Abrazos, lágrimas, maletas, madres e hijos. Las imágenes de las primeras excarcelaciones de presos tras el anuncio del Gobierno cubano el jueves por la noche del mayor indulto en una década, con 2.010 beneficiados, son una pequeña grieta en la oscuridad de un sistema penitenciario y represivo que no ha dejado de actuar, ni siquiera en estos dos últimos meses en los que la presión de Estados Unidos hacia la isla, en forma de cerco petrolero, casi ha paralizado la economía del país.

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Una de las mayores preocupaciones de la FIFA sobre las sedes mexicanas es la movilidad. A menos de 70 días de la inauguración, el tráfico en Guadalajara, Monterrey y Ciudad de México sigue siendo ingobernable. La primera prueba para las tres ciudades llegó recientemente con la reapertura del Estadio Azteca en la capital y los juegos de repechaje en Jalisco y Nuevo León. Además del tránsito, comparten otro problema sin solución inmediata a la vista: el transporte por aplicación en los aeropuertos. Viajeros confundidos, Uber piratas y autos en grúa forman una escena que se repite en las terminales principales del país, que recibirán a miles de personas para el torneo.

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Hernando Chindoy, líder indígena colombiano del pueblo Inga, es un vivo ejemplo de perseverancia y dedicación. Ostenta una fuerte convicción de que es posible crear un mundo más sostenible, más justo y, sobre todo, con más sentido humano, de respeto y sensibilidad hacia nuestro entorno. Está convencido de que, entre la naturaleza, el conocimiento científico, los saberes tradicionales, la autonomía de los pueblos indígenas y la actuación del Estado, existe una serie de lazos que pueden llevar a un mejor nivel de vida en un mundo globalizado y caracterizado por la inmediatez, el caos, la desigualdad y la incertidumbre.

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Ángel Ortiz recuerda sentarse ante su computadora para grabar cuando tenía unos 15 años. “Con lo poquito que sabía, hacía grabaciones. Tenía intención de compartirlo […] Estoy hablando de hace 20 años, no eran tan comunes las redes sociales en México”, cuenta al otro lado de la pantalla. Esos primeros tanteos fueron los que le llevaron a compartir versiones de banda y de música en inglés en sus redes, una inquietud que le ha llevado a expandir las —en ocasiones inamovibles— barreras del género del mariachi. Los recuerdos de las maquinitas de arcade con las que jugaba de pequeño hicieron que buscara adaptar los sonidos de los videojuegos y del anime al mariachi, un experimento que ha tenido gran aceptación en redes años después. Ortiz (Estado de México, 35 años) cuenta ya con más de 300.000 seguidores en TikTok, 100.000 en Facebook y 50.000 en Instagram.

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Argentina on Friday thanked Bolivia for its support on the Falklands/Malvinas sovereignty claim and called “unfortunate” the remarks by the British ambassador in La Paz, Richard Porter, who branded the Bolivian position “deeply disappointing and unacceptable.”

La edición 183 de la representación del viacrucis ha sido declarada Patrimonio Cultural Inmaterial de la Humanidad por la ONU y la UNESCO

Medellín, Colombia – There were 35 massacres in Colombia in the first three months of 2026, making it the most violent quarter in a decade, according to the Institute of Peace and Development Studies (Indepaz).

The Colombian NGO’s figures revealed that 133 people had died in the massacres, which occurred across 34 municipalities in 17 departments.

The grim figures come as Colombia faces a surge in violence related to its long-running armed conflict, almost ten years after a historic peace deal with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) rebel group.

The massacres claimed the lives of 74 men, 16 women, and 17 children. 40 of the victims have not been identified. 

The first massacre of the year, in which three women were killed, was committed in Santander de Quilichao, Cauca, on January 3. The single most violent attack took place in El Retorno, Guaviare, where 26 people were killed on January 16. 

This makes this year’s first quarter the most violent in the last ten years, during which Indepaz has recorded the deaths of nearly 3,000 people in over 700 different massacres. 

On the back of the peace accords signed in November 2016 between Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC, 2017 was the least violent year, registering 33 massacres in total. 

However, following the election of Iván Duque in 2018, yearly records of massacres increased from 39 in the first year of his presidency to 96 in 2021.

Under the current Gustavo Petro administration, figures have remained at similar levels, oscillating between the highest point of 94 cases in 2023 and 76 cases in 2024. Petro’s policy of Paz Total (Total Peace) that has sought to counter violence by negotiating with armed groups has had mixed results. 

