Debate presidencial Archi 2025, en vivo | Jeannette Jara y José Antonio Kast protagonizan su segundo encuentro antes de la segunda vuelta
Este miércoles los chilenos presencian el penúltimo debate de la segunda vuelta de las elecciones presidenciales 2025, que enfrenta a la candidata de la izquierda, Jeannette Jara, y al abanderado de la ultraderecha, José Antonio Kast. El encuentro es organizado por la Asociación de Radiodifusores de Chile (Archi), una entidad gremial que reúne a un grupo de radios del país sudamericano. Este es el segundo de los tres cara a cara programados entre los candidatos. El último debate ha quedado fijado para el próximo 9 de diciembre y está a cargo de la Asociación Nacional de Televisión (Anatel), la organización que agrupa a las estaciones de televisión abierta.
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Brazil clinches export clearances with Philippines, Guatemala, and Nicaragua
Brazilian authorities have completed negotiations with the Philippines, Guatemala, and Nicaragua to expand agricultural exports to these countries after reaching an understanding on sanitary and phytosanitary requirements.
Vote count flips in Honduras after interruption
Honduras' presidential race saw a lead change Tuesday as election officials resumed counting votes following accusations of US interference and the highly controversial pardon of a former Honduran president by Donald Trump.
Only 10 of Boliviana de Aviación’s 20 aircraft operational
Boliviana de Aviación (BoA) General Manager Juan José Galvarro confirmed Tuesday that the state-owned airline is operating with only half of its fleet, leading to severe disruptions across its domestic and international network.
Sheinbaum, un vacío sin casi precedentes en la inauguración de un Mundial
Las expectativas políticas del Mundial 2026 están a la altura del tamaño del torneo, que será el más grande de la historia y el primero organizado por tres países, México, Estados Unidos y Canadá. Mientras el presidente estadounidense Donald Trump utiliza el evento como escaparate político, un arma contra sus adversarios y estrecha su relación con la FIFA, la presidenta mexicana Claudia Sheinbaum ha decidido no asistir a una de las fechas más importantes del torneo, la ceremonia de inauguración del próximo 11 de junio en el Estadio Azteca. EL PAÍS consulta a los periodistas deportivos David Faitelson y Marion Reimers para analizar las implicaciones de la decisión de la mandataria. “Si no va, se equivoca. Un Mundial es una oportunidad histórica para enaltecer al país. Tendría que estar ahí”, apuntala Faitelson. “La posición está cargada de simbolismos que van de la mano con la agenda que maneja la presidenta”, considera Marion Reimers.
Anfitriones los ha habido de todo tipo. Desde presidentes y reyes, hasta emires, todos han dado el banderazo o asistido a los 22 mundiales que se han celebrado en la cita deportiva más vista del planeta. Sheinbaum podría convertirse entonces en la primera jefa de Estado en la historia en ausentarse de la inauguración de un Mundial. Desde 1930, los países anfitriones han contado con la presencia de su principal representante político, con una sola excepción, en Francia 1938, cuando el presidente Albert Lebrun no asistió al acto inicial, aunque sí entregó el trofeo a la selección campeona, en una época en la que las ceremonias de apertura aún no tenían el peso mediático y diplomático de hoy en día. Además, en esta ocasión no habría posibilidad de compensar la ausencia en la clausura, pues se celebrará en Estados Unidos. “No recuerdo un escenario en el que no estuviera el presidente o el primer mandatario de un país. Ni siquiera en el Mundial de 1978 en Argentina, cuando [Jorge Rafael] Videla estaba al frente del Gobierno y no aparecía mucho por razones obvias, faltó a la inauguración”, recuerda Faitelson.
Sheinbaum ha insistido en su decisión de no acudir y ceder su boleto 001 a una niña indígena aficionada al fútbol. Lo reafirmó este martes: “Es una oportunidad que transforma vidas. Yo ya había tomado la decisión hace tiempo”, dijo. La mandataria había anticipado su intención desde agosto, cuando el presidente de la FIFA, Gianni Infantino, visitó México y le regaló el primer boleto emitido para el torneo. Este martes, al confirmar su postura, destacó además que aún no está claro si Donald Trump o el primer ministro canadiense, Mark Carney, estarán presentes en la inauguración. “Todavía no sabemos quiénes van a venir. El trato sería de jefes de Estado. Pero es temprano para saber qué recepción daríamos”, afirmó. Sheinbaum ha defendido su intención de ver el partido inaugural desde las pantallas que instalará en el Zócalo capitalino.
Faitelson, uno de los periodistas deportivos más reconocidos del país, considera que la ausencia sería un error y asegura que la presencia del jefe de Estado en una inauguración es un acto irrenunciable. “Yo esperaría que los tres presidentes de los países organizadores estuvieran presentes. Sería lo correcto. Lo primero que tendría que hacer la doctora Sheinbaum es extenderles una invitación formal”, sostiene. “La imagen de un palco vacío sería muy triste y lamentable. Incluso podría interpretarse como un vacío de poder”, zanja. “Tanto López Obrador como ella han sido figuras muy apegadas al pueblo. Se les ve en giras, en la calle, cerca de la gente. Es su estilo, forma parte de la corriente política que representan”, señala.

Para David Faitelson, la historia pesa y podría ser un factor que esté empujando la decisión de la mandataria. El periodista recuerda que los expresidentes priistas Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (1970) y Miguel de la Madrid (1986) fueron abucheados en el Estadio Azteca durante sus respectivas inauguraciones. Díaz Ordaz llegó al Mundial dos años después de la matanza de Tlatelolco, y De la Madrid un año después del terremoto. “Leo esta decisión como que no se siente confiada para presentarse públicamente porque históricamente los estadios han sido espacios donde se manifiesta la inconformidad contra los políticos. También le ocurrió al expresidente Andrés Manuel López Obrador el día que lanzó la primera pelota en el estadio Alfredo Harp Helú, a pesar de que el béisbol es su pasión”, explica Faitelson. “Les pasa a los futbolistas, les pasa a los mandatarios. Es parte del oficio”, apunta. Las mismas dudas recorren las redes sociales. “¿No tiene un porcentaje altísimo de popularidad? Seguramente no la van a abuchear, ¿verdad?”, ironizó el reportero Rodolfo Landeros en su cuenta de X.
Faitelson también cuestiona la posible asistencia de Sheinbaum al sorteo de Washington. “La FIFA la puede invitar como aficionada, pero no hay invitación oficial del Gobierno de Estados Unidos. Ella tendría que haber dicho hace tiempo: ‘No voy’. No hay congruencia”, afirma. Por otro lado, el periodista sí reconoce el poder simbólico de incluir a una niña indígena en el palco. “Sería una imagen muy buena, alineada con una época de inclusión. Aunque el impacto de que no esté la presidenta sería todavía más fuerte. Tienen que estar ambas cosas, la representación indígena y la presencia de la presidenta, elegida por voto popular”. También subraya que Sheinbaum tiene una oportunidad histórica: “Es una mujer inteligente, valiente, con mucha capacidad. Sería maravilloso enviar ese mensaje al resto del mundo, la primera mujer gobernando en Norteamérica, antes que Canadá y Estados Unidos”.
Faitelson apunta además que el campeonato será “muy politizado”. “Infantino ha pasado más tiempo en la oficina oval de la Casa Blanca que en sus oficinas en Zúrich. Y este viernes veremos cómo Trump se adueña del sorteo. Ya lo hace: decide quién va, quién no va, amenaza con quitar sedes. Los políticos mexicanos tienen que entender que esta es una gran oportunidad, no para un botín político, sino para beneficio del país”, concluye.
Marion Reimers, periodista deportiva y especialista en análisis del deporte, ofrece otra lectura. Para ella, la decisión de Sheinbaum puede interpretarse como un gesto de coherencia ideológica y simbólica. “El fútbol ha dejado de ser cercano a las clases populares y se ha convertido en un deporte elitista”, sostiene. “Un evento muy machista y elitista, como lo han demostrado Infantino y Trump. La posición de la presidenta puede ir de la mano con la agenda que maneja”, afirma. Reimers considera que los Mundiales actuales están diseñados para un público privilegiado y responden a intereses que se alejan de la realidad social mexicana. “Este es un Mundial heredado, no impulsado por la 4T. Y la mandataria ha sabido manejarse muy bien con los simbolismos”, afirma. Para ella, gestos como renunciar al palco y ver el partido con la ciudadanía encajan con la estrategia política de Sheinbaum de mantenerse cercana a la población. Respecto al sorteo en Washington, Reimers no considera contradictorio que Sheinbaum decida asistir eventualmente. “Ir a Washington y tener una reunión con Trump tiene un doble significado que va más allá de acudir al sorteo. Tiene otras implicaciones políticas”, apunta.

La periodista también destaca el contexto social mexicano en el que se celebrará el torneo. “México tiene una oportunidad extraordinaria de mostrarse al mundo desde otra posición”, afirma. “El Mundial se llevará a cabo durante el mes del orgullo, cuando Ciudad de México planea acciones importantes de afirmación. Eso contrasta no sólo con Donald Trump, adversario abierto de la agenda de diversidad e inclusión, sino también con la FIFA, que ha mostrado tibieza frente a la homofobia y el racismo”, asegura. Según Reimers, el gesto simbólico de Sheinbaum podría interceptar esa narrativa. “Su propuesta de estar en las pantallas del Zócalo viendo el partido con la gente es coherente con el discurso que ha manejado. Sus gestos y actos han buscado desmarcarse en ocasiones del Mundial o llevarlo hacia su propio marco ideológico”, concluye.
A 190 días del Mundial y en medio de la incertidumbre, ambos periodistas coinciden en que es pronto para considerar como una decisión final la postura de la presidenta, que está a tiempo de recular si así lo quiere. Por ahora, la pelota sigue en la cancha de la presidenta.
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La caída de vacunación golpea a Argentina: siete muertos por tos ferina y temor por el sarampión
Uno de los mitos antivacunas más populares en los últimos años ha sido que la inmunización contra la covid-19 generaba magnetismo. En las redes sociales circulan vídeos con esta noticia falsa, pero la semana pasada llegó hasta la Cámara de Diputados de Argentina, con un evento antivacunas organizado por la diputada macrista Marilú Quiroz en el anexo del edificio legislativo. El espectáculo del “hombre imán” que mostró —tras varios intentos fallidos— cómo se le pegaba un objeto metálico al pecho y culpó de ello a haberse inmunizado contra la covid-19 provocó el repudio generalizado de la comunidad médica local. Los infectólogos consideran que en Argentina los antivacunas son pocos, pero ruidosos, aunque advierten que la caída de la cobertura en vacunación comienza a tener consecuencias. Siete bebés han fallecido por tos ferina, según el último boletín epidemiológico, y se han confirmado 35 casos de sarampión hasta la fecha.
El brote actual de tos ferina —también conocida como tos convulsa o coqueluche— se ha extendido ya a gran parte del territorio argentino, con 19 provincias afectadas y 688 casos confirmados. Se trata de una enfermedad respiratoria causada por la bacteria Bordetella pertusis que se transmite al toser, hablar o estornudar y es especialmente peligrosa en los menores de dos años. “No veníamos teniendo muertes por tos convulsa y ahora tenemos siete, esto es reflejo de la caída de cobertura de vacunación”, denuncia la médica infectóloga Florencia Cahn, directora de vacunas de la Fundación Huésped.

Los datos oficiales indican que vacunas clave, como las que previenen la poliomielitis, el sarampión o la difteria, entre otras enfermedades, cayeron a tasas de aplicación inferiores al 50%, cuando una década atrás superaban el 90%.
Cahn detalla que las razones del descenso de vacunaciones son múltiples, pero la principal es que muchos perciben que el riesgo de enfermarse es bajo, en especial cuando se trata de enfermedades casi erradicadas o poco conocidas. “Las vacunas son víctimas de su propio éxito”, dice esta infectóloga. Otro motivo es que existen barreras de acceso, como vacunatorios que funcionan sólo de lunes a viernes con horario restringido, y también que los discursos anti científicos en auge en todo el mundo “están empoderando a los grupos antivacunas para salir a la luz y decir barbaridades”. Aún así, Cahn subraya que casi todas las personas que no se vacunan lo hacen porque les falta información o encuentran algún tipo de obstáculo: “Más que centrarnos en los grupos extremos hay que mejorar la comunicación y garantizar el acceso a las vacunas”.
La reticencia de algunas familias a vacunar a sus hijos por miedo a los efectos secundarios suele desaparecer cuando reciben información sobre los riesgos que supone no hacerlo, según la pediatra infectóloga Marianela Borra. “Lo veo en el consultorio. Cuando me plantean que alguna vacuna les da miedo, al mostrarles la evidencia científica que hay, logro que muchos cambien de opinión”, dice.
Pese al trabajo de concientización de los profesionales, las tasas de vacunación de Argentina van en descenso desde la pandemia. El largo confinamiento impidió que muchos niños recibieran las dosis previstas en 2020 y el problema se ha agravado desde entonces.
Un caso clave es el sarampión. Argentina está libre de transmisión endémica de esta enfermedad desde el año 2000, pero las posibilidades de que pierda ese estatus aumentan año a año.
En 2024, sólo uno de cada dos niños que ingresaron en la escuela primaria argentina había recibido el refuerzo de la triple vírica que protege contra sarampión, paperas y rubéola. Aunque todos los brotes de sarampión detectados en los últimos años se originaron por casos importados, es decir, por personas que se contagiaron en otro país, se requiere una inmunidad cercana al 95% del total para garantizar la protección comunitaria. “No se vacuna sólo para proteger a un individuo, sino a toda la población. Como los menores de un año y las embarazadas, por ejemplo, no pueden en este caso, los demás hacen de escudo”, señala Borra, secretaria de la Sociedad Argentina de Pediatría.

En lo que va de 2025, Argentina ha registrado 35 casos de sarampión en tres distritos: la capital, la provincia de Buenos Aires y la de San Luis. Se trata del peor brote desde el de 2019 y 2020, cuando hubo 142 casos confirmados.
Las autoridades sanitarias temieron que la cifra creciese en las últimas semanas tras detectar que cuatro uruguayos habían cruzado Argentina en tres autobuses el pasado 15 de noviembre. Viajaron desde Bolivia hasta su país de origen por tierra y tuvieron contacto con cientos de personas. Pasaron ya dos semanas desde entonces, pero sigue vigente la alerta para que cualquier persona que compartió viaje con ellos o estuvo en las mismas estaciones ese día y presente síntomas como fiebre alta, tos, ojos rojos y erupción cutánea que se presente de inmediato a un hospital.
Por ahora no se ha informado de ningún contagio, pero los equipos epidemiológicos se mantienen en vilo hasta que se cumplan los 21 días del período máximo de incubación. “Hay que esperar 21 días desde que se fue el último individuo, estar muy atentos a gente que también viajó y presentó fiebre para en ese caso aislarlos y estudiarlos”, señala el médico infectólogo Eduardo López.
El temor a que el sarampión reaparezca en Chile hizo que el país transandino emitiese una alerta epidemiológica este martes. El Gobierno de Gabriel Boric destacó la fuerte caída en la cobertura de vacunación en Argentina y pidió reforzar los controles ante la inminente llegada del verano y el incremento del turismo procedente del otro lado de la cordillera.
López opina que Argentina y el mundo se encuentran “frente a un dilema respecto a las vacunas”. Aunque evitan millones de muertes al año, de a poco crece el riesgo de que reaparezcan enfermedades que eran cosas del pasado y que mueran personas por enfermedades prevenibles. “Fíjese el hecho bochornoso, casi circense, de la diputada que organizó una reunión con antivacunas a pesar de que Argentina tiene una ley nacional que dice que la vacunación debe ser universal y gratuita”, lamenta López. Este médico infectólogo, que fue asesor del Gobierno durante la pandemia de covid-19, cree que hay que poner en marcha estrategias más audaces para revertir la caída de la cobertura de vacunación. Cuanto más terreno se pierde, más aumenta el riesgo para la salud pública.
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El país de los líderes eternos
Si alguna pregunta debiéramos hacernos hoy no es si 100 precandidatos presidenciales son muchos (que lo son), y si esto es bueno o malo (que por supuesto es más malo que bueno), sino por qué han proliferado. Para el 3 de noviembre había 68 por firmas, pero faltan los que avalen los 32 partidos políticos. Un hecho inédito en la historia electoral del país.
Ahí subyacen varios mensajes. Para comenzar, expresa una crisis de liderazgo político y de agotamiento de la tecnocracia que lo ha acompañado, tanto en el gobierno, como en la dirigencia gremial y en las empresas del establishment. Una puerta giratoria, o mejor, un carrusel, que ha funcionado para una minoría, en el que los apellidos y caras se repiten. Cualquiera podría cruzar quiénes han sido ministros, directores de institutos, agencias y embajadores de los últimos gobiernos (incluido el primer año de Petro), y encontrará una repetición sistemática. No estaría mal si el país estuviera bien.
El problema es que en estos 40 años, sin desconocer los avances en la lucha contra la pobreza y en acceso a salud y educación, no se ha superado ninguno de los problemas estructurales, tenemos un complejo legado de violencia y criminalidad; de informalidad económica y laboral; de impunidad y de corrupción; y una altísima concentración de la propiedad de la tierra. Se sigue caminando sobre el viejo concepto colonial de la hacienda, como paradigma.
La proliferación de candidatos también expresa fatiga con las recetas. Con algunos matices, en materia de paz, por ejemplo, todos los gobiernos han mantenido unas líneas programáticas gruesas: privatizaciones, exportación de materias primas, sin importar los costos socioambientales, injusticia tributaria, alineamiento con Washington en política exterior y en lucha antidrogas, centralismo fiscal y administrativo, y fortalecimiento de los grupos que controlan la economía.
Y sí, el modelo ha sido exitoso, ha generado riqueza -eso no se discute- pero solo para los que más tienen. La desigualdad de ingreso se ha mantenido vergonzosamente estable (Gini 2022, 54,8), solo le ganamos a Puerto Rico, Namibia y Sudáfrica. Este pacto implícito hizo desaparecer la discusión doctrinaria y programática, y ello derivó, a su vez, en que la controversia electoral se limita a la puja por el poder burocrático y presupuestal. De allí la recurrencia al agravio personal y la satanización del adversario. Los sectores más radicales de la oposición llevan tres años y medio coreando “Fuera Petro” y anunciando catástrofes que parecerían desear, pero sin proponer nada que no sea más de lo mismo.
Es de tal magnitud la crisis que nadie siente que hace el ridículo presentándose, un papel antiguamente reservado para personajes como Goyeneche, Regina 11 o Mario Gareña. Este último, brillante compositor (Yo me llamo cumbia), se postuló en las elecciones de 1990 y tuvo una idea genial: que los narcotraficantes construyeran sus cárceles. La gente se rio, pero el que ríe de último ríe mejor. La propuesta la hizo realidad César Gaviria, quien le permitió a Pablo Escobar construir la suya (la famosa Catedral), desde la cual el tristemente célebre narcoterrorista siguió traficando y delinquiendo, protegido por el Gobierno.
Otra causa probable que explica la explosión de candidatos es la crisis de los partidos. Sin proyectos políticos que confrontar, la mayoría de ellos no significan nada, son fábricas de avales e instrumentos para tramitar aspiraciones personales. La obsesión privatizadora los tocó. Algunos funcionan como famiempresas y otros como empresas unipersonales. Por eso hay 79 comités registrados para participar por firmas en las elecciones al Congreso (35 para Senado y 44 para Cámara), que buscan participar por fuera de los rediles partidistas para evitar la disciplina canina, que ejercen los patrones a través de los avales y del poder de hacer las listas. Se salva el Pacto Histórico, que recurrió la consulta popular. En los demás impera el bolígrafo o las clientelas que administren.
A esta crisis han contribuido los expresidentes de la República. Particularmente la triada Gaviria, Uribe y Pastrana, unidos ahora en una nueva cruzada para salvar a Colombia por enésima vez. Al eternizarse han taponado la oxigenación democrática. Los tres suman ciento cincuenta años de vida pública. Uribe fue director de la Aerocivil en 1980; Pastrana, concejal de Bogotá en 1984; y Gaviria, concejal de Pereira en 1970 y luego alcalde en 1974.
En Colombia el peso político y mediático de los expresidentes es grande. Cuando se produjo el miserable atentado contra el senador Miguel Uribe Turbay, el presidente Gustavo Petro condenó el hecho porque, además, era un miembro de una “familia presidencial”, categoría inexistente en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico, aunque consagrada en la cultura política. Rafael Gutiérrez Girardot, ese brillante ensayista y crítico de la literatura hispanoamericana —que regentó la cátedra en la Universidad de Bonn durante más de 40 años— sostenía que en “algún lugar recóndito de republicanos y demócratas hispanoamericanos late un segundo corazón monárquico”. Las “familias presidenciales” son casi “casas reales”, con pretensiones dinásticas, delfines y línea de sucesión, y en torno a ellas gira la política nacional y regional. Hasta ahora. La llegada de Petro ha revolcado el paraíso. Por eso cualquier persona, aunque no pertenezca a la “nobleza criolla”, se cree con derecho a ser presidente.
El caso más notorio de taponamiento es el del Partido Liberal. César Gaviria llegó a la presidencia de manera accidental, por el asesinato de Luis Carlos Galán. Tenía 43 años. Su elección mandó a calificar servicios a una generación que se había preparado para gobernar. Luego, con su jefatura —que se ha prolongado por 20 años— les cerró el paso a personas que a esta altura podrían ser expresidentes. La situación más parecida es la de Gilberto Vieira, que estuvo 44 años como secretario del Partido Comunista. De los conservadores, ni hablar. Desde 1998 no han podido tener candidato. Y no por carecer de personas preparadas, sino para no correr el riesgo de quedarse por fuera de la repartija burocrática y presupuestal. No me voy a referir a los demás partidos y partiditos porque me haría interminable. Por sus obras los conoceréis, dice Jesús en el Evangelio según San Mateo.
Desde hace años el país viene dando signos de ese agotamiento político y programático. De allí la acogida de figuras como el profesor Antanas Mockus, el exmagistrado Carlos Gaviria o el sindicalista Lucho Garzón. En 2022 Gustavo Petro y Rodolfo Hernández, cada uno a su manera, interpretaron esa sed de cambio. Hernández llegó a primera vuelta solo, valga recordarlo, gracias al hastío que producían el resto de los candidatos, con sus lemas vacíos, frases trilladas y cuentos trasnochados, como el del castrochavismo
Al mirar las encuestas de intención de voto se ve que las ganas de cambio se mantienen intactas, esta vez con Iván Cepeda, Abelardo De la Espriella (quien ocupa el espacio de Hernández) y Sergio Fajardo. ¿Qué tienen en común los tres con Claudia López y Victoria Dávila? Que ninguno ha hecho parte directa del club de los liderazgos eternos ni ha sido ministro ni embajador. ¿Qué tienen en común Vargas Lleras, Peñalosa, Roy, Cárdenas y Cristo? Precisamente lo contrario. ¿No amerita al menos una reflexión?
@gperezflorez
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Peru: Presidential candidate Belaúnde survives armed attack
Peruvian Presidential candidate Rafael Belaúnde of the Popular Freedom party survived an armed attack on Tuesday in Cerro Azul, a town 147 kilometers south of Lima, sustaining only minor scratches from broken glass.
Colombian prosecutors want President's son arrested
Colombian prosecutors formally requested on Tuesday that Nicolás Petro Burgos, the eldest son of President Gustavo Petro, be placed in preventive detention on charges of alleged money laundering and illicit enrichment.
La familia del pescador colombiano asesinado en un bombardeo en el Caribe presenta una denuncia contra Estados Unidos ante la CIDH
La familia de Alejandro Carranza, el pescador identificado por el presidente Gustavo Petro como uno de los civiles asesinados en los ataques de Estados Unidos contra supuestas narcolanchas en el Caribe, ha presentado una denuncia formal contra Washington ante la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (CIDH). La noticia, adelantada por el medio británico The Guardian y confirmada por EL PAÍS, supone la primera reclamación ante un organismo internacional por la campaña militar lanzada por órdenes de Donald Trump en septiembre y en la que ya han muerto más de 80 personas.
El documento de la petición, al que ha tenido acceso este diario, cuenta con el respaldo de Daniel Kovalik, un abogado de derechos humanos y representante del presidente Petro en varios casos internacionales. En la solicitud explica con brevedad los hechos en los que, denuncia, murió Carranza: “El 15 de septiembre de 2025, el ejército de los Estados Unidos bombardeó el barco de Alejandro Andrés Carranza Medina, en el que navegaba por el Caribe, frente a las costas de Colombia. Murió en el bombardeo. El señor Carranza era pescador y ciudadano colombiano”. El hombre salió a faenar y nunca regresó a su casa.

