Mercosur: no es proteccionismo gratuito, es seguridad alimentaria
La narrativa oficial de Bruselas presenta el acuerdo con Mercosur como una “oportunidad histórica” de apertura comercial. Sin embargo, tras los apretones de manos, se esconde una realidad que explica por qué el sector ganadero europeo está en pie de guerra. No es proteccionismo gratuito; es una cuestión de supervivencia, lealtad competitiva y seguridad alimentaria en siete puntos clave:
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María José Pizarro, jefa de debate de Iván Cepeda: “Los ocho millones de votos para el Congreso fueron nuestra consulta”
Abanderada de la unidad de la izquierda en Colombia, la senadora María José Pizarro (Bogotá, 47 años) es una de las mujeres más visibles en el Pacto Histórico, la variopinta coalición de Gobierno que se fusionó en un partido político para las elecciones de este 2026. Progresista y feminista, es también la jefa de debate de Iván Cepeda, el líder de la encuestas en la campaña para encontrarle sucesor al presidente Gustavo Petro. Cuando se posesionó, el 7 de agosto de 2022, ella fue la encargada, al borde de las lágrimas, de ponerle la banda presidencial, en una ceremonia cargada de simbolismo. María José, como la suelen llamar, es hija de Carlos Pizarro, el comandante del M-19 que firmó la paz, asesinado en 1990 cuando era candidato presidencial. El eme, como se conocía a la guerrilla a la que también perteneció Petro, persistió en ese acuerdo de paz y fue protagonista de la Asamblea Constituyente que redactó la carta política de 1991.
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Élmer Mendoza: “La situación en Sinaloa no es para estar tristes, desesperanzados”
Hace cinco años, Élmer Mendoza no daba un peso por Claudia Sheinbaum. “No le veo estatura política”, decía en una entrevista con este mismo diario, “creo que los problemas se la han comido”. Sentado en la mesa del presente, Mendoza (Culiacán, 1949) se ríe. Entonces jefa de Gobierno de la capital, la actual presidenta de México vivió momentos complicados mediado su mandato, sobre todo por la inseguridad. Pero sobrevivió. Luego ganó la interna de Morena, llegó a las elecciones y el resto es historia. “¿Sabes qué? Yo voté por ella”, dice, divertido, el escritor, “porque es mujer, científica, y porque los otros candidatos… Jajaja, ay, Dios. Ella es universitaria, de la UNAM, como yo. Dije, ‘si alguien puede hacer algo, es ella".
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Lula withdraws from Kast inauguration amid presence of Flávio Bolsonaro
Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has canceled a planned trip to Chile to attend José Antonio Kast’s inauguration on Wednesday and will instead be represented at the ceremony by Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira. Brazilian officials said the change was due to “scheduling reasons.”
María Corina Machado arrives in Chile for Kast’s inauguration and meeting with Venezuelan migrants
Venezuelan opposition leader María Corina Machado has arrived in Chile to attend Wednesday’s ceremony in which Gabriel Boric will hand over the presidency to José Antonio Kast, in a visit that also includes an event with Venezuelan residents in Santiago and several public appearances in the capital. She is among the international guests invited to the transfer of power, where Kast will formally take office at Congress in Valparaíso.
La guerra en Irán pone en suspenso el repechaje para el Mundial que se jugará en Monterrey
La ofensiva de Estados Unidos e Israel contra Irán se ha convertido en la más reciente amenaza contra la Copa del Mundo que tendrá lugar en Norteamérica este verano. Este lunes, el director técnico de la selección de Irak, Graham Arnold, ha solicitado a la FIFA aplazar el encuentro de repechaje intercontinental programado para disputarse el 31 de marzo en el Estadio BBVA de Nuevo León, casa de los Rayados de Monterrey, debido a la dificultad logística que implica el cierre del espacio aéreo en Oriente Próximo tras la escalada militar en la región.
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Colombia presidential candidates announce running mates as race narrows
Bogotá, Colombia – Iván Cepeda and Abelardo de la Espriella, two of the frontrunners to be the next Colombian president, have announced their choices for vice president following Sunday’s legislative elections and presidential primaries.
Cepeda selected Aida Quilcué, a senator and Indigenous leader, to join him on the ticket for the left-wing Historic Pact (Pacto Historico), which won the most congressional seats on Sunday. Meanwhile, de la Espriella, a hard-right outsider, announced today that he will run alongside ex-finance minister José Manuel Restrepo.
But the big winner in Sunday’s primary, right-wing Paloma Valencia of the Democratic Center (Centro Democrático) party, has yet to announce her running mate amid mounting speculation.
On Monday, Cepeda formally announced Aida Quilcué as his running mate. A leader of the Nasa Indigenous group, Quilcué has a record as a staunch defender of human rights and as an advocate for ethnic minorities in Colombia.
She was integral to the negotiation of the ethnic chapter of the 2016 peace accord with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and has been a key figure in Colombia’s Indigenous rights movement.
Last month, Quilcué made national headlines when she was kidnapped in her home state of Cauca, in the Colombian Pacific, by dissidents of the FARC.
Miguel Jaramillo Luján, a Colombian political strategist, described Cepeda’s choice of Quilcué as a “symbolic” one which entrenches his stance as an advocate of peace and human rights.
But the analyst also noted that the selection may not be the most politically savvy move: “From an electoral standpoint, I believe that this is a concentric circle and does not add much electoral power to Iván Cepeda, who I think is acting symbolically but overly prideful in this decision,” Jaramillo told Latin America Reports.
Abelardo de la Espriella, a criminal defense attorney, has styled himself as an anti-establishment political outsider. His traditional values, tough on crime campaign has been successful so far, regularly placing him in second place in presidential polls.
Today, ‘The Tiger’, as he has styled himself, announced his running mate: José Manuel Restrepo.
Restrepo is an economist at the Rosario University in Bogotá and served as President Ivan Duque’s Minister of Finance and Public Credit from May 2021 to August 2022, running the country’s finances during the COVID-19 pandemic. Before that he was Minister of Commerce, Industry, and Tourism beginning in 2018.
“I think the selection of José Manuel Restrepo… represents an attempt to counterbalance de la Espriella, who has no experience in public office,” said Jaramillo.
While de la Espriella is an outsider, he must take on Cepeda and Valencia, both sitting senators since 2014. Restrepo burnishes the criminal lawyer’s bid by adding proven governance credentials.
When announcing his running mate on Tuesday, de la Espriella said: “My choice of vice president was not driven by political calculation… it was clear to me that a renowned academic, an outstanding economist, and a highly qualified former minister and technician will undoubtedly be the best travel companion.”
On Sunday, Paloma Valencia received over 45% of votes in presidential primaries, although Cepeda and de la Espriella were both absent from the contest.
Valencia’s win, as well as her Democratic Center party’s strong showing in legislative elections – winning the second highest number of seats – bolsters her position in the presidential race, according to experts.
“From the [primaries], it’s clear that Paloma Valencia is the right-wing’s principal candidate,” Sergio Guzmán, director at Colombia Risk Analysis, a political risk consultancy, told Latin America Reports.
Before Sunday’s vote, de la Espriella had been dominating conservative polls. Now, it is unclear which conservative candidate will attract the most voters in May’s election.
Whoever emerges as the winner must face off with Cepeda and will be under pressure to win over centrist Colombians, said Guzman.
One way to achieve this is by selecting running mates with a broader appeal.
Sunday’s primaries highlighted the widespread popularity of Juan Daniel Oviedo, who was on the same list as Valencia and won 17% of the total votes. The former director of the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE), Oviedo is considered center-right and notably more moderate than Valencia.
Valencia is under mounting public pressure to pick Oviedo as her running mate, according to Jaramillo, but the two differ on key issues and Oviedo has specified strict conditions for joining Valencia’s ticket.
“We openly show fundamental differences. For example, I believe in peace,” Oviedo told Colombian radio station Caracol on Monday. “You cannot take positions that do not recognize that the [2016 peace] agreement must be implemented and that it requires more than just bullets to get rid of criminals,” he added.
Valencia has staked her campaign on law and order, promising a ‘mano dura’, or ‘iron fist’, against crime and armed groups in Colombia. Her politics follow those of her party’s founder, ex-president Álvaro Uribe, who waged war on the FARC rebels from 2002 to 2010.
Today, Valencia told Caracol that she will not compromise on this: “I am an Uribista and I have my values and principles… Neither he [Oviedo] will change nor will I change.”
But Valencia said she remains open to running alongside Oviedo, with the two due to meet today to discuss a possible joint ticket. She is also considering four other possible running mates, according to Colombian newspaper El Tiempo, with her decision due by Friday.
Jaramillo argues the best move for Valencia is not to pick Oviedo, as he is legally bound to support her as they ran under the same list in the primaries.
He believes she should distance herself from Uribe – arguing Uribistas are more likely to back de la Espriella – and instead court the moderate vote by choosing a center-left candidate.
But Guzmán says that is unlikely: “She seems to be going in a different direction.”
Featured image description: Left to right: Iván Cepeda, Paloma Valencia, Abelardo de la Espriella.
Featured image credit: @PactoCol via X / @PalomaValenciaL via X / @ABDELAESPRIELLA via X
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Petro criticizes Trump for sidelining Colombia in ‘Shield of the Americas’ anti-drug alliance
Medellín, Colombia – President Gustavo Petro spoke out against Colombia’s exclusion from Trump’s ‘Shield of the Americas’ alliance on Monday, citing his country’s vital experience in fighting drug trafficking organizations.
Petro’s criticism comes after Trump announced on Saturday a coalition of 17 Latin American and Caribbean nations that will use “lethal force” against the “terrorist networks” of drug traffickers across the region.
The first summit of the ‘Shield of Americas’, held at Trump’s Miami golf club, invited delegates from predominantly right-wing and center-right governments, including key White House allies like Argentina, Ecuador, and El Salvador.
“The only way to defeat these enemies is by unleashing the power of our militaries,” Trump said on Saturday following the meeting.
But on Monday, speaking at a United Nations narcotics summit in Vienna, Petro defended his country’s record of confiscating cocaine and suggested Trump’s alliance would be weaker without his nation’s participation.
“Colombia has the most sophisticated intelligence capabilities to seize goods… without killing anyone,” he said.
While recognising that such political alliances are a matter of “free political understanding,” the president also maintained that “with 17 small, weak countries lacking experience in dealing with cocaine, you cannot make a southern shield; it will be punctured.”
He highlighted Colombia’s existing alliances with 75 nations and the record 3300 tonnes of cocaine that have been seized under his government.
Petro also celebrated Colombia’s strategy of crop substitution programmes which he called a “true revolution in how to address coca leaf production”. The programme, which aims to help farmers replace coca leaf production with legal, sustainable crops, has converted 42,000 hectares of farmland, according to Petro.
Mexican President Claudia Shaienbaum was also absent, despite Trump stressing, “the epicentre of cartel violence is Mexico.”
The summit came a week after the inaugural Americas Counter Cartel Conference, which similarly excluded Petro and Sheinbaum.
Dr Christopher Sabantini, researcher at Chatham House, criticized the shield of the Americas: “[it is] misguided to believe that a summit of only like-minded leaders can establish a meaningful basis for long-term shared principles and cooperation.” He added that the absence of Colombia, Mexico, and Brazil was a “fundamental flaw”.
At Saturday’s summit, Trump also warned of the prospect of action against Cuba, saying that the island state was in its “last moments.”
“As we achieve a historic transformation in Venezuela, we’re also looking forward to the great change that will soon be coming to Cuba,” the president said.
Feature image: Petro speaking at the UN meeting in Vienna.
Image credit: @petrogustavo via X.
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A jungle pipeline explosion exposes Peru’s fragile gas system
Lima, Peru — A pipeline explosion in southern Peru last week has triggered an energy crisis, exposing a structural vulnerability little known outside the country: Peru relies almost entirely on a single natural gas transport system to supply its economy.
The incident occurred on March 1 at kilometer 43 of the Camisea Gas Project pipeline operated by Transportadora de Gas del Perú, in the province of La Convención, in the Cusco region.
Following the blast, authorities suspended the gas flow while repair work is carried out.
The government declared a 14-day national emergency and activated a rationing mechanism to prioritize gas for households, electricity generation, and public transportation.
The consequences were immediate: long lines of vehicles formed at service stations in Lima and other cities as drivers searched for gasoline or gas.
“I work with natural gas vehicles because it’s cheaper. Now they tell me to use gasoline, but that means I practically earn nothing,” Carlos Quispe, a taxi driver in Lima, told Peru Reports. “Many of us live day to day. If the gas doesn’t come back soon, thousands of families will lose their income.”
At many stations, vehicle natural gas (CNG) has been restricted exclusively to public transport buses, leaving taxis and private cars without access.
“We do have priority to fill up with gas, but we’re still going from station to station until we find one that has it,” said José Ramírez, a public bus driver in Lima. “If the gas also runs out for us, the city’s transportation system will come to a halt,” he told Peru Reports.
A vulnerable system
The central problem is not only the explosion but the structure of Peru’s energy system.
Gas produced in Camisea — one of South America’s largest energy projects — travels hundreds of kilometers from the Amazon to the coast through a single pipeline corridor.
When that system fails, the impact spreads across the entire country. That scenario became reality this week.
In Peru, nearly 40% of electricity is generated using natural gas. In addition, thousands of industries and millions of households depend on it for cooking, heating water, or fueling vehicles.
A domino effect on the economy
The impact has already reached consumers. In just a few days, gasoline prices rose by between 2 and 3 soles per gallon ($0.50 and $0.80 per gallon) at several service stations. The price of household gas cylinders has also begun to increase in different regions of the country.
A difficult debut for the minister
The crisis has also become the first major test for the new Minister of Energy and Mines, Angelo Alfaro, who took office shortly before the incident.
At a press conference, Alfaro called for calm, but his remarks sparked controversy.
“We don’t have a magic wand to fix things. If taxi fares go up because of this situation, anyone who wants to take a taxi will have to pay,” he said.
The minister’s comments were criticized by some political sectors and transport unions, who argue that the crisis particularly affects informal workers and low-income families.
The situation is also unfolding amid rising global oil prices following the U.S. and Israel’s attack on Iran.
According to Felipe Cantuarias, president of the Peruvian Society of Hydrocarbons, the country faces strong exposure to international markets.
“In terms of gasoline, we are facing a perfect storm. The increase in gasoline, diesel, and LPG prices is linked to the international context, to the conflict in the Middle East. Today the market opened with crude at $107 per barrel, and that hits us very hard. We import 75% of our diesel and gasoline and 30% of our LPG — we are completely exposed,” he explained on March 9 to Exitosa.
A debate over the country’s energy future
The crisis has also reopened the debate about energy security in Peru. Experts say the country needs to invest in infrastructure to prevent a single incident from paralyzing the system.
Measures under discussion include building a backup pipeline, installing a liquefied natural gas import terminal on the coast, and accelerating exploration of new gas fields.
“It’s incredible that Peru has natural gas — which is 90% cheaper than diesel and gasoline — and yet many regions still do not have access,” Cantuarias said.
For now, the government hopes that repairs to the pipeline will allow supply to be restored within about 14 days. However, even if the crisis is resolved quickly, Peru will remain dependent on fragile infrastructure despite possessing significant natural gas reserves.
Featured image: The Camisea gas field, in the department of Cusco
Image credit: Agencia Andina
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Nicaraguan regime funds repression of opposition in exile: UN report
Medellín, Colombia – The government of Nicaragua is illegally diverting public funds to finance the repression of exiles abroad, according to a United Nations Human Rights Office report published this Tuesday.
Through analysis of documents and interviews dating back to 2018, the report concludes that the government’s repression could constitute crimes against humanity.
“Political persecution is financed by the State, executed through its institutions, and extended across borders to ensure that no one – absolutely no one – stands in the way of the regime,” said Chair of the Group of Human Rights Experts, Jan-Michael Simon.
The report details how public funds destined for welfare programmes have been misused to finance repression through pro-government armed groups, digital surveillance, and harassment to neutralise critics across the diaspora.
The network of repression incorporates members of the police, army, migration officers and ambassadors who surveil exiles and their families abroad.
This transnational repression has fostered a “climate of fear and suspicion” leading to “widespread self-censorship and social isolation” amongst exiled Nicaraguans. Last June, the former Sandinista turned government critic Roberto Samcam was assassinated at his home in Costa Rica.
Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo, married co-presidents of the Central American nation deemed a dictatorship by international organizations and governments, increased their repressive tactics following anti-government protests in 2018 which left over 300 people dead.
Since the beginning of their premiership the country has witnessed democratic backsliding and a concentration of power. The ruling Sandinista Liberation Front (FSLN) has effectively gained one-party state control. Ahead of the 2021 elections, six presidential candidates were imprisoned on “treason” charges to ensure Ortega’s reelection.
The report details that since 2023, 452 Nicaraguans have had their nationality removed while thousands more exiles have had requests to renew their identity documents refused. Those left effectively stateless include politicians, human rights defenders, and members of the Catholic church.
According to the UN, the state’s repression has also targeted women and LGBTIQ+ people through sexualized violence and the destruction of feminist groups.
The report emphasizes that due to the Nicaraguan government’s refusal to cooperate with the UN, international accountability including existing sanctions from the United Kingdom, United States, and European Union remain critical.
Featured image: 2018 protests in Masaya, Nicaragua.