The period of 2021 to 2025 observed an average of 303 deaths annually, an increase on the average of 201 deaths each year in the preceding five year period.  Even the most violent periods of the last decade did not register as many quarterly cases as 2026 has witnessed so far. The first quarter of 2020 recorded 17 massacres, under half of this year’s equivalent figure. 

In the last decade, 1,657 men, 285 women, and at least 133 children have been killed. Valle del Cauca was the worst affected department with 62 massacres resulting in 215 deaths, followed by Cauca which saw 58 massacres and 200 deaths. 

The surge in violence has come at a crucial moment in Colombian politics with presidential elections set to take place on May 31. While Petro’s possible Historic Pact successor, Iván Cepeda, looks to continue the Paz total policy, other candidates have promised tougher military measures against armed groups.

Featured image credit: Policía Nacional de los colombianos via Flickr

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What ever happened to the "Cancel Culture" touted by MAGA right-wingers? The same thing that happened to the prudish Republicans who were horrified by the Monica Lewinsky scandal, and the QAnon people who warned about the Washington-based child sex ring, and now support the pedophile running the government. And the same thing as the far-right people who hated the federal government to the extent that they refused to investigate the blowing of the Federal Building in downtown Oklahoma City in 1995 (Yes, I’m talking about you Newt) and now support the centralization of power in the hands of the Executive. And how about the Republicans who in the name of fiscal conservativism supported the strategy of “starve the beast” in order to reduce government spending and now support a President who boosts the federal debt and boasts of a trillion-dollar military budget. The bottom line here is do and say anything to make the rich richer.

Caracas, Venezuela — Delcy Rodríguez, Venezuela’s acting president, has been removed from the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctions list. 

Her name had been on the list since 2018, when as vice president, authorities identified her as one of the figures who contributed to undermining democracy in the South American country.

The decision was made nearly three months after Nicolás Maduro’s capture in an operation carried out in Caracas by U.S. military personnel.

Her removal represents another sign of rapprochement between Rodríguez and the Trump administration in their attempts to normalize relations between the two countries. Just this week, the U.S. announced it had reopened its embassy in Caracas after nearly seven years. 

In the post on X, Rodríguez applauded the action taken by Trump and said she hopes future sanctions against the country will be lifted. “This will allow for rapid economic development, investment, and an effective bilateral cooperation agenda for the benefit of our peoples. Let’s keep working for a prosperous Venezuela for all!” she said.

How did the sanctions affect Delcy Rodríguez?

Sanctions against the Chavista leader functioned as a personal blockade that paralyzed her ability to interact with the Western financial system.

Because she was included on the Specially Designated Narcotics Traffickers, also known as the Clinton List, she was prohibited from conducting any type of commercial or financial transaction with U.S. citizens or companies. 

This meant not only the freezing of any accounts or properties under U.S. jurisdiction, but also the inability to use basic services such as international credit cards or U.S.-based software platforms.

Furthermore, the sanctions affected her in the diplomatic and mobility spheres, as they barred her from entering U.S. territory and restricted her travel through other countries that have law enforcement cooperation agreements with Washington.

Sanctions are a hot-button issue among Venezuelans. 

The government claims they have been the main cause of the crisis in the country due to the restrictions they have imposed. However, many citizens and NGOs believe that even before the sanctions were imposed, the nation was already facing serious problems due to mismanagement by the authorities.

Featured image: Delcy Rodriguez.

Image credit: Government of Russia via Wikimedia Commons

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Medellín, Colombia – Following their complaint filed earlier this month before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), the family of Kelly Knight, a U.S. citizen who was found dead in Medellín in 2019, spoke to Latin America Reports about what the complaint describes as “impunity in the alleged femicide” of their daughter by the “Colombian State.”

On July 19, 2019, 34-year-old Knight was found dead in her apartment in Medellín. According to the complaint, since her marriage to an unnamed man in 2018, Knight was the alleged victim of a pattern of sustained spousal abuse, including an episode on the night before her death. 

Lawyers representing the family say that on July 18, while staying with her husband at a hotel in the town of Doradal a few hours outside of Medellín, hotel staff “alerted police after they reported hearing screams.” The complaint said police were “unresponsive” and Knight was later “dragged across the asphalt by her husband, according to documented conversations between the victim and her friend.”

Upon authorities finding her deceased in her Medellín apartment the next day – “under circumstances that to this day remain unclear” – the complaint alleges that a preliminary investigation was opened in 2019 on suspicion of femicide but the case has since gone “stagnant” with no formal charges or arrests made. 

Warning signs that went unaddressed 

The family’s complaint accuses Colombia of failing to “prevent, investigate, and determine responsibility for the alleged femicide.” The family considers Knight’s husband a principal suspect as well. 