La queja apunta directamente al secretario de Defensa de EE UU, Pete Hegseth, al ser “el responsable de ordenar el bombardeo de embarcaciones como las de Alejandro Carranza Medina y el asesinato de todas las personas que se encontraban en ellas”. De acuerdo con la prensa estadounidense, Hegseth ha dado la orden de “matar a todos” los tripulantes de las embarcaciones sospechosas, aun si no estuviera confirmada su supuesta relación con narcotraficantes. El documento también indica que Trump “ha ratificado la conducta del secretario Hegseth”.
“Al llevar a cabo este asesinato extrajudicial, Estados Unidos ha violado la Declaración Americana de los Derechos y Deberes del Hombre”, señala la petición firmada por la esposa de Carranza, Katerine Hernández Bernal. La familia acusa a Estados Unidos de violar los derechos a la vida, a la igualdad ante la ley, al reconocimiento de la personalidad jurídica, a un juicio justo y al debido proceso legal. Según el documento, hay un testigo del asesinato: se trata de un líder de una asociación de pescadores en Santa Marta que ha preferido mantener su nombre bajo reserva por las “amenazas de paramilitares”.
Petro denunció a finales de octubre que el segundo ataque de Washington en el mar Caribe contra una embarcación (el 15 de septiembre) había ocurrido contra un pescador colombiano y “presumiblemente” sucedió en aguas nacionales. El presidente colombiano denunció entonces que el hombre, al que identificó como Carranza, de 42 años, no tenía ningún vínculo con el narco. Trump, por su parte, reseñaba que en esa operación murieron tres “narcoterroristas venezolanos” que supuestamente se encontraban “transportando narcóticos ilegales con destino a Estados Unidos”.

La ONU y varias organizaciones de derechos humanos como Human Rights Watch y Amnistía Internacional han catalogado los bombardeos contra las supuestas narcolanchas como “ejecuciones extrajudiciales”. El jefe de derechos humanos de la ONU, Volker Türk, ha dicho que estas acciones “violan el derecho internacional”. La campaña militar, bautizada con el nombre de Lanza del Sur, inició con ataques contra embarcaciones en el mar Caribe, que luego se extendieron al océano Pacífico, la ruta de narcotráfico más común de las drogas que van del sur al norte de América. Más de 80 personas han muerto y solo se han identificado a dos supervivientes: un colombiano y un ecuatoriano, los cuales navegaban en un supuesto narcosubmarino, cuando este fue atacado el pasado 18 de octubre. Ambos fueron liberados en sus respectivos países al no probarse delitos en su contra.
La CIDH, con sede en Washington, es un órgano de la Organización de Estados Americanos (OEA) y su función es promover y proteger los derechos humanos en el continente. Si la entidad encuentra que uno de los 35 Estados miembros es responsable de violar los derechos humanos, emite un informe que puede incluir desde recomendaciones y reparaciones hasta sanciones contra los responsables y empujar a cambios legislativos. Si no hay una solución amistosa, los casos pueden elevarse a la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, cuyas sentencias tienen efectos vinculantes. EE UU es uno de los países fundadores de la OEA.
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Trump says military strikes on Venezuela to start “soon”
São Paulo, Brazil — United States President Donald Trump told reporters on Tuesday that strikes inside Venezuela are going to start “soon.”
“We’re going to start doing those strikes on land too,” said Trump to the press following a cabinet meeting at the White House. “We know where they live. We know where the bad ones live, and we’re going to start that very soon.”
U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, who was also present at the cabinet meeting, said, “We’ve only just begun striking narco boats and putting narco-terrorists at the bottom of the ocean,” adding, the U.S. military is “taking the gloves off.”
Both Hegseth and Trump also said they weren’t aware of a second strike on an alleged drug boat in September which killed two people who had survived an initial strike.
Instead the Pentagon said the repeat strike was ordered by Navy Admiral Frank Bradley, who serves as the head of the United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM).
The Washington Post last week reported that Hegseth had given a verbal order to kill everyone on board suspected drug boats, sparking criticism from lawmakers and rights groups that suspect war crimes could have been committed.
Since September, Trump has been authorizing attacks on small go-fast boats allegedly carrying drugs off the coasts of Venezuela and Colombia. More than 80 people have been killed so far, and in August, the U.S. began sending military warships to the Caribbean.
Most analysts see the military buildup not as a viable effort to combat drug trafficking, but rather posturing on behalf of the U.S. government in order to force regime change in an autocratic Venezuela.
On November 24 the U.S. designated the Cártel de los Soles (Cartel of the Suns) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), alleging that what most narcotics analysts call a loose network of corrupt military officials who traffic in drugs, is actually controlled by Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro.
Yván Gill Pinto, Venezuela’s Minister of Foreign Relations, rejected the designation, saying that the U.S. “hinders the development of the Caribbean peoples and contributes nothing to a true and genuine fight against drug trafficking.”
On Tuesday, Pentagon press secretary Kingsley Wilson told reporters that the 82 killings of “narco-terrorists” had saved potentially 25,000 American lives from overdosing.
She added that the U.S. has a contingency plan in case Maduro tries to leave the country.
“The department has a contingency plan for everything,” Wilson affirmed. “We are a planning organization, if anything were to happen around the world, we have a response planned and ready.”
Featured image credit:
Image: United States president Donald Trump
Source: The White House Gallery
The post Trump says military strikes on Venezuela to start “soon” appeared first on Latin America Reports.
Trump floats drug strikes against Colombia, Petro warns of war
Bogotá, Colombia – U.S. President Donald Trump said he would not rule out land attacks in any drug producing country on Tuesday, moments after criticizing cocaine production in Colombia.
“I hear Colombia, the country of Colombia, is making cocaine. They have cocaine manufacturing plants, OK, and then they sell us their cocaine. We appreciate that very much. But yeah, anybody that’s doing that and selling it into our country is subject to attack,” Trump told reporters at the White House on Tuesday afternoon.
In response, Colombian President Gustavo Petro warned that such an attack “would be a declaration of war,” telling Trump not to damage “two centuries of diplomatic relations.”
Trump’s comments come amid mounting tensions in the Caribbean, where the U.S. has amassed forces since September. While Washington has so far only attacked alleged drug boats, killing at least 80 people, Trump said on Tuesday he plans to expand the campaign to land strikes “very soon.”
While Venezuela and the Nicolás Maduro regime have been the primary focus of the pressure campaign, Petro’s criticism of the strikes aggravated already tense relations between Bogotá and Washington. In October, the White House sanctioned Petro after he alleged the U.S. had killed a Colombian fisherman in a September boat strike, accusing the South American leader of being “an illegal drug dealer.”
“I think the U.S. has been very clear that they have a problem with Petro, but that they have a very productive relationship with Colombian institutions and particularly the security forces,” explained Elizabeth Dickinson, Deputy Director for Latin America at International Crisis Group.
“For that reason, I think it would be extremely unlikely that there would be a strike on Colombian soil,” Dickinson told The Bogotá Post.
Today is not the first time Trump has floated strikes on Colombian territory, with the president in November saying he would be “proud” to destroy cocaine factories in Colombia.
Colombia is the world’s largest producer of cocaine and the United Nations recently estimated that potential cocaine production increased by 50% in 2023. Trump has personally blamed Petro for this increase but the Colombian president cites his government’s commitment to dismantling cocaine laboratories, often with U.S. cooperation.
But the White House has also shown its ability to distinguish between Colombia’s government and its security forces. When he decertified Colombia as a drug cooperation partner in September, Trump praised the country’s army and police and said “the failure of Colombia to meet its drug control obligations over the past year rests solely with its political leadership.”
For that reason, any strike in Colombia is likely to be done in cooperation with the country’s security and intelligence agencies, according to Dickinson.
“If there were to be a unilateral strike, I think that there would be a massive diplomatic fallout,” added the analyst, “but in practice, the relationship likely would survive.”
Featured image description: Donald Trump saluting soldiers.
Featured image credit: @Potus via X
This article originally appeared in The Bogotá Post and was republished with permission.
The post Trump floats drug strikes against Colombia, Petro warns of war appeared first on Latin America Reports.
Caribbean Immigrant Founder Breaks Barriers with World’s First AI Debt Capital Platform – AI Capital Exchange

News Americas, Fort Lauderdale, FL, Tues. Dec. 2, 2205: Guyana-born, US-based Caribbean immigrant entrepreneur and media leader Felicia J. Persaud, the founder and publisher of News Americas, has quietly made history.

After four months of building in silence, Persaud has soft-launched AI Capital Exchange, the first AI-powered debt capital platform in the world – built entirely by her, a non-tech founder and Caribbean immigrant.
The platform, available at aicapitalexchange.net, uses artificial intelligence to match qualified borrowers with institutional investors, lenders, and investment agencies across the U.S., Caribbean, Latin America, Europe, Africa, and Asia. It is powered by Invest Caribbean.
For the Caribbean – long restricted by limited access to financing — the launch represents a breakthrough moment.
“AI Capital Exchange is about leveling the playing field,” Persaud shared. “It proves that global innovation can come from our community — and that immigrants and non-tech founders can build world-changing technology.”
AI Capital Exchange pre-qualifies borrowers and then connects them to lenders for:
• Commercial real estate projects
• Renewable energy ventures
• Equipment financing
• Tech startups
• Business expansions
• Government and infrastructure capital
Lenders and investors can join to access verified, AI-organized deal flow. Investment agencies can showcase national investment programs to attract foreign capital.
What makes this launch extraordinary is the journey behind it.
Persaud — who migrated from Guyana with no coding background — built every component of the platform herself using AI tools.
“This was hundreds of hours of work, built with discipline, faith, and determination,” she said. “It is proof that where you come from does not limit where you can build.”
The platform has also been submitted to the India AI Global Impact Challenge 2026, marking its entry on the world stage.
Test the platform (pilot phase): https://aicapitalexchange.net
Investors interested in supporting the platform’s growth can connect here

Felicia J. Persaud is a Guyana-born, U.S.-based journalist and media and investment entrepreneur, widely known for her groundbreaking work in Caribbean diaspora media, her advocacy for Caribbean Census recognition, and her efforts to expand investment opportunities across the region.
The Godwin Friday Era Begins In St. Vincent & The Grenadines: The Brilliance Of Turning The Corner

News Americas, NEW YORK, NY, Tues. Dec. 2, 2205: Dr. Godwin Friday’s sweeping victory on November 27, 2025, is much more than a political shift. It is a national rebellion. It signals that the people of St. Vincent and the Grenadines are stepping into a new maturity where dignity is protected, accountability is expected, and shared purpose becomes the compass for public life. Small island states now stand at a global intersection. Economic pressures tighten. Climate threats intensify. Cultural bonds are strained.
Wars cast long shadows across continents. The United States has warned that Venezuelan airspace is too dangerous for civilian use, a sign that regional instability may be closer than comfort allows. In the midst of these tensions, Dr. Friday’s call to turn the corner rises like a steady light. It invites St. Vincent and the Grenadines to move forward with poise, clarity, and moral intelligence.
Friday’s New Democratic Party romped home to victory in the 2025 election by winning 14 of 15 seats. “The people have come out and said…’We want a better future for ourselves,’” Friday said as hundreds of people gathered in the capital, Kingstown, to support him, many blowing vuvuzelas in excitement.

The resonance of the new prime minister’s message lies in its elegant simplicity. He must serve with the integrity that earned the nation’s trust. He must persuade doubters not by clever words but by consistent action. He must restore confidence in public leadership by improving the daily realities of citizens from Owia’s quiet shores to Canouan’s vibrant rhythms. His commitment to nurturing young thinkers, ethical dreamers, and future builders reflects a rare understanding of how small island states flourish.
Leadership renewal is not a luxury reserved for calmer seasons. It is the very architecture of national survival. With global institutions under strain and regional tensions rising, Dr. Friday’s attention to grooming new leaders reveals wisdom that sees beyond election cycles and into the long sweep of national destiny.
His leadership rises even higher through his humility. Dr. Friday does not cling to power. He recognizes that leadership is a trust, not a possession. He understands that a legacy is not crafted through long tenure but through the thoughtful preparation of others who will carry the nation forward with competence and conscience.
This approach resonates with the work of Dr. Isaac Newton whose global advisory efforts emphasize wisdom that listens, service that sacrifices, character that endures, and institution building that lives beyond the lifespan of any administration. When a leader invests in others, a nation becomes resilient. When a leader grips power tightly, a nation becomes brittle. Dr. Friday has chosen resilience.
This moment is therefore one of profound possibility for St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Turning the corner is not a catchy phrase. It is a call to collective elevation. It invites citizens to expect excellence and to join in the shared labor of national progress. It tells the Caribbean that amid global turbulence, a small nation guided by principled leadership can model justice, creativity, courage, and unity.
It reminds the world that humility paired with strategic clarity can carve out safe harbors even when the tides of history rise violently. If Dr. Friday continues with conviction shaped by compassion and purpose rooted in principle, the Vincentian story will not only advance. It will inspire. It will shine. It will set a new standard for what leadership in this era can mean.
Editor’s Note: Dr. Isaac Newton is a strategist and scholar trained at Harvard, Princeton, and Columbia. He advises governments and international institutions on governance, transformation, and global justice, helping nations and organizations turn vision into sustainable progress.
Honduran officials call for “patience” amid technical tie in presidential elections
São Paulo, Brazil — Over 24 hours after polls closed on Sunday the people of Honduras still do not know who their next president will be.
Right-wing National Party candidate Nasry Asfura and center-right former TV host Salvador Nasralla are locked in a virtual tie after the country’s National Electoral Council (CNE) announced the conclusion of the Preliminary Electoral Results Transmission (TREP), according to CNN.
By Monday, Asfura had tallied 39.91% of votes counted while Nasralla had grabbed 39.89%, a separation of just 515 votes.
Meanwhile, the left-wing ruling party candidate, Rixi Moncada, had secured just 19.16%, leaving her out of reach of a victory.
The technical tie could paralyze the election and force a recount.
According to Honduran electoral law, the CNE has 30 days to declare the results and can recount the votes or call for new elections.
Ana Paola Hall, president of the CNE, asked Hondurans for patience while the electoral body reviews the results.
“Given this technical tie, we must remain calm, be patient, and wait for the National Electoral Council (CNE) to finish counting the ballots for contingency 1 and 2,” she wrote on X. “Afterward, the special scrutiny process will be carried out, thus finalizing the general scrutiny.”
Ahead of elections, U.S. President Donald Trump took to social media to throw his support behind the conservative Asfura.
Trump said the United States will be very “supportive” if the right-wing candidate wins.
“If Tito Asfura wins for President of Honduras, because the United States has so much confidence in him, his Policies, and what he will do for the Great People of Honduras, we will be very supportive,” he wrote on Truth Social.
In the same post, Trump also announced that he would pardon former Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández, who was convicted last year in a New York courtroom of drug trafficking and weapons charges and is serving a 45-year sentence.
Hernández is the former leader of Asfura’s National Party. Trump’s pardon is at odds with his aggressive drug interdiction efforts, targeting go-fast boats his administration says are shuttling drugs off the coasts of Venezuela and Colombia.
On Monday, the U.S. Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs said the election results are “preliminary” and the process needs to keep going until all the ballots have been counted.
Featured image credit:
Image: Nasry Asfura and Salvador Nasralla, Hondura’s presidential candidates
Source: Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan) / Official Photo by Shufu Liu / Office of the President
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Colombian armed groups committing human rights abuses in Venezuela’s mining rush for rare earth metals
Bogotá, Colombia – A go-fast speedboat with three big outboard motors pulled into the muddy Orinoco riverbank deep in Venezuela and a guerrilla commander stepped ashore to greet the waiting community. Behind, a dozen or so troops, all uniformed and wearing military webbing, kept their guns ready.
After some greetings he approached me.
“You’re a long way from home,” I said, detecting a Colombian accent.
“Not as far as you,” he replied, with a smile. Fair point, as I am originally from London.
It was a rare moment of humor in an otherwise tense situation; the nearby villagers were clearly nervous of the guerrillas in their midst. But the commander was relaxed. He was patrolling the river, he said “at the invitation of the president of Venezuela, to protect the communities”.
The encounter was a surprise. Historically, Colombian rebel armies often flitted across 2,200 kilometers of porous land borders, seeking refuge from military attacks. They also controlled drug running, contraband and human trafficking between the two countries. But we were deep inside Venezuela; at least 1,000 kilometers downstream from the border.
Why would Colombian armed groups penetrate all the way to Venezuela’s Atlantic coast? And why would they claim to work for its president?
Some answers came this month in a report from investigators at Amazon Underworld who pieced together a terrifying picture of a humanitarian crisis taking place along the Orinoco River, much of it hidden from sight from international media.
The global rush for critical metals had sparked a mining bonanza in high-biodiversity areas and indigenous territories, Bram Ebus, lead investigator of The Price of Progress: The Dark Side of Amazon Critical Minerals, told Latin America Reports this week.

