can be exacerbated everywhere, can capitalism operate in the medium and long term without a market that generates salaries, or with extremely low salaries? Something like if, in Germany, the average salary of the Armenians and Turks was generalized for the entire working population, or if the salaries of Mexican and Central American workers in the United States were predominant there. I don’t think so.
Finally, what tools or perspectives does Marxist dependency theory offer us in the face of today’s crises?
In its eagerness to deal with the acute and prolonged capitalist crisis, capital in every region seeks to accentuate forms of exploitation, including superexploitation. It seeks, once again, to reduce rights and benefits. With the war in Ukraine, it has found a good excuse to justify the increase in the price of food, housing, and energy, and its shameless return to the use of fuels that intensify pollution and environmental barbarism, as well as the increase in military budgets at the expense of wages and jobs.
The great imperial powers expect the subordination of economies and states to their decisions in periods of this sort. But the current crisis is also accelerating the crisis of hegemony in the world system, which opens spaces for greater degrees of autonomy—which does not put an end to dependency. This is evident in Washington’s difficulties with disciplining the Latin American and African states to support their position in the conflict in Europe.
The scenario in Latin America over the last few decades reveals processes of enormous interest. We have witnessed significant popular mobilization in almost every country in the region, questioning various aspects of the neoliberal tsunami, be it jobs, salaries, retirements, healthcare and education, as well as rights like abortion, recognition of gender identities, lands, water, and much more.
On this deeply fractured terrain that capital generates in the dependent world, class disputes tend to intensify. This explains the regular social and political outbursts in our societies. It’s the result of the barbarity that capitalism imposes on regions like ours.
One expression of this social force is manifested in the electoral terrain. But just as quickly as there have been victories, there have been defeats. These comings and goings can be naturalized, but why haven’t the victories allowed for lasting processes of change?
Of course, this is not to deny that there have been violent coups of a new sort that have managed to unseat governments. But even then, there were already signs of exhaustion that limited the protests, with the clear exception of Bolivia. There is an enormous gap between the leftist voter and the person who occasionally votes for left projects. The neoliberal triumph was not only in the economic policies and transformations it achieved, but also in its installment of a vision and interpretation of the world, its problems, and its solutions.
The struggle against neoliberalism today involves dismantling privatization of every kind and putting a stop to the conversion of social services and policies into private businesses. That means taking on the most economic and politically powerful sectors of capital, with control over state institutions where legislators, judges, and military members operate, together with the main media, schools, and churches. We can add that these are the sectors of capital with the strongest ties to imperialist capitals and their assemblage of supranational institutions, media, and states.
It's a powerful social bloc. It’s hard to think about attacking it without having to attack capitalism itself.
Chile: ensaio sobre uma derrota histórica
No dia 4 de setembro de 1970, o povo chileno foi às urnas para eleger Salvador Allende presidente da República. A vitória do socialista foi apertada, mas ainda assim referendada pelo Congresso, apesar das tentativas de golpe que já rondavam. Mil dias depois da sua posse, numa terça-feira, 11 de setembro de 1973, o presidente Allende despertou apreensivo com os rumores de traição militar, mas ainda assim determinado a um objetivo: anunciar um plebiscito popular sobre a necessidade de uma Nova Constituição, que superasse os limites da carta vigente desde 1925. Esta, por sua vez, havia sido escrita por uma cúpula de supostos “especialistas” no governo de Arturo Alessandri, latifundiário conhecido como “el León de Tarapacá”. A velha Constituição bloqueava o programa revolucionário da Unidade Popular, ao assegurar os privilégios e poderes da classe proprietária. E Allende era, como se sabe, um sério respeitador das leis.
Foi para evitar que Allende convocasse o plebiscito popular para uma Nova Constituição (análogo ao que os chilenos de hoje chamaram de “plebiscito de entrada”) que os comandantes militares anteciparam o golpe de 1973, ordenando o bombardeio ao Palácio de La Moneda dois dias antes do planejado. Foram informados das intenções presidenciais por Pinochet, chefe das Forças Armadas para quem, no domingo anterior, Allende havia confidenciado o anúncio do plebiscito em uma conversa privada na chácara de El Cañaveral.2
O plebiscito da Nova Constituição nunca foi anunciado. Allende morreu, a Unidade Popular foi massacrada. E a ideia allendista de um itinerário popular constituinte foi soterrada pela repressão. A isso seguiu-se a ditadura com quase 4 mil chilenos mortos e desaparecidos, com 38 mil presos e torturados e também com a constituição de 1980, escrita por Jaime Guzmán, Sérgio de Castro e outros homens da elite ditatorial. A carta teve a habilidade de projetar o “pinochetismo sem Pinochet”, fundando o Estado subsidiário e sua blindagem neoliberal que, por sua vez, foi perpetuada pelo pacto transicional de 1989, avançando por 30 anos de democracia. As décadas de 2000 e 2010 foram de crescente luta social contra a constituição pinochetista - culminando com a revolta de 2019 e o tardio colapso total da sua legitimidade.
Retomar esse percurso é importante para que se possa dimensionar o impacto histórico e simbólico do plebiscito de saída da Nova Constituição chilena ocorrido em 4 de setembro de 2022, cuja ampla escolha pelo rechazo ainda causa perplexidade e tristeza no movimento apruebista. Era enorme a carga de simbolismo histórico presente nesse plebiscito, a começar pela sua data: o atual itinerário constituinte estava desenhado para exorcizar Pinochet no aniversário de 52 anos do triunfo eleitoral de Allende.