“She was close to leaving at the time she was killed, very close. We found a letter in her apartment, in the trash can, telling [her husband] exactly that. And I don’t know if he had wadded it up and thrown it away; I’m not completely sure. We just found it in the trash can, and we turned it in to the investigators,” Ray Knight, her father, told Latin America Reports. 

“She told us every time something happened,” he added. “She wanted to come home multiple times.”

Lawyers for Knight’s family say that despite the severity of reported incidents of abuse, Colombian authorities failed to provide “protective measures, psychosocial support, adequate threat assessment against her, or timely investigations into these events until after she died.”

“There were various signs that made the authorities aware of what was going on,” Ignacio Javier Álvarez Martínez, Executive Director of IHR LEGAL, a law firm representing the family, told Latin America Reports. “They could have done something about it, and they didn’t.”

A bungled crime scene 

By the time authorities began investigating Knight’s death, key elements of the crime scene had already been compromised, the family’s attorneys said. 

“Kelly’s body was moved. No video of the crime scene was taken,” Mariana Hernandez, another lawyer for the family, told Latin America Reports. 

“The bedding was destroyed, and her clothes were given back to the main person of interest [the husband],” she added.

Her family also described what they saw as a chaotic and unprofessional crime scene inside the apartment. 

“They failed to cordon off the area. It was full of people while authorities were inside,” her mother, Lee Knight, told Latin America Reports.

Some of the most critical forensic evidence was also compromised, they said. 

“They mishandled important blood samples,” said Álvarez, noting that the limited amount collected was used in ways that prevented further testing abroad.

“[Her husband] told us he threw the bedding away,” said Knight’s father. “He said it was dirty.”

The family also told Latin America Reports that a representative from the legal team attempting to retrieve Knight’s belongings after the murder was violently confronted by Knight’s husband. No charges were filed in that alleged incident, they said. 

Attorneys for the family argue that the alleged failures at the crime scene weakened the investigation and may have permanently undermined any ability to determine what happened to Knight. 

Latin America Reports contacted the Prosecutor’s Office and Medellín Mayor’s Office for comment on the case but have not received a response at time of publication. 

IHR Legal, the law firm representing the family, said that Colombia has yet to issue an official response to the compliant because the IACHR has not yet officially present the State with the complaint – a process that can take several months. 

Knight’s parents also lamented being shut out from information surrounding the investigation into their daughter’s death. 

“We had no direct communication with the prosecutor or the medical examiner,” her father said. “We were not consulted on anything.”

Knight’s mother said authorities told them that they couldn’t share findings in the case. 

“They said they couldn’t report anything to us,” she said. “We were the parents—we just wanted to know what happened to our daughter.”

Femicides in Colombia 

Kelly Knight’s case is not an isolated incident. In recent months, multiple cases of gender-based killings across Colombia have drawn attention to persistent gaps in prevention and accountability, with advocates warning that impunity remains a defining feature in many investigations.

In just the first three months of 2025, over 5,300 women were reported to be victims of intrafamiliar violence, and over 3,800 women were reported victims of sexual violence, most of which were children or teenagers. 

A 2024 study by Colombia’s ​​National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences, found that sexism and violence against women are spurred by an enduring patriarchal society in Colombia, where women are positioned as the “self-sacrificing mother” or “submissive wife”, while men are positioned with dominance and strength. 

Moreover, the study also demonstrated that the hypersexualization of women, the glorification of “strong” and “dominant” men, and the narrative of traditional gender roles reinforce the patterns that are replicated in society.

In the case of Kelly Knight, the lawyers argue that her husband’s testimony was prioritized over the victim’s family’s. 

“His narrative is repeated multiple times in the case file,” said Hernández.

According to the attorneys, the husband’s version of events included claims that Knight struggled with substance abuse and instability, assertions she says were not supported by evidence.

“He said she was ‘crazy’ or a ‘drug addict,’ and there is no evidence of that,” Hernández added.

Despite this, the lawyer argues, authorities relied heavily on his account in building the case since he was the principal witness, yet disregarded the female’s family side of the story. 

“They based their investigation on what he told them,” she said. “There is a lack of gender perspective in both the police and the prosecutor’s office.”

What comes next for the Knight family? 

After six years, the Knight family, unsatisfied with how the investigation is proceeding in Colombia, filed a formal complaint with the IACHR on March 2, 2026.

Under international law, victims are typically required to exhaust domestic legal remedies before seeking redress from international judicial bodies. But exceptions apply when investigations are subject to prolonged delays or fail to produce meaningful progress.