The region forms part of the Guiana Shield, which dates back more than 1.5 billion years and is geologically rich in critical and rare earth minerals such as tungsten, coltan, nickel and manganese.
But rather than map out these deposits and mine them in any controlled way, regional governments had allowed extraction to fall under criminal control, spawning an unholy alliance of illegal armed groups, state forces, corrupt officials and shady Colombian companies sending valuable ores to Chinese buyers.
Vulnerable communities were being trampled in the stampede, said Ebus, with reports of summary executions, enforced child labor, sexual violence, torture, disappearances, displacement and confinement.
The humanitarian crisis was most acute on the Venezuelan side of the border.
“Mining activities in Venezuela are engulfed in violence and illegality,” said Ebus. “Human rights violations are much worse there than in Colombia and Brazil, especially as state agencies do not interfere with abuses committed by armed groups that often work alongside state forces. Mines are run with an iron fist, and those who violate rules imposed, especially by Colombian guerrilla groups, face violence and even execution”.
Groups like the ELN (National Liberation Army) had established entire mining villages with their own power supply, shops and restaurants where miners could bring rare earth rocks in exchange for goods. The Colombian guerrillas either taxed local miners or ran their own mines. Witnesses also described Chinese buyers arriving by helicopter to check operations, according to the Amazon Underworld report.
The report also detailed how villagers who dared to challenge the armed groups – over access restrictions, for example – faced being locked up in makeshift jungle prisons where victims were kept for days with no food or water.
Locals accused of stealing were shot dead, and miners could be murdered for selling minerals to other buyers, according to witness accounts collected by Amazon Underworld.
The mining free-for-all was transforming communities that traditionally sustained themselves through agriculture, fishing, and hunting. Many were becoming economically dependent on mining for survival, abandoning ancestral practices, and becoming reliant on costly river transport to bring basic supplies from distant cities.
Communities were also squeezed by the close collaboration between rebel groups like the ELN, ideologically aligned with the Caracas regime, and Venezuelan state forces such as the Bolivarian National Guard, who extorted miners for cash or minerals at military checkpoints – the hated alcabalas – or blockaded populations forcing them to work in the mines.
“At the entrance to the mines, at the control points, nobody can pass through, nobody leaves,” an indigenous miner told Amazon Underworld investigators.
Ebus said this collusion in the Orinoco belied recent claims by Caracas to be distancing itself from the Colombian rebels.
“In the mining areas, Venezuelan state forces have worked alongside Colombian guerrilla organizations, sometimes publicly appearing together in community meetings, with Colombian guerrilla members allegedly using vehicles of state agencies.”
His report also revealed cross-border collaboration with Colombian officials who assisted the smuggling of mined materials, often for fat kickbacks.

The mined minerals left the Orinoco region by various routes, according to the Amazon Underworld report, but the majority were transported across the Orinoco River to Colombia then given faked documents to be shipped to China.
Investigators had identified collection points on the Colombian side where Venezuelan ores containing rare earth minerals were assayed by buyers, then falsified – often disguised as less valuable metals such as tin – and transported by river and road to Bogotá then on to sea ports.
In many cases, the minerals are falsely declared to be mined in Colombia, with companies going as far as to create phantom mines on Colombian soil to disguise their origin. More recently, Venezuelan ores were being smelted in Colombia to produce ingots containing tin and rare earth metals which could be flown direct to China.
The trade was enabled on the Colombian side by lack of legal regulations, and the machinery to test cargos, explained Ebus. State enforcement agencies sometimes seized suspect cargos – but then returned them to mineral traders after it was unclear what the ore contained, or what legal parameters were being broken.
“Colombia’s state agencies are painfully lagging behind organized crime in the critical minerals business and corruption is rampant. But at the central level, it’s not just corruption; it’s bureaucratic paralysis and a complete absence of adequate legal frameworks to tackle illegal extraction and trade,” said Ebus.
The root of the problems was lack of effective state presence in areas of the Orinoco and Amazon river basins, a situation highlighted in a previous investigation by Amazon Underworld which found the presence of illegal armed groups in 67% of a total of 987 Amazon and Orinoco municipalities in six main countries.
State surrender to criminal enterprises had created an almost impossible task to claw back control over vast territories, with state militaries up against well-funded rebel groups now raking in new profits from rare earth metals.
The guerrillas I met in the mouth of the Orinoco had faster boats, more fuel, better guns, smarter uniforms and happier faces than their rag-tag counterparts in the Venezuelan national guard.
This was a point echoed by Ebus; with huge profits, and backed by powerful mercenary armies, the mining was not going away.
Solutions could stem from incremental technical improvements to detect deposits and control the flow of metals, he said. Proper assays at both extraction and supply chain levels could curb corruption and allow communities to better control mining in their own territories.
“Right now, miners are stripping topsoil just to see what rocks lay underneath, creating unnecessary environmental damage. They don’t even know what they’ve got,” he said.
A parallel strategy was to follow the money and identify the companies making vast profits from misery in the jungle. Regulation at export level would bring some control back down the supply chain.
The ultimate irony, said Ebus, was that this crisis was being driven by a global demand for critical minerals sparked by the boom in wind turbines, electric vehicles and solar panels.
“In the Orinoco and Amazon river basins, the extraction of the critical minerals needed for these green technologies is devastating indigenous communities and vital ecosystems — all the while fuelling guerrilla violence,” Ebus concluded.

Featured image: A fragment of mine soil rich in critical minerals.
Image credit: Bram Ebus, co-director, Amazon Underworld
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Man killed by lion at Brazil zoo had history of mental illness: Local media
São Paulo, Brazil — A 19-year-old man named Gerson de Melo Machado died on Sunday after climbing into a lioness enclosure at a zoo in João Pessoa, in Northwest Brazil. People who claim to know Machado said he had a history of mental illness.
The death was confirmed in an official statement issued by the Parque Zoobotânico Arruda Câmara, known as Bica.
Machado was filmed by other visitors getting inside the enclosure through a gap after climbing safety structures, and then descending a palm trunk to the ground. As soon as the lioness perceived Machado’s presence, she ran to him and mauled his leg, taking him to the ground.
On Sunday, the zoo stated that the man had deliberately entered the lioness’ cage and described the episode as “sad.” The zoo said the site will remain closed to visitors for the time being.
“We inform you that Bica will remain closed to visitors until the conclusion of the investigations and official procedures, prioritizing safety and transparency and our commitment to the safety of our visitors, employees, and animals,” read a joint statement issued by the zoo and João Pessoa’s city hall.
In another statement, the zoo said that the lioness, nicknamed Leona, has experienced a high level of stress but is doing well and receiving all necessary care. The post published on Instagram emphasized that the possibility of euthanizing the animal was never considered.
According to Thiago Nery, a veterinarian who works at the Bica zoo, Leona did not eat Gerson and did not have to be immobilized by darts.
Verônica Oliveira, a child welfare counselor from the state of Paraíba, claims to have known Machado.
According to her, he had been receiving assistance for eight years from the Child Welfare Council of Mangabeira, a neighborhood in João Pessoa, and had psychiatric problems not recognized by the Brazilian state.
Verônica, a child welfare counselor, and Gerson, killed by a lioness at a zoo in João Pessoa, Brazil. Photo: social media reproduction
“Gerson needed treatment, which was not offered. Gerson went through all the institutional care facilities in this city. Son of a schizophrenic mother and schizophrenic grandparents, but the psychiatrists insisted on saying that he was just a boy with behavioral problems,” Verônica said in a social media post.
“My feeling today is one of outrage. Because I never remained silent in the face of the absurd violations of rights that this citizen, who will be buried, suffered. He should have been in (psychiatric) treatment,” she added.
Local media reported that a month before the zoo incident which took his life, a state court ruled Machado should have been interned at the Custody and Psychiatric Treatment Hospital (HCTP) after medical reports concluded that he was “entirely incapable of understanding the criminal nature of his act or of behaving,” but officials were unable to locate him months after the ruling.
Featured image: Man climbing down a tree before being killed by a lioness at a zoo in João Pessoa, Brazil.
Author: Social media
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Everything To Know About Miss Universe Jamaica 2025 – The Contestant, The Competition & The Viral Fall Seen Around The World

News Americas, NEW YORK, NY, Mon. Dec. 1, 2025: Miss Universe Jamaica 2025 has captured international attention – not only for her beauty, talent, and poise, but also for the dramatic on-stage fall that ignited a global conversation and raised questions about safety, transparency, and the pressures faced by pageant contestants.
As searches for “Miss Universe Jamaica,” “Miss Jamaica fall,” and “Miss Universe 2025 Jamaica” skyrocket, here is everything you need to know about the contestant, the competition, and the controversy dominating headlines.

The Miss Universe Jamaica 2025 is Dr. Gabrielle Henry, a rising Caribbean talent known for her grace, intelligence, and commitment to representing her country on the global stage. She is 29, a graduate of the University of the West Indies, Mona campus and an ophthalmologist at the University Hospital of the West Indies, (UHWI). Her foundation, the See Me Foundation, supports the visually impaired. She is also a vocalist and dedicated humanitarian.
She entered the Miss Universe Jamaica competition with:
She won in August 2025. She was a previous contestant in 2023 and resurfaced from the ashes after not winning that competition. Her journey to the national crown made her a fan favorite long before pageant night.
The Miss Universe Jamaica pageant is one of the region’s most respected competitions, selecting a representative to compete at the Miss Universe 2025 stage – a platform that showcases global beauty, cultural expression, and female empowerment.
Key elements of her winning performance included:
In her Instagram profile’s bio, Dr Henry describes herself as a “beam of light, resident ophthalmologist, plant mom and model.” In her LinkedIn profile she describes herself as “a personable and engaging medical professional who is passionate about patient care and services. Adept at providing efficient communication and urgent patient care. Empathetic, nurturing, attending to patient’s needs in a timely fashion. Has practiced under tutelage of the best medical professionals at the University of the West Indies. Qualified in ACLS and BLS courses.”
During the evening gown segment of the pageant, Miss Universe Jamaica 2025 suffered a sudden and unexpected fall on stage. Video footage circulated rapidly across TikTok, Instagram, X, and YouTube, with millions of views within hours.
The fall raised immediate questions:
While initial reports focused on the incident itself, concerns quickly shifted toward her health and the aftermath.
As of the latest update:
Search interest for health updates is extremely high, making this an evolving story with major public attention.
In a surprising response, officials of the Miss Universe Jamaica franchise suggested that the fall resulted from a “misstep” by the contestant.
This attempt to assign blame has sparked major backlash, with critics saying:
Fans across the Caribbean diaspora have accused the organization of damage control instead of accountability.
The incident has unified Jamaicans worldwide, with thousands expressing:
TikTok edits, Instagram tributes, and X threads continue to trend as audiences wait for more information.
Until there is an official statement, fans will continue monitoring closely.
Miss Universe Jamaica 2025 is more than a headline — she represents:
Her journey is a reminder of the pressures that come with visibility, and the importance of empathy in moments of vulnerability.
News Americas will continue tracking:
This story is developing, and this page will be updated as soon as new information becomes available.
Caracas blocks Airspace for Iberia, TAP and Avianca airlines
The US military tensions have triggered a crisis in Venezuela’s air connectivity. On Wednesday, the Venezuelan government revoked flight concessions for Iberia, TAP, Turkish Airlines, Avianca, Latam Colombia and Gol, accusing them of joining the actions of terrorism promoted by the USA. Maiquetia International Airport in Caracas operated on Thursday with only seven scheduled departures […]
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St. Vincent And The Grenadines – Rethinking Power, Renewal And The Future Of Opposition

News Americas, NEW YORK, NY, Fri. Nov. 28, 2025: In the stillness that followed the 2025 St. Vincent and the Grenadines elections, Ralph Gonsalves’ single surviving seat felt less like a victory and more like a solitary echo from a fading era. Twenty-four years in office had stretched the limits of public patience, and the country’s quiet hunger for renewal finally spoke in unmistakable terms. The call for transition was not hidden. It was visible in drifting supporters, weary faces, and the simple question lingering in every community: What more could truly be offered after a quarter century of the same voice at the helm? The result was not just a loss. It was the public’s firm declaration that leadership must remain rooted in awareness, not memory.

The ULP’s unraveling did not happen overnight. It grew in the gap between the party’s internal culture and the country’s evolving needs. When a political movement stops thinking, stops questioning itself, and stops grooming new leaders, it becomes fragile long before the ballots are cast. Treating politics as an extension of personal legacy rather than a living partnership with the people created a disconnect that no speeches could repair. The defeat, therefore, was not surprising. It was the natural outcome of a leadership style that treated continuity as a strategy and familiarity as a plan.
Even so, the moment carries potential. Renewal begins with the simple act of listening without defensiveness. It requires conversations in homes, markets, church halls, and bus stops, not to reclaim power but to understand what the country is truly becoming. Fresh leadership must be cultivated with the discipline of mentorship and the courage to allow younger voices to shape new directions. Real solutions emerge when a party studies the present instead of rehearsing its past, taking the time to gather evidence, understand trends, and design policies that respond to lived experiences rather than assumptions.
Rebuilding the opposition will demand structure, curiosity, and intellectual honesty. A reformed opposition must start by assembling a broad national advisory group capable of producing ideas that matter: economic relief frameworks, community safety initiatives, youth employment pipelines, and modern governance standards. The party must invest in training organizers, communicators, and researchers who can engage the public with clarity and respect. Most importantly, it must show through consistent action that it values transparency, genuine debate, and shared leadership. Only then can the opposition grow into an institution the country takes seriously, not because of its past, but because of the future it is willing to design with discipline and imagination.
EDITOR’S NOTE: Dr. Isaac Newton is a strategist and scholar trained at Harvard, Princeton, and Columbia. He advises governments and international institutions on governance, transformation, and global justice, helping nations and organizations turn vision into sustainable progress.
Don’t Miss These Big New Caribbean Music Drops This Black Friday

News Americas, NEW YORK, NY, Fri. Nov. 29, 2025: Black Friday isn’t just about shopping deals – it’s also delivering a fresh wave of brand new Caribbean music. From high-energy soca to cross-continental collabs and roots reggae revival, here are the standout releases heating up the region and the diaspora this week in new music.