Se supunha que a Nova Constituição (NC), escrita de junho de 2021 a junho de 2022, era a mais genuína representação dos anseios populares, a primeira a escutar verdadeiramente as profundas demandas sociais desde o bombardeio de 11 de setembro. Mas não era. Dessa vez não foi um golpe militar que derrotou o horizonte de igualdade, diversidade, solidariedade e justiça plasmadas na nova carta, mas sim o próprio voto popular, em um enredo que, por isso mesmo, ganhou ares trágicos. Afinal, foi justamente aquele povo excluído e esquecido, invisibilizado e maltratado pelo Estado/mercado, o povo que a Convenção Constitucional acreditava representar de maneira profunda e inédita, que manifestou seu desagravo e gerou uma crise de legitimidade dos mecanismos democráticos mais inovadores do nosso continente.
Como explicar a crise de representatividade do organismo supostamente mais representativo da história chilena?
Voto popular contra a Nova Constituição por classe e território
A Nova Constituição chilena foi escrita por uma Convenção Constitucional (CC) eleita em maio de 2021, com voto facultativo de 6,1 milhões de eleitores (41% de participação). De maneira inédita, a CC foi composta por 50% de mulheres (lei 21.216)3 e 11% de povos indígenas (lei 21.298)4, e elegeu 32% de convencionales independentes,5 sendo considerada um organismo da mais alta representatividade popular. Apesar do polêmico quórum de ⅔ para aprovação das normas constitucionais e da tensão constante entre movimentos populares e instituições, a crítica avassaladora que a revolta de 2019 produziu às classes políticas tradicionais se materializou em um organismo constitucional com rostos novos, formado por dezenas de “pessoas comuns”, ativistas e lideranças populares. A CC mostrou a possibilidade de alteração rápida e radical da casta política, ao ser muito diversa do congresso nacional e dos profissionais de partidos que comandaram o “duopólio” das três décadas de democracia no Chile.
O resultado foi um texto constitucional atrelado às lutas dos movimentos sociais e aos valores da solidariedade social opostos ao neoliberalismo, um dos documentos mais avançados em direitos sociais e promoção da diversidade dos nossos tempos.
Em poucas palavras, eu diria que cinco eixos caracterizavam a Nova Constituição chilena como uma das mais progressistas do mundo:
A plurinacionalidade intercultural, a representatividade política e o direito à autodeterminação dos povos indígenas, preservando-se a unidade do Estado chileno, conceito inspirado pelo novo constitucionalismo latino-americano inaugurado por Equador (2007) e Bolívia (2009);
Os direitos da natureza e os freios à sua mercantilização, recuperando por exemplo o direito universal de acesso à água e suplantando o Código de Águas da ditadura, sendo a primeira constituição do mundo a reconhecer a crise climática como emergência global e nacional;
Os direitos sociais de caráter universal, como a educação gratuita, a saúde pública integral, a aposentadoria solidária, pública e tripartite, a moradia e o trabalho dignos (incluindo o direito universal à greve inexistente hoje), bem como o direito à cultura, ao esporte, a ciência e ao tempo livre;
Os direitos reprodutivos, econômicos e políticos das mulheres em sentido transversal, assegurando reconhecimento da economia do cuidado e do trabalho doméstico, o combate à violência de gênero e a paridade em todos os organismos oficiais, bem como uma perspectiva feminista no sistema de justiça e uma educação não sexista;
A descentralização do Estado como forma de aprofundar a democracia, garantindo maior orçamento e atribuições às comunas, províncias e regiões, bem como criando organismos de poder popular vinculantes na formulação de políticas públicas locais e nacionais.
Apesar da NC responder à maioria das demandas populares levantadas na revolta de 2019 e nas mobilizações das décadas anteriores, algo na Convenção Constitucional falhou para que o resultado desse grande esforço tenha sido tão amplamente derrotado. Se por um lado foi evidente o peso das fake news e o volumoso aporte financeiro das elites chilenas na campanha do Rechazo, que recebeu quatro vezes mais dinheiro que a campanha do Apruebo,6 também é importante reconhecer que havia pontos cegos e fraturas na comunicação entre representantes constituintes e as maiorias chilenas. Do contrário, a campanha de desinformação das direitas contra a nova carta não encontraria terreno tão fértil para se disseminar e prosperar.
Chegou-se ao seguinte paradoxo: o voto popular matou o projeto político mais democrático da história do Chile. O mesmo voto popular que desbancou as elites políticas tradicionais, rejeitou o suposto “amadorismo” dos convencionales, e com isso entregou o bastão da condução política constituinte novamente para o congresso.
O voto obrigatório no plebiscito de saída foi certamente um dos principais fatores para essa guinada. Diferentemente do plebiscito de entrada em outubro de 2020, com voto facultativo de 7,5 milhões de chilenos (50% de participação); da eleição dos convencionales em maio de 2021, com voto facultativo de 6,1 milhões de chilenos (41%); e do 2o turno das eleições presidenciais que deram vitória à coligação “Apruebo Dignidad” com voto facultativo de 8,3 milhões de chilenos (55,7%), o plebiscito de saída teve voto obrigatório com multa de 180 mil pesos (aproximadamente mil reais) para quem não comparecesse às urnas. A obrigatoriedade punitiva do voto com essa altíssima multa, em um contexto de desemprego, inflação e carestia, deu origem a uma mudança de perfil do eleitor que escapou à percepção dos apruebistas. Além de inédita, a participação de 13 milhões de chilenos (86%) no plebiscito de saída forçou a manifestação de mais de 5 milhões de absenteístas históricos, possivelmente o setor menos interessado em política da sociedade e os mais ausentes nas eleições da última década. Não é nada desprezível o fato de que o plebiscito de saída tenha contado com mais que o dobro (216%) do total de votantes das eleições para os representantes convencionales.