“After a reasonable period without meaningful progress, you don’t have to wait,” Álvarez, the attorney, said. 

The Commission must now determine whether to admit the case and formally notify the Colombian state, which then has an opportunity to respond. 

“Part of filing the case is to push the state to do something about it,” Álvarez said, adding that the proceedings could compel local authorities to move the investigation forward.

Beyond the individual case, he said, the implications could be broader. “This case could be paradigmatic for Colombia and the region.”

For Knight’s parents, however, the objective remains unchanged.

“We will try every available avenue to find out what happened,” her father said. “We will get to the bottom of this if we can.”

Featured image: Kelly Knight.

Image credit: Online obituary for Kelly Knight

The post Family of deceased US citizen accuses Colombian State of “impunity in the alleged femicide” (Interview) appeared first on Latin America Reports.

News Americas, NEW YORK, NY, Thurs. April 2, 2026: The killing of Haitian American Coral Springs Vice Mayor, Nancy Metayer Bowen, is reverberating far beyond Florida, sending shockwaves through Caribbean diaspora communities grappling with both the loss of a rising political voice and the deeper issues her death has brought into focus.

Metayer Bowen, 38, was not just a local elected official in Coral Springs. She represented a new generation of Caribbean American leadership – young, accomplished, and increasingly influential in shaping political engagement among immigrant communities.

Authorities have charged her husband, Jamaican roots Stephen Bowen, with first-degree murder following her death inside their home. Police have described the case as domestic in nature, underscoring a tragic and persistent reality that cuts across communities: intimate partner violence remains one of the leading causes of death for women in the United States. Bowen is being held in the Broward County main jail on charges of premeditated murder and tampering with or fabricating physical evidence. At a first-appearance hearing in Broward County Court Thursday morning, a judge ordered him held without bond.

Bowen, 40, worked at Delray Medical Center, according to the affidavit. He has an active license as a certified radiologic technologist that was issued in 2014 by the Department of Health. He was listed as the chief operating officer of Men of St. Luke Inc., a nonprofit based in Hollywood, as of 2025, state business records show. The organization originally registered in 2009 under the name The Most Worshipful Union Grand Lodge of Florida, St. Luke Lodge #530 and was described as a statewide Masonic organization.

Bowen frequently posted videos of himself at tactical shooting ranges on his personal Instagram. One video pinned to his profile depicts him on a wild boar hunt, smoking a cigar. His bio reads, “God | Husband | Armed.”

Officers found the vice mayor’s body, wrapped in a comforter and black trash bags, in the bedroom of her home in the 800 block of Northwest 127th Avenue Wednesday after her coworkers became concerned that she had not shown up for scheduled city meetings.

Coral Springs City Manager Catherine Givens said at the news conference that the city will have a behavioral health program available to employees.

“What’s worse is the tremendous grief that her family must endure. If you knew Nancy, her family was everything,” Givens said. “… She wasn’t just a leader; she was the light in every room that she entered. She was a steady voice in difficult times, a compassionate soul who lifted others up and a friend to so many.”

Commissioner Joshua Simmons spoke on behalf of the commission, which he said is now “incomplete.”

“She had such a good heart. She truly cared about people, even when people were saying some of the most horrible things about her and us,” Simmons told reporters. “She still cared, rolled up her sleeves, went to every event that she could go to because she truly cared about people and making sure people had a relationship with their elected officials.”

On it’s website, the City posted an image of her with the words “Rest In Peace. A statement added: “The City of Coral Springs remembers Vice Mayor Nancy Metayer with gratitude, respect and deep appreciation for her service to our community. A dedicated public servant, Vice Mayor Metayer served the residents of Coral Springs with passion, integrity and a strong commitment to building a better future for all. Her leadership reflected a deep belief in community, service and stewardship, and her contributions will continue to leave a lasting mark on our city.

But for many in the Haitian and wider Caribbean diaspora, the loss carries an additional weight.

Metayer Bowen was a trailblazer – the first Black and Haitian American woman elected to the Coral Springs Commission – and a key figure in mobilizing Caribbean voters in Florida, a critical political battleground. Her work extended beyond local governance into national politics, including roles connected to presidential campaign outreach targeting Caribbean American communities.

Her death leaves a void not only in public office, but in a growing movement aimed at strengthening diaspora representation and civic participation. Community leaders and advocates say the tragedy is forcing difficult conversations about the intersection of cultural stigma, domestic violence, and access to support systems within immigrant communities.