Travis World teams up with soca titan Machel Montano and hitmaker Preedy for the explosive Elektra Riddim, a two-track soca injection built for Carnival 2026.
Tracklist:
STREAM NOW
Check it out here
A reimagined version of the Patrice Roberts x Machel classic, produced by Travis World and recorded between Trinidad studios. High-energy nostalgia built for 2026.
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A powerful Jamaica–Bronx fusion produced by CJTheChemist. Chronic Law’s grit meets French Montana’s swagger for a global street anthem that bridges cultures and continents.
VIDEO
A heartfelt Guyanese roots anthem produced by KSBEATS & DLMuzik. Dutchin channels identity, resilience, and home.
Rising Jamaican star Cholita links with Skillibeng for a sultry dancehall–R&B fusion. After her global breakout with “Next Time,” this second single cements her star power.
A bright, uplifting reggae record from the rising Jamaican singer, produced by Natural High Music. Another confident step in Khalia’s ascent.
Check it out HERE
Kenyan reggae vocalist Cathy Matete delivers a stirring, spiritual call for unity and justice. A standout entry in the Roots Rock Reggae Riddim project.
VIDEO HERE
A bold, sensual groovy soca track from Jadel and GBM Nutron. Built for Carnival freedom, confidence, and pure energy.
STREAM NOW
A soulful reggae reinterpretation of Bobby Bloom’s 1970 classic, produced by Donovan Germain and featuring Dean Fraser. Shuga honors her birthplace while previewing her Spring 2026 album Girl From Montego Bay. Preview HERE
Nigerian hitmaker FAVE teams with Dre Skull for an Afro–dancehall glow-up anthem celebrating confidence, revenge, and main-character energy.
STREAM NOW
Multi-talented Jamaican singer-songwriter and viral sensation J’Calm teams up with breakout dancehall star Nigy Boy and Grammy-winning producer Tony “CD” Kelly for the emotionally rich new single “Emotions,” out now on all platforms via K-Licious Music/DubShot Records.
Blending classic reggae foundations with J’Calm’s silky R&B phrasing and Nigy Boy’s soulful delivery, Emotions redefines modern Caribbean fusion — warm, honest, and pulsing like a heartbeat.
The single serves as the title track of J’Calm’s debut album, arriving January 9, 2026, and featuring major reggae figures including Ky-Mani Marley, Wayne Wonder, and Khalia.
Tony Kelly constructs a contemporary reimagining of the iconic Answer Riddim, originally introduced by Studio One’s Clement “Coxsone” Dodd in 1967. The refreshed 2025 version gives the young artists room to shine as they merge vulnerability, identity, and rhythmic storytelling.
J’Calm says the single reflects his journey of self-discovery: “This song is about knowing my identity, embracing vulnerability, and empathizing with someone who mirrors my experience.”
Nigy Boy — visually impaired and trained at the Salvation Army School for the Blind — calls the collaboration “an honor,” adding: “Tony Kelly is a legend. Working with him and J’Calm felt seamless.”
The official video, directed by Filmaica and filmed across Jamaica, showcases both artists delivering stirring performances layered with emotion and youthful intensity.
Producer Tony Kelly added: “J’Calm and Nigy Boy represent an exciting new chapter in reggae and dancehall. They are young, ambitious, and extremely talented.”
Emotions stands as a generational bridge — honoring Jamaica’s musical roots, celebrating its Golden Era, and boldly pushing Caribbean music into its next evolution.
VIDEO: Watch “Emotions”
THE REAL LESSONS OF YESTERDAY'S SHOOTING IN WASHINGTON DC
President Trump, true to form, misses the real lesson from the tragic shooting of two national guardsmen in Washington. Trump announced that in light of what happened he will call on the Department of Defense (that’s still its official name) to call up 500 more National Guardsmen to Washington. The refugee program is also being revamped in order to avoid incidents like this from happening in the future. Just hours after the incident, the Trump administration announced it had stopped processing immigration applications from Afghanistan. The shooter, Rahmanulla Lakanwal, is an Afghan who was trained by the CIA to fight the Taliban in one of their strongholds. Apparently, Lakanwal acted in reaction to the gutting of much of the refugee program.
Trump’s moves miss the real lesson. Throughout the twenty-first century the United States has been in permanent wars throughout the world. The U.S. public doesn’t even know about many of them. We bomb countries in Africa on a regular basis. We’re in a permanent war situation in the Middle East. We’re bombing boats -- in the process blasting fishermen to pieces on both sides of Latin America and the victims are people not only from Venezuela, but also Trinidad, Colombia, Mexico and Ecuador. In doing so we are creating Frankenstein’s both at home and abroad. Lakanwal is one of them. All studies indicate that most acts of terrorism in the U.S. are committed by people and groups on the Right and a very large number of the perpetrators served in the military and are war veterans. George Lincoln Rockwell, the founder of the American Nazi Party, is just one example of a phenomenon in which the chickens come home to roost. Another is Timothy McVeigh, the author of the Oklahoma City bombing that killed 167 people in 1995 who was a veteran of the Persian Gulf War.
This is the discussion we should be having, not one about retribution which is the one being raised by Trump and his MAGA followers. Unfortunately, we cannot count on the mainstream media, which is increasingly being taken over by the political Right and is becoming increasingly concentrated, to raise these issues.
Boat Rides to Patagonia Glaciers and Penguins in Chile
If you come to the bottom of Chile, you’ll probably take a boat ride or two at some point, getting up close to geographic features you don’t see back home, like Patagonia glaciers that date back to the last Ice Age and if you’re lucky, a few pengins too. For my travels as the...
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The Battle for Venezuela @ Warp Speed
With US warships stationed off Venezuela’s coast and a new regional right-wing bloc forming under Washington’s tutelage, the Western hemisphere is entering a volatile phase. Yet today’s confrontation unfolds in a world very different from the one that allowed the US to dictate regional politics with little resistance in the past. China’s rise, the return […]
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Trump’s Provocations are a Boost for the Latin American Left
When Trump assumed the presidency in 2025, the Pink Tide governments in Latin America were losing ground. The approval rating of Brazil’s president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva reached the lowest of his three presidential terms while that of Colombia’s Gustavo Petro was a mere 34 percent. Furthermore, in the wake of the highly contested results of the July 2024 presidential elections in Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro found himself isolated in the region.
Now, less than a year later, the political landscape has shifted. Trump’s antics such as renaming the Gulf of Mexico, his weaponization of tariffs, and military actions in the Caribbean and Pacific have revitalized Pink Tide governments and the Left in general. Latin America has reacted to Trump’s invocation of the Monroe Doctrine with a surge of nationalist sentiment, mass demonstrations, and denunciations from political figures across most of the spectrum—including some on the center-right.
While the United States appears as an unreliable and declining hegemon, China positions itself as a champion of national sovereignty and a voice of reason in matters of international trade and investment. When Trump slapped a 50% tariff on most Brazilian imports in July, the Chinese stepped in to help fill the gap for the nation’s all-important soybean exports.
Lula versus Trump
Different scenarios are playing out in different nations, but with similar results: the strengthening of the Left and in some instances the weakening of the Right. One case is Brazil and Mexico, where Lula and President Claudia Sheinbaum have combined firmness with discretion, in contrast to Petro’s confrontational rhetoric.
In July, Lula responded defiantly to Trump’s attempt to strong-arm Brazil through punitive tariffs designed to secure the release of his ally and former president Jair Bolsonaro, jailed for involvement in coup and assassination plots. Unlike other heads of state, Lula refused to reach out to Trump, saying “I’m not going to humiliate myself.” Instead, Lula declared “Brazil would not be tutored by anyone,” at the same time that he recalled the 1964 Brazilian coup as a previous instance of U.S. intervention.
The face-off sparked mass pro-government demonstrations throughout the country which far outnumbered those called by the Right demanding the freeing of Bolsonaro. Lula’s supporters blamed the Right for the tariffs, and particularly Bolsonaro’s son Eduardo who campaigned for them after moving to Washington. Lula called Bolsonaro a "traitor" and said he should face another trial for being responsible for the so-called “Bolsonaro’s tax.” As a sign that Trump’s tariffs were a game changer and a boost for the Left, the 80-year old Lula announced he would run for reelection in October 2026, as his popularity reached the 50 percent mark.
Some analysts faulted Lula for having failed to use his 30-minute videoconference with Trump on October 6 to condemn Washington’s gunboat diplomacy in the Caribbean. According to this interpretation of the call, Lula displayed naivete and gutlessness by combining “concern and accommodation with US imperialism” and believing that “negotiations will be guided by a ‘win-win logic.’”
In fact, Lula has spoken out against the U.S. military presence as a “factor of tension” in the Caribbean, which he calls a “zone of peace.” Lula, though, undoubtedly could have gone further, as urged by the Landless Workers’ Movement (MST) – which backed Lula’s last presidential bid – by explicitly declaring solidarity with Venezuela.
But Lula can hardly be accused of being submissive in his dealings with Trump. Venezuela’s former Vice Minister for North America Carlos Ron told me that both Lula and Sheinbaum have shown that they “know how to handle Trump” as they have “gotten much of what they wanted.” Indeed, at the same time that Trump retreated from his tariff threats toward both nations, he took to praising the two heads of state.
A United Front in the Making
In Brazil and elsewhere in the region, a new alignment is emerging, drawing in forces both to the right and the left of the government in reaction to Washington’s posture. One notable example was Lula’s appointment of homeless workers movement activist and former presidential candidate Guilherme Boulos as Minister of the Presidency in October. Boulos belongs to the Socialism and Liberty Party, a leftist split-off from Lula’s Workers’ Party that endorsed Lula’s 2022 presidential candidacy but had ruled out holding positions in his government.
Boulos, who was instrumental in organizing the recent protests against Washington’s tariff hikes, spoke of the significance of his designation: "Lula gave me the mission to help put the government on the street… and listening to popular demands." His appointment signals a leftist turn in which, in the words of the Miami-based CE Noticias Financiera, “Lula showed that he is going into the 2026 election ready for war. A war in his own style, using the social movements.”
Venezuela is another example of political actors across much of the political spectrum converging on the need for a broad front to oppose U.S. aggression in the region. No other Pink Tide government has faced such a rapid succession of regime change and destabilization attempts as Venezuela under the Chavista (followers of Hugo Chávez) government of Maduro. The government’s response to these challenges has at times deviated from democratic norms and includes concessions to business interests, drawing harsh criticism from both moderate and more radical sectors of the Left.
One leader in the latter category is Elías Jaua, formerly a member of Chávez’s inner circle, whose leftist positions on economic policy and internal party democracy left him marginalized within the Chavista movement. In the face of the U.S. military threat in the Caribbean, Jaua has closed ranks with Maduro and decried the “psychological war” being waged against the President. He went on to say that in this critical moment it is necessary “to place the tranquility of the people above any ideological, political, or ulterior interest,” adding “the Homeland comes first.”
Other long-standing political figures who have supported Maduro’s call for a national dialogue to face the U.S. threat – while not letting Maduro off the hook for alleged undemocratic practices – include some on the center and even center-right of the political spectrum, including former presidential candidates Henrique Capriles, Manuel Rosales and Antonio Ecarri.
Others are moderate leftists who held important posts under Chávez and/or belonged to the moderate left party Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) in the 1990s. One of the latter is Enrique Ochoa Antich who presented a petition signed by 27 leading anti-Maduro moderates that stated “it is disheartening to see an extremist sector of the opposition” supporting sanctions and other U.S. actions. Ochoa Antich proposed a dialogue with government representatives “over the best way to foment national unity and defend sovereignty,” while adding “being realistic, I’m not going to ask that the party-state, which is the core of the Chavista project, be abolished.”
This stance, which views Maduro as a partner in resisting U.S. intervention, stands in sharp contrast to that of the Communist Party (PCV), which broke with his government in 2020 over its business-friendly orientation and its sidelining of sectors of the Left. In the same breath that it denounces imperialist aggression, the PCV points to the “authoritarian and anti-democratic nature of Maduro’s government.” While the PCV’s criticisms are worthy of debate, the party’s uncompromising hostility toward Maduro undermines efforts to face U.S. aggression. Indeed, the PCV’s position – supporting the Cuban government while denouncing Venezuela’s as undemocratic – appears inconsistent.
In Argentina, Trump came to the aid of the Right in what will most likely be a Pyrrhic victory. On the eve of the October 2025 legislative elections, Trump offered to bail out the Argentine economy to the tune of $40 billion but only under the condition that the party of right-wing president Javier Milei emerge victorious, which is precisely what happened. Trump’s blackmail was denounced as such by politicians from Peronist leaders linked to former Pink Tide governments to centrists who had been among their most vocal critics. Facundo Manes, leader of the centrist Radical Civic Union, was an example of the latter, declaring “the extorsion advances.” Meanwhile on the streets of Buenos Aires, protest banners denouncing Milei were marked by anti-U.S. slogans “Yankee go home” and “Milei is Trump’s mule,” as well as the burning of a U.S. flag.
This convergence around the need to confront Trump’s threats and actions creates an opportunity for progressives across the continent to unite. The call for such unity was taken up by the São Paulo Forum, a body that brings together over 100 Latin American leftist organizations that Lula helped found in 1990. At the outset of Trump’s first administration in 2017, the Forum drafted the document “Consensus for Our America” as a response to the neoliberal Washington Consensus and the escalation of U.S. interventionism in the hemisphere.
At the same time that it defended the pluralism of progressive movements and avoided the term “socialism,” the Consensus document foresaw the drafting of a more concrete set of reforms and goals. The expected step forward, however, never materialized. More recently, the Cuban ideologue Roberto Regalado lamented that, despite the urgent need for unity, “far from consolidating and expanding, the ‘Consensus for Our America’ has languished.”
Trump and the Latin American Right
Much of the Latin American right has tied its fortunes to President Trump. The right-wing presidents of Argentina, Ecuador and Paraguay are Trump followers, as are Bolsonaro, the Chilean presidential candidate José Antonio Kast and former president Álvaro Uribe in Colombia. In Venezuela, right-wing opposition leader María Corina Machado dedicated her Nobel Peace Prize to Trump.
Machado’s fellow Venezuelan rightist Leopoldo López co-founded the National Liberty Congress in 2022 dedicated to regime change in nations that happen to be considered adversaries by Washington. The idea is in line with the idea of an International of the Right promoted by Trump strategist Steve Bannon, among others. Bannon founded The Movement in 2016 to unite the European Right, but it has been largely snubbed by much of the continent’s right-wing.
The “internationalism” on the right is even less likely to flourish in Latin America. While in the U.S., Trump plays on patriotism – or a bogus form of it – in the case of Latin America, nationalist sentiment and support for Trump are oxymorons, specifically when it comes to tariffs, threats of military invasion and the brandishing of the Monroe Doctrine. In Venezuela, for instance, Machado’s popularity has declined and her opposition movement fractured as a result of popular repudiation of Trump’s policies.
In the U.S., Trump plays to his fanatic supporters while his popularity steadily declines. In Latin America the same is occurring, with the difference being that his popularity couldn’t be much lower than it is. Pew Research Center reports that just 8 percent of Mexicans have “confidence” in Trump.
Trump has contributed to a major shift in the Latin America’s political landscape now marked by political polarization and leftist inroads. In many countries, the Left—which for decades remained on the sidelines—has become a major point of reference, rallying around the banners of national sovereignty, if not, anti-imperialism.
In Chile, a Communist, Jeannette Jara, received a surprising 60.5 percent of the vote in the primaries to represent the main anti-rightist bloc in the upcoming presidential elections. In spite of the cautious tone of her discourse, Jara addressed Trump, saying “No U.S. soldiers will enter. Chile is to be respected, and so is its sovereignty.” In Ecuador, despite harsh repression, the followers of ex-Pink Tide president Rafael Correa have come close to winning the last three presidential elections. And in Colombia, Petro has reinvigorated his movement’s base through his forceful denunciations of U.S. military operations and by leading a drive, begun in October, to secure two million signatures for a national constituent assembly.
Polarization often refers to a scenario in which the extremes on both sides of the political spectrum gain ascendancy. That is not what is happening in Latin America – at least on the left. Instead, there is a convergence of progressives of different political stripes both domestically and among Pink Tide governments in their opposition to Trump and all that he represents. The challenge now is to translate this convergence into organized forms of unity – through united fronts at the national level as well as in the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) and other regional bodies.
This article was originally posted by Jacobin.
Steve Ellner is an associate managing editor of Latin American Perspectives and a retired professor at the Universidad de Oriente in Venezuela, where he lived for over forty years. He is the author of Rethinking Venezuelan Politics: Class, Conflict and the Chávez Phenomenon.
https://jacobin.com/2025/11/trump-latin-america-left-opposition
Democrats Always Cave in to the Republican Party. No Wonder their Popularity is so Abysmally Low
Trump got what he wanted with the 43-day shutdown. The Democrats didn’t get the SNAP funding nor the Obama Care subsidy. But this isn’t the first time they have surrendered. For years the Democrats were the ones who favored reconciliation across the aisle and the Republicans consistently snubbed them.
What about the 2000 electoral fraud in the 2000 presidential contest, and that happened even though Al Gore received 540,000 more popular votes? What about Mitch McConnell’s maneuver in 2016 to deprive the Democrats a Supreme Courte judge, creating a situation in which even though the Democrats almost always win the popular vote, the Republicans have 6 judges on the Supreme Court as against only 3 Democrats? And what about the fact that Washington DC, a Democratic city with a larger population than some red states, doesn’t have representation in congress? And what about Obama’s refusal to take advantage of national sentiment by proceed with judicial proceedings against Cheney and Bush for having committed torture in CIA blackholes, a move which would have clobbered the Republicans following their defeat in 2008.
Gavin Newsom now talks about fighting fire with fire, but the Democrats should have begun employing that strategy several decades ago. The real reason why they don’t is that they would prefer to face a strong Republican Party in a two-party system that pits the center against the right, rather than face the risk of opening a space on the left side of the political spectrum. Furthermore, with a Republican Party veto capacity in congress, the corporate-funded Democrats have an excuse for not enacting the reforms they supposedly champion.
Another Trump Turnaround –on Venezuela -- but this Time not Bad!
Trump just announced, “We may be having some discussions with Maduro, and we’ll see how that turns out.” Just about two weeks ago, Trump deauthorized Richard Grenell, who was his special envoy who said that no military incursion was being planned and that talks with Maduro were continuing. Now Trump says he’d like to continue talks with Maduro, even though Maduro all along has publicly indicated that he is open to talks and negotiations.
I’m hesitant to criticize Trump for being so capricious since I very much hope that this represents a new line and a new approach which would result in the withdrawal of U.S. the naval presence just 100 miles from the Venezuelan coast and the presence of the USS Gerald R Ford aircraft carrier within striking distance of Venezuela. It may be that Trump’s strategy all along was to attempt to intimidate Maduro and the Venezuelan armed forces and since that didn’t work, Trump is going into a new gear, that is he’s downshifting. Hope that’s the case. If it is, it demonstrates how effective Maduro has been in facing a dismaying challenge by mobilizing Venezuela militarily and politically and calling on people throughout the region to support the defense of Venezuela's national sovereignty. Regardless of what people think of Maduro, the effectiveness of this response and his leadership capacity in this context have to be recognized.
Villa Rentals in Latin America’s Elite Communities
If you want to see what it would be like to live in a foreign country, in a development where you have access to golf, tennis, and restaurants, there are villa rentals waiting for you where all you have to do is book it and show up with a suitcase. In the elite communities...
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Can Peru’s Democracy Recover?
By Cynthia McClintock*
Photographs from the early hours of the Generation Z protest in Peru, 2025
(Source: Wikimedia Commons)
Since 2021, democratic backsliding has been severe in Peru, and Peruvians are furious. Peru’s Congress is loathed. In 2025, the approval rating for Peru’s President, Dina Boluarte, fell below 3 percent and she became the most unpopular president on the planet. Finally, in October, Boluarte was impeached on the grounds of “permanent moral incapacity”; it was the fifth time since 2018 that a president had been impeached or had resigned upon imminent impeachment. Per Peru’s constitution, Boluarte was succeeded by the Congress Speaker, José Jerí. Presidential and Congressional elections are scheduled for early 2026.
Why are Peruvians so angry? What does their anger mean for the 2026 elections (with the Congressional elections and the first round of the presidential elections scheduled for April 12 and a likely runoff on June 7)? Is it possible that the elections can lead to a democratic recovery?
Why are Peruvians So Angry?
The key reason is not “the economy stupid,” but an escalation of organized crime and the perception that Peru’s political leaders are part of the problem rather than part of the solution.
Between 2019 and 2024 the number of homicides doubled and the number of reported extortions jumped sixfold. Extortion is hurting huge swathes of lower-middle class Peruvians. Transport workers have been particularly vulnerable; so far in 2025, approximately 50 bus drivers have been killed for refusing to make extortion payments.
The reasons behind the crime escalation are various. Demand for cocaine remains high and, over the last decade, Peru’s coca cultivation has increased. As the price for gold jumped, so did illegal gold mining. Peru’s gangs are fragmented—and therefore hard to track—and they have developed nefarious new strategies such as using WhatsApp for extortion.
But, Peruvians believe, the reasons also include the government’s complicity. In part because illicit operators have provided campaign finance, in 2024 approximately half of Peru’s legislators were under criminal investigation; these same legislators have passed laws to impede investigations and prosecutions. Boluarte herself is under investigation for various crimes, including illicit enrichment. She sported a Rolex watch priced at $19,000, despite no evident financial means for such extravagance.
Further, from the start large percentages of Peruvians did not deem Boluarte a legitimate president. In 2021-2022, Boluarte was Vice President under President Pedro Castillo. Leading a far-left party in fraught elections during COVID, Castillo was an accidental, unprepared president. He was virulently opposed by the dominant right-wing forces in Congress, in particular Fuerza Popular, the party of Keiko Fujimori, the daughter of former authoritarian President Alberto Fujimori. As Vice President, Boluarte had said that, if Castillo were impeached, she too would resign, triggering new elections. However, in the event of Castillo’s December 2022 impeachment, Boluarte stayed on, despite massive protests and ubiquitous calls for new elections.