Image credit: Jorge Mejía Peralta. License.
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Is Haiti Becoming The Caribbean’s First Drone War Zone?

News Americas, NEW YORK, NY, Tues. Mar. 10, 2026: Haiti’s escalating security crisis may be entering a troubling new phase: the growing use of explosive drones in densely populated neighborhoods. A new report from Human Rights Watch warns that armed quadcopter drones used in security operations have killed more than 1,200 people in Haiti since 2025, raising serious concerns about civilian casualties and potential extrajudicial killings.

According to the report, Haitian security forces and private contractors working with them have conducted at least 141 drone strike operations between March 1, 2025, and January 21, 2026, killing 1,243 people and injuring 738 others. Among the dead are at least 43 adults who were reportedly not members of criminal groups and 17 children, highlighting the dangers of deploying explosive drones in densely populated urban areas.
“Dozens of ordinary people, including many children, have been killed and injured in these lethal drone operations,” said Juanita Goebertus, Americas director at Human Rights Watch. “Haitian authorities should urgently rein in the security forces and private contractors working for them before more children die.”
Human Rights Watch says the attacks have been carried out using quadcopter drones armed with explosives, capable of maneuvering between buildings while transmitting live video feeds to operators controlling the strikes remotely.
The United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti attributes the drone operations to a specialized “Task Force” created by Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé, reportedly operating with support from Vectus Global, a private military company. The U.S. ambassador to Haiti has confirmed that the U.S. State Department issued a license allowing Vectus Global to export defense services to Haiti.
Neither the Haitian government, the Haitian National Police, nor Vectus Global responded to requests for comment from Human Rights Watch regarding the strikes.
The report notes that the number of drone attacks has surged in recent months, with 57 operations reported between November and January 21, nearly double the 29 reported from August through October. More than 40 percent of reported killings occurred between December 1 and January 21, suggesting a sharp escalation in the use of drone warfare-style tactics in the capital.
One of the deadliest incidents occurred on September 20, 2025, in the Simon Pelé neighborhood of Port-au-Prince, where a drone carrying an explosive detonated near the “Nan Pak” recreation complex during a gathering organized by a local criminal group.
Human Rights Watch found that 10 people who were not members of criminal groups — including nine children between the ages of 3 and 12 – were killed in the blast.
Witnesses described scenes of chaos as families rushed to help the wounded.
“I heard the sound of the explosion,” said a woman who lost both her husband and her three-year-old daughter in the strike. “My husband and daughter were together at the place where my husband makes his crafts.… There was panic, and I wanted to go and see what had happened.”
Another mother said her six-year-old daughter had been playing near the complex when the drone exploded.
“When I arrived near the vendor, I heard an explosion. It was chaos, people were mutilated, there were noises everywhere,” she said. “It was full of children. Many people were dead.”
Doctors who treated victims reported severe blast injuries, including traumatic amputations, complex fractures, and fragmentation wounds caused by the explosion.
Human Rights Watch researchers also reviewed videos circulating on social media showing drones striking vehicles, buildings, and individuals in Port-au-Prince neighborhoods including Martissant and Village de Dieu. In several cases, the footage did not appear to show targets engaged in violent acts at the time of the strike.
Residents say the drones have become a constant source of fear.
“I live with this fear, this anxiety, all the time,” said a shopkeeper living in Martissant, one of the neighborhoods affected by the strikes. “I pray that the drones will no longer be in our area.” The woman fled the explosion but returned to the scene a few minutes later, where she found her cousin dead. She said that she had been unable to recover the body because she would have had to pay criminal groups for the remains.
She stated that she had not seen or heard any sign of a threat before the explosion. “I was on the phone with my cousin when the explosion happened, so I knew that her [truck] had been hit, but I don’t know why they hit that [truck],” she said.
While Haitian authorities have argued that the operations are necessary to combat heavily armed criminal groups controlling large parts of the capital, human rights advocates warn that explosive drones are difficult to use safely in crowded urban environments.
Human Rights Watch said the strikes may violate international human rights law, which requires that lethal force in law enforcement operations be used only when strictly unavoidable to protect life.
“Restoring security in Haiti is essential,” Goebertus said. “But unlawful attacks with armed drones are adding a new layer of abuses to the violence that has devastated communities for years.”
The organization is calling on Haitian authorities to halt the use of explosive drones in populated areas, investigate alleged unlawful killings, and ensure accountability for any violations of international law.
As Haiti struggles to contain gang violence and restore stability, the report raises a stark question: whether the country’s security strategy is turning parts of its capital into something resembling a drone battlefield – a development with profound implications for civilian safety and the future of law enforcement in the Caribbean.
Rihanna’s Fenty Beauty To Launch In Guyana

News Americas, NY, NY, Tues. Mar. 10, 2026: When Rihanna launched Fenty Beauty in 2017, she did more than introduce another celebrity cosmetics line – she reshaped the global beauty industry by putting diversity at the center of product design. Nearly a decade later, that same vision is now returning to the Caribbean in a deeply symbolic way.

On March 28, 2026, Fenty Beauty and Fenty Skin will officially launch in another CARICOM country – this time Guyana, marking one of the most culturally meaningful expansions yet for Rihanna’s global beauty empire.
The brand will debut exclusively at Glamour Beauty in Movietowne Mall in Guyana, bringing the internationally celebrated cosmetics line to a country that holds personal significance for the billionaire entrepreneur.
Rihanna’s mother, Monica Braithwaite, is Guyanese, while her late father was Barbadian. The singer herself was born in Barbados – a blend of Caribbean identities that has shaped her global brand story.
“I am so excited to FINALLY bring Fenty Beauty, Skin and Fragrance brands to the Caribbean,” said Rihanna. “I know the community has been waiting a long time and we can’t wait for you to experience the brand and try the products in a place that’s near and dear to my heart.”
The arrival of Fenty Beauty in Guyana reflects a broader shift in how Caribbean heritage influences global industries. For decades, Caribbean consumers were primarily recipients of international brands rather than drivers of them. Rihanna changed that narrative.
With products designed for every skin tone and cultural background, Fenty Beauty quickly became one of the most disruptive forces in cosmetics history, forcing major brands worldwide to expand their shade ranges and rethink representation.
Now, bringing the brand deeper into the Caribbean represents a full-circle moment: a global product shaped by Caribbean identity returning to Caribbean consumers.
Among the products expected to debut in Guyana are Fenty’s signature items, including:
• Pro Filt’r Soft Matte Longwear Foundation, known for its 50 inclusive shades
• Gloss Bomb Universal Lip Luminizer, a high-shine cult favorite
• Hydra Vizor Invisible Moisturizer SPF 30, designed to blend seamlessly across skin tones
• Fenty Treatz Hydrating Lip Oils, infused with nourishing fruit oils
The timing of the expansion also intersects with Guyana’s rapidly growing economy, fueled by its emerging oil industry and expanding middle class.
As international brands increasingly recognize Guyana’s rising consumer market, Rihanna’s decision to launch there reinforces the country’s growing presence in the Caribbean retail landscape. For many Guyanese consumers, however, the moment is less about luxury cosmetics and more about cultural recognition.
Fenty Beauty’s philosophy – that beauty should reflect the diversity of the world – resonates strongly across Caribbean societies long overlooked by global beauty standards.
The launch also comes amid a tense moment for the singer after a Florida woman was arrested this week following gunfire outside Rihanna’s Los Angeles-area home. Authorities confirmed the singer was inside at the time but unharmed. Ivana Lisette Ortiz, of Florida, has now been booked for attempted murder. Bail has been set at more than $10 million. Ortiz’ criminal record from Florida shows several incidents of domestic violence dating back to 2023. The 35-year-old was arrested on Sunday, March 8, 2026, after shots rang out outside Rihanna’s Beverly Glen property.
Despite the unsettling incident, Rihanna’s brand expansion continues to move forward, reinforcing her role not only as a global pop icon but as one of the Caribbean diaspora’s most powerful entrepreneurs.
With Fenty Beauty now officially arriving in Guyana, the message is clear: Caribbean influence in global culture is no longer peripheral. It is leading.
Empowering Half The World: Why Women And Girls Must Lead The Future Of The Commonwealth

By Dr. Isaac Newton
News Americas, NEW YORK, NY, Tues. Mar. 10, 2026: At the opening of the first interactive retreat session of the Commonwealth Foreign Affairs Ministers Meeting (CFAMM), Dr. Denzil L. Douglas, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, International Trade, Industry, Commerce and Consumer Affairs, Economic Development and Investment of Saint Kitts and Nevis, paid tribute, honor and recognition to the women and girls of the Federation and across the world. Addressing colleagues from across the Commonwealth of Nations, he reminded the gathering that the progress of nations is closely tied to how deliberately societies cultivate the potential of their women and girls. His remarks placed their contributions not at the margins of development but at the center of global progress.

Across the Caribbean and throughout the Commonwealth, women quietly sustain the reality of daily life. They guide families through uncertainty, shape the minds of future leaders in classrooms, build enterprises that energize local economies, and strengthen the social fabric of communities. In small island states such as Saint Kitts and Nevis, the steady influence of women is visible in every sector from education and healthcare to entrepreneurship and public service. Yet the pathways to leadership and opportunity remain narrower than they should be, leaving much of this talent underutilized.
It was within this context that Dr. Douglas offered a powerful reflection to the ministers gathered. “We must never sell our multilateral organisation short by failing to more greatly empower our women and girls of the Commonwealth.” His statement carried a simple but profound logic. When international institutions overlook the abilities, ideas, and leadership of women, they weaken the very cooperation they seek to strengthen. Multilateralism reaches its full purpose only when the voices shaping global decisions mirror the diversity of the people those decisions affect.
The Caribbean already offers compelling illustrations of what becomes possible when women are given room to lead. Women entrepreneurs are designing new economic possibilities in tourism, technology, and agriculture. Women educators are nurturing critical thinkers and innovators whose ideas will shape the next generation. Women in governance are bringing thoughtful perspectives to policy discussions that influence the direction of national development. Each advancement expands the horizon for young girls who are watching closely and learning what leadership can look like.
The message that emerges from the Commonwealth dialogue is not abstract. It is practical and immediate. Nations that invest in the education, confidence, and leadership opportunities of women and girls expand their own capacity to solve problems and imagine new futures. The recognition offered by Dr. Douglas at the CFAMM retreat signals a commitment that extends beyond words. When women and girls are equipped to participate fully in shaping their societies, the possibilities for the Commonwealth and for the world widen in ways that benefit everyone.
EDITOR’S NOTE: Dr. Isaac Newton is a globally experienced thought leader, Harvard, Princeton, and Columbia-trained strategist, and advocate for social justice and leadership excellence. With over thirty years of experience bridging cultural, economic, and ideological divides, he translates strategy into measurable results. His work spans governance, economic development, and public policy, consistently delivering initiatives that create employment, strengthen institutions, and advance sustainable growth across the Caribbean.
Newgen Hosts High-Impact Executive Roundtable in Guyana to Shape the Future of AI-first Decision Intelligence

GEORGETOWN, Guyana, March 10, 2026 /PRNewswire/ — Newgen Software, a global provider of an AI-first unified digital transformation platform, successfully hosted an exclusive Executive Roundtable on ‘The AI Decisioning Layer for Scaling Speed and Trust’ at the Marriott, Georgetown, bringing together some of Guyana’s most influential banking and insurance leaders. The closed-door, peer-led forum brought together the country’s leading CXO-level executives for a focused conversation on how AI-first decision intelligence can transform financial services amid a rapidly evolving market landscape.

With growing customer expectations and regulatory frameworks, financial institutions across Guyana are looking to deliver instant onboarding, faster credit decisions, seamless policy servicing, and fully traceable, regulator-ready processes. Discussions focused on unifying Content Intelligence, Communication Intelligence, and Data Intelligence to create a single decisioning layer that drives accuracy, transparency, and speed. The roundtable explored how these imperatives can be met by embedding intelligence into the core pillars of customer journeys.
Participants also reflected on challenges unique to the region, including the need for faster credit turnaround, improved portfolio visibility, reduced risk leakage, and stronger customer trust. Aligned with the Government’s strategic vision for a ‘Digital Guyana,’ the discussion also highlighted the growing mandate for commercial banks to expand financial inclusion by offering online account opening, digital loan origination, and seamless electronic payments. The recent foundational completion of the National Payments System (NPS) was recognized as a major milestone in advancing the country’s digital financial ecosystem, promoting wider adoption of digital payment platforms and financial technology. Speakers emphasized the growing responsibility of financial institutional leaders to champion secure, future-ready digital frameworks that keep their organizations relevant, competitive, and resilient as Guyana advances toward a modern, inclusive economy.
Randir Ramkissoon and Shawn Gurcharran from Guyana Bank for Trade and Industry (GBTI), shared frontline perspectives on digital transformation challenges and opportunities within Guyana’s banking sector.
Expressing his views on the significance of the event, Manish Kumar Dugar, Newgen’s Head of Strategic Accounts in the region, stated, “AI-first decision intelligence isn’t just an aspiration, it’s a strategic imperative. Today’s financial leaders are navigating rising customer expectations and complex regulatory landscapes; at this roundtable, we collectively examined how smarter decisioning can drive speed, control, and trust simultaneously.”
Newgen reaffirmed its commitment to supporting Guyana’s financial ecosystem through continued engagement, capacity-building, and future curated leadership forums focused on accelerating AI-powered transformation across the region. The session concluded with lunch and networking over drinks, fostering deeper industry collaboration and knowledge-sharing.
About Newgen Software
Newgen is the leading provider of an AI-first unified digital transformation platform with native process automation, content services, customer engagement, and AI/ML capabilities. Globally, successful enterprises rely on Newgen’s industry-recognized low-code application platform to develop and deploy complex, content-driven, and customer-engaging business applications on the cloud. From onboarding to service requests, lending to underwriting, and for many more use cases across industries, Newgen unlocks simple with speed and agility.
For more details, visit www.newgensoft.com

Excremento por todas partes y perros sin correa: a la caza de los dueños irresponsables en la Alcaldía Cuauhtémoc
Un paseo por alguna de las concurridas colonias de la alcaldía Cuauhtémoc arroja distintos panoramas. En algunas partes, es común encontrarse con basura tirada en las calles, mientras que en otras zonas es menos frecuente que los desechos sean parte del paisaje. De vez en cuando, un recordatorio desagradable de la irresponsabilidad de los dueños de mascotas también se percibe, uno que, sobre todo en un espacio público, se convierte en un problema de todos. El combate a esta problemática ha sido ampliamente difundido desde la alcaldía Cuauhtémoc que ha publicado en sus redes sociales las remisiones a juzgados cívicos por esta falta, en una especie de humillación pública para los infractores cuya cara, que no es reconocible, recuerda a las detenciones anunciadas por la Fiscalía de la República.
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U.S. reportedly closing in on economic deal with Cuba
The Trump administration is reportedly close to announcing an economic deal with Cuba, according to USA Today.
Sources “with knowledge of the administration’s plans” told the U.S. daily newspaper that the planned deal could loosen travel restrictions for Americans going to the island, allow the current leadership (including Raúl Castro and current President Miguel Díaz-Canel) a political exit strategy (as well as continued residence on the island) and involve agreements on “[Cuban] ports, energy and tourism”.
Since the military operation to remove Cuba’s ally and Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro from power, the Trump administration has employed a campaign of maximum economic and political pressure against Cuba, cutting off foreign oil imports to the nation and declaring the Cuban government an “unusual and extraordinary threat” to the United States.
The Trump policies were a mere exacerbation of pre-existing economic and political American sanctions against the island; the U.S. has maintained an economic embargo against Cuba since 1962 and considers Cuba a state sponsor of terrorism.
The prospect of an economic deal between Havana and Washington has long been a possibility: U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has previously suggested that the U.S. may ease pressure on Cuba if the government introduces reforms to liberalize the economy.
There have also been reports that Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agents had been negotiating with Colonel Alejandro Castro Espín, the son of Raúl Castro and nephew of Cuban revolutionary leader Fidel Castro, in Mexico about a transition on the island that would see economic, as opposed to political, change.
According to ABC, the proposed transition would involve allowing American companies to do business in key sectors of the Cuban economy, such as energy, tourism, banking and telecommunications. In return, the U.S. would lift their economic embargo against the island, which has lasted more than six decades.
The nature of the potential imminent economic deal seems, so far, to resemble that of the reported negotiation in Mexico.
Although there has been no official confirmation of these particular negotiations, the Trump and Díaz-Canel administrations appear to have been engaged in some form of dialogue for weeks at least.

Dr Robert Burrell, a Senior Research Fellow with the Global and National Security Institute and conflict specialist at the University of South Florida and U.S. veteran, spoke to Latin America Reports about the various possibilities for a settlement between the U.S. and Cuba.
“I do not anticipate a U.S. military intervention in Cuba. A free and democratic Cuba has little to offer in terms of economic benefits to the United States, and I think the Trump administration will view U.S. blood and treasure as not worth the cost”, Burrell argued.
Instead, the conflict specialist suggested that “the last business roundtable he [President Trump] had to support Venezuelan oil production would serve as a model for a similar effort with Cuba”.
At that particular roundtable meeting, which was attended by over a dozen oil executives and the press, Trump attempted to leverage the Maduro operation and America’s consequent political influence over Venezuela to convince oil giants to invest in the South American country.