Rep. Dan Daley, D-Coral Springs, and Rep. Christine Hunschofsky, D-Parkland, attended the news conference to announce her sudden death. They were both close friends of Metayer Bowen. Rep. Anna Eskamani, a Democrat representing the Orlando area, in a statement shared on social media Wednesday said that Metayer Bowen’s family has “already experienced deep loss” with his suicide.

Metayer Bowen’s younger brother, Donovan Joshua Leigh Metayer, died by suicide in their family home in December at age 26. He was a senior at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland during the 2018 mass shooting and struggled with mental health issues afterward, according to a GoFundMe online fundraiser for funeral expenses.

“Nancy and I worked side by side in the reproductive rights movement for years, and I’ve been honored to call her not just a colleague, but a dear friend,” Eskamani wrote. “She was brilliant, compassionate, and deeply committed to justice. I’m heartbroken by this loss, her future in politics and leadership was only just beginning, and our communities will feel that absence profoundly.”

Her family shared a statement on Metayer Bowen’s social media Wednesday evening.

“Throughout her years in public office, she led with integrity, compassion, and an unwavering sense of purpose,” the family’s statement said. “She believed in bringing people together, listening to those she served, and working tirelessly to create positive change in her community. To us, she was a source of strength, wisdom, and love – someone who always put others before herself.”

“While many knew her as a leader and advocate, we knew her as a sister, a daughter, and a friend whose warmth and laughter filled every room. Her legacy will live on not only in the policies she helped shape but in the countless lives she touched.”

While domestic violence is a global issue, experts note that Caribbean and immigrant communities often face additional barriers, including fear of stigma, lack of resources, and reluctance to seek help.

Metayer Bowen’s story, they say, highlights the urgency of addressing these challenges openly.

Her life also reflects the broader trajectory of Caribbean excellence in the diaspora – from public service to scientific work – demonstrating the expanding role Caribbean Americans are playing in shaping U.S. civic life.

Even as the investigation continues, her legacy is already being defined by more than the circumstances of her death. It is rooted in her work to amplify Caribbean voices, expand voter engagement, and open doors for future leaders.

Now, her passing is prompting a renewed call for both protection and progress. For many, the question is no longer just about what happened – but what must change.

News Americas, NEW YORK, NY, Thurs. April 2, 2026: A new chapter in Caribbean sporting history is unfolding at one of golf’s most iconic stages, as Barbados’ Emily Odwin steps into the spotlight at the Augusta National Women’s Amateur – not just as a competitor, but as a symbol of representation, access, and possibility.

At just 22, Odwin has become the first golfer from Barbados to compete in the prestigious tournament, carrying with her more than personal ambition. She represents a region where talent is abundant but opportunity often remains limited.

Her performance is already turning heads. After carding an impressive 2-under 70 in her opening round, Odwin sits in contention, demonstrating that Caribbean athletes can compete – and excel – on golf’s global stage.

But beyond the leaderboard, her presence is resonating far deeper.

“I carry the flag with me everywhere,” Odwin said, underscoring the pride and responsibility she feels representing Barbados and the wider Caribbean. Her journey reflects a broader narrative: one of breaking into spaces where few from the region – and even fewer Black women – have historically had access.

Golf, long viewed as an elite and expensive sport, continues to present barriers for many young athletes across the Caribbean. Odwin herself points to accessibility and cost as key challenges limiting wider participation, despite the region’s undeniable talent.

Yet her rise is beginning to shift that perception.

A standout at Southern Methodist University, Odwin has steadily built an international résumé, including runner-up finishes in major amateur tournaments across Latin America, South America, and the Caribbean. She has also already made history as the first Barbadian golfer to compete in a major championship, the U.S. Women’s Open.

Now, on one of golf’s most visible platforms, she is part of a growing movement pushing the sport toward greater diversity and inclusion.

Her impact extends beyond competition. For young Caribbean athletes – especially girls – Odwin’s visibility sends a powerful message: the pathway, while challenging, is possible.

She is also helping to expand the narrative of Caribbean excellence beyond traditional sports like cricket and track and field, positioning golf as an emerging frontier for regional talent.

As she navigates the pressures of Augusta, Odwin remains focused on the fundamentals – one shot at a time – while acknowledging the significance of the moment.

Her presence alone is already a win for representation. But her performance suggests something more: that this may be just the beginning of a broader Caribbean breakthrough in global golf.

News Americas, NEW YORK, NY, Thurs. April 2, 2026: Choosing the best yacht charter destination is the single most important decision for a first-time yacht charter. Before boat size, route length, or even the type of yacht, geography and local sailing conditions shape how safe, relaxed, and enjoyable the experience will be. Some regions are naturally forgiving: short distances, predictable weather, clear navigation, and charter-friendly infrastructure. Others demand confidence and experience from day one.