As President, Boluarte appeared indifferent to Peruvians’ concerns. Between December 2022 and February 2023, 49 civilian protesters were killed by the security forces. Boluarte’s response was support for an amnesty law. And, amid an October 2025 transport workers’ strike, Boluarte’s advice to Peruvians worried about crime was that they should not open text messages from unfamiliar people—placing blame for crimes on the victims.
What Does Peruvians’ Anger Mean for the 2026 Elections?
Peruvians’ anger spells difficulties for its incumbent parties and advantages for parties that can claim an “outsider” mantle. Fujimori’s Fuerza Popular is widely considered the dominant party in the Congress, and it will struggle against this perception. Its presidential candidate, Fujimori, is running for the fourth time and is likely to have worn out her welcome.
Not surprisingly, demands for an “iron fist” against crime are strong. The current presidential frontrunner is Renovación Popular’s Rafael López Aliaga (aka “Porky”), a Trump-like far-rightist who placed third in the 2021 election and was subsequently elected Lima’s mayor. López Aliaga promises a hardline strategy against organized crime, including implementing similar imprisonment policies to those of El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele. But Renovación Popular holds the fourth largest number of seats in Congress and it will be difficult for López Aliaga to claim an “outsider” mantle.
A candidate likely to claim an “outsider” mantle is Mario Vizcarra, running as a proxy for his brother, former President Martín Vizcarra. As President in 2018-2020, Vizcarra confronted the dominant parties in Peru’s Congress, building his popularity but ultimately catalyzing his impeachment. After a strong showing in Peru’s 2021 legislative elections, he was disqualified from holding elected office for ten years. Yet, Vizcarra’s government was far from without fault. There are other candidates, including the popular former clown, Carlos Álvarez, who could seize the “outsider” mantle.
Can Peru’s 2026 Elections Lead to Democratic Recovery?
The challenges to Peru’s elections are serious. In recent years Fuerza Popular and other illiberal parties in Peru’s Congress have allied to skew the electoral playing field in their favor. Interim President Jerí is, of course, new to his position and his possible impact on the elections is unclear. (His first-month record was better than was first expected.)
As elsewhere in Latin America, Peru’s illiberal parties have strategized to achieve the disqualification of viable candidates. As indicated, this strategy is currently being used against Vizcarra; it could also be used against a rising new candidate.
Peru’s illiberal parties have calculated that a plethora of candidates is in their interest. Currently, 39 party lists are registered. Such a head-spinning number is problematic for journalists trying to cover the campaign and problematic for voters trying to identify their preferred candidate, especially because pre-election polls are more likely to be inaccurate. Yet, Peru’s Congress cancelled a provision for a preliminary round of voting, in which parties would have been required to secure 1.5 percent of the vote in order to qualify for the “first round.”
Still, there are grounds for optimism. The massive protests of recent years have shown that Peruvians want their political views heard. Peruvians recognize the importance of honest, capable leadership and want to find it.
*Cynthia McClintock is Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University.
Bolivia Decisively Enters New If Unknown Political Territory
By Robert Albro, Associate Director, CLALS
Rodrigo Paz is sworn in as president of Bolivia, 2025
(Source: Wikimedia Commons)
Centrist Rodrigo Paz’s victory in October’s runoff election signals a dramatic change of direction for Bolivian politics. The era of dominance of the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party, led by ex-president Evo Morales, is definitively over. For only the second time since 2006 the MAS will not control the presidency. As a result of the recent election, it now has a mere two representatives in the legislature’s lower house, and no one in the upper house. Though it does not hold an outright majority, Paz’s Christian Democratic Party is now the single largest presence in both legislative chambers. How did Bolivia get here?
Twenty years ago, the leftist-populist MAS swept into power, as a new and energetic grassroots alternative to the elite-run traditional parties that had traded off governing Bolivia since the end of dictatorship in 1982, or one could even argue, since the 1952 Revolution. The MAS’s popularity sprung largely from the dynamism of Morales, himself, then a coca grower union leader adept at organizing and leading large-scale protests in opposition to prevailing Washington Consensus policies and government efforts to sell off Bolivia’s non-renewable resources to transnational corporate interests. The MAS styled itself a bottom-up social movement and not a party. Its participatory “lead by following” approach to governance appealed to a great majority of indigenous voters and working-class people of indigenous descent.
Morales and the MAS proved historically consequential in undertaking a contentious but innovative rewrite of the country’s Constitution, which went into force in 2009. It fully embraced Bolivia’s “plurinational” identity and incorporated an unprecedented variety of collective indigenous rights of consultation, to their traditional territories, and perhaps most controversially, of judicial autonomy. The Morales administration also used a large surplus from the country’s extractive boom to finance a wide range of new social safety net provisions that halved the number of people living in poverty, including cash transfers to families, a pension program, minimum wage increase, as well as public investments in schools, hospitals, and other infrastructure. Perhaps most importantly, his presidency raised the public visibility of Bolivia’s indigenous majority, no longer as second class citizens but as political protagonists of their own present and future.
Morales and the MAS were immensely popular. But then cracks began to appear. In 2011 a plan to build a controversial highway through a protected indigenous reserve brought the MAS government into direct conflict with the reserve’s residents, damaging its support among some indigenous groups. When the extractive boom ended around 2014, Bolivia’s economy slowed considerably, and the MAS fiscal policies that had lifted so many out of poverty became increasingly unsustainable. Part of the problem was Morales, who served two presidential terms and aspired to another, without any thought to a succession plan. Constitutionally limited to two terms, in 2016 he soundly lost a national referendum in a bid for a third and then ignored the result, further alienating many former supporters.
The upheaval around the contested 2019 election, which eventuated in Morales going into exile in Mexico and the persecution of MAS loyalists by a rightwing caretaker government, set the stage for the party’s eventual fall from grace. The 2020 election restored the MAS to power. But soon Morales and the new president, his ex-finance minister Luis Arce, were in a pitched battle for control over the party, a bitter and increasingly personal rivalry that fatally fragmented the MAS into opposed camps. Their protracted feud, which paralyzed congress, strayed into surreal territory, with accusations of a staged coup and mutual assassination attempts. The credibility of the MAS was so fundamentally damaged that the incumbent Arce, with his poll numbers plummeting, suspended his campaign. Morales, meanwhile, remains holed up in his coca grower redoubt to avoid criminal charges.
The MAS-led government’s political fragmentation, and its ineffectual response to Bolivia’s increasingly disastrous economy, have left the party deeply unpopular. The country is currently floundering amid its worst economic crisis in 40 years. Its natural gas production is half of what it was in 2014, with nothing to replace it. Bolivia has failed to develop its large reserves of lithium. Depleted currency reserves and a scarcity of US dollars have driven up inflation, creating severe shortages of fuel and basic goods. Over the past year, ordinary Bolivians have angrily expressed their discontent with the country’s economic collapse through repeated strikes and protest actions.
Emerging from this bleak political and economic state-of-affairs is the surprise election winner, Rodrigo Paz. Son of onetime leftist president Jaime Paz Zamora, former mayor of Tarija, and recently a senator, Paz’s campaign focused on restoring Bolivia’s economy, but gradually rather than by instituting sweeping fiscal austerity measures as his rival in the run-off proposed. Non-indigenous, pro-business, and ideology averse, Paz successfully positioned himself as a pragmatic reformer. He has delivered a strong anti-corruption message, pledged to restore relations with the US and bring back foreign investment. His populist call for a “capitalism for all” hopes to thread the needle by mixing decentralization, lower taxes, support for small businesses, and greater fiscal discipline, with continued spending on popular MAS-era social programs.
Paz’s critics argue that what he proposes is an impossible fiscal balancing act. Desperate and impatient Bolivians will expect immediate results. But it remains far from clear whether Paz will be able to overcome likely regional opposition to at least some of his policies. And if he does not stabilize the country’s dysfunctional economy quickly, Paz’s political honeymoon might be brief.
Tequila Los Arango From Guanajuato
If you spend time in Mexican resort bars or browse around duty free shops, you’ve probably seen the Corralejo tequila in the tall, thin bottle. It stands out for its design and shape, but the company that makes it has several other brands that are actually more noteworthy if you’re a real tequila fan,...
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US military squeeze on Venezuela might boomerang on Washington DC
The U.S. military buildup along South America’s northern rim is, Washington insists, aimed at Narco-Terrorists. A growing chorus of analysts aren’t convinced; they suspect what the Trump administration is really after is regime change in Venezuela. Nicolás Maduro, the country’s leader since 2013, is taking no chances. In recent weeks he responded to the Trump […]
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The Rise, Decline, and Crisis of Ecuador’s Indigenous Movement
By Dr. Pablo Andrade Andrade
October 17 Demonstrations (Manifestaciones del 17 de Octubre)
(Source: Wikimedia Commons)
Just six years ago, in 2019, the three major organizations of the Ecuadorian indigenous movement were on the rise. CONAIE (the Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador) led the charge against Lenin Moreno’s government. For eleven days their widespread demonstrations posed a serious threat to the government’s stability. The “Paro Nacional” (Nationwide Strike) not only facilitated CONAIE’s alliances with the other two indigenous organizations (FENOCIN, the Federación Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas, Indígenas y Negras, and FEINE, the Federación Ecuatoriana de Indígenas Evangélicos) but also broadened its coalition with a diverse range of civil society organizations, marking a significant shift in Ecuadorian politics. The impact of the indigenous movement on Ecuadorian politics was profound, as Moreno´s government was seriously weakened. Two years later, in 2021, CONAIE’s political party, Pachakutik, won substantial representation in the National Assembly and placed third in the Presidential elections.
In 2022 CONAIE’s president, Leonidas Iza, led a successful national strike against Guillermo Lasso’s right-wing government. His leadership, bolstered by unity among indigenous communities and their allies, made it the most powerful leftist organization. Newfound solidarity among indigenous communities and stronger ties with student, feminist, and environmental movements, enhanced Iza’s national and international reputation. Less than a year later, President Lasso had to end his term and called for early general elections. However, at that moment Iza´s radical wing of CONAIE also attempted to impose its agenda over Pachakutik and the Amazonian federation CONFENIAE, which proved to be a high-cost strategy. The internal conflicts that followed led, in 2025, to the most serious electoral defeats that both organizations had suffered in decades.
The 2023 general elections were marred by prison massacres and political assassinations, including that of presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio and the mayor of Manta, among numerous other government officials. Amid this unprecedented turmoil, a young center-right candidate, Daniel Noboa, emerged victorious as interim president. His win signaled yet another shift in Ecuador’s political landscape, with the country’s fragile democracy once again at the mercy of a personalist, plebiscitarian president.
The first warning sign of the current political turn to populist rule came with the 2025 regular election. The President’s party (Alianza Democrática Nacional, ADN) and the opposition party (Revolución Ciudadana, RC) totalled over 80 percent of National Assembly representatives. Noboa won his first five-year mandate. Pachakutik saw its representation shrink to five members, who the government rapidly coopted. Free from legislative checks, Noboa advanced his economic adjustment program. In addition, amid the ongoing public security crisis, Noboa expanded the military’s role in maintaining domestic order. Although assassinations have risen since 2023, militarization has strengthened Noboa’s control over organized violence, boosting political support for his government.
As part of its economic program, in September 2025, the Noboa administration raised diesel prices, a decision that in 2021 and 2022 sparked the wrath of CONAIE. But the leaders misjudged the lasting strength gained in 2021 and 2022, failing to account for damage from the 2023 and 2025 leadership races. As a result, they rushed to emulate the apparent successes of the past. This time, however, CONAIE was at its lowest point. Unable to coordinate a nationwide strike, organizations in the northern province of Imbabura were left to their fate. The indigenous peoples of Cotacachi, Ilumán, Peguche, and Otavalo sustained demonstrations for a month. Still, they paid a high price in lost lives, injured people, and detainees due to systematic and brutal repression at the hands of the Armed Forces and the Police. This time, the government did not back down; the solidarity of allied urban groups was, in this case, mostly symbolic and ineffective.
If CONAIE’s crisis should not be seen as the end of the indigenous movement, its significance cannot be overlooked. While grassroots mobilization once seemed effective, Noboa’s strong appeal and military support present new challenges. The aftermath of the national strike has called into question CONAIE’s representativeness and capacity to organize. An emboldened Noboa is now proposing a national plebiscite, in which he will likely be victorious, while Ecuador’s civil society appears weaker than ever. The challenges ahead are complex. The failed challenge to Noboa´s government could herald a new era of competitive authoritarianism, a scenario made even more likely by renewed international tolerance of hybrid forms of democracy. The lost battle left the indigenous organizations of Imbabura with wounds that could be challenging to heal, and racism lurks underneath the surface of Ecuador’s still young experiment with intercultural co-governance.
Pablo Andrade Andrade is Professor and Chair of the Germánico Salgado Lectures, Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar
*This post continues an ongoing series, as part of CLALS’s Ecuador Initiative, examining the country’s economic, governance, security, and societal challenges, made possible with generous support from Dr. Maria Donoso Clark, CAS/PhD ’91.
Venezuela on the Chopping Block because its super rich in Oil & Gas and other Commodities
Venezuela’s main problem is that it is fabulously rich not only in oil and gas but in a wide range of other precious commodities and the USA has always wanted to control not only those resources but all similar riches throughout the Americas at least since the time of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine. Although we […]
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Where to Stay Near Torres del Paine in Patagonia, Chile
When it comes to bucket list adventure destinations with amazing scenery, it’s hard to top the Torres del Paine region in Patagonia, Chile. I recently came back from the bottom of South America after spending nearly two weeks there and got a great overview. We have reviews of all the best luxury hotels in...
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The Movie “A House of Dynamite” and the Possibility of World War III
Just like Dr. Strangelove facetiously drew attention to the possibility of World War III back in the 60s, Netflix’s recently released “A House of Dynamite” does the same but more poignantly.
The film shows that in a quandary that could lead to nuclear war, there is no way to predict how things will play out. There are too many variables, and top leaders who are calling the shots are after all human beings. But more important, the arguments for and against pressing the button thrust people in unpredictable situations as unpredictable issues emerge. That means that the risk of a war, even when the facts are not on the table (in the movie no one knows whether Russia is behind the missile that is about to obliterate Chicago), the possibility of “suicide” (in the words of one of the key people) is all the greater.
All the key people in the movie who are influencing the final decision as to whether or not to strike Russia are intelligent and responsible in their own ways. Compare that to the current situation with the guy we now have in the White House surrounded by people like Hegseth and Marco Rubio. The situation is more precarious than ever before.
People should watch this movie and talk about it. Casual talk about the use of nuclear weapons has become the new normal. In that sense the situation today is even worse than at the height of the Cold War when everyone knew what was at stake. Trump’s recent announcement of resuming nuclear bomb testing didn’t provoke the reaction that it merited. Not many Democrats even talked about it. Gavin Newsom did, but half dismissed it as just tough guy talk. Russia has 4,309 nuclear warheads, the U.S. has 4,309, and China has about 600. That means that in spite of its insular geographical position, the United States is not safe in any sense.
The issue has to be raised by people on the ground, because the corporate media (beholden to the military industrial complex) certainly can’t be relied on to promote a serious conversation about the issue. It’s up to us, we the people, to do so.
On the U.S. – Argentina Currency Swap
By Dr. Susana Nudelsman
Central Bank of Argentina (Banco Central de la República Argentina)
(Source: Wikimedia Commons)
In October of this year, the United States Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent ratified the signing of a US$20 billion currency swap with the Central Bank of Argentina as part of an “economic stabilization agreement” (Buenos Aires Herald, 2025). Moreover, the U.S. Treasury announced it is working on a complementary US$20 billion credit line that would be provided by private-sector banks and sovereign wealth funds (La Nación, 2025).
According to the Argentine banking institution, this agreement seeks to contribute to the country’s macroeconomic stability, emphasizing the need to preserve price stability and promote sustainable economic growth. The swap operations will enable the Central Bank of Argentina “to expand its set of monetary and exchange rate policy instruments, including the liquidity of its international reserves”, in line with the regulatory functions outlined in its statutes. The agreement is an important factor of a far-reaching approach that aims to strengthen the country’s monetary policy and improve the Bank’s ability to cope with events of volatility in the foreign exchange and capital market (Central Bank of Argentina, 2025).
Why is Argentina interested in this agreement?
Peterson Institute Professor Maurice Obstfeld (2025) highlights Milei’s remarkable success in lowering inflation, achieving a federal budget surplus, and relaxing regulations. Prior to the present crisis, the IMF predicted that Argentina’s GDP would expand by 5.5 percent in 2025, after shrinking 1.3 percent in 2024. At the same time, the IMF’s initial assessment of April 2025 concluded that, with one exception, important objectives were met. Indeed, the country’s net foreign exchange reserves, which are primarily in US dollars, fell well short of their target level.
Harvard Professor Ricardo Hausmann (2025) explains that Argentina is trapped in a multiple equilibrium, that is, a situation in which given the same set of conditions, an economy can achieve two or more distinct and stable equilibrium outcomes. If investors are willing to lend money when they feel optimistic, this lowers interest rates helping the economy grow and keeping debt service low, thus confirming the initial expectations. Conversely, if investors become pessimistic, they demand high risk premiums, which causes interest rates to skyrocket, harming investment and making public debt more expensive, thus justifying their fear of a crisis.
For his part, the former Secretary of Finance of Argentina Daniel Marx (2025) underscores that the pre-election portfolio adjustment has been less complicated than in the past, which shows more credibility with banks and institutions. In this regard, financial support from the U.S. Treasury can be useful in creating a sequence that enables its orderly implementation. Hence, the funds obtained to cope with the ongoing problems could be used to address important unresolved issues rather than being used for other instances in which funds are being depleted in the short-term.
Why is the U.S. interested in this agreement?
As Brad Setser (2025), Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, argues, Washington has an interest in Milei’s success, not only because of his emphasis on stabilizing the Argentine economy, but also because his commitment to the free-market approach could serve as an important example for the rest of the continent.
However, U.S. interest in the swap agreement should also be understood in terms of the momentous change that the architecture of international financial relations has been experiencing in recent times. Indeed, following various decades of growing global economic integration, the planet is now confronting the threat of policy-driven geo-economic fragmentation.
In this context, Argentina matters for the strategic interest of the United States. Scott Bessent (2025) has emphatically stressed that the country is “a systemically important U.S. ally and that the U.S. Treasury stands ready to do what is needed within its mandate to support Argentina.” In other words, the Trump administration’s bailout resembles Mario Draghi’s support for European stability in 2012 with his “whatever it takes” approach, applied to the Argentine case in 2025.
Vera Bergengruen (2025), a journalist for The Wall Street Journal, believes that Washington’s security policy is a sort of revival of the Monroe doctrine. While the prior doctrine sought to keep European powers out of the region, the current one is primarily focused throughout the Americas with an aim to reward loyalty and to root out enemies. In this respect, Argentinian political analyst Juan Landaburu (2025) points out that in the context of a North American withdrawal from other regions, the so-called “backyard” of the United States is gaining greater importance, but this time not because of European ambitions but because of China’s advances.
REFERENCES
Bergengruen Vera, 2025, Trump’s ‘Donroe Doctrine’ Aims to Dominate the Americas, The Wall Street Journal, October 22, available at https://archive.is/20251023231723/https://www.wsj.com/world/americas/trumps-donroe-doctrine-aims-to-dominate-the-americas-b31208dd
Bessent Scott, 2025, Argentina is a systemically important U.S. ally in Latin America, and the @US Treasury stands ready to do what is needed within its mandate to support Argentina, available at https://x.com/SecScottBessent/status/1970107351912075454
Buenos Aires Herald, 2025, Scott Bessent confirms Argentina-US currency swap has been signed, available at https://buenosairesherald.com/economics/scott-bessent-confirms-argentina-us-currency-swap-has-been-signed
Central Bank of Argentina (Banco Central de la República Argentina), 2025, The BCRA and the U.S. Department of the Treasury sign a USD 20 billion agreement for exchange rate stabilization, available at https://www.bcra.gob.ar/Pdfs/Noticias/acuerdo-bcra-tesoro-estados-unidos-EN.pdf
Hausmann Ricardo, 2025, Trump Alone Can`t Save Argentina, New York Times, October 15, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/15/opinion/argentina-milei-trump-bailout.html
La Nación, 2025, Estados Unidos prepara otra ayuda para la Argentina con el sector privado por US 20000 millones, October 16, available at https://www.lanacion.com.ar/estados-unidos/eeuu-prepara-otra-ayuda-para-la-argentina-con-sector-privado-por-us20000-millones-nid16102025/
Landaburu Juan, 2025, Por qué Trump mira a América Latina más que nunca? La Nación, October 25, available at https://www.lanacion.com.ar/el-mundo/por-que-trump-mira-a-america-latina-mas-que-nunca-y-cuales-son-los-riesgos-detras-de-su-estrategia-nid25102025/