Este é um dos elementos explicativos mais importantes de tamanha quebra de expectativas e da guinada política entre eleições tão próximas. A NC foi rechaçada por 7,8 milhões de chilenos (61,8%) contra 4,8 milhões de apruebistas (38,1%). Os votos contrários de Rechazo no plebiscito, sozinhos, somaram mais do que o total de votantes no pleito que elegeu os convencionales. Em números absolutos, o quórum de 4 de setembro de 2022 foi o maior de toda a história chilena.
Tais números absolutos devem nos conduzir a uma análise dos votos por classes sociais e territórios, como alertou o historiador Sérgio Grez.7 Ao segmentar o total de comunas em quatro estratos de renda, o quintil que reúne as comunas mais pobres do país apresentou uma média de 75% rechazo, expressivamente maior que o resultado nacional. As comunas com renda média-baixa rechaçaram o texto em 71%; as média-altas o rechaçaram em 64%; e o quintil de maior renda o rechaçou em 60%. Quanto mais pobres as comunas, mais avassalador foi o rechaço.
Em Colchane, por exemplo, a comuna de Tarapacá com mais altos índices de pobreza (24%)8 e que enfrentou a fase mais aguda da crise migratória do Norte, o rechaço obteve 94%. Ao mesmo tempo, províncias com maiores índices de população indígena também demonstraram altos níveis de rechaço, ao contrário do que se poderia imaginar. Foram as regiões de fronteira indígena - Ñuble (74%), Araucanía (73%), Maule (71%) e Biobio (69%)9 - que obtiveram os maiores níveis de rechaço em comparação à média nacional. Já as regiões com maior aceitação da NC - a Região Metropolitana (RM) e Valparaíso -, ainda assim experimentaram a derrota do texto, com respectivamente 55% e 57% de rechazo. Em termos nacionais, o Apruebo só obteve maioria em 8 de 346 comunas do país, sendo 5 em Valparaíso e 3 na RM.10 Entre elas, não está a comuna de Recoleta, na RM, governada desde 2012 pelo prefeito comunista Daniel Jadue, principal rival de Boric na coligação Apruebo Dignidad. A Recoleta foi palco de experimentos importantes do PC governo, como a universidade popular, as livrarias populares e as farmácias populares, reunindo habitantes santiaguinos simpáticos à esquerda e entusiastas de Jadue. Seus votos do plebiscito, porém, resultaram em inexplicáveis 51,9% pelo Rechazo.
Além disso, como alertou Igor Donoso, nas comunas que “os ambientalistas denominaram zonas de sacrifício”11 por vivenciarem atividades de extrativismo e conflito socioambiental, o rechaço foi amplamente vitorioso, a despeito das diretrizes ecológicas da NC que asseguravam os direitos das populações dos territórios de mineração, pesca industrial, monoculturas florestais e outras atividades predatórias. Nestas “zonas de sacrifício”, Donoso menciona o triunfo do rechazo em La Ligua (58,93%), Quintero (58,11%), Los Vilos (56,93%), Puchuncaví (56,11%), Petorca (56,11%), Villa Alemana (57,82%) e Freirina (55,54%). Nas cidades mineiras afetadas pelo extrativismo e suas contaminações, o rechaço também venceu amplamente, como em Calama (70,64%) e Rancagua (60,63%).
Emblemática dessa contradição territorial foi a comuna de Petorca, cenário de uma aguerrida luta popular pelo acesso à água na última década. Ali, a desertificação prejudica os pequenos agricultores e a população em geral, que dependem de caminhões-pipa para obter a água necessária à sobrevivência e à produção de alimentos, enquanto grandes empresas monocultoras detém direitos de propriedade sobre a água inclusive das propriedades camponesas, uma vez que o Código de Águas de 1981 permitiu a bizarra desassociação dos mercados da terra e da água.12 A eleição de Rodrigo Mundaca, líder do Movimento pela Defesa do Acesso à Água, Terra e Proteção Ambiental (MODATIMA), a governador da região de Valparaíso em maio de 2021 indicava uma consistente orientação popular pela agenda ecológica e contra a privatização da água, princípios destacados da NC. No entanto, Petorca derrotou o novo texto com 56% de rechazo,13 o que fez Mundaca declarar: “sinto a incerteza de não reconhecer o lugar que habito (...). Parece bastante irracional a votação sustentada por esta comuna”. 14
Pontos cegos da política constituinte: causas do rechazo popular
Segundo pesquisa realizada pelo CIPER15 na semana seguinte ao plebiscito, com entrevista a 120 pessoas de 12 comunas com maiorias trabalhadoras, as principais razões do voto popular pelo rechazo foram, nesta ordem:
O Estado se apropriaria das casas das pessoas
Os fundos de pensão não seriam herdáveis
O país seria dividido
O governo merece críticas (voto castigo)
Contrários ao aborto
A pesquisa CADEM feita na mesma semana,16 questionou 1.135 pessoas com a pergunta “qual foi a principal razão pela qual você votou rechazo?” e obteve como resultado o gráfico abaixo. Foram 40% de entrevistados que atribuíram seu voto a um processo constituinte “muy malo”, que despertou “desconfiança”; 35% de menções críticas à plurinacionalidade (um dos mais intensos focos de fake news); 29% de desaprovação do governo Boric; 24% de críticas à instabilidade e insegurança política e econômica; 13% contrários à suposta proibição de saúde e educação privadas (fake); 13% de referências a um “mal camino” do país associado à delinquência e ao conflito mapuche; 12% de menções contrárias a uma nova constituição e em defesa da reforma da carta da ditadura; e 8% de referências contrárias ao aborto e às mudanças do sistema político.