Although Maduro’s former Vice President Delcy Rodríguez remains in power, the U.S. now holds enormous sway over the Venezuelan economy through management of all bank accounts that hold royalty, tax and dividend payments from Venezuelan oil production.
This formula of negotiating preferential access to a former adversary’s economy whilst enforcing limited political change could be replicated by the Trump administration in Cuba.
Featured Image: Members of Cubans4Trump, a grassroots coalition of Cuban-American supporters of Donald Trump, celebrate his first inauguration in 2017
Image Credit: Voice of America via picryl
License: Creative Commons Licenses
The post U.S. reportedly closing in on economic deal with Cuba appeared first on Latin America Reports.
10 Immigrants Have Now Died In ICE Custody In 2026

By Felicia J. Persaud
News Americas, NEW YORK, NY, Mon. Mar. 9, 2026: The number of immigrants who have died in U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) custody this year has climbed to 10 in just the first 61 days of 2026. The latest death was that of a Caribbean immigrant.
Emanuel Cleeford Damas of Haiti died March 2, 2026, while in ICE custody at HonorHealth Scottsdale Osborn Medical Center in Scottsdale, Arizona. According to ICE, Damas “was pronounced dead at 1:12 p.m. after becoming unresponsive.”
“Despite lifesaving efforts by facility staff, Damas died,” ICE said in a March 6 statement. A physician reported that the preliminary cause of death remains unknown.
ICE said Damas had been hospitalized days earlier after complaining of shortness of breath. However, his family said his concerns about a toothache went unanswered before he received proper medical treatment. ICE maintains that medical screening conducted when Damas entered custody in September did not reveal any serious medical issues.
Damas was admitted to the hospital again in February, when his family said doctors told them he was being treated for pneumonia. The family has requested an independent autopsy to determine the exact cause of death. ICE denies that Damas was refused emergency medical care and says the agency remains “committed to ensuring that all those in custody reside in safe, secure and humane environments.”
Before his hospitalization, Damas reportedly called family members several times a day from the Florence Detention Center in Arizona.
Damas had been arrested by the Boston Police Department for assault and battery on Sept. 14, 2025. ICE Boston arrested him the following day at the Nashua Street Jail and placed him into custody under the Laken Riley Act, which mandates detention of individuals with pending immigration cases who may pose a public safety risk.
Another immigrant death occurred just a day earlier.
Pejman Karshenas Najafabadi, a 59-year-old Iranian national, died March 1, 2026, at Merit Health Hospital in Natchez, Mississippi, after suffering cardiac arrest. ICE said he was pronounced deceased at approximately 6:32 p.m. despite lifesaving efforts by hospital staff. Najafabadi had been hospitalized since Feb. 20.
He had a documented medical history including cardiac arrest, inflammation of the heart, and methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus (MRSA). Najafabadi had entered the United States in 1991 as a lawful permanent resident but had been convicted of several crimes over the years, including conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, possession of fentanyl, and theft.
February alone saw three additional deaths in ICE custody.
Alberto Gutierrez-Reyes, a 48-year-old immigrant from Mexico convicted of inflicting corporal injury on a spouse, died Feb. 27 at Victor Valley Global Medical Center in Victorville, California. He had been hospitalized for chest pain and shortness of breath and was pronounced dead at 12:58 a.m.
On Feb. 16, Jairo Garcia-Hernandez, a 27-year-old migrant from Guatemala convicted of criminal possession of a weapon and impersonating an officer, died at Larkin Community Hospital in Miami after collapsing and becoming unresponsive.
That same day, Lorth Sim, a 59-year-old Cambodian national with prior convictions, was found unresponsive in his cell at the Miami Correctional Facility in Miami County. Despite lifesaving efforts by staff and emergency responders, he was pronounced dead at 7:10 a.m. His cause of death remains under investigation.
Five immigrants also died in ICE custody in January.
They include Geraldo Lunas Campos, a 55-year-old Cuban national who died Jan. 3 at Camp East Montana after experiencing medical distress; Luis Gustavo Nunez Caceres, a 42-year-old Honduran migrant who died Jan. 5 at HCA Houston Healthcare in Conroe after being admitted for chronic heart-related conditions; Victor Manuel Diaz, a 36-year-old Nicaraguan immigrant who died Jan. 14 at Camp East Montana in El Paso; Heber Sanchaz Domínguez, a 34-year-old Mexican national who died Jan. 14 at the Robert A. Deyton Detention Center in Georgia; and Parady La, a 46-year-old Cambodian national who died Jan. 9 at Thomas Jefferson University Hospital in Philadelphia.
According to ICE, all of the deaths remain under investigation.
Felicia J. Persaud is the founder and publisher of NewsAmericasNow.com, the only daily syndicated newswire and digital platform dedicated exclusively to Caribbean Diaspora and Black immigrant news across the Americas.
Women’s Day rallies in Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay focused on femicide, austerity and public funding
International Women’s Day rallies in Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay this weekend produced a shared Southern Cone agenda: opposition to gender-based violence, demands for sustained public policies and warnings about the impact of economic strain and state cutbacks on women’s lives. In Brazil, the message centered on rising femicide; in Argentina, on a strike-backed protest against President Javier Milei’s austerity drive; and in Uruguay, on demands for more funding to enforce gender-violence laws and renewed attention to vicarious violence.
Historic Pact and Democratic Center lead Colombia’s Senate race after legislative vote
Historic Pact, the left-wing coalition linked to President Gustavo Petro, and the Democratic Center, led by former president Alvaro Uribe, were on Sunday emerging as the two main forces in Colombia’s Senate for the 2026-2030 term, according to preliminary pre-count results. Colombia’s electoral authority, the Registraduría, was publishing official real-time results on its election portal, while local media reported that Senate bulletin 25 showed Historic Pact with 3,599,411 votes and Democratic Center with 2,473,529.
Trump launches anti-cartel coalition, says Cuba regime “in its final days”
U.S. President Donald Trump on Saturday opened the first Shield of the Americas summit in Doral, Florida, bringing together a group of like-minded Latin American and Caribbean leaders to unveil a new regional security alliance focused on fighting drug cartels. In his remarks, he said Cuba was “very much at the end of the line,” claimed Havana wanted to negotiate with Washington, and said his administration had formally recognized the interim government of Delcy Rodríguez in Venezuela as diplomatic ties between the two countries were being restored.
Costa Rica 2026: Political Continuity and Signs of Democratic Erosion
By Ilka Treminio-Sánchez, Political Scientist of the University of Costa Rica.
The national elections held in Costa Rica on February 1, 2026, marked a turning point in the country’s recent political trajectory. Contrary to expectations of a runoff—common in a highly fragmented party system—the ruling party candidate, Laura Fernández, won in the first round with 48.3 percent of votes counted. This result not only ensured the continuity of the political project championed by President Rodrigo Chaves but also consolidated a deeper transformation of the Costa Rican political system.
The election saw a 69 percent voter turnout, the highest since 2010. This increase can be interpreted as a sign of civic revitalization, but also as a consequence of growing polarization. During the campaign, two distinct blocs emerged: on one side, the ruling party, organized around Chaves’s personalistic leadership; on the other, a fragmented opposition that, despite its ideological differences, shared concerns about the country’s institutional direction, and which ultimately consolidated most of its votes around the National Liberation Party. In the run up to the election, supporters of traditional and emerging parties came together. Concerned about the country’s democracy, they spontaneously organized various forms of collective action outside event venues. These activities culminated in the so-called “multicolored caravans,” named for the diversity of party flags displayed under the unifying slogan: “Out with Chaves!” But, despite such mobilizations, and in line with poll results, the opposition did not advance to a runoff.
From an organizational standpoint, the process was impeccable. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal once again demonstrated high standards of transparency and efficiency, reaffirming the technical soundness of the Costa Rican electoral system. However, this procedural strength contrasts sharply with the political tensions that accumulated during Chaves’s presidency, characterized by a confrontational discourse toward oversight bodies and the judiciary.
The Ruling Party and the Construction of Continuity
Fernández’s victory cannot be understood without considering the central role of the outgoing president. Although constitutionally barred from immediate reelection, Chaves devised a succession strategy based on personal loyalty and the symbolic transfer of his leadership. The official campaign revolved around the slogan “continuity of change,” presenting Fernández as the custodian of the president’s political mandate and as its guarantor of continued power.
The electoral vehicle was the Sovereign People’s Party (PPSO), created after Chaves fell out with the leadership of the Social Democratic Progress Party, with which he rose to power in 2022. The reorganization allowed it to concentrate the vote and achieve not only the presidency, but also 31 of the 57 legislative seats, an absolute majority unprecedented in recent decades.
This result substantially alters the conditions for governance. While previous administrations had to govern with small and fragmented factions, the new government will have a robust parliamentary group, although of late some friction has emerged among its leaders. Nevertheless, only the National Liberation Party – historically the most dominant political force in Costa Rica – had achieved a similar number of representatives in 1982, during an exceptional economic crisis.
This legislative majority opens the door to the possibility of far-reaching political reforms. During his presidency, Chaves repeatedly expressed interest in expanding the executive branch’s powers, limiting oversight bodies’ authority, and promoting a transformation of the state that his supporters call the “Third Republic,” a successive step in the destruction of the Second Republic inherited after the 1948 Civil War, whose foundations were laid by the liberationist José Figueres Ferrer. Without a supermajority, such reforms were not feasible. Today, the balance of power looks different.
During the transition period, two unprecedented decisions were announced. First, the president-elect expressed her intention to appoint Rodrigo Chaves as Minister of the Presidency, the sole responsible for coordinating actions between the executive and legislative branches. Second, the outgoing president appointed Laura Fernández as Minister of the Presidency for the remaining months of the administration. Chaves also stated that, in his future role, he would seek to bring on board members of the National Liberation Party to form the supermajority necessary to approve constitutional reforms.
Populism, Leadership, and Institutional Tensions
Rodrigo Chaves’s governing style represented a break with traditional Costa Rican political patterns. His confrontational rhetoric, directed against media outlets, public universities, judges, and opposition members of parliament, reinforced an anti-establishment narrative that resonated with sectors disillusioned with the status quo. His rhetoric fits into the political model followed by other populist presidents on the continent.
Surveys conducted by the Center for Political Research and Studies (CIEP) at the University of Costa Rica showed that his supporters primarily valued his ability to “impose order” and “produce results.” These attributes reflect a social demand for strong leadership and swift decisions, even if such an approach creates tension with the deliberative procedures inherent in liberal democracy.
In this sense, the Costa Rican case fits into a broader regional trend. The political and inspirational affinity with Salvadorian President Nayib Bukele’s influence was evident throughout the campaign, particularly regarding public safety and proposals to toughen the prison system. Likewise, the first congratulatory messages to Fernández came from far-right figures such as Chilean president-elect Antonio Kast, and Mexican media figure Eduardo Verástegui, suggesting the integration of Costa Rica’s new leadership into transnational conservative-right networks. This realignment does not necessarily imply a break with traditional partners, but it does signal an ideological shift that redefines the country’s international standing.
Security, Social Cohesion, and a Democratic Future
The new government’s main challenge will be public security. The sustained increase in homicides and expansion of organized crime have eroded Costa Rica’s reputation as a peaceful exception in Central America. Policies implemented so far have been lax and ineffective, to the point that candidates labeled them permissive during the campaign debates.
Added to this are structural problems: the deterioration of the education system, the strain on the healthcare system, and the weakening of environmental policies that historically formed part of a national consensus. These issues not only affect social well-being but also undermine the legitimacy of a democratic system seemingly unable to improve the situation.
The 2026 elections do not simply represent a change or continuity of political parties. They reflect a reconfiguration of the political system around a personalistic leadership that combines right-wing populism, social conservatism, an evangelical agenda, and challenges to institutional checks and balances. The electoral strength of the ruling party is undeniable; so too is the broad-based support it received.
The underlying concern is undoubtedly that the new continuity government could further the trajectory of democratic erosion. When anti-institutional rhetoric is legitimized by those in power and the political concentration of that power is presented as a condition for effective governance, the risk is not an abrupt collapse but rather an incremental erosion.
For a society with a long tradition of stability and the rule of law, the central challenge will be to rebuild a minimal consensus around respect for horizontal checks and balances and pluralistic deliberation. The continuity of Chaves’s political project opens a new cycle. Its outcome will depend not only on the Executive and its legislative majority, but also on the capacity of the citizenry and institutions to maintain the balances that have historically defined Costa Rican democracy.
Re-imagining the Americas Through Culture Amid an Increasingly Fragmented Hemisphere
Source: Wikimedia Commons
By Felipe Rezende, Research Fellow and Visiting Scholar in Residence at American University’s Center for Latin American and Latino Studies (AU-CLALS), from the University of Brasília (UnB), Brazil.
In the current context of jingoistic nationalisms and divisive political projects, particularly in the United States, where the current Trump administration has intensified a political agenda anchored in anti-immigration discourse and practices, reflecting upon the challenges and opportunities for re-imagining what people across the America’s might have in common, in terms of identity, culture and shared belong, is at present particularly important. Contemporary cultural developments such as Bad Bunny’s performance at the Super Bowl LX and Brazil’s global awarded film industry illustrate how notions of “American” belonging can also be culturally and politically contentious.
Hemispheric Myths of National Assimilation
At first glance, imagining a unitary cultural identity across the Americas appears challenging. Although Latin American nation-states might share similar colonial and post-colonial histories, their different national and subnational cultural commitments have also been forged in dynamic relation with cultural assets from elsewhere influencing what is now recognized as latino culture. Similarly, the idea of a North American identity does not emerge as an empirically verifiable cultural synthesis, but rather as the contingent result of ongoing symbolic disputes marked by racial hierarchies, power asymmetries, and competing projects of belonging.
Mid-twentieth century notions such as the melting pot in the United and the myth of the so-called cosmic race or mestizaje in Latin America, offer different but comparable assimilationist narratives for the nation, narratives which obscure persistent structural conflicts within post-colonial American societies. Such accounts function largely as ideological constructs aimed at producing one or another sort of unified national identity. In this sense, contemporary debates about pluri- or multiculturalism in the Americas carry an inherent ambiguity: cultural diversity is recognized rhetorically but also regulated through mechanisms that posit and reproduce racial and other social asymmetries.
This multicultural dilemma in the Americas, therefore, derives from the tension between the political recognition of plural identities, on the one hand, and the impulse to preserve national identity as previously imagined, on the other. In this context, artistic and cultural production and its diffusion emerge as privileged arenas of symbolic mediation, contestation of meaning, and negotiation of belonging, which often seek to transcend closed assumptions of national identity. We might understand the hemispheric and global diffusion of national artistic production from Latin American countries as more than just cultural industry content, and as helping to circulate diverse cultural perspectives.
Latin American Pop Culture is Having a Moment
Recently, numerous products of Latin American popular culture have achieved global recognition, potentially serving as pillars for re-imagining a broader and more cohesive sense of identity across the Americas, and in ways increasingly independent from taken-for-granted nationalist mythologies across the continent. Especially in times of growing international fragmentation, authoritarian threats to democratic systems, and dysfunctional global regimes that fail to produce international cooperation the cases below illustrate new opportunities for re-imagining identity, culture, and belonging in the Americas.
In recent years musical artists like the Colombian Karol G and Puerto Rican Bad Bunny have come to exemplify the consolidation of Latin urban pop as a transnational cultural phenomenon, with a strong presence in the global music industry and recurring visibility through numerous nominations and awards in the GRAMMY and Latin GRAMMY circuits. Bad Bunny won the 68th GRAMMY Awards in the following categories: Best Música Urbana Album and Best Album Cover, for DeBÍ TiRAR MáS FotoS, and Best Global Music Performance for EoO. Also, his 2026 Super Bowl LX halftime performance made history as the first solo Latino artist to headline the show, bringing renewed attention to discussions about what it means to be “American.”
Also in music, Liniker, a Black Brazilian trans woman songwriter, won three categories at the 26th Latin GRAMMY Awards: Best Portuguese-Language Contemporary Pop Album, and Portuguese-Language Urban Performance for Caju, as well as Best Portuguese-Language Song for Veludo Marrom. In addition, the album Milton + esperanza (2024), a collaboration between the acclaimed North American jazz artist Esperanza Spalding and the Brazilian master Milton Nascimento, was nominated for the 67th GRAMMY Award in the category Best Jazz Vocal Album.
In cinema, Brazilian audiovisual productions have undeniably entered the global mainstream, particularly through films addressing the memory of political tragedies such as that country’s military dictatorship. “I’m Still Here” (2024) won the 2025 Academy Award for Best International Feature Film, the 2025 Golden Globe for Best Actress in a Motion Picture – Drama (Fernanda Torres), and more than 70 additional international awards. “The Secret Agent”(2025) won Best Director (Kleber Mendonça Filho) and Best Actor (Wagner Moura) at the 2025 Cannes Film Festival, and later won the 2026 Golden Globe for Best Non-English Language Film and Best Actor in a Motion Picture – Drama (Wagner Moura). The film is also nominated for the 2026 Academy Awards in the categories Best Picture, Best Actor, Best International Feature Film, and Achievement in Casting.
In literature, the growing presence of Latin American authors within global circuits of recognition can also be observed through the wider international circulation of their books, increasing number of translations, and their selection for prestigious literary prizes. For example, the Brazilian novelist Itamar Vieira Junior, author of Torto Arado (2019), saw the 2023 English translation shortlisted for the 2024 International Booker Prize.