Marx Daniel, 2025, De pesos a dólares: esta vez es algo diferente, El Cronista Comercial, October 21, available at https://www.cronista.com/suscripciones/?limit=false&continue=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cronista.com%2Fcolumnistas%2Fde-pesos-a-dolares-esta-vez-es-algo-diferente%2F&kicker=Opini%C3%B3nExclusivo%20Members&title=De%20pesos%20a%20d%C3%B3lares%3A%20esta%20vez%20es%20algo%20diferente&summary=&image=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cronista.com%2Ffiles%2Fimage%2F1272%2F1272625%2F68f969cdb980d_600_315!.jpg%3Fs%3D0eec9030d86ead2043d767eb59f61bac%26d%3D1761176231
Obstfeld Maurice, 2025, Argentina’s Credibility Trap, Brookings Institution, available at https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economics/2025/argentinas-credibility-trap
Setser Brad, 2025, Will Trump’s $20 Billion Backing Help Milei Change Argentina’s Fortunes, available at https://www.cfr.org/article/will-trumps-20-billion-backing-help-milei-change-argentinas-fortunes
Susana Nudelsman is a Doctor in Economics focused on international political economy. Counselor at the Argentine Council for International Relations and visiting fellow at CLALS.
The Best Mexican Food Cities for Regional Cuisine
What are the best Mexico vacation spots for foodies? Where can you find the most interesting regional cuisine in this large country with such diverse geography and growing conditions? After traveling around the country since our founding 18 years ago, we’ve got some strong opinions on this subject. Here are our picks for the...
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Venezuela deploys troops @ coastline amid US military buildup in Caribbean
The Venezuelan defense minister says the armed forces are maintaining a full deployment along the country’s coastline as the USA steps up military buildup in the Caribbean. Vladimir Padrino Lopez made the remarks on Thursday, saying Venezuela’s army is seeking to achieve the optimal point of coordination and readiness to respond to the US actions […]
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Vicissitudes of Global Inequality
By Dr. Susana Nudelsman
Global inequality is composed of two components: between-country inequality and within-country inequality. The between-country component assesses disparities in per capita gross domestic product between countries, either as an unweighted measure where each country counts equally, or as a weighted measure in which each country is weighted by its population, the latter being the methodology applied by most empirical studies. The within-country component adds up to the calculation of the disparities within countries (Neckerman and Torche, 2007).
Today, global inequality is greater than it was 200 years ago, but at the same time, it has stopped increasing for the first time since the Industrial Revolution. This downward trend has been driven by a reduction in inequality between countries—the main driving force of global income disparities—and should not be surprising, as growth rates in low-income Asian countries, especially China, significantly outpaced the global average. However, within countries, inequality has tended to increase. The pandemic led to a rise in global inequality, while for the following years, the data show a return to the downward trend, albeit at a slow pace and with differences across countries (Milanovic, 2019; World Inequality Report, 2022).
In particular, global inequality in the final quarter of the 20th century shows substantial changes. A rising global middle class in Asian countries — mainly China—, the establishment of a real plutocratic elite, and the steady income levels of the lower middle classes in wealthier countries are changing global economic, social, and political dynamics. In relative terms, the emerging global middle class has emerged as the primary “winner” of globalization; however, in absolute terms, the wealthiest and ultra-wealthy individuals have reaped the biggest rewards, while the poorest groups have received only a minimal share of the global wealth.
Regarding within-country inequality, three primary factors have influenced its development: technology, globalization, and politics. As a result, inequality in the most advanced Western economies, particularly the United States, includes the growing share of capital in the national pie, the high concentration of capital ownership, the higher return on assets of the richest, the rising correlation of high capital and labor incomes in the same people, the rising mating among people of similar incomes, the greater intergenerational transmission of disparities and the strong control of the political process by those at the top who wield increasing power in a move towards plutocracy (Milanovic, 2019).
In this framework, the traditional political economy inquiry regarding the division between capital and labor in global income reveals a decline for the latter (Piketty, 2014), which has also been influenced by the race between technology and education (Goldin and Katz, 2008).
In China, the share of private capital earnings has increased in the context of a growing privatization process led by capitalist-business sectors and the professionals of the new middle class, who also, through their savings, significantly enhanced their status. The political structure in terms of bureaucratic effectiveness, absence of the rule of law, and state autonomy has, in contrast with Western experience, overshadowed the influence of the emerging capitalist class pandemic (Milanovic, 2019).
Regarding between-country inequality, the population-weighted measure indicates a decline since the late 1970s. Given that this measure represents the bulk of global inequality, changes in between-country inequality allow us to capture changes in the total quite accurately. Nevertheless, income gaps between countries persist today (World Inequality Lab, 2024).
China’s growth performance, and to a lesser degree India’s, has been a crucial equalizing element in driving this decline. Curiously, the swift economic expansion of this country is related to its idiosyncratic policymaking that clearly reveals a rejection of the principles of neoliberalism in its domestic policies, combined with its acceptance in its international economic interactions. And that sets China apart from numerous other developed and developing countries that adopted both the domestic and international aspects of globalization with great seriousness (Maddison, 2006; Hung and Kucinskas, 2011).
While the pandemic caused the most significant rise in global income inequality in over thirty years, the trajectory of global inequality largely depends on the growth of incomes in different regions worldwide. If the trends of the past thirty years persist, inequality could rise as the growth in those countries that helped reduce inequality now leads to greater inequality, as they occupy the higher tiers of the global income distribution. However, if less affluent countries today expand more rapidly than their wealthier counterparts, worldwide inequality might keep declining (García Rojas et al., 2025).
References
Garcia Rojas Diana C., Nishant Yonzan and Christoph Lakner, 2025, Global Inequality and Economic Growth The Three Decades before Covid-19 and Three Decades After, Policy Research Working Paper 11093, World Bank Group.
Goldin Claudia and Lawrence F. Katz, 2008, The Race between Education and Technology. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Hung, Ho-F. and Jaime Kucinskas, 2011, Globalization and Global Inequality: Assessing the Impact of the Rise of China and India, 1980-2005, American Journal of Sociology, 116 (5).
Milanovic Branko 2019, Capitalism Alone, The Belknap Press of Harvard University.
Neckerman, Kathryn M. and Florencia Torche, 2007, Inequality: Causes and Consequences, Annual Review of Sociology, 33.
Piketty Thomas, 2014, Capital in the Twenty First Century, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
World Inequality Lab Activity Report, 2024, World Inequality Lab, available at https://wid.world/www-site/uploads/2025/03/WIL-Activity-Report-2024.pdf
Susana Nudelsman is a Doctor in Economics focused on international political economy. Counselor at the Argentine Council for International Relations and visiting fellow at CLALS.
Nicaragua, the “Republic of Poets” has become a “Republic of Clandestine Poets.”
Nicaragua, the “Republic of Poets” has become a “Republic of Clandestine Poets.”
One of the martyred heroes of the Sandinista revolution is Leonel Rugama, the young poet who died in combat at the age of 20. His poem "The Earth is a satellite of the Moon " has been considered by critics as one of the most widely distributed poems in Latin American poetry. It was a poet, Rigoberto Lopez Perez, who assassinated the first Somoza, at a ball in 1956, and was himself beaten and shot to death on the dance floor.
Nicaraguan newspapers used to feature literary supplements filled with poems from both luminaries and unknowns. Leading poets could be spotted, like movie stars, in certain cafes in the cities. In the university town of Leon, busts of Nicaraguan poets and plaques with quotations from their work fill the “Park of Poets,” while the main street, Calle Ruben Dario, is named for the country’s preeminent poet.
Ruben Dario, the poet and writer of Nicaragua is the most well-known in the world. He is considered as the father of the Modernist Movement in Spanish literature in the twentieth century. His book Azul (1888) is said to be the inaugural book of Hispanic-American modernism. He was a precocious poet and published his poem in a newspaper at the age of thirteen.
President Daniel Ortega is a poet, as is his wife, Rosario Murillo. When Ortega was a political prisoner from 1968 (at the age of 23) to 1974 during the dictatorship of Somoza, he wrote many poems, including the famous one titled “I never saw Managua when miniskirts were in fashion.” While in jail he received visits from Rosario Murillo, a poet. The prisoner and visitor fell in love; Murillo became Ortega's wife. She has published several books of poems. One of them is called as ¨Amar es combatir ¨- to love is to combat.
After the overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship in 1979, the victorious Sandinistas named one of the country’s most famous poets, Ernesto Cardenal, as minister of culture. He brought poets to all corners of the country to teach people to read and write poetry at a time when Nicaragua suffered a 70 to 95 percent illiteracy rate. It is still possible in villages to find people who are unable to read or write but can recite Dario’s poetry by heart. Poetry was used as a tool for political literacy, consolidating the country as a "Republic of Poets.”
Some of the ministers in the initial years of President Ortega's cabinet were poets and writers. Notable among these is Sergio Ramirez, Gioconda Belli and Ernesto Cardinal.
Since his reelection as President in 2007, Daniel Ortega has become authoritarian and has rigged the elections and the constitution to continue as president indefinitely. His wife Rosario Murillo has now become the Co-President after having been Vice-President for some years. The couple have betrayed the noble ideals of the Sandinista revolution and have created a corrupt family dictatorship, similiar to the Somoza dynastic dictatorship which had ruled for 42 years. Most of the writers and intellectuals who had nurtured the revolution eventually left the Sandinista party and started fighting against the dictatorial regime. They used poetry to fight back, just like they did during the revolutionary era against the Somoza dictatorship. The Ortegas have suppressed dissent and persecuted poets, intellectuals and journalists besides political leaders who resisted their dictatorship. The regime has imprisoned or exiled some of the dissidents, stripped their citizenship and even seized their assets and houses. The regime has become harsher after the large scale public protests in 2018. Many exiled poets and writes live in Costa Rica and Spain. The exiled poets include Sergio Ramírez, Gioconda Belli and Freddy Quezada. The regime has shut down thousands of NGOs and independent media outlets, including PEN Nicaragua and the Nicaraguan Academy of Language. One of the hardest blows to Nicaraguan literary culture came in 2022 with the cancellation of the Granada International Poetry Festival, created in 2005, which once brought together more than 1,200 poets from 120 countries. The regime revoked the legal status of the NGO that funded it, leading to its cancellation.
While accepting the Cervantes Prize for literature in April 2018, Ramírez dedicated his award to the young people then protesting Ortega’s government and to the memory of Nicaraguans who had recently “been murdered on the streets after demanding justice and democracy.”
The Ortega-Murillo dictatorship has driven the poetry underground. The poets hide themselves and their poems from the repressive regime which has been ruthlessly censoring literature and news. The poets write clandestinely expressing their frustration and resistance. The "Republic of Poets" has now become the "Republic of Clandestine Poets".
Crooked plow- Brazilian novel by Itamar Vieira Junior
Itamar Vieira is a young and upcoming Brazilian writer. Crooked Plow (Torto Arado) is his first novel. He has earlier written a short story collection.
"Small Earthquakes: A Journey Through Lost British History in South America” - book by Shafik Meghji
While the Spanish and Portuguese colonized Latin America, the British have played a significant role in slavery, wars of independence, politics, lending, investment, railways and football in the region. These have been brought out by the author of the book who has done extensive research and travelled through the South American countries which had been impacted by the British.
The Brazilian Supreme Court has done what its U.S. counterpart has tragically failed to do
The Brazilian Supreme Court has convicted (on 11 September) and sentenced ex-President Bolsonaro for his crimes of coup attempt, plot to assassinate political and judicial leaders and incitement of mobs to destroy the buildings of the Supreme Court, the Presidential palace, and the Congress, after he lost the elections in 2022. The court also sentenced seven other military and political accomplices of Bolsonaro. Earlier, the court had convicted more than 600 far right extremist followers of Bolsonaro who had vandalized the iconic government buildings of Brasila.
Bolsonaro has ignited a new gun culture in Brazil. His three politician sons have been fierce proponents of expanding gun ownership through policy proposals and social media posts. Eduardo Bolsonaro has spoken admiringly of the Second Amendment in the United States. He has lobbied to make the Brazilian market more attractive to foreign arms manufacturers, which he said would lower prices and provide gun buyers with more choices. Flávio Bolsonaro, a senator, made the promotion of gun manufacturing in Brazil the focus of his first project in the legislature. During his presidency, Bolsonaro had loosened gun control to make more firearms available easily to more of his followers. Gun ownership rocketed by 98% during Bolsonaro’s first year as President. Weapons newly available to the public now included semi-automatic rifles, previously only available to the army. In April 2020, Bolsonaro revoked decrees that existed to facilitate the tracing and identification of weapons and ammunition. One week later, he tripled the quantity of ammunition available for purchase by civilians, saying on record in a ministerial meeting, that he wanted “everyone” to carry guns.. Bolsonaro's signature favorite pose is gun shooting gesture. Bolsonaro reaffirmed in his inaugural speech, “Good citizens deserve the means to defend themselves through gun ownership”. His supporters in the Congress cheered and applauded him by pointing their fingers in the shape of a gun.
Apocalypse in the Tropics - Brazilian documentary film
This film, released in Netflix recently, has come at the right time when Bolsonaro is on trial for his apocalyptic attempts to overthrow the elected government of President Lula and assassinate political leaders and and judges in 2023.
The Marxist school of Dependency Theory - An interview with Professor Jaime Osorio
Our present, however, is one of spiraling crises. Since the financial crash of 2008, the economic crisis converges with ecological collapse and the exhaustion of liberal democratic forms, reaching civilizational dimensions. In this context, the pandemic laid bare how, instead of disappearing, the divide between the center and periphery of the world system is as sharp and as meaningful as ever.
With neoliberal hegemony fractured, other ways of thinking and practicing politics have reemerged from their intellectual exiles. Among these, dependency theory stands out as an original and revolutionary contribution of Latin American critical thought, offering tools for understanding uneven capitalist development and imperialism both historically and today. For an introduction to this unique framework, we turn to Dr. Jaime Osorio.
When a military coup d’état in Chile overthrew the democratically elected government of Salvador Allende on September 11, 1973, Osorio had already been accepted to begin his doctoral studies at the University of Chile’s Center for Socio-Economic Studies (CESO, in Spanish). The dictatorship’s advance brought him instead to Mexico, where today he ranks as Distinguished Professor at the Autonomous Metropolitan University (UAM) in Xochimilico and as Researcher Emeritus by the National Council of Science and Technology (CONACYT). He is the author of many books, including Fundamentos del análsis social. La realidad social y su conocimiento and Sistema mundial. Intercambio Desigual y renta de la tierra.
In this interview, Osorio speaks with Jacobin contributing editor Hilary Goodfriend about the Marxist school of dependency theory, its origins and principles, and its present-day applications.
Dependency theory and its Marxist strain emerged from debates and dialogues about development, underdevelopment, and imperialism in the context of decolonization and the national liberation struggles of the twentieth century. What were the main positions and strategies in dispute, and how did Marxist dependency theorists position themselves in these arguments?
At the theoretical level, Marxist dependency theory [TMD, in Spanish] is the result of the Cuban Revolution’s victory in 1959. Latin American Marxism was moved by the island’s gesture. All the main theses about the nature of Latin American societies and the character of revolution came into question.
A little over a decade after that event, which sharpened the debates, TMD reached maturity. In those years, some of the proposals that fed theories of dependency emphasized the role of trade relations, such as the “deterioration of the terms of trade” thesis put forward by the [Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean] CEPAL, which referred to the cheapening of primary goods against the rising prices of industrial products in the world market.
Orthodox Marxists highlighted the presence of internal “obstacles” that impeded development, like idle terrain in the hands of landowners, which also blocked the expansion of wage relations. Generally, in these proposals, capitalism wasn’t to blame. In fact, it was necessary to accelerate its spread so that its inherent contradictions would heighten. Only then could a socialist revolution be proposed, according to this stage-based perspective prevalent in the Communist Parties.
For the Cepalinos, their horizon was achieving advanced capitalism, which would be possible by means of a process of industrialization. This would allow the region to cease exporting primary goods and food products and importing secondary goods, which would now be produced internally, sparking technological development and stemming the outflow of resources.
In both proposals, the industrial bourgeoisie had a positive role to play, be it in the medium or long term.
For Marxist dependency theory, the region’s so-called economic “backwardness” was a result of the formation and expansion of the capitalist world system, whose course produced development and underdevelopment simultaneously. Therefore, these divergent economic histories are not independent processes, nor are they connected tangentially. From this perspective, the fundamental theoretical and historical problem required explaining the processes that generated both development and underdevelopment in the same movement.
This problem demanded, furthermore, a response that accounted for how this process is reproduced over time since civilization and barbarism are constantly made anew by the world system.
Many of the acclaimed Marxist dependency theorists—Ruy Mauro Marini, Theotonio Dos Santos, Vania Bambirra—share a trajectory of flight from South American dictatorships and exile in Mexico. You were also subject to this forced displacement. How did these experiences of revolution and counterrevolution influence the construction of TMD?
Four names stand out in the development of TMD: André Gunder Fank, Theotonio Dos Santos, Vania Vambirra, and Ruy Mauro Marini. The first was a German-U.S. economist and the other three Brazilians, who shared readings and discussions in Brazil before the 1964 coup in that country. Subsequently, they found each other in Chile in the late 1960s in the Center for Socio-Economic Studies, until the military coup of 1973. During this period—at least in the case of the Brazilians—they produced their principals works with regards to TMD. I had the fortune of meeting and working with Marini in Mexico in the mid-1970s, before his return to Brazil.
TMD offers no concessions to the local ruling classes, holding them responsible for the prevailing conditions in which they manage to reap enormous profits in collusion with international capitals, despite [international] value transfers. For this reason, it was hard for these theorists to find spaces for their knowledge in the academic world.
The 1973 military coup in Chile meant that the principal creators of TMD appeared on the search lists of the military forces and their intelligence apparatus. And this coup in Chile, which was preceded by the coup in Brazil in 1964, was followed by many more in the Southern part of the continent, which dispersed and disbanded working groups and closed important spaces in those societies.
At the same time, this long counterrevolutionary phase, which was not limited to military governments, favored sweeping transformations in the social sciences, where neoliberal theories and methodological individualism came to reign supreme. TMD emerged in an exceptional period of recent history. However, subsequently and in general—saving certain moments and countries in the region—ideal conditions for its development and dissemination have not existed.
In his classic work, The Dialectics of Dependency, Marini defines dependency as a “relation of subordination between formally independent nations, in whose framework the relations of production of the subordinate nation are modified or recreated in order to ensure the expanded production of dependency.” What are the mechanisms of this expanded production, and how have they changed since Marini formulated his proposal in the 1970s?
When we talk about the processes generated by dependent capitalism, the “dependent” qualifier isn’t redundant. We’re talking about another way of being capitalist. That is to say that in the world system, diverse forms of capitalism coexist and are integrated, and they feed off each other and deepen their particular forms within the global unity of capital.
The heterogeneity of the system can be explained, then, not by the backwardness of some economies, not as prior states [of development], not as deficiencies. Each constitutes its full, mature form of capitalism possible in this system.
In this way, with the stroke of a pen, TMD destroyed the hopes of the developmentalists, who supposed that the dependent economies could achieve higher states of welfare and development within this order constituted by capital. For them, it was just a matter of taking advantage of windows that regularly open. There is nothing in the prevailing dynamic to suggest that things are moving in that direction. To the contrary, what is produced and continues to emerge is the “development of underdevelopment,” so long as capitalist social relations prevail.
The gap between underdeveloped and developed capitalism, or between imperialist and dependent capitalism is ever widening. Dependency deepens and more acute modalities are generated. In a world in which digital capitalism is gaining ground—the internet of things, artificial intelligence, robotics, as an example—this isn’t hard to understand.
Experiences like that of South Korea can’t be repeated at will. They are, instead, exceptions to the rule. Why did the IMF cut off and suffocate the Argentine economy and not extend its hand like imperialist capital did for South Korea after the 1952 war on the peninsula? It was the latter’s exceptional position in a strategic space, which was disrupted by the triumph of Mao’s revolution in China and the need to construct a barrier to prevent the expansion of socialism in Korea, that turned on the faucet of enormous resources, at least for Japan and the United States, and put blinders on those defenders of democracy and the free market when South Korea was governed by a succession of military dictatorships that ferociously applied state intervention, not the free market, to define plans and programs to define priorities for investment and loans.
Today, all a government in the dependent world has to do is establish some rules for foreign capital, and the whole clamor and propaganda of transnational media demand that communism be stopped, impeding international loans, blocking access to markets, and seeking to suffocate those alleged subversives.
The concept of superexploitation as a mechanism by which dependent capitalists compensate for their subordinate insertion in the international division of labor is perhaps Marini’s most original and polemic proposal. Some Marxists, for example, protest the possibility of the systematic violation of the law of value. This is a theme that you take up in your debate with the Argentinian researcher Claudio Katz. How do you define superexploitation, and why, or in what terms, do you defend its validity today?