Gráfico 1 - Razões para votar rechazo (CADEM)
As principais fake news que abalaram o voto apruebista se relacionavam à ameaça contra a chilenidade: se disseminou que a plurinacionalidade era o fim da bandeira e do hino, que o Chile iria mudar de nome, que imigrantes venezuelanos e povos indígenas tomariam o poder e se tornariam cidadãos privilegiados, sem punibilidade pela justiça, e que os chilenos não poderiam mais circular livremente pelo seu próprio território (usando como pretexto o desastrado episódio da ex ministra do Interior, Iskia Siches, impedida de realizar uma reunião em Temucuicui, Araucanía, bloqueada por uma barricada mapuche na primeira quinzena de governo Boric). Também os direitos reprodutivos, a constitucionalização do direito ao aborto e o direito à diversidade sexual ocuparam um lugar de destaque nas fake news, embora a pesquisa CADEM indique que este não tenha sido o ponto mais crítico impulsionador do rechazo.
Além dos conglomerados midiáticos tradicionais da direita e extrema direita, dezenas de contas de Facebook, Youtube e Instagram não declaradas ao Servel propagaram, durante meses, uma série de mentiras sobre a NC, se aproveitando do sentimento de insegurança e instabilidade dos mais pobres, em função da crise econômica, do trauma da pandemia e do flagrante aumento da criminalidade. Medo da violência, racismo, xenofobia foram dispositivos conservadores mobilizados em massa, mas que não teriam obtido sucesso se tais sentimentos não existissem no terreno da experiência social e das ideologias populares, como diagnosticou Jorge Magasich.17 Afinal, fake news não se propaga no vácuo.
A opinião de que o processo constituinte foi “mal feito”, de que a Constituição não era uma obra tecnicamente viável e que a CC foi marcada por escrachos, anarquia e confusão é particularmente importante para um país que havia acabado de “demitir” sua classe política e convocar “pessoas comuns” para o centro da elaboração constituinte. Há um paradoxo de difícil interpretação no fato de que a revolta de 2019 consolidou a crítica popular ao duopólio, às instituições tradicionais e aos profissionais dos partidos, mas que somente três anos depois o plebiscito de saída tenha desmoralizado os legítimos representantes do chileno comum, do lado de fora dos acordões e diretamente do chão das ruas. Com isso, o plebiscito de saída devolveu a bola para as mesmas instituições de sempre, que o estallido social havia deslegitimado e declarado incapazes de governar.
A ideia de uma Convenção amadora e caótica, que errou mais do que acertou, terminou sendo reiterada por declarações como de Marcos Arellano, convencional independente da Coordinadora Plurinacional, que pediu desculpas, em nome da CC: “é de exclusiva responsabilidade da Convenção como órgão”, declarou sobre o triunfo do rechazo: “vários convencionales tiveram condutas de soberba. Houve falta de solenidade em alguns casos, uma série de performances que afetaram a credibilidade do órgão”.18 Arellano também expressou uma autocrítica sobre o uso excessivo das horas de trabalho dos convencionales das portas da CC para dentro, com evidente descaso e descuido com o trabalho de comunicação política de massas e experiência de base nas periferias em defesa do novo texto. É fato inegável que os debates sobre justiça social, paridade e plurinacionalidade dos convencionales aconteceram em termos que alguns consideraram “acadêmicos” ou “pos-modernos”, distantes da realidade vivida pelo povo chileno e de suas subjetividades políticas. Essa fratura é trágica, porque a CC se legitimou como organismo mais popular, representativo e democrático da história do Chile, mas terminou sendo desmoralizada pelo povo que alegava representar.
Talvez a vitória retumbante de 78% pelo Apruebo no plebiscito de entrada tenha distorcido a percepção política sobre o plebiscito de saída, subestimando sua dificuldade. O plebiscito de saída não era nenhum passeio. Não era uma vitória a mais na coleção de triunfos da esquerda pós-estallido, mas sim outra montanha a ser escalada, dentro de uma correlação de forças móvel, que afinal ofereceu 3,75 milhões de votos à extrema direita com José Antônio Kast em dezembro de 2021. A CN não estava ganha apenas pelos significados de justiça e solidariedade mobilizados pelo seu texto em si mesmo. Ainda mais considerando o fator voto obrigatório e o ponto cego dos 5 milhões de absenteístas agora convertidos em votantes, que sequer se interessaram pelos pleitos anteriores. Era preciso escrever a NC e ao mesmo tempo lutar pela sua comunicação popular nas poblaciones.