Each Latin American cultural producer mentioned here successfully transformed historically localized experiences – often addressing political violence, state terrorism, racism, and patriarchy, among other challenging topics – into aesthetically communicable narratives accessible at a transnational scale. But it is important to note that these recent successes in music, film and literature cannot be explained solely by the artistic genius of their creators. Beyond their evident creative excellence, also important has been the existence of public policies supporting the production and diffusion of national cultural assets, which have also contributed to the international success of Latin American popular culture.
Take the case of Brazil, which put in place a set of public policies that directly incentivize and support contributions to the country’s cultural economy. These include the so-called Rouanet Law, providing tax incentives to support the completion and circulation cultural projects. In the audiovisual field specifically, the Audiovisual Sector Fund (FSA) ensures public resources for film production and distribution. They also include the National Aldir Blanc Policy (PNAB), which established a continuous and decentralized state-funding model strengthening cultural infrastructure and expanding access to cultural rights at the local level. The international reach of works such as “I’m Still Here” (2024) and “The Secret Agent” (2025) should also be understood as the result of a public infrastructure that sustains the competitiveness and global insertion of Brazilian audiovisual products.
What Hemispheric Cultural Diplomacy Has to Offer
Whether through voluntary cultural cooperation, institutional support from domestic cultural public policies, or efforts of public and cultural diplomacy, the growing presence of Latin American artistic production in the hemisphere is neither accidental nor merely the result of its exoticization by Global North audiences. Despite long-standing legacies of stereotyping and archetypal representations of Latin American peoples and cultures, contemporary Latin American cultural products, which circulate throughout the hemisphere and beyond, help us to reconfigure the hemisphere’s identity in new and pluricultural ways.
Even amid the challenges posed by a context of fragmentation, competition, and new threats of geopolitical violence, the aesthetic innovations and moral premises foregrounded by contemporary Latin American artists, and informed by expressions of human rights, peaceful coexistence, and American belonging, present rich opportunities for new imaginaries of hemispheric identity and culture. In this sense, imagining what people across the Americas might have in common can cease to be just an idealistic abstraction and become one critical horizon for revitalizing mutual respect and democratic coexistence in the hemisphere.
Ron La Gloria Rum From Veracruz, Mexico
Since I’m based in Mexico and the country seems to grow lots of sugar cane, it has been a mystery to me why they don’t produce more rum. So when I see a Mexican rum brand on the shelf I don’t recognize, I almost always buy it. So when I saw Ron La Gloria...
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The Pantanal hotspot of Biodiversity
The Pantanal is a land of superlatives. The largest tropical wetland in the world. A biodiversity hot spot. Home to South America’s “Big Five”: Jaguar, Giant Anteater, Giant River Otter, Maned Wolf & Brazilian Tapir. Not to mention the Pantaneira culture, shaped by an unforgiving landscape. What the floodplain landscape lacks in elevation it holds […]
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Download These Travel Apps Before Your Latin America Trip
You’ve bought your plane ticket, booked your hotels, lined up tours, and you’ll be heading to a country in Latin America on vacation. Great! You’re not quite done yet though. Make sure you’re prepared for what can go wrong along the way by getting a few extra travel apps on your phone or laptop....
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Does the Trump Administration Really Believe People are so Brainless?
In the face of Trump’s steady decline in approval ratings, White House spokesman Davis Ingle claimed: “The ultimate poll was November 5th 2024 when nearly 80 million Americans overwhelmingly elected President Trump to deliver on his popular and commonsense agenda.” OVERWHELMINGLY? Trump received under 50% of the popular vote and only 1.5% more than Kamala Harris. Does that make his triumph “overwhelming?” Of course not, but that doesn’t deter Trump and his allies from constantly conflating the popular vote and the electoral college vote in order to claim that 2024 was a landslide victory.
Venezuela offers Amnesty and pardon for Political Prisoners
Mérida, February 23, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Venezuelan National Assembly passed the Amnesty Law for Democratic Coexistence on Thursday, January 19. The government, led by Acting President Delcy Rodríguez, immediately enacted the legislation and presented it as a step toward “peace and tolerance.” The law establishes mechanisms that aim to promote political reconciliation through a […]
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No Kings Rally is Building Momentum but Needs to Raise the Issue of Washington's War Mongering
Momentum is building for the March 28 massive nation-wide No Kings rally. But as reflected in this sign “No War on Venezuela,” the protests should focus as much on the aggressive regime-change moves by the U.S. and the resultant death and destruction, as on issues on the domestic front. These photos are from today’s protest in Germantown MD, which are taking place every Saturday and are getting positive, enthusiastic responses from cars passing by at this busy intersection.
The Illusion of Progress? The Rise of Women in Ecuadorian Politics Despite Ongoing Gender Violence in Its Indigenous Communities
(Source: Wikimedia Commons)
By Isabella Serra & S. Shrestha
On January 24, 2006, Estuardo Remache was criminally charged with domestic violence and removed from his position as head of Ecuador’s Human Rights Commission. The case was brought forward by his wife, Maria Lucrecia Nono, who had spent years seeking justice for the repeated abuse she endured. On numerous occasions Maria’s attempts to report the violence were dismissed, her credibility questioned, and her intentions painted as vindictive.
When Maria first turned to local authorities and Comisarías, state-run women’s centers meant to support survivors of gender-based violence (GBV), she was told her case was a personal matter to be resolved at home. Officials cited Article 191 of the Ecuadorian Constitution, which separates the federal and Indigenous legal systems, and told her she must seek justice within her own Kichwa community.
Gender-based violence, which includes emotional, physical, and sexual harm rooted in gender inequality, is a widespread and deeply structural form of oppression. Maria’s abuse didn’t stop at home; it was reinforced by the very institutions intended to protect her. Each time she sought help, she was met with indifference, disbelief, or outright rejection, despite returning with visible bruises and ongoing emotional trauma. Her story points to a more systemic issue: the absence of female political power in Ecuador to challenge and transform these injustices.
Maria’s ordeal highlights a troubling paradox: the greater presence of women – particularly Indigenous Kichwa women – in Ecuador’s political sphere, alongside the continued high rates of GBV in their communities. Why, despite growing political representation for women, does gender-based violence remain so entrenched, especially among Indigenous communities?
Legal and Structural Context
Ecuador’s 2008 Constitution marked a turning point, officially recognizing the country as plurinational and intercultural, thus legitimizing Indigenous governance structures alongside the national legal system. Yet this dual system has limitations. While intended to acknowledge indigenous sovereignty, in practice it often creates conditions of legal marginality, particularly for Indigenous women. In Maria’s case, the national judiciary abdicated responsibility, claiming the Kichwa system to be the appropriate jurisdiction, while Kichwa authorities sought to silence her to avoid casting their communities in a negative light.
This tension reflects a broader legal failure: the promotion of state-sponsored multiculturalism but the failure to protect vulnerable populations within specific communities. The burden of representation falls heavily on Indigenous women like Mirian Masaquiza Jerez, a Kichwa woman staffing the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues. In an interview, she explained that any missteps are seen not as individual failings, but as reflections on her entire community. Despite these pressures, her greater visibility, along with that of many others, marks a notable shift in the gendered landscape of Ecuadorian politics
Gender-Based Violence in Context
Ecuador has made substantial progress toward increasing women’s political representation, thanks in part to gender quotas implemented since the early 2000s. These measures mandate a minimum number of female candidates in national and local elections, enabling more women to ascend to political leadership. Despite recent infighting and a diminished presence in the national legislature, Ecuador’s Indigenous-led Pachakutik party has played a pivotal role in this shift over the past three decades, advocating for environmental justice and Indigenous rights, including those of women.
Yet political representation does not always translate to structural change. The existence of women in positions of power can obscure the continued suffering of those on the margins. Indigenous women in rural areas still live under deeply patriarchal norms, face high rates of GBV, and often lack access to justice, health care, or safe housing. Nearly 6 in 10 women in Ecuador report having experienced GBV. The rate rises to 68 percent among Indigenous women, 10 percentage points higher than among their non-indigenous counterparts. These figures expose the intersectional nature of GBV: it disproportionately affects women who are poor, Indigenous, or otherwise marginalized. GBV is not just a personal issue; it is a societal failure sustained by socioeconomic inequality, cultural norms, and weak legal protections.
In many Indigenous communities, patriarchal expectations remain strong. Divorce and contraceptives are taboo, and women who speak out like Maria risk being ostracized by their families and communities. Maria’s relatives warned her that if she pursued legal action, she might lose custody of her children. And she nearly did: Estuardo Remache was awarded custody of four of their five children before he was convicted.
Eco-Politics, Exploitation, and Gendered Harm
The entanglement of environmental exploitation and gender inequality has further exacerbated the issue. Since the 1960s, Ecuador’s adoption of a free-market model encouraged the expansion of oil extraction in the Amazon. While economically beneficial in the short term, these projects have devastated Indigenous lands and polluted vital resources. The resulting health effects, such as increased miscarriages and birth defects, are disproportionately born by women.
Historically oil companies, empowered by deregulation, offered large financial incentives to communities in exchange for land. Communities that resisted remained poor and resource scarce. Those who accommodated faced social stigma, displacement, and environmental degradation. Both paths potentially deepened indigenous poverty.
These developments have reshaped gender roles. As men leave to work for the very oil companies that displaced their communities, women are left to manage households, often under increased financial and social stress. This dynamic has continued to entrench patriarchal authority and contributes to higher rates of domestic violence. Workers exposed to exploitative labor, drugs, and alcohol often bring that trauma home. Women, already made vulnerable by poverty and legal liminality, often suffer the consequences.
While the 2008 Constitution granted new rights, Ecuador’s laws have failed to notably improve conditions for indigenous women, and in some cases, have exacerbated hardships. The continued expansion of extractive industries under new hydrocarbons and related environmental laws, has led to further environmental contamination, social disruption, and increased gendered violence.
Reassessing “Progress”
After years of litigation, Ecuador’s Constitutional Court issued a judgment in 2014 finding that María Lucrecia Nono’s constitutional rights had been violated. Yet the ruling did not bring closure: the prolonged process left her struggle for justice fundamentally unresolved.
Maria’s story is often held up as an example of progress, offered as proof that Indigenous women can now access justice. But this interpretation is dangerously reductive. Maria’s case dragged on for years. She endured physical and emotional abuse, not only from her husband but from a system that refused to believe her. Even after winning she paid a steep price: continued violence, loss of custody, and pressure from Indigenous political leaders urging her to remain silent to protect their image.
Her case exposes the limits of symbolic victory. Representation alone is not enough to dismantle cultures of impunity and deeply rooted systems of oppression. Real justice requires the transformation of legal systems, political norms, and economic structures that continue to marginalize Indigenous women.
Conclusions
Ecuador presents a complex landscape: a country lauded for increasing female political representation, yet plagued by high levels of GBV, especially within Indigenous communities. Maria Lucrecia Nono’s case is not a victory; it is a warning. It illustrates how cultural recognition, extractive capitalism, and patriarchal power can conspire to silence women, even when they appear to be gaining political stature.
The emergence of Indigenous women in Ecuador’s political sphere is long overdue. But without corresponding reforms in legal protections, community norms, and economic structures, political power will remain largely symbolic. True liberation for Indigenous women in Ecuador will require dismantling the intersecting systems that perpetuate gender-based violence, which requires listening to women like Maria not only when they win, but when they are silenced.
Isabella Serra & S. Shrestha are Research Assistants at The Immigration Lab
*This post continues an ongoing series, as part of CLALS’s Ecuador Initiative, examining the country’s economic, governance, security, and societal challenges, made possible with generous support from Dr. Maria Donoso Clark, CAS/PhD ’91.
The 3 Velas Resorts of Los Cabos
Often when a lodging company has three resorts in one location, they’re scattered around town in different spots, even if it’s a big brand like Marriott. The Velas Resorts company has a very different situation in Los Cabos though, where their three resorts that appeal to different crowds are all a few minutes’ walk...
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USA demands Venezuela to change Labor Laws, Court & Banking Systems
US President Donald Trump is considering a visit to Venezuela, though he did not specify when the trip might take place or what agenda it would entail. I’m going to make a visit to Venezuela, Trump told reporters outside the White House on Friday. The US President addressed the press ahead of a trip to […]
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Trump Recognizes that his Embargo on Cuba Represents a “Humanitarian Threat”
The U.S. embargo (really a blockade) on Cuba is a “humanitarian threat.” Those aren’t my words. They’re Trump’s very words. Basically, what Trump is saying amounts to this: Someone puts a gun to some else’s head and tells the person to pull down their pants. He then says, if you don’t do what I'm telling you to do, I’m going to kill you and it’ll be your fault.
Protect Your Personal Data from Cyber Threats in Hotels
I’m writing this post from a hotel, which is not unusual since I’m a travel editor. I’m on an open signal that anyone in the 400+ rooms here can access without a log-in, as can any random person here for a conference, a meal, or a drink. If I opened up my travel itinerary...
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Pam Bondi Shirks Responsibility for Criminal Neglect
Pam Bondi gets the award for coming up with the worst excuse ever made in all of history. At the hearing of the House Judiciary Committee, various Democratic Representatives asked her if she would apologize for the Justic Department’s failure to redact names of Jeffrey Epstein victims who were sitting just in back of her. She shouted back at the Democrats asking ‘have you apologized for the criminal charges you leveled against the greatest president in U.S. history for supposedly attempting to rig the 2020 presidential elections?’ Anybody who doesn’t see the pathetic nature of Bondi’s response, let me recommend an undergraduate course in “Introduction to Logic.”
Bendito Benito: The Cultural is Always Political
By Ernesto Castañeda
Bad Bunny’s halftime performance showed how much Latinos love America, even if some parts of America do not love them back. Performed mostly in Spanish, it showed the reality that Latinos and Spanish are part of America’s culture: its history, its present, and its future. As the performance’s references to salsa and Ricky Martin’s participation in it reminded us, Latinos’ contributions to U.S. and global culture are not a new phenomenon.
Performances like this weaken MAGA’s ideological project even without any direct references to the current administration. Most importantly, they are a reminder of what most people can see: that Latinos, Asians, and Africans are part of U.S. communities, schools, labs, and the art and music scenes.
That is why most people in the U.S. were against ICE and mass deportations before the Super Bowl halftime show. But the humanization of Puerto Ricans and brown people could have reached and created empathy or even admiration among some people who were on the fence, do not follow the news, or live in areas with few immigrants.
When Bad Bunny was announced, some said they would boycott, that ICE would be present and carry out mass arrests, that people would not watch the show, or that it would go badly. None of that happened. The hate and fearmongering just made Bad Bunny’s performance even more special and powerful.
The performance’s positive message about love and inclusivity is a strong antidote to the fear created by ICE operations and the hatred induced by anti-immigrant, anti-Latino, and anti-black discourse. As a Puerto Rican, Benito Antonio Martínez Ocasio, aka Bad Bunny, is a U.S. citizen. However, like many other minorities, on the street, he is racialized and treated as having fewer rights and valid political claims than white citizens who speak English as their first language.
Trusting his team to catch him after he fell backwards from the roof of the casita is a good metaphor for how he knew that Puerto Ricans, Latinos, immigrants, and Americans would have his back, despite the death threats against him that forced him to wear a bulletproof vest during the Grammys ceremony. The community was able to celebrate with him and through him as they watched the Super Bowl during a challenging time. Thus, in his own eyes, his music, lyrics, and his political statements against colonialism, calling Puerto Rica trash, and the dehumanization of people of color and the risks this entails, are worth it.
The halftime show made Latino kids and teenagers feel proud of who they are. It also made many Latinos and non-Latinos, whether they speak Spanish or not, proud of their musical tastes. Some of their parents or grandparents may not have known Bad Bunny’s music, but his fans are not alone. Bad Bunny recently won the Grammy for Album of the Year. He is the most-streamed artist globally on Spotify and other platforms, and the Super Bowl halftime show was enjoyed by over 130 million live viewers, plus over 80 million replays on the NFL YouTube page. This is as close as any cultural act can come to entering the U.S. and global mainstream.
That is why the NFL selected the world’s leading artist. Bad Bunny is popular worldwide, singing in Spanish. He has no shame about his native language, accent, lingo, or culture. He is proudly Puerto Rican, which makes him emblematic of this multicultural reality.
MAGA proposes that these types of performances threaten US culture. But the USA is stronger than MAGA thinks. It is strong because of its diversity and its mixing of elements from around the world into new, creative products that sell very well.
As I told Univision News, soon after Bad Bunny was announced as the performer for Super Bowl LX, and after he had hosted SNL and addressed the controversy the announcement caused, sending ICE to the Super Bowl would not have changed our multicultural reality; though it would have represented the fact that ICE and CBP act as if immigration equals crime. Santa Clara, California, is in the San Francisco Bay Area, where many residents were born abroad and work at Silicon Valley’s corporations. Thus, it would have been very difficult for ICE to patrol the streets around the Levy Stadium. Furthermore, it would have been economically and politically expensive if a large ICE operation in or around the stadium had caused the Super Bowl to start later or be severely understaffed.
When criticized by conservatives for being selected, Bad Bunny defended himself. In doing so, he also indirectly defended other Latinos who are not as famous as he is, but who also contribute in their own way to daily life in the U.S.A.