For sailors stepping into their first bareboat charter, the destinations below consistently offer the best learning curve – where enjoyment grows faster than stress.

British Virgin Islands (BVI): The Global Benchmark For Beginners

The British Virgin Islands are widely considered the easiest place in the world to start bareboat sailing. Islands sit close together, routes are almost entirely line-of-sight, and trade winds are steady without being extreme.

Mooring balls simplify overnight stops, reducing the need for advanced anchoring skills. Short passages allow crews to gain confidence quickly while still enjoying varied scenery, snorkeling, and lively island culture.

Why it works for beginners: predictable conditions, short distances, and a mature charter ecosystem built specifically around bareboat sailing.

Croatia: Calm Adriatic Sailing With Excellent Infrastructure

Croatia combines sheltered waters with one of the most developed marina networks in Europe. The Dalmatian coast allows island hopping without long offshore passages, and navigation is largely visual.

Formal sailing licenses are often required, but once approved, first-time skippers benefit from clear routes, reliable weather patterns in summer, and easy access to services. Historic towns and well-marked anchorages add confidence at every step.

Why it works for beginners: line-of-sight navigation, dense marina coverage, and short daily legs along the coast.

Ionian Sea, Greece: Gentle Conditions and Flexible Routes

While parts of Greece are known for strong winds, the Ionian Sea is a different story. Located on the western side of the country, it offers lighter winds, greener landscapes, and protected waters.

Routes between Lefkada, Meganisi, Ithaca, and Kefalonia are short and forgiving. The sailing rhythm is relaxed, making it ideal for crews transitioning from crewed sailing to skippering their own yacht.

Why it works for beginners: mild winds, sheltered passages, and a slower-paced sailing environment.

Bahamas (Exumas): Shallow Waters and Visual Navigation

The Exumas in the Bahamas offer a unique introduction to Caribbean sailing. Navigation relies heavily on visual reading of water color rather than complex instruments, helping beginners develop real situational awareness.

While shallow waters demand attention, calm seas and protected routes reward careful planning. The result is a hands-on learning environment that builds confidence through observation and practice.

Why it works for beginners: calm seas, visual navigation, and short hops between anchorages.

US Virgin Islands (USVI): Easy Access and Familiar Systems

The United States Virgin Islands provide many of the same advantages as the BVI, with the added benefit of U.S.-based infrastructure and regulations. Short distances between St. Thomas and St. John create easy itineraries, while modern marinas and provisioning simplify logistics.

The sailing area feels compact and approachable, making it a strong option for sailors who want Caribbean conditions with minimal complexity.

Why it works for beginners: short routes, predictable weather, and straightforward logistics.

What All Beginner-Friendly Destinations Have in Common

Despite regional differences, these destinations share a few critical traits:

They allow short daily passages, so mistakes never feel overwhelming.
They offer predictable weather patterns, reducing surprise conditions.
They rely on visual navigation, not offshore routing.
They have charter infrastructure designed for bareboat sailors, not professionals only.

These elements combine to create learning environments where confidence builds naturally through repetition rather than pressure.

Choosing the Right First Destination

The best first yacht charter destination is not the most famous or dramatic — it’s the one that lets you focus on learning, enjoyment, and rhythm. Destinations that reduce complexity allow first-time sailors to experience success early, which shapes how they approach sailing in the future.

A good first charter doesn’t just deliver a vacation. It creates the foundation for many voyages to come, turning cautious beginners into confident skippers ready to explore more challenging waters next time.

Bogotá, Colombia – After days of searching for missing American Airlines flight attendant Eric Gutiérrez, Colombian authorities discovered his body in a river in Antioquia province on Friday, several hours away from where he was last seen near Medellín.

While the coroner’s office has not issued an official cause of death, it quickly concluded Gutiérrez, a U.S.-citizen, had not died of natural means; officials are reportedly working on the hypothesis that Gutierrez’s death was a robbery gone wrong, likely involving the incapacitating drug scopolamine.

Advocacy groups say the murder of Gutiérrez – a gay man – is part of a pattern of violence against members of the LGBTQ+ community in Colombia, while officials offer reassurances to travellers, saying these crimes are rare and could happen to anyone.

What happened to Eric Gutiérrez?

Gutiérrez, 32, arrived in Colombia on March 22 after working on a flight from Miami to Medellín. He reportedly went to the Perro Negro nightclub in the El Poblado neighborhood of the city with his colleagues, where they met two men. 

Gutiérrez and his colleague then went with the men to Itagüí, a city on the outskirts of Medellín.