Por outro lado, questionar a capacidade técnica e a seriedade de um organismo com independentes, mulheres, indígenas e líderes populares parece ser uma forma trágica de cair na armadilha das campanhas de deslegitimação arquitetadas pelas direitas (pinochetista e centrista), que buscaram a todo tempo desmoralizar um organismo que permaneceu fora do seu tradicional controle político. Se levarmos em conta os relatos insuspeitos de uma brasileira, a constitucionalista Ester Rizzi, que esteve dentro da Convenção em fevereiro, os trabalhos estavam eficientes, técnicos, organizados e com assessoria de inúmeros profissionais competentes emprestados pelas universidades, em um processo constitucional com parcos recursos financeiros e pouco investimento público.19 Nesse sentido, a qualidade da NC foi quase um milagre, fruto de um esforço coletivo e técnico fenomenal em condições das mais adversas, que merece aplausos aos convencionales.
Entre as possibilidades não aproveitadas pela CC estavam os plebiscitos intermediários, que inicialmente visavam contornar o bloqueio dos ⅔ de quórum pelo voto popular e superar a impossibilidade de amplos consensos entre convencionales recorrendo às maiorias simples do povo. Talvez a impressionante vitória das esquerdas na eleição da CC em maio de 2021 tenha sido, no médio prazo, uma vitória de Pirro, ao gerar um excesso de confiança no procedimento interno do órgão, enfraquecendo a comunicação necessária com as maiorias sociais e descartando os plebiscitos intermediários em função dos consensos progressistas dos ⅔ de esquerda e centro-esquerda obtidos no caminho. Assim, a CC se fechou em si mesma e se distanciou do processo mobilizador que a tornou possível.
Terceiro Turno, derrota de Boric e o novo gabinete
A coligação de Boric, Apruebo Dignidad, carregava no seu nome a opção governista pela NC. Embora tenha se engajado na campanha tardia e timidamente, constrangido pelas imposições da Fiscalía que proibia a campanha oficialista para qualquer um dos lados, Boric utilizou a ideia de que a máxima participação no plebiscito seria em si mesmo um triunfo da democracia. Será mesmo?
Entre as causas mais relevantes do rechazo está a evidência de que o plebiscito representou o terceiro turno das eleições presidenciais. A má avaliação do governo, por sua incapacidade de apresentar soluções compreensíveis aos problemas do país e melhorias rápidas da vida popular, somadas as contradições entre o comportamento de Boric antes e depois de se tornar presidente (sendo a posição contrária ao “quinto retiro” dos fundos de pensão o exemplo mais escancarado), fez cair a popularidade do presidente numa velocidade preocupante. Entre março e setembro de 2022, a aprovação do governo Boric caiu de 50% para 33%, enquanto a reprovação subiu de 20% a 60%. Não por acaso, a reprovação corresponde à votação no Rechazo, como mostra o gráfico abaixo.
Gráfico 2 - Aprovação do presidente Gabriel Boric, mar-set/2022 (CADEM)
Em termos numéricos, o voto Apruebo correspondeu de maneira quase exata ao voto em Boric no segundo turno (ganhando apenas 200 mil novos apoiadores, de 4,6 milhões nas eleições a 4,8 milhões no plebiscito).20 Territorialmente, a votação do Apruebo foi quase idêntica à de Boric. Na RM, por exemplo, Boric teve 2,1 milhões e o Apruebo 2,2 milhões. Em Valparaíso, 545 mil votos em Boric e 583 mil no Apruebo. Na região de O’Higgins, respectivamente 252 mil e 244 mil. As diferenças entre os votos do Boric e do Apruebo foi tão pequena que se conclui que os quase 5 milhões de novos votantes no plebiscito de saída se direcionaram quase integralmente para o rechazo.
A incapacidade do Apruebo de ganhar votos entre o segundo turno presidencial (dezembro de 2021) e o plebiscito (setembro de 2022) diz muito sobre as dificuldades de dois setores das esquerdas em transferir suas agendas de mudança do plano da utopia e da imaginação política para a vida concreta das maiorias mais desinteressadas do país. Tanto a esquerda centrista do governo com seu modus operandi continuista e até repressor de movimentos sociais, como as esquerdas de horizontes mais rupturistas que atuaram na CC (chamadas por Boric de maximalistas), por motivos diferentes, não conseguiram atingir o objetivo mais crucial de toda sua luta: superar o a Constituição pinochetista/neoliberal e abrir caminho constitucional para um Estado de bem estar social, com justiça distributiva e direitos assegurados.
De tudo isso, se apreendeu que a relação entre as multidões mobilizadas no estallido (que encheram avenidas com milhões e demonstraram uma convicção impressionante) e as multidões silenciosas, absenteístas e invisibilizadas (que estiveram em casa nos últimos dez anos de eleições) é profundamente contraditória e muito mais complexa e tensa do que os apruebistas supunham. As classes trabalhadoras são heterogêneas e nem sempre se entendem.
A mudança de gabinete de Boric mostrou que das duas coligações que compõe o governo - Apruebo Dignidad e Socialismo Democrático - a segunda saiu ganhando. A nova ministra do interior, Carolina Tohá (filha do ministro do interior de Allende, José Tohá) foi Secretária Geral da Presidência (Segpres) de Bachelet, entrou no lugar da polêmica Iskia Siches, que teve sua reputação derretida em cinco meses de governo, erros vergonhosos e excessivos pedidos de desculpas. A nova Segpres, que substituiu Giorgio Jackson (o engenheiro da Frente Ampla), é Ana Lya Uriarte, que foi chefa de gabinete de Bachelet. Enquanto Siches foi demitida, Jackson, que não poderia ficar fora do governo por sua enorme relevância na trajetória de Boric da FECH à presidência, foi deslocado para o ministério do desenvolvimento social.