The U.S. continues living a practical contradiction on the one side being dependent on immigrant labor for affordability and economic growth but also complains about people arrivie to work and study. On the one hand, we have ICE detaining people for speaking Spanish, for being Latino, and hundreds of thousands of deportations happening. On the other hand, we have Latinos, the majority of whom are American citizens. Latinos are part of the economy, of culture, and of music. In the case of Bad Bunny, they make America great.
All Puerto Ricans are citizens because Puerto Rico is a U.S. territory. Nevertheless, many assume that being American means being white and speaking English without an accent, which is not true. There are U.S. citizens of all origins, races, skin colors, faiths, and mother tongues. This Super Bowl halftime show was a celebration of that diversity, which makes us strong. Bad Bunny was not out of place in the Super Bowl, but much discrimination against Latinos includes the belief that Latinos are not one hundred percent American.
The upset from MAGA spokespeople is because they do not have control over popular culture. They would like corridos and songs in all genres to be written in celebration of Trump. However, with a few rare exceptions, this is not the case.
People vote every few years, but they listen to music every week. The “culture wars” are not what Fox News says they are. Fox and other right-wing organizations politicize social issues that are at the early stages of the popular opinion shifts that ultimately lead to social change. No cultural product is loved by one hundred percent of the public. Culture is about practice, consumption, and remixing. People choose what type of food, music, and movies to consume time and time again. In recent years, Pedro Pascal, Diego Luna, Oscar Isaac, Benicio del Toro, Marcelo Hernández, Zoe Saldana, Ana de Armas, Rosario Dawson, Sofia Vergara, to name a few, have played key roles in some of the most popular movies and shows.
The takeaway is that Latinos are an important part of the United States and make cultural contributions that benefit the whole world. Besides many transnational influences, collaboration with other artists based in the U.S. and throughout the Americas creates a new cultural reality. This cultural reality is a blend of contributions from Latinos and other U.S.-based artists. Together, we are all stronger, and our music is more universal, as the broad national and international appeal of Bad Bunny’s performance clearly shows.
Ernesto Castañeda is a political, social, and cultural analyst.
A Challenge Becoming an Opportunity: The Venezuelan Diaspora’s Journey to Social Integration
By Danjha Leon Martinez
Peru has become one of the top destinations for Venezuelan migrants, second only to Colombia, with close to a million Venezuelans now calling it home. The Venezuelan diaspora started their mobilization journey after being forcibly displaced due to the socio-political situation in their home country.
Most migrants are young adults aged 18 to 34. About half hold technical or university degrees. Despite this, they had been encountering difficulties finding enough opportunities suitable for their professional or occupational credentials. In terms of resettlement, Peru still faces challenges in delivering the social services needed for effective migrants’ social integration. Specifically, the Peruvian system does not expedite their access to primary services such as documentation, healthcare, housing, and education during the early stages of their integration into the country. Thus, Venezuelans find themselves working in the informal economy as street vendors, construction workers, or housekeepers, taking any opportunities that they can find.
For many migrants, the choice to settle in Peru isn’t random. They are drawn by the country’s steady economic growth and its notable progress in reducing poverty. Others come to reunite with family or because Peru’s legal migration procedures are comparatively easier than those of other nations.
Diego: When I arrived in Peru, I said ‘Vaya! Hay Audis, Mercedes Benz, Starbucks…’ In Peru, I found opportunities… I was able to open a barbershop and take a loan to buy a car.
Venezuelan arrivals have put a slight increase in demand on Peru’s public services, with hospitals, schools, and social programs. But a growing population will grow the economy and produce more opportunities for all in Peru. Locals have noticed more competition for low-wage jobs, fueling worries about unemployment and sparking some anti-immigrant attitudes that are tied to xenophobic sentiment.
Given the high degree of informality in Peru’s economy, migrants can find work quickly, and open migration policies have made it easier for them to get temporary permits. Still, Venezuelans in Lima, the capital of Peru, face hurdles in getting formal jobs, leaving many with higher education degrees to work as street vendors, housekeepers, and in small trades just to get by.
For this reason, Venezuelans heavily rely on transnational and local social networks, which provide crucial support, including information about job opportunities, housing, and other resources that aid economic survival.
Pedro: (former employee at PDVSA, Petróleos de Venezuela): During the first three months that I was here in Peru, I could not find a job. I survived only with the support of my countrymen.
Despite issues such as job precariousness and limited rights, Lima offers better economic opportunities than other potential destinations in Peru’s main cities.
Saul: I feel like I really prospered. When I arrived, the challenges were overwhelming, but the benefits I gained from it are invaluable. Now I can give stability to my family, and I own a business which I’m proud of.
Jose (Venezuelan mechanic who moved to Lima in 2018): “The minimum wage here in Peru… it’s not feasible for a Venezuelan to live with dignity because the rent prices and groceries cost basically the whole salary.”
Despite the funding and technical support from several international NGOs to implement humanitarian assistance, there has been a disconnect between the results of these initiatives and the intended outcomes. Almost 70% of the Venezuelan community still need to accelerate their migration process and acquire a formal status, requiring international protection. Coping strategies for financial survival include juggling multiple informal jobs, entrepreneurial activities, and sharing housing to reduce living costs, often under precarious conditions. Venezuelan migrants who plan for a future in Peru balance hopes for stability with the need to adapt to informal economic contexts and local cultural idiosyncrasies.
Peru’s political will towards the integration of the Venezuelan diaspora could be reflected by future policy frameworks that help secure legal immigration statuses and access to social programs with fewer bureaucratic hurdles. Even after facing a difficult journey, Venezuelan migrants have significantly contributed to Peru’s economy and society. They have filled critical labor gaps in sectors such as construction, food services, and informal vending, thereby driving economic growth, particularly in low-wage jobs. Many have also opened small businesses, diversifying local economies and creating jobs.
Overall, migration brings development opportunities to a country. As of now, the Venezuelan diaspora is still in the process of integration and organizing mutual support. Given the diaspora’s positive impact on the country’s development and Peru’s long-standing history of economic growth driven by the arrival of diverse migrant clusters, it would be beneficial for both the vulnerable community and the host country to advocate for the protection and effective integration of the Venezuelan diaspora.
Danjha Leon Martinez is a Research Assistant for the Immigration Lab at the Center for Latin American & Latino Studies. She is a Development Management graduate student at American University with a focus on humanitarian aid and global migration.
Edited by Ernesto Castañeda, Director of the Center for Latin American and Latino Studies (CLALS) and the Immigration Lab, Katheryn Olmos, Research & Data Coordinator, and Vincent Iannuzzi-Sucich, Research Intern at the Immigration Lab.
Yesterday’s Superbowl: A Demonstration of the Inequalities of Football
Football teams have 22 players in addition to punters and kickers. Of those 22, one player, the quarterback, gets 60 % of the attention and credit (and blame) for a team’s performance. Five other players (the backs and the two ends) get 35% (in other words each get 7%) of the attention. The remaining 5% goes to the 11 members of the defensive team (that is, each get less than a half of 1%). The 5 members of the offensive line (excluding the ends) get 0%. Why is that? The performance of the defensive line can get measured by the number of tackles, sacks and fumble recoveries. But all the offensive line does is block. How can you measure that?
Drake Maye got all the blame for the Patriot’s poor performance. But the game was really about Seattle’s defensive line which didn’t give Maye time to throw, and sacked him a record number of times for a Superbowl. They deserved most of the credit for Seattle’s victory. And the team’s head coach recognized their performance on stage when the Vince Lombardi trophy was presented. But who were the two players on stage who got to speak for the team? Seattle’s quarterback Sam Darnold and running back Kenneth Walker. And it was Walker who received the trophy.
Today’s controversy: 'Walker didn’t deserve the trophy, but rather kicker Jason Myers who broke an NFL Super Bowl record with 6 field goals.' That controversy may have been a manifestation of racism. Kickers are white possibly without exception. But what about the Seattle’s defensive linemen? Those who criticized the choice of Walker didn’t even consider that maybe the defensive linemen should have been given the trophy. Maybe all 5 of them collectively.
And poor Maye got all the blame for the Patriot’s defeat. But shouldn’t most of the blame have gone to the offensive linemen? I suppose if quarterbacks get most of the credit for victories, it’s only logical that they receive the brunt of the blame for defeats. It all shows how unequal and unfair football is.
Venezuela stages Massive Rally demanding Maduro Liberation & Return to Caracas
Caracas, February 4, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Chavista supporters filled the streets of Caracas on Tuesday to demand the release of President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady and Deputy Cilia Flores. The rally marked one month from their kidnapping on January 3 as part of a US military attack against Venezuela. Heavy gunfire erupts near Presidential […]
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Bolivia to honor transparent Lithium Deals with Russia & China
Bolivia will honor lithium agreements concluded by the previous government with Russia and China if the integrity and transparency of those deals are confirmed, President Rodrigo Paz said. The deals will be reviewed and made public to allow proper scrutiny, Paz told the Financial Times in an interview published Tuesday. Bolivia controls the Price of […]
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Tour Grand Solmar Land’s End at the Tip of the Baja Peninsula
The luxury resort scene in Los Cabos keeps getting more heated all the time. This has clearly become the go-to spot for high-end hotel chains to make their mark in Mexico. The home-grown Mexican companies are no slackers, however, and Grand Solmar Land’s End is worth considering for its impressive pool complexes, large rooms,...
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The US's Magical Realism show in Venezuela
What has happened in Venezuela is not a surprise to those who have read the Magical Realism stories of Gabriel Garcia Marquez and the other famous Latin American writers. In this signature genre of Latin American literature, the writers blur the line between fantasy and facts, weaving magic into reality.
"The Tree Within: The Mexican Nobel Laureate writer Octavio Paz’s Years in India" - Book by Indranil Chakravarty
The Mexican writer Octavio Paz was the most prominent Latin American to understand, analyze, interpret and promote India intellectually and culturally from a Latin American perspective in the twentieth century. He had first hand experience of India as a diplomat posted in New Delhi for seven years. He has written numerous poems and articles on India. His book "Vislumbres de la India" (In the light of India) is regarded as one of the best introductions to India among Latin American thinkers. Some cultural visitors from the Spanish-speaking world travel around the country with Paz’s book as an ‘intimate guide’. They see India through his eyes, trying to grasp the immense complexity of India.
Nicaragua, the “Republic of Poets” has become a “Republic of Clandestine Poets.”
Nicaragua, the “Republic of Poets” has become a “Republic of Clandestine Poets.”
One of the martyred heroes of the Sandinista revolution is Leonel Rugama, the young poet who died in combat at the age of 20. His poem "The Earth is a satellite of the Moon " has been considered by critics as one of the most widely distributed poems in Latin American poetry. It was a poet, Rigoberto Lopez Perez, who assassinated the first Somoza, at a ball in 1956, and was himself beaten and shot to death on the dance floor.
Nicaraguan newspapers used to feature literary supplements filled with poems from both luminaries and unknowns. Leading poets could be spotted, like movie stars, in certain cafes in the cities. In the university town of Leon, busts of Nicaraguan poets and plaques with quotations from their work fill the “Park of Poets,” while the main street, Calle Ruben Dario, is named for the country’s preeminent poet.
Ruben Dario, the poet and writer of Nicaragua is the most well-known in the world. He is considered as the father of the Modernist Movement in Spanish literature in the twentieth century. His book Azul (1888) is said to be the inaugural book of Hispanic-American modernism. He was a precocious poet and published his poem in a newspaper at the age of thirteen.
President Daniel Ortega is a poet, as is his wife, Rosario Murillo. When Ortega was a political prisoner from 1968 (at the age of 23) to 1974 during the dictatorship of Somoza, he wrote many poems, including the famous one titled “I never saw Managua when miniskirts were in fashion.” While in jail he received visits from Rosario Murillo, a poet. The prisoner and visitor fell in love; Murillo became Ortega's wife. She has published several books of poems. One of them is called as ¨Amar es combatir ¨- to love is to combat.
After the overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship in 1979, the victorious Sandinistas named one of the country’s most famous poets, Ernesto Cardenal, as minister of culture. He brought poets to all corners of the country to teach people to read and write poetry at a time when Nicaragua suffered a 70 to 95 percent illiteracy rate. It is still possible in villages to find people who are unable to read or write but can recite Dario’s poetry by heart. Poetry was used as a tool for political literacy, consolidating the country as a "Republic of Poets.”
Some of the ministers in the initial years of President Ortega's cabinet were poets and writers. Notable among these is Sergio Ramirez, Gioconda Belli and Ernesto Cardinal.
Since his reelection as President in 2007, Daniel Ortega has become authoritarian and has rigged the elections and the constitution to continue as president indefinitely. His wife Rosario Murillo has now become the Co-President after having been Vice-President for some years. The couple have betrayed the noble ideals of the Sandinista revolution and have created a corrupt family dictatorship, similiar to the Somoza dynastic dictatorship which had ruled for 42 years. Most of the writers and intellectuals who had nurtured the revolution eventually left the Sandinista party and started fighting against the dictatorial regime. They used poetry to fight back, just like they did during the revolutionary era against the Somoza dictatorship. The Ortegas have suppressed dissent and persecuted poets, intellectuals and journalists besides political leaders who resisted their dictatorship. The regime has imprisoned or exiled some of the dissidents, stripped their citizenship and even seized their assets and houses. The regime has become harsher after the large scale public protests in 2018. Many exiled poets and writes live in Costa Rica and Spain. The exiled poets include Sergio Ramírez, Gioconda Belli and Freddy Quezada. The regime has shut down thousands of NGOs and independent media outlets, including PEN Nicaragua and the Nicaraguan Academy of Language. One of the hardest blows to Nicaraguan literary culture came in 2022 with the cancellation of the Granada International Poetry Festival, created in 2005, which once brought together more than 1,200 poets from 120 countries. The regime revoked the legal status of the NGO that funded it, leading to its cancellation.
While accepting the Cervantes Prize for literature in April 2018, Ramírez dedicated his award to the young people then protesting Ortega’s government and to the memory of Nicaraguans who had recently “been murdered on the streets after demanding justice and democracy.”
The Ortega-Murillo dictatorship has driven the poetry underground. The poets hide themselves and their poems from the repressive regime which has been ruthlessly censoring literature and news. The poets write clandestinely expressing their frustration and resistance. The "Republic of Poets" has now become the "Republic of Clandestine Poets".
Crooked plow- Brazilian novel by Itamar Vieira Junior
Itamar Vieira is a young and upcoming Brazilian writer. Crooked Plow (Torto Arado) is his first novel. He has earlier written a short story collection.
"Small Earthquakes: A Journey Through Lost British History in South America” - book by Shafik Meghji
While the Spanish and Portuguese colonized Latin America, the British have played a significant role in slavery, wars of independence, politics, lending, investment, railways and football in the region. These have been brought out by the author of the book who has done extensive research and travelled through the South American countries which had been impacted by the British.
The Marxist school of Dependency Theory - An interview with Professor Jaime Osorio
Our present, however, is one of spiraling crises. Since the financial crash of 2008, the economic crisis converges with ecological collapse and the exhaustion of liberal democratic forms, reaching civilizational dimensions. In this context, the pandemic laid bare how, instead of disappearing, the divide between the center and periphery of the world system is as sharp and as meaningful as ever.
With neoliberal hegemony fractured, other ways of thinking and practicing politics have reemerged from their intellectual exiles. Among these, dependency theory stands out as an original and revolutionary contribution of Latin American critical thought, offering tools for understanding uneven capitalist development and imperialism both historically and today. For an introduction to this unique framework, we turn to Dr. Jaime Osorio.
When a military coup d’état in Chile overthrew the democratically elected government of Salvador Allende on September 11, 1973, Osorio had already been accepted to begin his doctoral studies at the University of Chile’s Center for Socio-Economic Studies (CESO, in Spanish). The dictatorship’s advance brought him instead to Mexico, where today he ranks as Distinguished Professor at the Autonomous Metropolitan University (UAM) in Xochimilico and as Researcher Emeritus by the National Council of Science and Technology (CONACYT). He is the author of many books, including Fundamentos del análsis social. La realidad social y su conocimiento and Sistema mundial. Intercambio Desigual y renta de la tierra.
In this interview, Osorio speaks with Jacobin contributing editor Hilary Goodfriend about the Marxist school of dependency theory, its origins and principles, and its present-day applications.
Dependency theory and its Marxist strain emerged from debates and dialogues about development, underdevelopment, and imperialism in the context of decolonization and the national liberation struggles of the twentieth century. What were the main positions and strategies in dispute, and how did Marxist dependency theorists position themselves in these arguments?
At the theoretical level, Marxist dependency theory [TMD, in Spanish] is the result of the Cuban Revolution’s victory in 1959. Latin American Marxism was moved by the island’s gesture. All the main theses about the nature of Latin American societies and the character of revolution came into question.
A little over a decade after that event, which sharpened the debates, TMD reached maturity. In those years, some of the proposals that fed theories of dependency emphasized the role of trade relations, such as the “deterioration of the terms of trade” thesis put forward by the [Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean] CEPAL, which referred to the cheapening of primary goods against the rising prices of industrial products in the world market.