The flight attendant’s co-worker returned to their hotel the next day alone, feeling disoriented. He was admitted to hospital with suspected scopolamine poisoning. 

Law enforcement began searching for Gutiérrez, but did not find his body until Friday, located in the Piedras River near the town of Jericó, a roughly three-hour drive from Medellín. 

Authorities have also begun to share details of criminal investigations, saying they have found evidence linking the case to criminal rings known to use scopolamine to rob people.

Scopolamine is commonly used by thieves in Colombia to incapacitate victims in order to access their bank accounts and steal their possessions. 

‘Pattern of violence’

Gutiérrez’s death reveals a broader trend of violence against gay men, according to Caribe Afirmativo, a Colombia-based LGBTQ+ rights observatory.

“This latest death should not be viewed as an isolated incident,” read a statement by the organization released a day after the flight attendant’s body was found.

“On the contrary, it is yet another sign—serious, painful, and deeply alarming—of a pattern of violence that continues to take hold in Antioquia and that now demands a forceful response from the Colombian government,” it continued.

Caribe Afirmativo said that Gutiérrez’s murder marked the 23rd killing of an LGBTQ+ person in Colombia this year, noting “a large proportion of the cases” had occurred in Antioquia.

“What has happened cannot be dismissed as a mere coincidence or an individual risk. We are facing a systematic form of urban violence that combines organized crime, substance abuse, and contexts of vulnerability,” continued the statement. 

In April last year, Italian biologist Alessandro Coatti was found dead in Santa Marta. Authorities later discovered he had been lured into a robbery by a man on the gay dating app Grindr and was likely drugged with scopolamine.

The observatory called for “urgent” action by authorities, including information campaigns warning the public of the risks of scopolamine and robberies in the nighttime economy. 

Authorities reassure LGBTQ+ travellers 

Despite suggestions of a pattern of violence against LGBTQ+ people in Colombia, authorities in Medellin insist that LGBTQ+ travellers do not face a heightened risk.

“We have no evidence of a systematic trend of crime targeting exclusively LGBTQ+ travelers,” Manuel Villa Mejía, Medellín’s Secretary of Security, told Latin America Reports.

He maintained that the risks to travellers are the same, regardless of sexual orientation, and highlighted broader patterns in how tourists are targeted, including “the use of social media, dating apps, or fake offers of companionship to commit theft or extortion.”

Villa Mejía called on all tourists, regardless of who they are, to exercise caution and stay aware of their surroundings. 

He also offered reassurances to travellers: “In Medellin we protect all people equally and our priority is to guarantee the security of all visitors, without distinction.”  

Featured image description: Missing poster for Eric Gutierrez

Image credit: Alcaldía de Medellín

The post US flight attendant death highlights LGBTQ+ violence in Colombia appeared first on Latin America Reports.

By Ron Cheong

News Americas, TORONTO, Canada, Weds. April 1, 2026: The war with Iran is reshaping modern warfare, revealing critical failures across military, economic and psychological fronts. Fresh off its stunning strike on Venezuela, capturing President Nicholas Maduro in a display of technological and military prowess, the United States, in coordination with Israel, launched a surprise attack on Iran, even as negotiations for a peace deal were underway.

In the first days of Operation Epic Fury, launched on February 28, the administration basked in an aura of invincibility. Ignoring consultation with allies or NATO, it flaunted military superiority, predicted swift victory, and declared the Iranian leadership “put into the stone age.”

But modern warfare is no longer decided solely on the battlefield. It unfolds across three interlocking fronts: military, economic, and psychological. Victory requires coherence across all three – failure on any one can unravel the rest.

One month into the war with Iran, the picture is not just of setbacks, but of a deeper strategic failure: a conflict launched without clear objectives, without an exit strategy, and with a profound misunderstanding of the adversary.

1. The Military Front: Fighting The Wrong War

On paper, the United States entered with overwhelming superiority. Aircraft carriers, stealth systems, satellites, and precision-strike capabilities have long created an aura of near-invincibility.

But as seen in Ukraine and now Iran, modern warfare has shifted. Dominance in conventional military assets no longer guarantees victory. We live in the era of asymmetric warfare, where weaker opponents avoid direct confrontation and exploit vulnerabilities.

Iran has done exactly that. Instead of matching U.S. air and naval power, it relies on cheap drones, missile swarms, naval mines, and proxy forces. Low-cost drone systems have successfully threatened high-value assets, undermining traditional force hierarchies. Even after heavy bombardment, Iran continues to project power through decentralized and resilient systems.