With Marini’s short book, The Dialectics of Dependency, whose central body was written in 1972 and would be published in 1973, TMD reaches its point of greatest maturity. We can synthesize the nucleus of Marini’s thesis in the question: How is the reproduction of a capitalism that regularly transfers value to imperialist economies possible?
It’s possible because in dependent capitalism, a particular form of exploitation is imposed which means that capital isn’t just appropriating surplus value, but also part of workers’ consumption fund, which ought to correspond to their salaries, in order to transfer it to their accumulation fund. That’s what the category of superexploitation accounts for. If all capital eventually ends up being unpaid labor, in dependent capitalism, all capital is unpaid labor and the appropriated life fund [of the working class].
Marini’s response is theoretically and politically brilliant, because it allows us to explain the reasons for the multiplication of misery and the devastation of the workers in the dependent world, but also the reasons for which capital is unable to establish stable forms of domination in these regions, regularly expelling huge contingents of workers from its civilizational promises, thrusting them into barbarism and converting them into contingents that resist, revolt, and rise up against the projects of the powerful.
Superexploitation has consequences at all levels of Latin American societies. For now, we can emphasize that it accompanies the formation of economies oriented to foreign markets. Following the processes of independence in the nineteenth century, and under the guidance of local capitals, the region’s economies advanced on the basis of exports, initially of primary materials and foodstuffs, to which we can add, recently, the production and assembly of luxury industrial goods like cars, televisions, state-of-the-art cell phones—products equally distant from the general consumption needs of most of the working population. This is compatible with the dominant modality of exploitation, which seriously impacts salaries, reducing workers’ consumption power and reducing their participation in the formation of a dynamic internal market.
It’s relevant here to consider a significant difference with capitalism in the developed world. There, as capitalism advanced in the nineteenth century, it faced the dilemma that in order to keep expanding, which implied the multiplication of the mass of goods and products, it would need to incorporate workers into consumption. That was achieved by paying salaries with the purchasing power for basic goods such as clothing, shoes, utensils, and home furnishings. This balance was accomplished by introducing improved production techniques, which reduced the pressure to extend the working day by multiplying the mass of products thrown into the market. From there, we can understand the weight of relative surplus value in developed capitalism.
But in Latin America, things worked differently. Nineteenth-century capitalism didn’t see the need to create markets, because they had been available since the colonial period in the imperialist centers. In addition, English capitalism’s takeoff increased the demand for primary materials and foodstuffs. For this reason, there wasn’t any hurry to change the kind of use values and products put on the market. They continued to be foodstuffs and primary goods. In this way, the emergent capitalism in our region was under no pressure to do something qualitatively different. The mass of salaried laborers expanded, but they don’t comprise the principal demand for the goods being produced, which was in Europe, the United States, and Asia.
Through their insertion in the world market and when it comes time to sell products, Latin American economies transfer value [abroad] for the simple reason that the capitals that operate here have lower compositions and productivities than the capitals in economies that spend more on new machinery, equipment, and technology, allowing them greater productivity and the ability to appropriate value created in other parts of the world. This process is called unequal exchange.
It's important to note that unequal exchange occurs in the market, at the moment of the purchase and sale of commodities. Apart from their low organic composition, this concept doesn’t tell us much about how these commodities were produced, and above all, what allows for a capitalist process to be reproduced over time in such conditions. That’s where super-exploitation comes in.
That is the secret that makes dependent capitalism viable. And this calls all the more attention to the errors of people like Claudio Katz, who have formulated proposals that try to eliminate this concept and do so, furthermore, with grotesque arguments, like that Marx never mentioned it in Capital – he refers to [superexploitaiton] many times, in a variety of ways – because that would imply a dilution or a direct attack on his theoretical proposition since capitalism can’t annihilate its workforce.
I’m not going to repeat those debates with Katz. I will simply reiterate that Marx’s Capital is a book that is central to the study of capitalism and its contradictions. But no one can claim that it accounts for everything, or that capitalism, in its spread over time, can’t exhibit theoretical or historical novelties of any kind. That is a religious reading, but Capital is not a sacred text. Such a position, furthermore, is an attack on a central dimension of Marxism as a theory able to explain not only what has existed, but also that which is new. For this reason, the only orthodoxy Marxism can claim is its mode of reflection.
It's also argued that the spread of superexploitation to the central economies following globalized neoliberal restructuring invalidates its character as a process unique to dependent capitalism.
Superexploitation can be present anywhere that capital operates, be that in the developed or underdeveloped world, just like forms of relative surplus value and absolute surplus value. Of course, there is superexploitation in Brazil and Guatemala, just as there is in Germany and South Korea.
But that’s not the problem. What’s relevant is to elucidate the weight of these forms of exploitation, which can be present in any capitalist space, in capital’s reproduction. So the central issue is different, and so are the economic, social, and political consequences.
Setting aside periods of crisis, when the most brutal forms of exploitation can be exacerbated everywhere, can capitalism operate in the medium and long term without a market that generates salaries, or with extremely low salaries? Something like if, in Germany, the average salary of the Armenians and Turks was generalized for the entire working population, or if the salaries of Mexican and Central American workers in the United States were predominant there. I don’t think so.
Finally, what tools or perspectives does Marxist dependency theory offer us in the face of today’s crises?
In its eagerness to deal with the acute and prolonged capitalist crisis, capital in every region seeks to accentuate forms of exploitation, including superexploitation. It seeks, once again, to reduce rights and benefits. With the war in Ukraine, it has found a good excuse to justify the increase in the price of food, housing, and energy, and its shameless return to the use of fuels that intensify pollution and environmental barbarism, as well as the increase in military budgets at the expense of wages and jobs.
The great imperial powers expect the subordination of economies and states to their decisions in periods of this sort. But the current crisis is also accelerating the crisis of hegemony in the world system, which opens spaces for greater degrees of autonomy—which does not put an end to dependency. This is evident in Washington’s difficulties with disciplining the Latin American and African states to support their position in the conflict in Europe.
The scenario in Latin America over the last few decades reveals processes of enormous interest. We have witnessed significant popular mobilization in almost every country in the region, questioning various aspects of the neoliberal tsunami, be it jobs, salaries, retirements, healthcare and education, as well as rights like abortion, recognition of gender identities, lands, water, and much more.
On this deeply fractured terrain that capital generates in the dependent world, class disputes tend to intensify. This explains the regular social and political outbursts in our societies. It’s the result of the barbarity that capitalism imposes on regions like ours.
One expression of this social force is manifested in the electoral terrain. But just as quickly as there have been victories, there have been defeats. These comings and goings can be naturalized, but why haven’t the victories allowed for lasting processes of change?
Of course, this is not to deny that there have been violent coups of a new sort that have managed to unseat governments. But even then, there were already signs of exhaustion that limited the protests, with the clear exception of Bolivia. There is an enormous gap between the leftist voter and the person who occasionally votes for left projects. The neoliberal triumph was not only in the economic policies and transformations it achieved, but also in its installment of a vision and interpretation of the world, its problems, and its solutions.
The struggle against neoliberalism today involves dismantling privatization of every kind and putting a stop to the conversion of social services and policies into private businesses. That means taking on the most economic and politically powerful sectors of capital, with control over state institutions where legislators, judges, and military members operate, together with the main media, schools, and churches. We can add that these are the sectors of capital with the strongest ties to imperialist capitals and their assemblage of supranational institutions, media, and states.
It's a powerful social bloc. It’s hard to think about attacking it without having to attack capitalism itself.
Chile: ensaio sobre uma derrota histórica
No dia 4 de setembro de 1970, o povo chileno foi às urnas para eleger Salvador Allende presidente da República. A vitória do socialista foi apertada, mas ainda assim referendada pelo Congresso, apesar das tentativas de golpe que já rondavam. Mil dias depois da sua posse, numa terça-feira, 11 de setembro de 1973, o presidente Allende despertou apreensivo com os rumores de traição militar, mas ainda assim determinado a um objetivo: anunciar um plebiscito popular sobre a necessidade de uma Nova Constituição, que superasse os limites da carta vigente desde 1925. Esta, por sua vez, havia sido escrita por uma cúpula de supostos “especialistas” no governo de Arturo Alessandri, latifundiário conhecido como “el León de Tarapacá”. A velha Constituição bloqueava o programa revolucionário da Unidade Popular, ao assegurar os privilégios e poderes da classe proprietária. E Allende era, como se sabe, um sério respeitador das leis.
Foi para evitar que Allende convocasse o plebiscito popular para uma Nova Constituição (análogo ao que os chilenos de hoje chamaram de “plebiscito de entrada”) que os comandantes militares anteciparam o golpe de 1973, ordenando o bombardeio ao Palácio de La Moneda dois dias antes do planejado. Foram informados das intenções presidenciais por Pinochet, chefe das Forças Armadas para quem, no domingo anterior, Allende havia confidenciado o anúncio do plebiscito em uma conversa privada na chácara de El Cañaveral.2
O plebiscito da Nova Constituição nunca foi anunciado. Allende morreu, a Unidade Popular foi massacrada. E a ideia allendista de um itinerário popular constituinte foi soterrada pela repressão. A isso seguiu-se a ditadura com quase 4 mil chilenos mortos e desaparecidos, com 38 mil presos e torturados e também com a constituição de 1980, escrita por Jaime Guzmán, Sérgio de Castro e outros homens da elite ditatorial. A carta teve a habilidade de projetar o “pinochetismo sem Pinochet”, fundando o Estado subsidiário e sua blindagem neoliberal que, por sua vez, foi perpetuada pelo pacto transicional de 1989, avançando por 30 anos de democracia. As décadas de 2000 e 2010 foram de crescente luta social contra a constituição pinochetista - culminando com a revolta de 2019 e o tardio colapso total da sua legitimidade.
Retomar esse percurso é importante para que se possa dimensionar o impacto histórico e simbólico do plebiscito de saída da Nova Constituição chilena ocorrido em 4 de setembro de 2022, cuja ampla escolha pelo rechazo ainda causa perplexidade e tristeza no movimento apruebista. Era enorme a carga de simbolismo histórico presente nesse plebiscito, a começar pela sua data: o atual itinerário constituinte estava desenhado para exorcizar Pinochet no aniversário de 52 anos do triunfo eleitoral de Allende.
Se supunha que a Nova Constituição (NC), escrita de junho de 2021 a junho de 2022, era a mais genuína representação dos anseios populares, a primeira a escutar verdadeiramente as profundas demandas sociais desde o bombardeio de 11 de setembro. Mas não era. Dessa vez não foi um golpe militar que derrotou o horizonte de igualdade, diversidade, solidariedade e justiça plasmadas na nova carta, mas sim o próprio voto popular, em um enredo que, por isso mesmo, ganhou ares trágicos. Afinal, foi justamente aquele povo excluído e esquecido, invisibilizado e maltratado pelo Estado/mercado, o povo que a Convenção Constitucional acreditava representar de maneira profunda e inédita, que manifestou seu desagravo e gerou uma crise de legitimidade dos mecanismos democráticos mais inovadores do nosso continente.
Como explicar a crise de representatividade do organismo supostamente mais representativo da história chilena?
Voto popular contra a Nova Constituição por classe e território
A Nova Constituição chilena foi escrita por uma Convenção Constitucional (CC) eleita em maio de 2021, com voto facultativo de 6,1 milhões de eleitores (41% de participação). De maneira inédita, a CC foi composta por 50% de mulheres (lei 21.216)3 e 11% de povos indígenas (lei 21.298)4, e elegeu 32% de convencionales independentes,5 sendo considerada um organismo da mais alta representatividade popular. Apesar do polêmico quórum de ⅔ para aprovação das normas constitucionais e da tensão constante entre movimentos populares e instituições, a crítica avassaladora que a revolta de 2019 produziu às classes políticas tradicionais se materializou em um organismo constitucional com rostos novos, formado por dezenas de “pessoas comuns”, ativistas e lideranças populares. A CC mostrou a possibilidade de alteração rápida e radical da casta política, ao ser muito diversa do congresso nacional e dos profissionais de partidos que comandaram o “duopólio” das três décadas de democracia no Chile.
O resultado foi um texto constitucional atrelado às lutas dos movimentos sociais e aos valores da solidariedade social opostos ao neoliberalismo, um dos documentos mais avançados em direitos sociais e promoção da diversidade dos nossos tempos.
Em poucas palavras, eu diria que cinco eixos caracterizavam a Nova Constituição chilena como uma das mais progressistas do mundo:
A plurinacionalidade intercultural, a representatividade política e o direito à autodeterminação dos povos indígenas, preservando-se a unidade do Estado chileno, conceito inspirado pelo novo constitucionalismo latino-americano inaugurado por Equador (2007) e Bolívia (2009);
Os direitos da natureza e os freios à sua mercantilização, recuperando por exemplo o direito universal de acesso à água e suplantando o Código de Águas da ditadura, sendo a primeira constituição do mundo a reconhecer a crise climática como emergência global e nacional;
Os direitos sociais de caráter universal, como a educação gratuita, a saúde pública integral, a aposentadoria solidária, pública e tripartite, a moradia e o trabalho dignos (incluindo o direito universal à greve inexistente hoje), bem como o direito à cultura, ao esporte, a ciência e ao tempo livre;
Os direitos reprodutivos, econômicos e políticos das mulheres em sentido transversal, assegurando reconhecimento da economia do cuidado e do trabalho doméstico, o combate à violência de gênero e a paridade em todos os organismos oficiais, bem como uma perspectiva feminista no sistema de justiça e uma educação não sexista;
A descentralização do Estado como forma de aprofundar a democracia, garantindo maior orçamento e atribuições às comunas, províncias e regiões, bem como criando organismos de poder popular vinculantes na formulação de políticas públicas locais e nacionais.
Apesar da NC responder à maioria das demandas populares levantadas na revolta de 2019 e nas mobilizações das décadas anteriores, algo na Convenção Constitucional falhou para que o resultado desse grande esforço tenha sido tão amplamente derrotado. Se por um lado foi evidente o peso das fake news e o volumoso aporte financeiro das elites chilenas na campanha do Rechazo, que recebeu quatro vezes mais dinheiro que a campanha do Apruebo,6 também é importante reconhecer que havia pontos cegos e fraturas na comunicação entre representantes constituintes e as maiorias chilenas. Do contrário, a campanha de desinformação das direitas contra a nova carta não encontraria terreno tão fértil para se disseminar e prosperar.
Chegou-se ao seguinte paradoxo: o voto popular matou o projeto político mais democrático da história do Chile. O mesmo voto popular que desbancou as elites políticas tradicionais, rejeitou o suposto “amadorismo” dos convencionales, e com isso entregou o bastão da condução política constituinte novamente para o congresso.
O voto obrigatório no plebiscito de saída foi certamente um dos principais fatores para essa guinada. Diferentemente do plebiscito de entrada em outubro de 2020, com voto facultativo de 7,5 milhões de chilenos (50% de participação); da eleição dos convencionales em maio de 2021, com voto facultativo de 6,1 milhões de chilenos (41%); e do 2o turno das eleições presidenciais que deram vitória à coligação “Apruebo Dignidad” com voto facultativo de 8,3 milhões de chilenos (55,7%), o plebiscito de saída teve voto obrigatório com multa de 180 mil pesos (aproximadamente mil reais) para quem não comparecesse às urnas. A obrigatoriedade punitiva do voto com essa altíssima multa, em um contexto de desemprego, inflação e carestia, deu origem a uma mudança de perfil do eleitor que escapou à percepção dos apruebistas. Além de inédita, a participação de 13 milhões de chilenos (86%) no plebiscito de saída forçou a manifestação de mais de 5 milhões de absenteístas históricos, possivelmente o setor menos interessado em política da sociedade e os mais ausentes nas eleições da última década. Não é nada desprezível o fato de que o plebiscito de saída tenha contado com mais que o dobro (216%) do total de votantes das eleições para os representantes convencionales.
Este é um dos elementos explicativos mais importantes de tamanha quebra de expectativas e da guinada política entre eleições tão próximas. A NC foi rechaçada por 7,8 milhões de chilenos (61,8%) contra 4,8 milhões de apruebistas (38,1%). Os votos contrários de Rechazo no plebiscito, sozinhos, somaram mais do que o total de votantes no pleito que elegeu os convencionales. Em números absolutos, o quórum de 4 de setembro de 2022 foi o maior de toda a história chilena.
Tais números absolutos devem nos conduzir a uma análise dos votos por classes sociais e territórios, como alertou o historiador Sérgio Grez.7 Ao segmentar o total de comunas em quatro estratos de renda, o quintil que reúne as comunas mais pobres do país apresentou uma média de 75% rechazo, expressivamente maior que o resultado nacional. As comunas com renda média-baixa rechaçaram o texto em 71%; as média-altas o rechaçaram em 64%; e o quintil de maior renda o rechaçou em 60%. Quanto mais pobres as comunas, mais avassalador foi o rechaço.
Em Colchane, por exemplo, a comuna de Tarapacá com mais altos índices de pobreza (24%)8 e que enfrentou a fase mais aguda da crise migratória do Norte, o rechaço obteve 94%. Ao mesmo tempo, províncias com maiores índices de população indígena também demonstraram altos níveis de rechaço, ao contrário do que se poderia imaginar. Foram as regiões de fronteira indígena - Ñuble (74%), Araucanía (73%), Maule (71%) e Biobio (69%)9 - que obtiveram os maiores níveis de rechaço em comparação à média nacional. Já as regiões com maior aceitação da NC - a Região Metropolitana (RM) e Valparaíso -, ainda assim experimentaram a derrota do texto, com respectivamente 55% e 57% de rechazo. Em termos nacionais, o Apruebo só obteve maioria em 8 de 346 comunas do país, sendo 5 em Valparaíso e 3 na RM.10 Entre elas, não está a comuna de Recoleta, na RM, governada desde 2012 pelo prefeito comunista Daniel Jadue, principal rival de Boric na coligação Apruebo Dignidad. A Recoleta foi palco de experimentos importantes do PC governo, como a universidade popular, as livrarias populares e as farmácias populares, reunindo habitantes santiaguinos simpáticos à esquerda e entusiastas de Jadue. Seus votos do plebiscito, porém, resultaram em inexplicáveis 51,9% pelo Rechazo.
Além disso, como alertou Igor Donoso, nas comunas que “os ambientalistas denominaram zonas de sacrifício”11 por vivenciarem atividades de extrativismo e conflito socioambiental, o rechaço foi amplamente vitorioso, a despeito das diretrizes ecológicas da NC que asseguravam os direitos das populações dos territórios de mineração, pesca industrial, monoculturas florestais e outras atividades predatórias. Nestas “zonas de sacrifício”, Donoso menciona o triunfo do rechazo em La Ligua (58,93%), Quintero (58,11%), Los Vilos (56,93%), Puchuncaví (56,11%), Petorca (56,11%), Villa Alemana (57,82%) e Freirina (55,54%). Nas cidades mineiras afetadas pelo extrativismo e suas contaminações, o rechaço também venceu amplamente, como em Calama (70,64%) e Rancagua (60,63%).
Emblemática dessa contradição territorial foi a comuna de Petorca, cenário de uma aguerrida luta popular pelo acesso à água na última década. Ali, a desertificação prejudica os pequenos agricultores e a população em geral, que dependem de caminhões-pipa para obter a água necessária à sobrevivência e à produção de alimentos, enquanto grandes empresas monocultoras detém direitos de propriedade sobre a água inclusive das propriedades camponesas, uma vez que o Código de Águas de 1981 permitiu a bizarra desassociação dos mercados da terra e da água.12 A eleição de Rodrigo Mundaca, líder do Movimento pela Defesa do Acesso à Água, Terra e Proteção Ambiental (MODATIMA), a governador da região de Valparaíso em maio de 2021 indicava uma consistente orientação popular pela agenda ecológica e contra a privatização da água, princípios destacados da NC. No entanto, Petorca derrotou o novo texto com 56% de rechazo,13 o que fez Mundaca declarar: “sinto a incerteza de não reconhecer o lugar que habito (...). Parece bastante irracional a votação sustentada por esta comuna”. 14
Pontos cegos da política constituinte: causas do rechazo popular
Segundo pesquisa realizada pelo CIPER15 na semana seguinte ao plebiscito, com entrevista a 120 pessoas de 12 comunas com maiorias trabalhadoras, as principais razões do voto popular pelo rechazo foram, nesta ordem:
O Estado se apropriaria das casas das pessoas
Os fundos de pensão não seriam herdáveis
O país seria dividido
O governo merece críticas (voto castigo)
Contrários ao aborto
A pesquisa CADEM feita na mesma semana,16 questionou 1.135 pessoas com a pergunta “qual foi a principal razão pela qual você votou rechazo?” e obteve como resultado o gráfico abaixo. Foram 40% de entrevistados que atribuíram seu voto a um processo constituinte “muy malo”, que despertou “desconfiança”; 35% de menções críticas à plurinacionalidade (um dos mais intensos focos de fake news); 29% de desaprovação do governo Boric; 24% de críticas à instabilidade e insegurança política e econômica; 13% contrários à suposta proibição de saúde e educação privadas (fake); 13% de referências a um “mal camino” do país associado à delinquência e ao conflito mapuche; 12% de menções contrárias a uma nova constituição e em defesa da reforma da carta da ditadura; e 8% de referências contrárias ao aborto e às mudanças do sistema político.
Gráfico 1 - Razões para votar rechazo (CADEM)
As principais fake news que abalaram o voto apruebista se relacionavam à ameaça contra a chilenidade: se disseminou que a plurinacionalidade era o fim da bandeira e do hino, que o Chile iria mudar de nome, que imigrantes venezuelanos e povos indígenas tomariam o poder e se tornariam cidadãos privilegiados, sem punibilidade pela justiça, e que os chilenos não poderiam mais circular livremente pelo seu próprio território (usando como pretexto o desastrado episódio da ex ministra do Interior, Iskia Siches, impedida de realizar uma reunião em Temucuicui, Araucanía, bloqueada por uma barricada mapuche na primeira quinzena de governo Boric). Também os direitos reprodutivos, a constitucionalização do direito ao aborto e o direito à diversidade sexual ocuparam um lugar de destaque nas fake news, embora a pesquisa CADEM indique que este não tenha sido o ponto mais crítico impulsionador do rechazo.
Além dos conglomerados midiáticos tradicionais da direita e extrema direita, dezenas de contas de Facebook, Youtube e Instagram não declaradas ao Servel propagaram, durante meses, uma série de mentiras sobre a NC, se aproveitando do sentimento de insegurança e instabilidade dos mais pobres, em função da crise econômica, do trauma da pandemia e do flagrante aumento da criminalidade. Medo da violência, racismo, xenofobia foram dispositivos conservadores mobilizados em massa, mas que não teriam obtido sucesso se tais sentimentos não existissem no terreno da experiência social e das ideologias populares, como diagnosticou Jorge Magasich.17 Afinal, fake news não se propaga no vácuo.
A opinião de que o processo constituinte foi “mal feito”, de que a Constituição não era uma obra tecnicamente viável e que a CC foi marcada por escrachos, anarquia e confusão é particularmente importante para um país que havia acabado de “demitir” sua classe política e convocar “pessoas comuns” para o centro da elaboração constituinte. Há um paradoxo de difícil interpretação no fato de que a revolta de 2019 consolidou a crítica popular ao duopólio, às instituições tradicionais e aos profissionais dos partidos, mas que somente três anos depois o plebiscito de saída tenha desmoralizado os legítimos representantes do chileno comum, do lado de fora dos acordões e diretamente do chão das ruas. Com isso, o plebiscito de saída devolveu a bola para as mesmas instituições de sempre, que o estallido social havia deslegitimado e declarado incapazes de governar.