Orthodox Marxists highlighted the presence of internal “obstacles” that impeded development, like idle terrain in the hands of landowners, which also blocked the expansion of wage relations. Generally, in these proposals, capitalism wasn’t to blame. In fact, it was necessary to accelerate its spread so that its inherent contradictions would heighten. Only then could a socialist revolution be proposed, according to this stage-based perspective prevalent in the Communist Parties.
For the Cepalinos, their horizon was achieving advanced capitalism, which would be possible by means of a process of industrialization. This would allow the region to cease exporting primary goods and food products and importing secondary goods, which would now be produced internally, sparking technological development and stemming the outflow of resources.
In both proposals, the industrial bourgeoisie had a positive role to play, be it in the medium or long term.
For Marxist dependency theory, the region’s so-called economic “backwardness” was a result of the formation and expansion of the capitalist world system, whose course produced development and underdevelopment simultaneously. Therefore, these divergent economic histories are not independent processes, nor are they connected tangentially. From this perspective, the fundamental theoretical and historical problem required explaining the processes that generated both development and underdevelopment in the same movement.
This problem demanded, furthermore, a response that accounted for how this process is reproduced over time since civilization and barbarism are constantly made anew by the world system.
Many of the acclaimed Marxist dependency theorists—Ruy Mauro Marini, Theotonio Dos Santos, Vania Bambirra—share a trajectory of flight from South American dictatorships and exile in Mexico. You were also subject to this forced displacement. How did these experiences of revolution and counterrevolution influence the construction of TMD?
Four names stand out in the development of TMD: André Gunder Fank, Theotonio Dos Santos, Vania Vambirra, and Ruy Mauro Marini. The first was a German-U.S. economist and the other three Brazilians, who shared readings and discussions in Brazil before the 1964 coup in that country. Subsequently, they found each other in Chile in the late 1960s in the Center for Socio-Economic Studies, until the military coup of 1973. During this period—at least in the case of the Brazilians—they produced their principals works with regards to TMD. I had the fortune of meeting and working with Marini in Mexico in the mid-1970s, before his return to Brazil.
TMD offers no concessions to the local ruling classes, holding them responsible for the prevailing conditions in which they manage to reap enormous profits in collusion with international capitals, despite [international] value transfers. For this reason, it was hard for these theorists to find spaces for their knowledge in the academic world.
The 1973 military coup in Chile meant that the principal creators of TMD appeared on the search lists of the military forces and their intelligence apparatus. And this coup in Chile, which was preceded by the coup in Brazil in 1964, was followed by many more in the Southern part of the continent, which dispersed and disbanded working groups and closed important spaces in those societies.
At the same time, this long counterrevolutionary phase, which was not limited to military governments, favored sweeping transformations in the social sciences, where neoliberal theories and methodological individualism came to reign supreme. TMD emerged in an exceptional period of recent history. However, subsequently and in general—saving certain moments and countries in the region—ideal conditions for its development and dissemination have not existed.
In his classic work, The Dialectics of Dependency, Marini defines dependency as a “relation of subordination between formally independent nations, in whose framework the relations of production of the subordinate nation are modified or recreated in order to ensure the expanded production of dependency.” What are the mechanisms of this expanded production, and how have they changed since Marini formulated his proposal in the 1970s?
When we talk about the processes generated by dependent capitalism, the “dependent” qualifier isn’t redundant. We’re talking about another way of being capitalist. That is to say that in the world system, diverse forms of capitalism coexist and are integrated, and they feed off each other and deepen their particular forms within the global unity of capital.
The heterogeneity of the system can be explained, then, not by the backwardness of some economies, not as prior states [of development], not as deficiencies. Each constitutes its full, mature form of capitalism possible in this system.
In this way, with the stroke of a pen, TMD destroyed the hopes of the developmentalists, who supposed that the dependent economies could achieve higher states of welfare and development within this order constituted by capital. For them, it was just a matter of taking advantage of windows that regularly open. There is nothing in the prevailing dynamic to suggest that things are moving in that direction. To the contrary, what is produced and continues to emerge is the “development of underdevelopment,” so long as capitalist social relations prevail.
The gap between underdeveloped and developed capitalism, or between imperialist and dependent capitalism is ever widening. Dependency deepens and more acute modalities are generated. In a world in which digital capitalism is gaining ground—the internet of things, artificial intelligence, robotics, as an example—this isn’t hard to understand.
Experiences like that of South Korea can’t be repeated at will. They are, instead, exceptions to the rule. Why did the IMF cut off and suffocate the Argentine economy and not extend its hand like imperialist capital did for South Korea after the 1952 war on the peninsula? It was the latter’s exceptional position in a strategic space, which was disrupted by the triumph of Mao’s revolution in China and the need to construct a barrier to prevent the expansion of socialism in Korea, that turned on the faucet of enormous resources, at least for Japan and the United States, and put blinders on those defenders of democracy and the free market when South Korea was governed by a succession of military dictatorships that ferociously applied state intervention, not the free market, to define plans and programs to define priorities for investment and loans.
Today, all a government in the dependent world has to do is establish some rules for foreign capital, and the whole clamor and propaganda of transnational media demand that communism be stopped, impeding international loans, blocking access to markets, and seeking to suffocate those alleged subversives.
The concept of superexploitation as a mechanism by which dependent capitalists compensate for their subordinate insertion in the international division of labor is perhaps Marini’s most original and polemic proposal. Some Marxists, for example, protest the possibility of the systematic violation of the law of value. This is a theme that you take up in your debate with the Argentinian researcher Claudio Katz. How do you define superexploitation, and why, or in what terms, do you defend its validity today?
With Marini’s short book, The Dialectics of Dependency, whose central body was written in 1972 and would be published in 1973, TMD reaches its point of greatest maturity. We can synthesize the nucleus of Marini’s thesis in the question: How is the reproduction of a capitalism that regularly transfers value to imperialist economies possible?
It’s possible because in dependent capitalism, a particular form of exploitation is imposed which means that capital isn’t just appropriating surplus value, but also part of workers’ consumption fund, which ought to correspond to their salaries, in order to transfer it to their accumulation fund. That’s what the category of superexploitation accounts for. If all capital eventually ends up being unpaid labor, in dependent capitalism, all capital is unpaid labor and the appropriated life fund [of the working class].
Marini’s response is theoretically and politically brilliant, because it allows us to explain the reasons for the multiplication of misery and the devastation of the workers in the dependent world, but also the reasons for which capital is unable to establish stable forms of domination in these regions, regularly expelling huge contingents of workers from its civilizational promises, thrusting them into barbarism and converting them into contingents that resist, revolt, and rise up against the projects of the powerful.
Superexploitation has consequences at all levels of Latin American societies. For now, we can emphasize that it accompanies the formation of economies oriented to foreign markets. Following the processes of independence in the nineteenth century, and under the guidance of local capitals, the region’s economies advanced on the basis of exports, initially of primary materials and foodstuffs, to which we can add, recently, the production and assembly of luxury industrial goods like cars, televisions, state-of-the-art cell phones—products equally distant from the general consumption needs of most of the working population. This is compatible with the dominant modality of exploitation, which seriously impacts salaries, reducing workers’ consumption power and reducing their participation in the formation of a dynamic internal market.
It’s relevant here to consider a significant difference with capitalism in the developed world. There, as capitalism advanced in the nineteenth century, it faced the dilemma that in order to keep expanding, which implied the multiplication of the mass of goods and products, it would need to incorporate workers into consumption. That was achieved by paying salaries with the purchasing power for basic goods such as clothing, shoes, utensils, and home furnishings. This balance was accomplished by introducing improved production techniques, which reduced the pressure to extend the working day by multiplying the mass of products thrown into the market. From there, we can understand the weight of relative surplus value in developed capitalism.
But in Latin America, things worked differently. Nineteenth-century capitalism didn’t see the need to create markets, because they had been available since the colonial period in the imperialist centers. In addition, English capitalism’s takeoff increased the demand for primary materials and foodstuffs. For this reason, there wasn’t any hurry to change the kind of use values and products put on the market. They continued to be foodstuffs and primary goods. In this way, the emergent capitalism in our region was under no pressure to do something qualitatively different. The mass of salaried laborers expanded, but they don’t comprise the principal demand for the goods being produced, which was in Europe, the United States, and Asia.
Through their insertion in the world market and when it comes time to sell products, Latin American economies transfer value [abroad] for the simple reason that the capitals that operate here have lower compositions and productivities than the capitals in economies that spend more on new machinery, equipment, and technology, allowing them greater productivity and the ability to appropriate value created in other parts of the world. This process is called unequal exchange.
It's important to note that unequal exchange occurs in the market, at the moment of the purchase and sale of commodities. Apart from their low organic composition, this concept doesn’t tell us much about how these commodities were produced, and above all, what allows for a capitalist process to be reproduced over time in such conditions. That’s where super-exploitation comes in.
That is the secret that makes dependent capitalism viable. And this calls all the more attention to the errors of people like Claudio Katz, who have formulated proposals that try to eliminate this concept and do so, furthermore, with grotesque arguments, like that Marx never mentioned it in Capital – he refers to [superexploitaiton] many times, in a variety of ways – because that would imply a dilution or a direct attack on his theoretical proposition since capitalism can’t annihilate its workforce.
I’m not going to repeat those debates with Katz. I will simply reiterate that Marx’s Capital is a book that is central to the study of capitalism and its contradictions. But no one can claim that it accounts for everything, or that capitalism, in its spread over time, can’t exhibit theoretical or historical novelties of any kind. That is a religious reading, but Capital is not a sacred text. Such a position, furthermore, is an attack on a central dimension of Marxism as a theory able to explain not only what has existed, but also that which is new. For this reason, the only orthodoxy Marxism can claim is its mode of reflection.
It's also argued that the spread of superexploitation to the central economies following globalized neoliberal restructuring invalidates its character as a process unique to dependent capitalism.
Superexploitation can be present anywhere that capital operates, be that in the developed or underdeveloped world, just like forms of relative surplus value and absolute surplus value. Of course, there is superexploitation in Brazil and Guatemala, just as there is in Germany and South Korea.
But that’s not the problem. What’s relevant is to elucidate the weight of these forms of exploitation, which can be present in any capitalist space, in capital’s reproduction. So the central issue is different, and so are the economic, social, and political consequences.
Setting aside periods of crisis, when the most brutal forms of exploitation can be exacerbated everywhere, can capitalism operate in the medium and long term without a market that generates salaries, or with extremely low salaries? Something like if, in Germany, the average salary of the Armenians and Turks was generalized for the entire working population, or if the salaries of Mexican and Central American workers in the United States were predominant there. I don’t think so.
Finally, what tools or perspectives does Marxist dependency theory offer us in the face of today’s crises?
In its eagerness to deal with the acute and prolonged capitalist crisis, capital in every region seeks to accentuate forms of exploitation, including superexploitation. It seeks, once again, to reduce rights and benefits. With the war in Ukraine, it has found a good excuse to justify the increase in the price of food, housing, and energy, and its shameless return to the use of fuels that intensify pollution and environmental barbarism, as well as the increase in military budgets at the expense of wages and jobs.
The great imperial powers expect the subordination of economies and states to their decisions in periods of this sort. But the current crisis is also accelerating the crisis of hegemony in the world system, which opens spaces for greater degrees of autonomy—which does not put an end to dependency. This is evident in Washington’s difficulties with disciplining the Latin American and African states to support their position in the conflict in Europe.
The scenario in Latin America over the last few decades reveals processes of enormous interest. We have witnessed significant popular mobilization in almost every country in the region, questioning various aspects of the neoliberal tsunami, be it jobs, salaries, retirements, healthcare and education, as well as rights like abortion, recognition of gender identities, lands, water, and much more.
On this deeply fractured terrain that capital generates in the dependent world, class disputes tend to intensify. This explains the regular social and political outbursts in our societies. It’s the result of the barbarity that capitalism imposes on regions like ours.
One expression of this social force is manifested in the electoral terrain. But just as quickly as there have been victories, there have been defeats. These comings and goings can be naturalized, but why haven’t the victories allowed for lasting processes of change?
Of course, this is not to deny that there have been violent coups of a new sort that have managed to unseat governments. But even then, there were already signs of exhaustion that limited the protests, with the clear exception of Bolivia. There is an enormous gap between the leftist voter and the person who occasionally votes for left projects. The neoliberal triumph was not only in the economic policies and transformations it achieved, but also in its installment of a vision and interpretation of the world, its problems, and its solutions.
The struggle against neoliberalism today involves dismantling privatization of every kind and putting a stop to the conversion of social services and policies into private businesses. That means taking on the most economic and politically powerful sectors of capital, with control over state institutions where legislators, judges, and military members operate, together with the main media, schools, and churches. We can add that these are the sectors of capital with the strongest ties to imperialist capitals and their assemblage of supranational institutions, media, and states.
It's a powerful social bloc. It’s hard to think about attacking it without having to attack capitalism itself.
Chile: ensaio sobre uma derrota histórica
No dia 4 de setembro de 1970, o povo chileno foi às urnas para eleger Salvador Allende presidente da República. A vitória do socialista foi apertada, mas ainda assim referendada pelo Congresso, apesar das tentativas de golpe que já rondavam. Mil dias depois da sua posse, numa terça-feira, 11 de setembro de 1973, o presidente Allende despertou apreensivo com os rumores de traição militar, mas ainda assim determinado a um objetivo: anunciar um plebiscito popular sobre a necessidade de uma Nova Constituição, que superasse os limites da carta vigente desde 1925. Esta, por sua vez, havia sido escrita por uma cúpula de supostos “especialistas” no governo de Arturo Alessandri, latifundiário conhecido como “el León de Tarapacá”. A velha Constituição bloqueava o programa revolucionário da Unidade Popular, ao assegurar os privilégios e poderes da classe proprietária. E Allende era, como se sabe, um sério respeitador das leis.
Foi para evitar que Allende convocasse o plebiscito popular para uma Nova Constituição (análogo ao que os chilenos de hoje chamaram de “plebiscito de entrada”) que os comandantes militares anteciparam o golpe de 1973, ordenando o bombardeio ao Palácio de La Moneda dois dias antes do planejado. Foram informados das intenções presidenciais por Pinochet, chefe das Forças Armadas para quem, no domingo anterior, Allende havia confidenciado o anúncio do plebiscito em uma conversa privada na chácara de El Cañaveral.2
O plebiscito da Nova Constituição nunca foi anunciado. Allende morreu, a Unidade Popular foi massacrada. E a ideia allendista de um itinerário popular constituinte foi soterrada pela repressão. A isso seguiu-se a ditadura com quase 4 mil chilenos mortos e desaparecidos, com 38 mil presos e torturados e também com a constituição de 1980, escrita por Jaime Guzmán, Sérgio de Castro e outros homens da elite ditatorial. A carta teve a habilidade de projetar o “pinochetismo sem Pinochet”, fundando o Estado subsidiário e sua blindagem neoliberal que, por sua vez, foi perpetuada pelo pacto transicional de 1989, avançando por 30 anos de democracia. As décadas de 2000 e 2010 foram de crescente luta social contra a constituição pinochetista - culminando com a revolta de 2019 e o tardio colapso total da sua legitimidade.
Retomar esse percurso é importante para que se possa dimensionar o impacto histórico e simbólico do plebiscito de saída da Nova Constituição chilena ocorrido em 4 de setembro de 2022, cuja ampla escolha pelo rechazo ainda causa perplexidade e tristeza no movimento apruebista. Era enorme a carga de simbolismo histórico presente nesse plebiscito, a começar pela sua data: o atual itinerário constituinte estava desenhado para exorcizar Pinochet no aniversário de 52 anos do triunfo eleitoral de Allende.
Se supunha que a Nova Constituição (NC), escrita de junho de 2021 a junho de 2022, era a mais genuína representação dos anseios populares, a primeira a escutar verdadeiramente as profundas demandas sociais desde o bombardeio de 11 de setembro. Mas não era. Dessa vez não foi um golpe militar que derrotou o horizonte de igualdade, diversidade, solidariedade e justiça plasmadas na nova carta, mas sim o próprio voto popular, em um enredo que, por isso mesmo, ganhou ares trágicos. Afinal, foi justamente aquele povo excluído e esquecido, invisibilizado e maltratado pelo Estado/mercado, o povo que a Convenção Constitucional acreditava representar de maneira profunda e inédita, que manifestou seu desagravo e gerou uma crise de legitimidade dos mecanismos democráticos mais inovadores do nosso continente.
Como explicar a crise de representatividade do organismo supostamente mais representativo da história chilena?
Voto popular contra a Nova Constituição por classe e território
A Nova Constituição chilena foi escrita por uma Convenção Constitucional (CC) eleita em maio de 2021, com voto facultativo de 6,1 milhões de eleitores (41% de participação). De maneira inédita, a CC foi composta por 50% de mulheres (lei 21.216)3 e 11% de povos indígenas (lei 21.298)4, e elegeu 32% de convencionales independentes,5 sendo considerada um organismo da mais alta representatividade popular. Apesar do polêmico quórum de ⅔ para aprovação das normas constitucionais e da tensão constante entre movimentos populares e instituições, a crítica avassaladora que a revolta de 2019 produziu às classes políticas tradicionais se materializou em um organismo constitucional com rostos novos, formado por dezenas de “pessoas comuns”, ativistas e lideranças populares. A CC mostrou a possibilidade de alteração rápida e radical da casta política, ao ser muito diversa do congresso nacional e dos profissionais de partidos que comandaram o “duopólio” das três décadas de democracia no Chile.