O governo Boric, dessa forma, aumentou o número de mulheres em seu comitê político tanto quanto de bacheletistas, se transformando em uma espécie de governo Bachelet 3.
Buscando atenuar e naturalizar sua derrota, Boric discursou no 4 de setembro: “no Chile as instituições funcionam (…), a democracia chilena sai mais robusta”.21 Também apontou para mais um passo em direção à moderação, dizendo que “o maximalismo, a violência e a intolerância com que pensa diferente devem ficar definitivamente de lado”, como se algum tipo de radicalismo tivesse dado o tom da CC, o que não é verdade. Afirmou ainda que “é preciso escutar a voz do povo, não só este dia, mas sim de tudo o que aconteceu nestes últimos anos intensos”. E arrematou: “Não esqueçamos porque chegamos até aqui. Este mal estar segue latente e não podemos ignorá-lo”.
No mesmo tom de relativização da derrota, a ministra vocera Camila Vallejo, cujo cargo é o equilíbrio tênue que segura o Partido Comunista em uma coligação cada vez mais inconveniente, afirmou: “o compromisso do governo de impulsionar seu programa está intacto (…). Não esqueçamos porque estamos aqui. O que nos levou a ser governo foram anos e décadas demandando maior justiça social, aposentadoria digna, saúde digna, o direito à educação. Temos um mandato a cumprir. (…) Estes desafios estão em pleno trâmite”.22 Resta saber, ainda, como seria possível cumprir o programa de Boric sem a NC. A verdade inconveniente é a adequação deste programa à velha ordem (Bachelet 3).
Limbo constitucional e novo itinerário
Até mesmo os politicos da direita tradicional, comemorando o resultado na sede do comando do Rechazo, afirmaram que a constituição de 1980 está morta. Sua campanha esteve baseada em escrever uma “NC melhor”, “uma que nos una”, mais nacional e unitária, que não “dívida o país”, apelando à falsa compreensão do plurinacional como antagônico ao nacional.
É certo que haverá um novo itinerário constituinte, mas não se sabe ainda quanto da Constituição de 1980 será contrabandeada para dentro do novo processo. Fez parte dos acordos pós-estallido a ideia de uma NC a partir de uma folha em branco, contrária a reformar mais uma vez o texto de Pinochet. Agora, como disse Boric e sua nova ministra Uriarte, o protagonismo será do congresso, o que contraria todo esforço da revolta de 2019 até aqui.
Ainda havia a possibilidade de diferentes modalidades de golpe contra o resultado do plebiscito de entrada, que apontou inequivocamente para uma nova constituição e para uma convenção eleita para este fim, rejeitando que o congresso redigisse o novo texto para envernizar o velho. No dia 12 de setembro, uma reunião entre lideranças dos partidos no Parlamento definiu que haverá sim um “organismo eleito”, possivelmente formado nos próximos meses, e acompanhado de um “comitê de expertos”,23 o que significa o triunfo do neoliberalismo pela tecnocracia.
Ganha a interpretação de que a NC foi rechaçada por ser amadora, enquanto a nova carta deverá ser controlada por saberes tecnocráticos obviamente vinculados ao mercado e suas normativas típicas. A questão é que se já era difícil combater o neoliberalismo com uma nova constituição (cuja aplicação seria desafiadora e dependeria da luta constante dos movimentos sociais), se tornou frustrante e falsificador combatê-lo submetido a uma tutela tecnocrática que emanará da racionalidade neoliberal.
Mas a luta não terminou. Segundo a declaração dos movimentos sociais após a derrota, “o aprendizado que construímos será fundamental, porque os movimentos sociais já não somos o que éramos antes de escrever esta Constituição. Neste processo o povo aprendeu a auto representar-se, isso não é algo dado, depois de décadas de exclusão dos setores populares da vida política, poder representar a nós mesmas é um trabalho do qual não iremos renunciar”.25
O Rechazo foi um bombardeio às avessas, quase tão inimaginável quanto o do dia 11. O Palácio de La Moneda não foi avariado física, mas politicamente. Dessa vez não de cima pela Força Aérea, mas “desde abajo” pela vontade popular, em um estranho paradoxo democrático.
Para atravessar tempos de derrota histórica, os mapuche usam a palavra “marichiweu”, que significa “nunca vão nos vencer”, explica Elisa Loncón, a linguista indígena que presidiu a primeira metade da CC.25
Nos triênios de 1970-1973 e de 2019-2022, o Chile mostrou sua capacidade de entusiasmar a América Latina com criatividade política e projetos utópicos, que inspiram e iluminam povos vizinhos como miragens magnetizantes. Suas derrotas doem, porque também costumam ser nossas.
The Latin America Daily Briefing is Moving
Dear Readers:
The Latin America Daily Briefing is moving to Substack, part of a broader redesign project that aims to get you the same content you know (and hopefully love) in better formats with fewer technical glitches.
If you're already a subscriber, you don't need to do anything. If you are a new reader interested in subscribing or reading content online, please head to: https://latinamericadailybriefing.substack.com/ to check it out.
Thank you all!