A ideia de uma Convenção amadora e caótica, que errou mais do que acertou, terminou sendo reiterada por declarações como de Marcos Arellano, convencional independente da Coordinadora Plurinacional, que pediu desculpas, em nome da CC: “é de exclusiva responsabilidade da Convenção como órgão”, declarou sobre o triunfo do rechazo: “vários convencionales tiveram condutas de soberba. Houve falta de solenidade em alguns casos, uma série de performances que afetaram a credibilidade do órgão”.18 Arellano também expressou uma autocrítica sobre o uso excessivo das horas de trabalho dos convencionales das portas da CC para dentro, com evidente descaso e descuido com o trabalho de comunicação política de massas e experiência de base nas periferias em defesa do novo texto. É fato inegável que os debates sobre justiça social, paridade e plurinacionalidade dos convencionales aconteceram em termos que alguns consideraram “acadêmicos” ou “pos-modernos”, distantes da realidade vivida pelo povo chileno e de suas subjetividades políticas. Essa fratura é trágica, porque a CC se legitimou como organismo mais popular, representativo e democrático da história do Chile, mas terminou sendo desmoralizada pelo povo que alegava representar.
Talvez a vitória retumbante de 78% pelo Apruebo no plebiscito de entrada tenha distorcido a percepção política sobre o plebiscito de saída, subestimando sua dificuldade. O plebiscito de saída não era nenhum passeio. Não era uma vitória a mais na coleção de triunfos da esquerda pós-estallido, mas sim outra montanha a ser escalada, dentro de uma correlação de forças móvel, que afinal ofereceu 3,75 milhões de votos à extrema direita com José Antônio Kast em dezembro de 2021. A CN não estava ganha apenas pelos significados de justiça e solidariedade mobilizados pelo seu texto em si mesmo. Ainda mais considerando o fator voto obrigatório e o ponto cego dos 5 milhões de absenteístas agora convertidos em votantes, que sequer se interessaram pelos pleitos anteriores. Era preciso escrever a NC e ao mesmo tempo lutar pela sua comunicação popular nas poblaciones.
Por outro lado, questionar a capacidade técnica e a seriedade de um organismo com independentes, mulheres, indígenas e líderes populares parece ser uma forma trágica de cair na armadilha das campanhas de deslegitimação arquitetadas pelas direitas (pinochetista e centrista), que buscaram a todo tempo desmoralizar um organismo que permaneceu fora do seu tradicional controle político. Se levarmos em conta os relatos insuspeitos de uma brasileira, a constitucionalista Ester Rizzi, que esteve dentro da Convenção em fevereiro, os trabalhos estavam eficientes, técnicos, organizados e com assessoria de inúmeros profissionais competentes emprestados pelas universidades, em um processo constitucional com parcos recursos financeiros e pouco investimento público.19 Nesse sentido, a qualidade da NC foi quase um milagre, fruto de um esforço coletivo e técnico fenomenal em condições das mais adversas, que merece aplausos aos convencionales.
Entre as possibilidades não aproveitadas pela CC estavam os plebiscitos intermediários, que inicialmente visavam contornar o bloqueio dos ⅔ de quórum pelo voto popular e superar a impossibilidade de amplos consensos entre convencionales recorrendo às maiorias simples do povo. Talvez a impressionante vitória das esquerdas na eleição da CC em maio de 2021 tenha sido, no médio prazo, uma vitória de Pirro, ao gerar um excesso de confiança no procedimento interno do órgão, enfraquecendo a comunicação necessária com as maiorias sociais e descartando os plebiscitos intermediários em função dos consensos progressistas dos ⅔ de esquerda e centro-esquerda obtidos no caminho. Assim, a CC se fechou em si mesma e se distanciou do processo mobilizador que a tornou possível.
Terceiro Turno, derrota de Boric e o novo gabinete
A coligação de Boric, Apruebo Dignidad, carregava no seu nome a opção governista pela NC. Embora tenha se engajado na campanha tardia e timidamente, constrangido pelas imposições da Fiscalía que proibia a campanha oficialista para qualquer um dos lados, Boric utilizou a ideia de que a máxima participação no plebiscito seria em si mesmo um triunfo da democracia. Será mesmo?
Entre as causas mais relevantes do rechazo está a evidência de que o plebiscito representou o terceiro turno das eleições presidenciais. A má avaliação do governo, por sua incapacidade de apresentar soluções compreensíveis aos problemas do país e melhorias rápidas da vida popular, somadas as contradições entre o comportamento de Boric antes e depois de se tornar presidente (sendo a posição contrária ao “quinto retiro” dos fundos de pensão o exemplo mais escancarado), fez cair a popularidade do presidente numa velocidade preocupante. Entre março e setembro de 2022, a aprovação do governo Boric caiu de 50% para 33%, enquanto a reprovação subiu de 20% a 60%. Não por acaso, a reprovação corresponde à votação no Rechazo, como mostra o gráfico abaixo.
Gráfico 2 - Aprovação do presidente Gabriel Boric, mar-set/2022 (CADEM)
Em termos numéricos, o voto Apruebo correspondeu de maneira quase exata ao voto em Boric no segundo turno (ganhando apenas 200 mil novos apoiadores, de 4,6 milhões nas eleições a 4,8 milhões no plebiscito).20 Territorialmente, a votação do Apruebo foi quase idêntica à de Boric. Na RM, por exemplo, Boric teve 2,1 milhões e o Apruebo 2,2 milhões. Em Valparaíso, 545 mil votos em Boric e 583 mil no Apruebo. Na região de O’Higgins, respectivamente 252 mil e 244 mil. As diferenças entre os votos do Boric e do Apruebo foi tão pequena que se conclui que os quase 5 milhões de novos votantes no plebiscito de saída se direcionaram quase integralmente para o rechazo.
A incapacidade do Apruebo de ganhar votos entre o segundo turno presidencial (dezembro de 2021) e o plebiscito (setembro de 2022) diz muito sobre as dificuldades de dois setores das esquerdas em transferir suas agendas de mudança do plano da utopia e da imaginação política para a vida concreta das maiorias mais desinteressadas do país. Tanto a esquerda centrista do governo com seu modus operandi continuista e até repressor de movimentos sociais, como as esquerdas de horizontes mais rupturistas que atuaram na CC (chamadas por Boric de maximalistas), por motivos diferentes, não conseguiram atingir o objetivo mais crucial de toda sua luta: superar o a Constituição pinochetista/neoliberal e abrir caminho constitucional para um Estado de bem estar social, com justiça distributiva e direitos assegurados.
De tudo isso, se apreendeu que a relação entre as multidões mobilizadas no estallido (que encheram avenidas com milhões e demonstraram uma convicção impressionante) e as multidões silenciosas, absenteístas e invisibilizadas (que estiveram em casa nos últimos dez anos de eleições) é profundamente contraditória e muito mais complexa e tensa do que os apruebistas supunham. As classes trabalhadoras são heterogêneas e nem sempre se entendem.
A mudança de gabinete de Boric mostrou que das duas coligações que compõe o governo - Apruebo Dignidad e Socialismo Democrático - a segunda saiu ganhando. A nova ministra do interior, Carolina Tohá (filha do ministro do interior de Allende, José Tohá) foi Secretária Geral da Presidência (Segpres) de Bachelet, entrou no lugar da polêmica Iskia Siches, que teve sua reputação derretida em cinco meses de governo, erros vergonhosos e excessivos pedidos de desculpas. A nova Segpres, que substituiu Giorgio Jackson (o engenheiro da Frente Ampla), é Ana Lya Uriarte, que foi chefa de gabinete de Bachelet. Enquanto Siches foi demitida, Jackson, que não poderia ficar fora do governo por sua enorme relevância na trajetória de Boric da FECH à presidência, foi deslocado para o ministério do desenvolvimento social.
O governo Boric, dessa forma, aumentou o número de mulheres em seu comitê político tanto quanto de bacheletistas, se transformando em uma espécie de governo Bachelet 3.
Buscando atenuar e naturalizar sua derrota, Boric discursou no 4 de setembro: “no Chile as instituições funcionam (…), a democracia chilena sai mais robusta”.21 Também apontou para mais um passo em direção à moderação, dizendo que “o maximalismo, a violência e a intolerância com que pensa diferente devem ficar definitivamente de lado”, como se algum tipo de radicalismo tivesse dado o tom da CC, o que não é verdade. Afirmou ainda que “é preciso escutar a voz do povo, não só este dia, mas sim de tudo o que aconteceu nestes últimos anos intensos”. E arrematou: “Não esqueçamos porque chegamos até aqui. Este mal estar segue latente e não podemos ignorá-lo”.
No mesmo tom de relativização da derrota, a ministra vocera Camila Vallejo, cujo cargo é o equilíbrio tênue que segura o Partido Comunista em uma coligação cada vez mais inconveniente, afirmou: “o compromisso do governo de impulsionar seu programa está intacto (…). Não esqueçamos porque estamos aqui. O que nos levou a ser governo foram anos e décadas demandando maior justiça social, aposentadoria digna, saúde digna, o direito à educação. Temos um mandato a cumprir. (…) Estes desafios estão em pleno trâmite”.22 Resta saber, ainda, como seria possível cumprir o programa de Boric sem a NC. A verdade inconveniente é a adequação deste programa à velha ordem (Bachelet 3).
Limbo constitucional e novo itinerário
Até mesmo os politicos da direita tradicional, comemorando o resultado na sede do comando do Rechazo, afirmaram que a constituição de 1980 está morta. Sua campanha esteve baseada em escrever uma “NC melhor”, “uma que nos una”, mais nacional e unitária, que não “dívida o país”, apelando à falsa compreensão do plurinacional como antagônico ao nacional.
É certo que haverá um novo itinerário constituinte, mas não se sabe ainda quanto da Constituição de 1980 será contrabandeada para dentro do novo processo. Fez parte dos acordos pós-estallido a ideia de uma NC a partir de uma folha em branco, contrária a reformar mais uma vez o texto de Pinochet. Agora, como disse Boric e sua nova ministra Uriarte, o protagonismo será do congresso, o que contraria todo esforço da revolta de 2019 até aqui.
Ainda havia a possibilidade de diferentes modalidades de golpe contra o resultado do plebiscito de entrada, que apontou inequivocamente para uma nova constituição e para uma convenção eleita para este fim, rejeitando que o congresso redigisse o novo texto para envernizar o velho. No dia 12 de setembro, uma reunião entre lideranças dos partidos no Parlamento definiu que haverá sim um “organismo eleito”, possivelmente formado nos próximos meses, e acompanhado de um “comitê de expertos”,23 o que significa o triunfo do neoliberalismo pela tecnocracia.
Ganha a interpretação de que a NC foi rechaçada por ser amadora, enquanto a nova carta deverá ser controlada por saberes tecnocráticos obviamente vinculados ao mercado e suas normativas típicas. A questão é que se já era difícil combater o neoliberalismo com uma nova constituição (cuja aplicação seria desafiadora e dependeria da luta constante dos movimentos sociais), se tornou frustrante e falsificador combatê-lo submetido a uma tutela tecnocrática que emanará da racionalidade neoliberal.
Mas a luta não terminou. Segundo a declaração dos movimentos sociais após a derrota, “o aprendizado que construímos será fundamental, porque os movimentos sociais já não somos o que éramos antes de escrever esta Constituição. Neste processo o povo aprendeu a auto representar-se, isso não é algo dado, depois de décadas de exclusão dos setores populares da vida política, poder representar a nós mesmas é um trabalho do qual não iremos renunciar”.25
O Rechazo foi um bombardeio às avessas, quase tão inimaginável quanto o do dia 11. O Palácio de La Moneda não foi avariado física, mas politicamente. Dessa vez não de cima pela Força Aérea, mas “desde abajo” pela vontade popular, em um estranho paradoxo democrático.
Para atravessar tempos de derrota histórica, os mapuche usam a palavra “marichiweu”, que significa “nunca vão nos vencer”, explica Elisa Loncón, a linguista indígena que presidiu a primeira metade da CC.25
Nos triênios de 1970-1973 e de 2019-2022, o Chile mostrou sua capacidade de entusiasmar a América Latina com criatividade política e projetos utópicos, que inspiram e iluminam povos vizinhos como miragens magnetizantes. Suas derrotas doem, porque também costumam ser nossas.
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Gang warfare in Haiti (May 23, 2022)
U.S. navigates choppy diplomatic waters (May 20, 2022)
News Briefs
Brazil Supreme Court rejects Bolsonaro complaint (May 19, 2022)
A Brazilian Supreme Court judge rejected a complaint filed by President Jair Bolsonaro in which he accused another justice of abusing his authority, the latest in an ongoing battle between Brazil's executive and judicial branches ahead of October's presidential elections.
U.S. encourages Venezuela talks (May 18, 2022)
The U.S. Biden administration has slightly eased restrictions on Chevron's ability to negotiate with Venezuela's government. Senior administration officials said the move was intended to support talks between the government of President Nicolás Maduro and the U.S.-backed opposition, reports the Washington Post.
Political Report #1466 The April 2002 Coup Through Time
by LAP Editor, Steve Ellner
Political Report #1465 “Those Who Are Poor, Die Poor” | Notes on The Chilean Elections
Political Report 1464 - Nicaragua: Chronicle of an Election Foretold
With seven opposition presidential candidates imprisoned and held incommunicado in the months leading up to the vote and all the remaining contenders but one from miniscule parties closely allied with President Daniel Ortega and his Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), the results of Nicaragua’s November 7 presidential elections were a foregone conclusion. The government declared after polls closed that Ortega won 75 percent of the vote and that 65 percent of voters cast ballots. The independent voting rights organization Urnas Abiertas, meanwhile, reported an abstention rate of approximately 80 percent and widespread irregularities at polling stations around the country.
The vote was carried out in a climate of fear and intimidation, with a total absence of safeguards against fraud.The vote was carried out in a climate of fear and intimidation, with a total absence of safeguards against fraud. In a complete breakdown of the rule of law, Ortega carried out a wave of repression from May to October, leading the opposition to issue a joint statement on October 7 calling for a boycott of the election. Several dozen opposition figures—among them, presidential candidates, peasant, labor, and student leaders, journalists, and environmentalists—were arrested and detained without trial, while several hundred others were forced into exile or underground.
Among those exiled were celebrated novelist Sergio Ramirez, who served as Ortega’s vice president during the 1980s revolution. While the government charged Ramirez with “conspiracy to undermine national integrity,” his crime was provoking the ire of the regime by publishing his latest novel, Tongolele No Sabía Bailar, a fictionalized account of the 2018 mass protests that marked the onset of the current political crisis and the degeneration of the regime into dictatorship. The book was promptly banned in the country, with customs authorities ordered to block shipments at ports of entry.
The repression particularly decimated the left-leaning opposition party Democratic Renovation Union (UNAMOS), formerly called the Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS). The MRS was formed in 1995 by Ortega’s former comrades in arms who either left the FSLN after the failure of their efforts to democratize it or were expelled for challenging Ortega’s leadership of the party. Among those UNAMOS leaders arrested and to date held incommunicado are legendary guerrilla commanders Dora María Téllez and Hugo Torres, as well as deputy foreign minister in the 1980s, Victor Hugo Tinoco, and party president Ana Margarita Vigil. Amnesty International condemned such detentions and incommunicado conditions as “enforced disappearance as a strategy of repression.”
As part of the crackdown the government also banned 24 civic organizations and professional associations—in addition to some 30 that it had previously banned, including three opposition political parties. The majority of these 24 organizations were professional medical guilds that had come under fire for criticizing the regime’s handling of the Covid-19 pandemic, including reporting that the government had concealed the number of infections and deaths. Vice President Rosario Murillo accused doctors of “health terrorism” and of spreading “false outlooks and news” on the impact of the contagion. During the early months of the pandemic the government convened mass public events under the banner of “Love in Times of Covid.” Nicaragua, together with Haiti, has the lowest rate of vaccination in Latin America, with only 4.9 percent of the population inoculated as of October.
In late 2020, the Sandinistas decreed a spate of laws that allows authorities to criminalize anyone who speaks out against the government. Among these are a Cybercrime Law that allows fines and imprisonment of anyone who publishes in the press or on social media what the government deems to be “false news.” Meanwhile, a “hate crimes” law allows life sentences for anyone considered to have carried out “hate crimes,” as defined by the government. Among the varied offenses listed by Sandinista prosecutors for the recent wave of detentions are “conspiracy to undermine national integrity,” “ideological falsehood,” “demanding, exalting, or applauding the imposition of sanctions against the Nicaraguan state and its citizens,” and “using international funding to create organizations, associations, and foundations to channel funds, through projects or programs that deal with sensitive issues such as sexual diversity groups, the rights of Indigenous communities, or through political marketing on topics such as free expression or democracy.”
A week before the vote, Ortega proclaimed that his wife, Vice President Rosario Murillo, was henceforth the “co-president” of the country. While his bizarre declaration has no legal basis or constitutional legitimacy, it was widely seen as a move to anoint her as his successor—the 76-year-old Ortega is known to be in ill health—and a further step towards the rule of a family dynasty. The ruling couple’s eight children already serve as advisors to the presidency and manage the family’s empire of private and ostensibly public media outlets, investment funds, and family businesses.
A mid-October poll by CID-Gallup—an independent pollster that has been conducting political opinion surveys in the country since 2011—found that 76 percent of the country’s electorate believed the country was moving in the wrong direction. The poll reported that 19 percent of the electorate planned to vote for Ortega, 65 percent stated they would favor an opposition candidate, and 16 percent remained undecided. A rival pollster contracted by the FSLN, M&R, showed Ortega with nearly 80 percent support. While all polls should be assessed with caution given the methodological limitations to surveys conducted amid political instability and civil conflict, it is noteworthy that Ortega’s support dropped to 19 from the 33 percent support reported by a CID-Gallup survey conducted in May of this year, which in turn was down from the high point of popular support for Ortega, 54 percent, registered in CID-Gallup’s 2012 poll.
Now that the votes have been cast, it is impossible to get accurate figures for the results given that the Sandinistas control the Supreme Electoral Council and exercise a near absolute control over reporting on the results. In addition, independent foreign observers were banned, and the threat of repression has dissuaded journalists and civic organizations from speaking out.
Ortega will now start his fourth consecutive term in office since the FSLN returned to power in 2007 in the midst of economic and political crisis. With its legitimacy shattered in the aftermath of the 2018 mass uprising and its violent repression, the regime has to rely more on direct coercion to maintain control. After the economy contracted each year from 2018 to 2020, the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America estimates a 2.0 percent growth rate for the current year and 1.8 percent for 2022—not enough for the economy to recover from the three-year tumble. As the crisis has intensified, the number of Nicaraguans trying to cross the U.S.-Mexico border climbed to historically unprecedented levels to exceed 50,000 this year, compared to just a few thousand in 2020. These numbers are in addition to the 140,000 who had already fled into exile since 2018, mostly to Costa Rica.
The International Left Remains Divided on Nicaragua
The international left remains divided on the Nicaraguan crisis, with some among it arguing that the Ortega-Murillo regime represents a continuation of the 1980s revolution and that the United States has been attempting to overthrow it. However, as I showed in an earlier NACLA article, there is little evidence to corroborate the claim that the 2018 mass uprising was instigated by Washington in an attempt to carry out a coup d’état against the government, or that the United States has since carried out a destabilization campaign aimed at overthrowing the regime.
It was not until the mass protests of 2018 that the co-government pact that Ortega had negotiated with the capitalist class, organized into the Superior Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP), broke down.The Ortega inner circle hacked its way into the ranks of the country’s elite in the aftermath of the 1980s revolution and launched a new round of capitalist development starting in 2007. During this period, the Sandinista bourgeoisie set about to vastly expand its wealth. Leading Sandinistas grouped around Ortega heavily invested in tourism, agroindustry, finance, import-export, and subcontracting for the maquiladoras. Ortega and Murillo championed a program—dressed in a quasi-leftist discourse of “Christian, Socialist, and Solidarity”— of constructing a populist multiclass alliance under the firm hegemony of capital and Sandinista state elites. This model did improve material conditions until the economy began to tank in 2015. It was not until the mass protests of 2018 that the co-government pact that Ortega had negotiated with the capitalist class, organized into the Superior Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP), broke down.
Washington would have liked to have a more pliant regime in place from the start, and the recent events have upped the ante in U.S.-Nicaragua relations. Nonetheless, successive U.S. administrations accommodated themselves since 2007 to the Ortega government, which cooperated closely with the U.S. Southern Command, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and U.S. immigration policies. Although the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has supplied several million dollars to opposition civic organizations through the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), USAID also granted several hundred million dollars directly to the Ortega government from 2007 until 2018.
On the eve of the Nicaraguan vote, the U.S. Congress passed the RENACER Act, which calls for targeted sanctions on Nicaraguan government officials found guilty of human rights violations and corruption. It also requires the executive branch to determine if Nicaragua should be expelled from the Central American Free Trade Agreement and to “expand oversight” of lending to Nicaragua by international financial agencies. In 2017 the U.S. government passed almost identical legislation, the NICA Act, which to date has resulted in sanctions slapped on several dozen top Nicaraguan government officials, affecting the assets they hold in the United States.
Apart from these sanctions on individuals, however, Washington did not enforce the NICA Act. It did not apply trade sanctions and has not blocked Nicaragua from receiving billions of dollars in credits from international agencies. From 2017 to 2021, Nicaragua received a whopping $2.2 billion in aid from the Central American Bank of Economic Integration (BCIE), and in 2020-2021 it received several hundred million in credits from the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund.
Some among the international Left condemn calls for sanctions on Ortega. Yet the U.S. and international Left broadly mobilized (unsuccessfully) in 1978 and 1979 to force Washington to impose sanctions on the Somoza dictatorship and block international financing because of the regime’s gross human rights violations. The worldwide Left similarly demanded sanctions against apartheid South Africa, sought to block U.S. and international financing for the Pinochet dictatorship, and currently calls for “boycott, divestment, and sanctions” against Israel.
Grassroots opponents of the Ortega-Murillo regime find themselves between the rock of an Ortega-Murillo dictatorship and the hard place of the capitalist class and its political agents among the traditional conservative parties. The Right—just as disturbed as Ortega by the outburst of popular protest from below in the 2018 uprising—tried to hitch mass discontent to its own agenda of recovering direct political power and assuring there would be no threat to its control over the Nicaraguan economy.
It was the government’s repression of the popular uprising of students, workers, feminists, and environmentalists that paved the way for the Right’s current hegemony over the anti-Sandinista opposition. The mass of Nicaraguans—beyond the Sandinistas’ secure base in some 20 percent of the population—have not shown any enthusiasm for the traditional conservative parties and businessmen that dominate the opposition and have no real political representation. Indeed, the October CID-Gallup poll found that 77 percent of the country’s electoral does not feel represented by any political party.