O resultado foi um texto constitucional atrelado às lutas dos movimentos sociais e aos valores da solidariedade social opostos ao neoliberalismo, um dos documentos mais avançados em direitos sociais e promoção da diversidade dos nossos tempos.
Em poucas palavras, eu diria que cinco eixos caracterizavam a Nova Constituição chilena como uma das mais progressistas do mundo:
A plurinacionalidade intercultural, a representatividade política e o direito à autodeterminação dos povos indígenas, preservando-se a unidade do Estado chileno, conceito inspirado pelo novo constitucionalismo latino-americano inaugurado por Equador (2007) e Bolívia (2009);
Os direitos da natureza e os freios à sua mercantilização, recuperando por exemplo o direito universal de acesso à água e suplantando o Código de Águas da ditadura, sendo a primeira constituição do mundo a reconhecer a crise climática como emergência global e nacional;
Os direitos sociais de caráter universal, como a educação gratuita, a saúde pública integral, a aposentadoria solidária, pública e tripartite, a moradia e o trabalho dignos (incluindo o direito universal à greve inexistente hoje), bem como o direito à cultura, ao esporte, a ciência e ao tempo livre;
Os direitos reprodutivos, econômicos e políticos das mulheres em sentido transversal, assegurando reconhecimento da economia do cuidado e do trabalho doméstico, o combate à violência de gênero e a paridade em todos os organismos oficiais, bem como uma perspectiva feminista no sistema de justiça e uma educação não sexista;
A descentralização do Estado como forma de aprofundar a democracia, garantindo maior orçamento e atribuições às comunas, províncias e regiões, bem como criando organismos de poder popular vinculantes na formulação de políticas públicas locais e nacionais.
Apesar da NC responder à maioria das demandas populares levantadas na revolta de 2019 e nas mobilizações das décadas anteriores, algo na Convenção Constitucional falhou para que o resultado desse grande esforço tenha sido tão amplamente derrotado. Se por um lado foi evidente o peso das fake news e o volumoso aporte financeiro das elites chilenas na campanha do Rechazo, que recebeu quatro vezes mais dinheiro que a campanha do Apruebo,6 também é importante reconhecer que havia pontos cegos e fraturas na comunicação entre representantes constituintes e as maiorias chilenas. Do contrário, a campanha de desinformação das direitas contra a nova carta não encontraria terreno tão fértil para se disseminar e prosperar.
Chegou-se ao seguinte paradoxo: o voto popular matou o projeto político mais democrático da história do Chile. O mesmo voto popular que desbancou as elites políticas tradicionais, rejeitou o suposto “amadorismo” dos convencionales, e com isso entregou o bastão da condução política constituinte novamente para o congresso.
O voto obrigatório no plebiscito de saída foi certamente um dos principais fatores para essa guinada. Diferentemente do plebiscito de entrada em outubro de 2020, com voto facultativo de 7,5 milhões de chilenos (50% de participação); da eleição dos convencionales em maio de 2021, com voto facultativo de 6,1 milhões de chilenos (41%); e do 2o turno das eleições presidenciais que deram vitória à coligação “Apruebo Dignidad” com voto facultativo de 8,3 milhões de chilenos (55,7%), o plebiscito de saída teve voto obrigatório com multa de 180 mil pesos (aproximadamente mil reais) para quem não comparecesse às urnas. A obrigatoriedade punitiva do voto com essa altíssima multa, em um contexto de desemprego, inflação e carestia, deu origem a uma mudança de perfil do eleitor que escapou à percepção dos apruebistas. Além de inédita, a participação de 13 milhões de chilenos (86%) no plebiscito de saída forçou a manifestação de mais de 5 milhões de absenteístas históricos, possivelmente o setor menos interessado em política da sociedade e os mais ausentes nas eleições da última década. Não é nada desprezível o fato de que o plebiscito de saída tenha contado com mais que o dobro (216%) do total de votantes das eleições para os representantes convencionales.
Este é um dos elementos explicativos mais importantes de tamanha quebra de expectativas e da guinada política entre eleições tão próximas. A NC foi rechaçada por 7,8 milhões de chilenos (61,8%) contra 4,8 milhões de apruebistas (38,1%). Os votos contrários de Rechazo no plebiscito, sozinhos, somaram mais do que o total de votantes no pleito que elegeu os convencionales. Em números absolutos, o quórum de 4 de setembro de 2022 foi o maior de toda a história chilena.
Tais números absolutos devem nos conduzir a uma análise dos votos por classes sociais e territórios, como alertou o historiador Sérgio Grez.7 Ao segmentar o total de comunas em quatro estratos de renda, o quintil que reúne as comunas mais pobres do país apresentou uma média de 75% rechazo, expressivamente maior que o resultado nacional. As comunas com renda média-baixa rechaçaram o texto em 71%; as média-altas o rechaçaram em 64%; e o quintil de maior renda o rechaçou em 60%. Quanto mais pobres as comunas, mais avassalador foi o rechaço.
Em Colchane, por exemplo, a comuna de Tarapacá com mais altos índices de pobreza (24%)8 e que enfrentou a fase mais aguda da crise migratória do Norte, o rechaço obteve 94%. Ao mesmo tempo, províncias com maiores índices de população indígena também demonstraram altos níveis de rechaço, ao contrário do que se poderia imaginar. Foram as regiões de fronteira indígena - Ñuble (74%), Araucanía (73%), Maule (71%) e Biobio (69%)9 - que obtiveram os maiores níveis de rechaço em comparação à média nacional. Já as regiões com maior aceitação da NC - a Região Metropolitana (RM) e Valparaíso -, ainda assim experimentaram a derrota do texto, com respectivamente 55% e 57% de rechazo. Em termos nacionais, o Apruebo só obteve maioria em 8 de 346 comunas do país, sendo 5 em Valparaíso e 3 na RM.10 Entre elas, não está a comuna de Recoleta, na RM, governada desde 2012 pelo prefeito comunista Daniel Jadue, principal rival de Boric na coligação Apruebo Dignidad. A Recoleta foi palco de experimentos importantes do PC governo, como a universidade popular, as livrarias populares e as farmácias populares, reunindo habitantes santiaguinos simpáticos à esquerda e entusiastas de Jadue. Seus votos do plebiscito, porém, resultaram em inexplicáveis 51,9% pelo Rechazo.
Além disso, como alertou Igor Donoso, nas comunas que “os ambientalistas denominaram zonas de sacrifício”11 por vivenciarem atividades de extrativismo e conflito socioambiental, o rechaço foi amplamente vitorioso, a despeito das diretrizes ecológicas da NC que asseguravam os direitos das populações dos territórios de mineração, pesca industrial, monoculturas florestais e outras atividades predatórias. Nestas “zonas de sacrifício”, Donoso menciona o triunfo do rechazo em La Ligua (58,93%), Quintero (58,11%), Los Vilos (56,93%), Puchuncaví (56,11%), Petorca (56,11%), Villa Alemana (57,82%) e Freirina (55,54%). Nas cidades mineiras afetadas pelo extrativismo e suas contaminações, o rechaço também venceu amplamente, como em Calama (70,64%) e Rancagua (60,63%).
Emblemática dessa contradição territorial foi a comuna de Petorca, cenário de uma aguerrida luta popular pelo acesso à água na última década. Ali, a desertificação prejudica os pequenos agricultores e a população em geral, que dependem de caminhões-pipa para obter a água necessária à sobrevivência e à produção de alimentos, enquanto grandes empresas monocultoras detém direitos de propriedade sobre a água inclusive das propriedades camponesas, uma vez que o Código de Águas de 1981 permitiu a bizarra desassociação dos mercados da terra e da água.12 A eleição de Rodrigo Mundaca, líder do Movimento pela Defesa do Acesso à Água, Terra e Proteção Ambiental (MODATIMA), a governador da região de Valparaíso em maio de 2021 indicava uma consistente orientação popular pela agenda ecológica e contra a privatização da água, princípios destacados da NC. No entanto, Petorca derrotou o novo texto com 56% de rechazo,13 o que fez Mundaca declarar: “sinto a incerteza de não reconhecer o lugar que habito (...). Parece bastante irracional a votação sustentada por esta comuna”. 14
Pontos cegos da política constituinte: causas do rechazo popular
Segundo pesquisa realizada pelo CIPER15 na semana seguinte ao plebiscito, com entrevista a 120 pessoas de 12 comunas com maiorias trabalhadoras, as principais razões do voto popular pelo rechazo foram, nesta ordem:
O Estado se apropriaria das casas das pessoas
Os fundos de pensão não seriam herdáveis
O país seria dividido
O governo merece críticas (voto castigo)
Contrários ao aborto
A pesquisa CADEM feita na mesma semana,16 questionou 1.135 pessoas com a pergunta “qual foi a principal razão pela qual você votou rechazo?” e obteve como resultado o gráfico abaixo. Foram 40% de entrevistados que atribuíram seu voto a um processo constituinte “muy malo”, que despertou “desconfiança”; 35% de menções críticas à plurinacionalidade (um dos mais intensos focos de fake news); 29% de desaprovação do governo Boric; 24% de críticas à instabilidade e insegurança política e econômica; 13% contrários à suposta proibição de saúde e educação privadas (fake); 13% de referências a um “mal camino” do país associado à delinquência e ao conflito mapuche; 12% de menções contrárias a uma nova constituição e em defesa da reforma da carta da ditadura; e 8% de referências contrárias ao aborto e às mudanças do sistema político.
Gráfico 1 - Razões para votar rechazo (CADEM)
As principais fake news que abalaram o voto apruebista se relacionavam à ameaça contra a chilenidade: se disseminou que a plurinacionalidade era o fim da bandeira e do hino, que o Chile iria mudar de nome, que imigrantes venezuelanos e povos indígenas tomariam o poder e se tornariam cidadãos privilegiados, sem punibilidade pela justiça, e que os chilenos não poderiam mais circular livremente pelo seu próprio território (usando como pretexto o desastrado episódio da ex ministra do Interior, Iskia Siches, impedida de realizar uma reunião em Temucuicui, Araucanía, bloqueada por uma barricada mapuche na primeira quinzena de governo Boric). Também os direitos reprodutivos, a constitucionalização do direito ao aborto e o direito à diversidade sexual ocuparam um lugar de destaque nas fake news, embora a pesquisa CADEM indique que este não tenha sido o ponto mais crítico impulsionador do rechazo.
Além dos conglomerados midiáticos tradicionais da direita e extrema direita, dezenas de contas de Facebook, Youtube e Instagram não declaradas ao Servel propagaram, durante meses, uma série de mentiras sobre a NC, se aproveitando do sentimento de insegurança e instabilidade dos mais pobres, em função da crise econômica, do trauma da pandemia e do flagrante aumento da criminalidade. Medo da violência, racismo, xenofobia foram dispositivos conservadores mobilizados em massa, mas que não teriam obtido sucesso se tais sentimentos não existissem no terreno da experiência social e das ideologias populares, como diagnosticou Jorge Magasich.17 Afinal, fake news não se propaga no vácuo.
A opinião de que o processo constituinte foi “mal feito”, de que a Constituição não era uma obra tecnicamente viável e que a CC foi marcada por escrachos, anarquia e confusão é particularmente importante para um país que havia acabado de “demitir” sua classe política e convocar “pessoas comuns” para o centro da elaboração constituinte. Há um paradoxo de difícil interpretação no fato de que a revolta de 2019 consolidou a crítica popular ao duopólio, às instituições tradicionais e aos profissionais dos partidos, mas que somente três anos depois o plebiscito de saída tenha desmoralizado os legítimos representantes do chileno comum, do lado de fora dos acordões e diretamente do chão das ruas. Com isso, o plebiscito de saída devolveu a bola para as mesmas instituições de sempre, que o estallido social havia deslegitimado e declarado incapazes de governar.
A ideia de uma Convenção amadora e caótica, que errou mais do que acertou, terminou sendo reiterada por declarações como de Marcos Arellano, convencional independente da Coordinadora Plurinacional, que pediu desculpas, em nome da CC: “é de exclusiva responsabilidade da Convenção como órgão”, declarou sobre o triunfo do rechazo: “vários convencionales tiveram condutas de soberba. Houve falta de solenidade em alguns casos, uma série de performances que afetaram a credibilidade do órgão”.18 Arellano também expressou uma autocrítica sobre o uso excessivo das horas de trabalho dos convencionales das portas da CC para dentro, com evidente descaso e descuido com o trabalho de comunicação política de massas e experiência de base nas periferias em defesa do novo texto. É fato inegável que os debates sobre justiça social, paridade e plurinacionalidade dos convencionales aconteceram em termos que alguns consideraram “acadêmicos” ou “pos-modernos”, distantes da realidade vivida pelo povo chileno e de suas subjetividades políticas. Essa fratura é trágica, porque a CC se legitimou como organismo mais popular, representativo e democrático da história do Chile, mas terminou sendo desmoralizada pelo povo que alegava representar.
Talvez a vitória retumbante de 78% pelo Apruebo no plebiscito de entrada tenha distorcido a percepção política sobre o plebiscito de saída, subestimando sua dificuldade. O plebiscito de saída não era nenhum passeio. Não era uma vitória a mais na coleção de triunfos da esquerda pós-estallido, mas sim outra montanha a ser escalada, dentro de uma correlação de forças móvel, que afinal ofereceu 3,75 milhões de votos à extrema direita com José Antônio Kast em dezembro de 2021. A CN não estava ganha apenas pelos significados de justiça e solidariedade mobilizados pelo seu texto em si mesmo. Ainda mais considerando o fator voto obrigatório e o ponto cego dos 5 milhões de absenteístas agora convertidos em votantes, que sequer se interessaram pelos pleitos anteriores. Era preciso escrever a NC e ao mesmo tempo lutar pela sua comunicação popular nas poblaciones.
Por outro lado, questionar a capacidade técnica e a seriedade de um organismo com independentes, mulheres, indígenas e líderes populares parece ser uma forma trágica de cair na armadilha das campanhas de deslegitimação arquitetadas pelas direitas (pinochetista e centrista), que buscaram a todo tempo desmoralizar um organismo que permaneceu fora do seu tradicional controle político. Se levarmos em conta os relatos insuspeitos de uma brasileira, a constitucionalista Ester Rizzi, que esteve dentro da Convenção em fevereiro, os trabalhos estavam eficientes, técnicos, organizados e com assessoria de inúmeros profissionais competentes emprestados pelas universidades, em um processo constitucional com parcos recursos financeiros e pouco investimento público.19 Nesse sentido, a qualidade da NC foi quase um milagre, fruto de um esforço coletivo e técnico fenomenal em condições das mais adversas, que merece aplausos aos convencionales.
Entre as possibilidades não aproveitadas pela CC estavam os plebiscitos intermediários, que inicialmente visavam contornar o bloqueio dos ⅔ de quórum pelo voto popular e superar a impossibilidade de amplos consensos entre convencionales recorrendo às maiorias simples do povo. Talvez a impressionante vitória das esquerdas na eleição da CC em maio de 2021 tenha sido, no médio prazo, uma vitória de Pirro, ao gerar um excesso de confiança no procedimento interno do órgão, enfraquecendo a comunicação necessária com as maiorias sociais e descartando os plebiscitos intermediários em função dos consensos progressistas dos ⅔ de esquerda e centro-esquerda obtidos no caminho. Assim, a CC se fechou em si mesma e se distanciou do processo mobilizador que a tornou possível.
Terceiro Turno, derrota de Boric e o novo gabinete
A coligação de Boric, Apruebo Dignidad, carregava no seu nome a opção governista pela NC. Embora tenha se engajado na campanha tardia e timidamente, constrangido pelas imposições da Fiscalía que proibia a campanha oficialista para qualquer um dos lados, Boric utilizou a ideia de que a máxima participação no plebiscito seria em si mesmo um triunfo da democracia. Será mesmo?
Entre as causas mais relevantes do rechazo está a evidência de que o plebiscito representou o terceiro turno das eleições presidenciais. A má avaliação do governo, por sua incapacidade de apresentar soluções compreensíveis aos problemas do país e melhorias rápidas da vida popular, somadas as contradições entre o comportamento de Boric antes e depois de se tornar presidente (sendo a posição contrária ao “quinto retiro” dos fundos de pensão o exemplo mais escancarado), fez cair a popularidade do presidente numa velocidade preocupante. Entre março e setembro de 2022, a aprovação do governo Boric caiu de 50% para 33%, enquanto a reprovação subiu de 20% a 60%. Não por acaso, a reprovação corresponde à votação no Rechazo, como mostra o gráfico abaixo.
Gráfico 2 - Aprovação do presidente Gabriel Boric, mar-set/2022 (CADEM)
Em termos numéricos, o voto Apruebo correspondeu de maneira quase exata ao voto em Boric no segundo turno (ganhando apenas 200 mil novos apoiadores, de 4,6 milhões nas eleições a 4,8 milhões no plebiscito).20 Territorialmente, a votação do Apruebo foi quase idêntica à de Boric. Na RM, por exemplo, Boric teve 2,1 milhões e o Apruebo 2,2 milhões. Em Valparaíso, 545 mil votos em Boric e 583 mil no Apruebo. Na região de O’Higgins, respectivamente 252 mil e 244 mil. As diferenças entre os votos do Boric e do Apruebo foi tão pequena que se conclui que os quase 5 milhões de novos votantes no plebiscito de saída se direcionaram quase integralmente para o rechazo.