-- Jordana
Gang warfare in Haiti (May 23, 2022)
U.S. navigates choppy diplomatic waters (May 20, 2022)
News Briefs
Brazil Supreme Court rejects Bolsonaro complaint (May 19, 2022)
A Brazilian Supreme Court judge rejected a complaint filed by President Jair Bolsonaro in which he accused another justice of abusing his authority, the latest in an ongoing battle between Brazil's executive and judicial branches ahead of October's presidential elections.
U.S. encourages Venezuela talks (May 18, 2022)
The U.S. Biden administration has slightly eased restrictions on Chevron's ability to negotiate with Venezuela's government. Senior administration officials said the move was intended to support talks between the government of President Nicolás Maduro and the U.S.-backed opposition, reports the Washington Post.
Political Report #1466 The April 2002 Coup Through Time
by LAP Editor, Steve Ellner
Political Report #1465 “Those Who Are Poor, Die Poor” | Notes on The Chilean Elections
Political Report 1464 - Nicaragua: Chronicle of an Election Foretold
With seven opposition presidential candidates imprisoned and held incommunicado in the months leading up to the vote and all the remaining contenders but one from miniscule parties closely allied with President Daniel Ortega and his Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), the results of Nicaragua’s November 7 presidential elections were a foregone conclusion. The government declared after polls closed that Ortega won 75 percent of the vote and that 65 percent of voters cast ballots. The independent voting rights organization Urnas Abiertas, meanwhile, reported an abstention rate of approximately 80 percent and widespread irregularities at polling stations around the country.
The vote was carried out in a climate of fear and intimidation, with a total absence of safeguards against fraud.The vote was carried out in a climate of fear and intimidation, with a total absence of safeguards against fraud. In a complete breakdown of the rule of law, Ortega carried out a wave of repression from May to October, leading the opposition to issue a joint statement on October 7 calling for a boycott of the election. Several dozen opposition figures—among them, presidential candidates, peasant, labor, and student leaders, journalists, and environmentalists—were arrested and detained without trial, while several hundred others were forced into exile or underground.
Among those exiled were celebrated novelist Sergio Ramirez, who served as Ortega’s vice president during the 1980s revolution. While the government charged Ramirez with “conspiracy to undermine national integrity,” his crime was provoking the ire of the regime by publishing his latest novel, Tongolele No Sabía Bailar, a fictionalized account of the 2018 mass protests that marked the onset of the current political crisis and the degeneration of the regime into dictatorship. The book was promptly banned in the country, with customs authorities ordered to block shipments at ports of entry.
The repression particularly decimated the left-leaning opposition party Democratic Renovation Union (UNAMOS), formerly called the Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS). The MRS was formed in 1995 by Ortega’s former comrades in arms who either left the FSLN after the failure of their efforts to democratize it or were expelled for challenging Ortega’s leadership of the party. Among those UNAMOS leaders arrested and to date held incommunicado are legendary guerrilla commanders Dora María Téllez and Hugo Torres, as well as deputy foreign minister in the 1980s, Victor Hugo Tinoco, and party president Ana Margarita Vigil. Amnesty International condemned such detentions and incommunicado conditions as “enforced disappearance as a strategy of repression.”
As part of the crackdown the government also banned 24 civic organizations and professional associations—in addition to some 30 that it had previously banned, including three opposition political parties. The majority of these 24 organizations were professional medical guilds that had come under fire for criticizing the regime’s handling of the Covid-19 pandemic, including reporting that the government had concealed the number of infections and deaths. Vice President Rosario Murillo accused doctors of “health terrorism” and of spreading “false outlooks and news” on the impact of the contagion. During the early months of the pandemic the government convened mass public events under the banner of “Love in Times of Covid.” Nicaragua, together with Haiti, has the lowest rate of vaccination in Latin America, with only 4.9 percent of the population inoculated as of October.
In late 2020, the Sandinistas decreed a spate of laws that allows authorities to criminalize anyone who speaks out against the government. Among these are a Cybercrime Law that allows fines and imprisonment of anyone who publishes in the press or on social media what the government deems to be “false news.” Meanwhile, a “hate crimes” law allows life sentences for anyone considered to have carried out “hate crimes,” as defined by the government. Among the varied offenses listed by Sandinista prosecutors for the recent wave of detentions are “conspiracy to undermine national integrity,” “ideological falsehood,” “demanding, exalting, or applauding the imposition of sanctions against the Nicaraguan state and its citizens,” and “using international funding to create organizations, associations, and foundations to channel funds, through projects or programs that deal with sensitive issues such as sexual diversity groups, the rights of Indigenous communities, or through political marketing on topics such as free expression or democracy.”
A week before the vote, Ortega proclaimed that his wife, Vice President Rosario Murillo, was henceforth the “co-president” of the country. While his bizarre declaration has no legal basis or constitutional legitimacy, it was widely seen as a move to anoint her as his successor—the 76-year-old Ortega is known to be in ill health—and a further step towards the rule of a family dynasty. The ruling couple’s eight children already serve as advisors to the presidency and manage the family’s empire of private and ostensibly public media outlets, investment funds, and family businesses.
A mid-October poll by CID-Gallup—an independent pollster that has been conducting political opinion surveys in the country since 2011—found that 76 percent of the country’s electorate believed the country was moving in the wrong direction. The poll reported that 19 percent of the electorate planned to vote for Ortega, 65 percent stated they would favor an opposition candidate, and 16 percent remained undecided. A rival pollster contracted by the FSLN, M&R, showed Ortega with nearly 80 percent support. While all polls should be assessed with caution given the methodological limitations to surveys conducted amid political instability and civil conflict, it is noteworthy that Ortega’s support dropped to 19 from the 33 percent support reported by a CID-Gallup survey conducted in May of this year, which in turn was down from the high point of popular support for Ortega, 54 percent, registered in CID-Gallup’s 2012 poll.