A incapacidade do Apruebo de ganhar votos entre o segundo turno presidencial (dezembro de 2021) e o plebiscito (setembro de 2022) diz muito sobre as dificuldades de dois setores das esquerdas em transferir suas agendas de mudança do plano da utopia e da imaginação política para a vida concreta das maiorias mais desinteressadas do país. Tanto a esquerda centrista do governo com seu modus operandi continuista e até repressor de movimentos sociais, como as esquerdas de horizontes mais rupturistas que atuaram na CC (chamadas por Boric de maximalistas), por motivos diferentes, não conseguiram atingir o objetivo mais crucial de toda sua luta: superar o a Constituição pinochetista/neoliberal e abrir caminho constitucional para um Estado de bem estar social, com justiça distributiva e direitos assegurados.
De tudo isso, se apreendeu que a relação entre as multidões mobilizadas no estallido (que encheram avenidas com milhões e demonstraram uma convicção impressionante) e as multidões silenciosas, absenteístas e invisibilizadas (que estiveram em casa nos últimos dez anos de eleições) é profundamente contraditória e muito mais complexa e tensa do que os apruebistas supunham. As classes trabalhadoras são heterogêneas e nem sempre se entendem.
A mudança de gabinete de Boric mostrou que das duas coligações que compõe o governo - Apruebo Dignidad e Socialismo Democrático - a segunda saiu ganhando. A nova ministra do interior, Carolina Tohá (filha do ministro do interior de Allende, José Tohá) foi Secretária Geral da Presidência (Segpres) de Bachelet, entrou no lugar da polêmica Iskia Siches, que teve sua reputação derretida em cinco meses de governo, erros vergonhosos e excessivos pedidos de desculpas. A nova Segpres, que substituiu Giorgio Jackson (o engenheiro da Frente Ampla), é Ana Lya Uriarte, que foi chefa de gabinete de Bachelet. Enquanto Siches foi demitida, Jackson, que não poderia ficar fora do governo por sua enorme relevância na trajetória de Boric da FECH à presidência, foi deslocado para o ministério do desenvolvimento social.
O governo Boric, dessa forma, aumentou o número de mulheres em seu comitê político tanto quanto de bacheletistas, se transformando em uma espécie de governo Bachelet 3.
Buscando atenuar e naturalizar sua derrota, Boric discursou no 4 de setembro: “no Chile as instituições funcionam (…), a democracia chilena sai mais robusta”.21 Também apontou para mais um passo em direção à moderação, dizendo que “o maximalismo, a violência e a intolerância com que pensa diferente devem ficar definitivamente de lado”, como se algum tipo de radicalismo tivesse dado o tom da CC, o que não é verdade. Afirmou ainda que “é preciso escutar a voz do povo, não só este dia, mas sim de tudo o que aconteceu nestes últimos anos intensos”. E arrematou: “Não esqueçamos porque chegamos até aqui. Este mal estar segue latente e não podemos ignorá-lo”.
No mesmo tom de relativização da derrota, a ministra vocera Camila Vallejo, cujo cargo é o equilíbrio tênue que segura o Partido Comunista em uma coligação cada vez mais inconveniente, afirmou: “o compromisso do governo de impulsionar seu programa está intacto (…). Não esqueçamos porque estamos aqui. O que nos levou a ser governo foram anos e décadas demandando maior justiça social, aposentadoria digna, saúde digna, o direito à educação. Temos um mandato a cumprir. (…) Estes desafios estão em pleno trâmite”.22 Resta saber, ainda, como seria possível cumprir o programa de Boric sem a NC. A verdade inconveniente é a adequação deste programa à velha ordem (Bachelet 3).
Limbo constitucional e novo itinerário
Até mesmo os politicos da direita tradicional, comemorando o resultado na sede do comando do Rechazo, afirmaram que a constituição de 1980 está morta. Sua campanha esteve baseada em escrever uma “NC melhor”, “uma que nos una”, mais nacional e unitária, que não “dívida o país”, apelando à falsa compreensão do plurinacional como antagônico ao nacional.
É certo que haverá um novo itinerário constituinte, mas não se sabe ainda quanto da Constituição de 1980 será contrabandeada para dentro do novo processo. Fez parte dos acordos pós-estallido a ideia de uma NC a partir de uma folha em branco, contrária a reformar mais uma vez o texto de Pinochet. Agora, como disse Boric e sua nova ministra Uriarte, o protagonismo será do congresso, o que contraria todo esforço da revolta de 2019 até aqui.
Ainda havia a possibilidade de diferentes modalidades de golpe contra o resultado do plebiscito de entrada, que apontou inequivocamente para uma nova constituição e para uma convenção eleita para este fim, rejeitando que o congresso redigisse o novo texto para envernizar o velho. No dia 12 de setembro, uma reunião entre lideranças dos partidos no Parlamento definiu que haverá sim um “organismo eleito”, possivelmente formado nos próximos meses, e acompanhado de um “comitê de expertos”,23 o que significa o triunfo do neoliberalismo pela tecnocracia.
Ganha a interpretação de que a NC foi rechaçada por ser amadora, enquanto a nova carta deverá ser controlada por saberes tecnocráticos obviamente vinculados ao mercado e suas normativas típicas. A questão é que se já era difícil combater o neoliberalismo com uma nova constituição (cuja aplicação seria desafiadora e dependeria da luta constante dos movimentos sociais), se tornou frustrante e falsificador combatê-lo submetido a uma tutela tecnocrática que emanará da racionalidade neoliberal.
Mas a luta não terminou. Segundo a declaração dos movimentos sociais após a derrota, “o aprendizado que construímos será fundamental, porque os movimentos sociais já não somos o que éramos antes de escrever esta Constituição. Neste processo o povo aprendeu a auto representar-se, isso não é algo dado, depois de décadas de exclusão dos setores populares da vida política, poder representar a nós mesmas é um trabalho do qual não iremos renunciar”.25
O Rechazo foi um bombardeio às avessas, quase tão inimaginável quanto o do dia 11. O Palácio de La Moneda não foi avariado física, mas politicamente. Dessa vez não de cima pela Força Aérea, mas “desde abajo” pela vontade popular, em um estranho paradoxo democrático.
Para atravessar tempos de derrota histórica, os mapuche usam a palavra “marichiweu”, que significa “nunca vão nos vencer”, explica Elisa Loncón, a linguista indígena que presidiu a primeira metade da CC.25
Nos triênios de 1970-1973 e de 2019-2022, o Chile mostrou sua capacidade de entusiasmar a América Latina com criatividade política e projetos utópicos, que inspiram e iluminam povos vizinhos como miragens magnetizantes. Suas derrotas doem, porque também costumam ser nossas.
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Gang warfare in Haiti (May 23, 2022)
U.S. navigates choppy diplomatic waters (May 20, 2022)
News Briefs
Brazil Supreme Court rejects Bolsonaro complaint (May 19, 2022)
A Brazilian Supreme Court judge rejected a complaint filed by President Jair Bolsonaro in which he accused another justice of abusing his authority, the latest in an ongoing battle between Brazil's executive and judicial branches ahead of October's presidential elections.
U.S. encourages Venezuela talks (May 18, 2022)
The U.S. Biden administration has slightly eased restrictions on Chevron's ability to negotiate with Venezuela's government. Senior administration officials said the move was intended to support talks between the government of President Nicolás Maduro and the U.S.-backed opposition, reports the Washington Post.
Political Report #1466 The April 2002 Coup Through Time
by LAP Editor, Steve Ellner
Political Report #1465 “Those Who Are Poor, Die Poor” | Notes on The Chilean Elections
Political Report 1464 - Nicaragua: Chronicle of an Election Foretold
With seven opposition presidential candidates imprisoned and held incommunicado in the months leading up to the vote and all the remaining contenders but one from miniscule parties closely allied with President Daniel Ortega and his Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), the results of Nicaragua’s November 7 presidential elections were a foregone conclusion. The government declared after polls closed that Ortega won 75 percent of the vote and that 65 percent of voters cast ballots. The independent voting rights organization Urnas Abiertas, meanwhile, reported an abstention rate of approximately 80 percent and widespread irregularities at polling stations around the country.
The vote was carried out in a climate of fear and intimidation, with a total absence of safeguards against fraud.The vote was carried out in a climate of fear and intimidation, with a total absence of safeguards against fraud. In a complete breakdown of the rule of law, Ortega carried out a wave of repression from May to October, leading the opposition to issue a joint statement on October 7 calling for a boycott of the election. Several dozen opposition figures—among them, presidential candidates, peasant, labor, and student leaders, journalists, and environmentalists—were arrested and detained without trial, while several hundred others were forced into exile or underground.
Among those exiled were celebrated novelist Sergio Ramirez, who served as Ortega’s vice president during the 1980s revolution. While the government charged Ramirez with “conspiracy to undermine national integrity,” his crime was provoking the ire of the regime by publishing his latest novel, Tongolele No Sabía Bailar, a fictionalized account of the 2018 mass protests that marked the onset of the current political crisis and the degeneration of the regime into dictatorship. The book was promptly banned in the country, with customs authorities ordered to block shipments at ports of entry.
The repression particularly decimated the left-leaning opposition party Democratic Renovation Union (UNAMOS), formerly called the Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS). The MRS was formed in 1995 by Ortega’s former comrades in arms who either left the FSLN after the failure of their efforts to democratize it or were expelled for challenging Ortega’s leadership of the party. Among those UNAMOS leaders arrested and to date held incommunicado are legendary guerrilla commanders Dora María Téllez and Hugo Torres, as well as deputy foreign minister in the 1980s, Victor Hugo Tinoco, and party president Ana Margarita Vigil. Amnesty International condemned such detentions and incommunicado conditions as “enforced disappearance as a strategy of repression.”
As part of the crackdown the government also banned 24 civic organizations and professional associations—in addition to some 30 that it had previously banned, including three opposition political parties. The majority of these 24 organizations were professional medical guilds that had come under fire for criticizing the regime’s handling of the Covid-19 pandemic, including reporting that the government had concealed the number of infections and deaths. Vice President Rosario Murillo accused doctors of “health terrorism” and of spreading “false outlooks and news” on the impact of the contagion. During the early months of the pandemic the government convened mass public events under the banner of “Love in Times of Covid.” Nicaragua, together with Haiti, has the lowest rate of vaccination in Latin America, with only 4.9 percent of the population inoculated as of October.
In late 2020, the Sandinistas decreed a spate of laws that allows authorities to criminalize anyone who speaks out against the government. Among these are a Cybercrime Law that allows fines and imprisonment of anyone who publishes in the press or on social media what the government deems to be “false news.” Meanwhile, a “hate crimes” law allows life sentences for anyone considered to have carried out “hate crimes,” as defined by the government. Among the varied offenses listed by Sandinista prosecutors for the recent wave of detentions are “conspiracy to undermine national integrity,” “ideological falsehood,” “demanding, exalting, or applauding the imposition of sanctions against the Nicaraguan state and its citizens,” and “using international funding to create organizations, associations, and foundations to channel funds, through projects or programs that deal with sensitive issues such as sexual diversity groups, the rights of Indigenous communities, or through political marketing on topics such as free expression or democracy.”
A week before the vote, Ortega proclaimed that his wife, Vice President Rosario Murillo, was henceforth the “co-president” of the country. While his bizarre declaration has no legal basis or constitutional legitimacy, it was widely seen as a move to anoint her as his successor—the 76-year-old Ortega is known to be in ill health—and a further step towards the rule of a family dynasty. The ruling couple’s eight children already serve as advisors to the presidency and manage the family’s empire of private and ostensibly public media outlets, investment funds, and family businesses.
A mid-October poll by CID-Gallup—an independent pollster that has been conducting political opinion surveys in the country since 2011—found that 76 percent of the country’s electorate believed the country was moving in the wrong direction. The poll reported that 19 percent of the electorate planned to vote for Ortega, 65 percent stated they would favor an opposition candidate, and 16 percent remained undecided. A rival pollster contracted by the FSLN, M&R, showed Ortega with nearly 80 percent support. While all polls should be assessed with caution given the methodological limitations to surveys conducted amid political instability and civil conflict, it is noteworthy that Ortega’s support dropped to 19 from the 33 percent support reported by a CID-Gallup survey conducted in May of this year, which in turn was down from the high point of popular support for Ortega, 54 percent, registered in CID-Gallup’s 2012 poll.
Now that the votes have been cast, it is impossible to get accurate figures for the results given that the Sandinistas control the Supreme Electoral Council and exercise a near absolute control over reporting on the results. In addition, independent foreign observers were banned, and the threat of repression has dissuaded journalists and civic organizations from speaking out.
Ortega will now start his fourth consecutive term in office since the FSLN returned to power in 2007 in the midst of economic and political crisis. With its legitimacy shattered in the aftermath of the 2018 mass uprising and its violent repression, the regime has to rely more on direct coercion to maintain control. After the economy contracted each year from 2018 to 2020, the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America estimates a 2.0 percent growth rate for the current year and 1.8 percent for 2022—not enough for the economy to recover from the three-year tumble. As the crisis has intensified, the number of Nicaraguans trying to cross the U.S.-Mexico border climbed to historically unprecedented levels to exceed 50,000 this year, compared to just a few thousand in 2020. These numbers are in addition to the 140,000 who had already fled into exile since 2018, mostly to Costa Rica.
The International Left Remains Divided on Nicaragua
The international left remains divided on the Nicaraguan crisis, with some among it arguing that the Ortega-Murillo regime represents a continuation of the 1980s revolution and that the United States has been attempting to overthrow it. However, as I showed in an earlier NACLA article, there is little evidence to corroborate the claim that the 2018 mass uprising was instigated by Washington in an attempt to carry out a coup d’état against the government, or that the United States has since carried out a destabilization campaign aimed at overthrowing the regime.
It was not until the mass protests of 2018 that the co-government pact that Ortega had negotiated with the capitalist class, organized into the Superior Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP), broke down.The Ortega inner circle hacked its way into the ranks of the country’s elite in the aftermath of the 1980s revolution and launched a new round of capitalist development starting in 2007. During this period, the Sandinista bourgeoisie set about to vastly expand its wealth. Leading Sandinistas grouped around Ortega heavily invested in tourism, agroindustry, finance, import-export, and subcontracting for the maquiladoras. Ortega and Murillo championed a program—dressed in a quasi-leftist discourse of “Christian, Socialist, and Solidarity”— of constructing a populist multiclass alliance under the firm hegemony of capital and Sandinista state elites. This model did improve material conditions until the economy began to tank in 2015. It was not until the mass protests of 2018 that the co-government pact that Ortega had negotiated with the capitalist class, organized into the Superior Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP), broke down.
Washington would have liked to have a more pliant regime in place from the start, and the recent events have upped the ante in U.S.-Nicaragua relations. Nonetheless, successive U.S. administrations accommodated themselves since 2007 to the Ortega government, which cooperated closely with the U.S. Southern Command, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and U.S. immigration policies. Although the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has supplied several million dollars to opposition civic organizations through the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), USAID also granted several hundred million dollars directly to the Ortega government from 2007 until 2018.
On the eve of the Nicaraguan vote, the U.S. Congress passed the RENACER Act, which calls for targeted sanctions on Nicaraguan government officials found guilty of human rights violations and corruption. It also requires the executive branch to determine if Nicaragua should be expelled from the Central American Free Trade Agreement and to “expand oversight” of lending to Nicaragua by international financial agencies. In 2017 the U.S. government passed almost identical legislation, the NICA Act, which to date has resulted in sanctions slapped on several dozen top Nicaraguan government officials, affecting the assets they hold in the United States.
Apart from these sanctions on individuals, however, Washington did not enforce the NICA Act. It did not apply trade sanctions and has not blocked Nicaragua from receiving billions of dollars in credits from international agencies. From 2017 to 2021, Nicaragua received a whopping $2.2 billion in aid from the Central American Bank of Economic Integration (BCIE), and in 2020-2021 it received several hundred million in credits from the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund.
Some among the international Left condemn calls for sanctions on Ortega. Yet the U.S. and international Left broadly mobilized (unsuccessfully) in 1978 and 1979 to force Washington to impose sanctions on the Somoza dictatorship and block international financing because of the regime’s gross human rights violations. The worldwide Left similarly demanded sanctions against apartheid South Africa, sought to block U.S. and international financing for the Pinochet dictatorship, and currently calls for “boycott, divestment, and sanctions” against Israel.
Grassroots opponents of the Ortega-Murillo regime find themselves between the rock of an Ortega-Murillo dictatorship and the hard place of the capitalist class and its political agents among the traditional conservative parties. The Right—just as disturbed as Ortega by the outburst of popular protest from below in the 2018 uprising—tried to hitch mass discontent to its own agenda of recovering direct political power and assuring there would be no threat to its control over the Nicaraguan economy.
It was the government’s repression of the popular uprising of students, workers, feminists, and environmentalists that paved the way for the Right’s current hegemony over the anti-Sandinista opposition. The mass of Nicaraguans—beyond the Sandinistas’ secure base in some 20 percent of the population—have not shown any enthusiasm for the traditional conservative parties and businessmen that dominate the opposition and have no real political representation. Indeed, the October CID-Gallup poll found that 77 percent of the country’s electoral does not feel represented by any political party.