Now that the votes have been cast, it is impossible to get accurate figures for the results given that the Sandinistas control the Supreme Electoral Council and exercise a near absolute control over reporting on the results. In addition, independent foreign observers were banned, and the threat of repression has dissuaded journalists and civic organizations from speaking out.
Ortega will now start his fourth consecutive term in office since the FSLN returned to power in 2007 in the midst of economic and political crisis. With its legitimacy shattered in the aftermath of the 2018 mass uprising and its violent repression, the regime has to rely more on direct coercion to maintain control. After the economy contracted each year from 2018 to 2020, the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America estimates a 2.0 percent growth rate for the current year and 1.8 percent for 2022—not enough for the economy to recover from the three-year tumble. As the crisis has intensified, the number of Nicaraguans trying to cross the U.S.-Mexico border climbed to historically unprecedented levels to exceed 50,000 this year, compared to just a few thousand in 2020. These numbers are in addition to the 140,000 who had already fled into exile since 2018, mostly to Costa Rica.
The International Left Remains Divided on Nicaragua
The international left remains divided on the Nicaraguan crisis, with some among it arguing that the Ortega-Murillo regime represents a continuation of the 1980s revolution and that the United States has been attempting to overthrow it. However, as I showed in an earlier NACLA article, there is little evidence to corroborate the claim that the 2018 mass uprising was instigated by Washington in an attempt to carry out a coup d’état against the government, or that the United States has since carried out a destabilization campaign aimed at overthrowing the regime.
It was not until the mass protests of 2018 that the co-government pact that Ortega had negotiated with the capitalist class, organized into the Superior Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP), broke down.The Ortega inner circle hacked its way into the ranks of the country’s elite in the aftermath of the 1980s revolution and launched a new round of capitalist development starting in 2007. During this period, the Sandinista bourgeoisie set about to vastly expand its wealth. Leading Sandinistas grouped around Ortega heavily invested in tourism, agroindustry, finance, import-export, and subcontracting for the maquiladoras. Ortega and Murillo championed a program—dressed in a quasi-leftist discourse of “Christian, Socialist, and Solidarity”— of constructing a populist multiclass alliance under the firm hegemony of capital and Sandinista state elites. This model did improve material conditions until the economy began to tank in 2015. It was not until the mass protests of 2018 that the co-government pact that Ortega had negotiated with the capitalist class, organized into the Superior Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP), broke down.
Washington would have liked to have a more pliant regime in place from the start, and the recent events have upped the ante in U.S.-Nicaragua relations. Nonetheless, successive U.S. administrations accommodated themselves since 2007 to the Ortega government, which cooperated closely with the U.S. Southern Command, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and U.S. immigration policies. Although the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has supplied several million dollars to opposition civic organizations through the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), USAID also granted several hundred million dollars directly to the Ortega government from 2007 until 2018.
On the eve of the Nicaraguan vote, the U.S. Congress passed the RENACER Act, which calls for targeted sanctions on Nicaraguan government officials found guilty of human rights violations and corruption. It also requires the executive branch to determine if Nicaragua should be expelled from the Central American Free Trade Agreement and to “expand oversight” of lending to Nicaragua by international financial agencies. In 2017 the U.S. government passed almost identical legislation, the NICA Act, which to date has resulted in sanctions slapped on several dozen top Nicaraguan government officials, affecting the assets they hold in the United States.
Apart from these sanctions on individuals, however, Washington did not enforce the NICA Act. It did not apply trade sanctions and has not blocked Nicaragua from receiving billions of dollars in credits from international agencies. From 2017 to 2021, Nicaragua received a whopping $2.2 billion in aid from the Central American Bank of Economic Integration (BCIE), and in 2020-2021 it received several hundred million in credits from the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund.
Some among the international Left condemn calls for sanctions on Ortega. Yet the U.S. and international Left broadly mobilized (unsuccessfully) in 1978 and 1979 to force Washington to impose sanctions on the Somoza dictatorship and block international financing because of the regime’s gross human rights violations. The worldwide Left similarly demanded sanctions against apartheid South Africa, sought to block U.S. and international financing for the Pinochet dictatorship, and currently calls for “boycott, divestment, and sanctions” against Israel.
Grassroots opponents of the Ortega-Murillo regime find themselves between the rock of an Ortega-Murillo dictatorship and the hard place of the capitalist class and its political agents among the traditional conservative parties. The Right—just as disturbed as Ortega by the outburst of popular protest from below in the 2018 uprising—tried to hitch mass discontent to its own agenda of recovering direct political power and assuring there would be no threat to its control over the Nicaraguan economy.
It was the government’s repression of the popular uprising of students, workers, feminists, and environmentalists that paved the way for the Right’s current hegemony over the anti-Sandinista opposition. The mass of Nicaraguans—beyond the Sandinistas’ secure base in some 20 percent of the population—have not shown any enthusiasm for the traditional conservative parties and businessmen that dominate the opposition and have no real political representation. Indeed, the October CID-Gallup poll found that 77 percent of the country’s electoral does not feel represented by any political party.