This is doctrinal, not accidental. History, from Vietnam to Afghanistan, shows that a weaker adversary need not win outright; it only needs to avoid losing while increasing the cost of victory. The United States appears prepared for a conventional war. Iran prepared for a different kind entirely.

2. The Economic Front: The Strait Of Hormuz Miscalculation

If the battlefield revealed tactical misjudgments, the economic front exposes strategic blindness.

At the center is the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20% of the world’s oil supply flows. Iran’s ability to disrupt this chokepoint has proven decisive. Shipping through the strait has collapsed, global oil prices have surged, and inflationary ripple effects are destabilizing energy markets and supply chains worldwide.

Remarkably, Iran has achieved this leverage despite suffering major conventional military losses. This underscores a crucial shift: economic disruption can outweigh battlefield success. Washington may destroy targets, but Tehran can impose costs on the global system itself, turning international pressure back onto the U.S.

This raises a critical question: Was there ever a viable plan to secure the economic front – or was it simply assumed that military dominance would suffice?

3. The Psychological Front: The Collapse Of Deterrence Mythology

Perhaps the most consequential front is psychological.

For decades, U.S. power rested on a potent intangible: the belief in its overwhelming superiority. That belief alone deterred adversaries.

Wars are not just fought with weapons; they are fought with perceptions. Today, that perception is eroding. Iran has withstood sustained bombardment, struck back, and demonstrated that U.S. power, while immense, is not absolute.

Within the United States, conflicting narratives are emerging: official claims of success clash with visible disruptions such as the prolonged closure of Hormuz and rising economic fallout. Globally, allies hesitate, adversaries are emboldened, and neutral actors grow skeptical.

This is how great powers lose more than battles – they lose aura. And once the psychological edge is gone, it is extraordinarily difficult to restore.

The Deeper Problem: No Clear Objective, No Exit

Underlying all three fronts is a more fundamental flaw: What is the objective of this war? Regime change? Deterrence? Elimination of nuclear capability? Restoration of maritime security?

The answers are inconsistent, even contradictory. Recent statements suggest both confidence in victory and uncertainty about outcomes, with talk of withdrawal even if key objectives, like reopening Hormuz, remain unresolved.

That is not a strategy. That is improvisation. Without a clearly defined end state, there can be no coherent path to victory, only drift toward escalation or withdrawal under pressure.

Hubris And The Strategic Trap

History offers a warning: the moment of greatest triumph often precedes the greatest overreach.

Buoyed by successes in Venezuela and technological dominance, the United States appears to have entered this conflict with strategic overconfidence, underestimating Iran’s resilience, asymmetric doctrine, willingness to absorb punishment, and ability to shift the battlefield beyond the military domain.

This is the classic trap of great powers: fighting the war they expect, not the war that is actually being fought.

A Turning Point In Modern Warfare

This conflict may ultimately be remembered not for who won militarily, but for what it revealed:

• Cheap technology can neutralize expensive dominance
• Economic chokepoints can outweigh battlefield victories
• Psychological perception is as decisive as firepower

Most importantly, even the most powerful military is vulnerable when it enters a war without clear objectives, strategic coherence, or a full understanding of its adversary.

If that lesson is not absorbed, this may not just be a difficult war. It may be a defining one.

EDITOR’S NOTE: Ron Cheong is a frequent political commentator and columnist whose recent work focuses on international relations, economic resilience, and Caribbean-American affairs. He is a community activist and dedicated volunteer with extensive international banking experience. Now residing in Toronto, Canada, he is a fellow of the Institute of Canadian Bankers and holds a Bachelor of Science degree from the University of Toronto.

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By Danny Shaw

News Americas, NEW YORK, NY, Weds. April 1, 2026: A shaky video shot in the streets of Solino in October 2024 captures the reality unfolding in Haiti. In the clip, a contingent of young men and child soldiers wave guns in the air and chant triumphantly: “Take Solino! If you are not with Viv Ansanm, we will burn you all together.” It is a brief, jolting window into the growing power of the Viv Ansanm (Living Together) paramilitary coalition and the central role of children within its ranks.

As the group expands its control over the country, one glaring reality is that a significant portion of its armed members are under 18. Under the command of Jimmy Chérizier, known as “Barbecue,” and his former lieutenant, escaped kidnapper Kempès Sanon, Viv Ansanm deployed these armed youths to sack the sprawling neighborhoods of Solino. Their assault has displaced over 125,000 people across 24 different communities. “Viv Ansanm burned us out of our homes because we were one of the last bastions of peace and resistance left in Pòtoprens [Port-au-Prince],” said Ezayi Jules, a spokesperson for the community. “They reduced our neighborhoods to ashes. Now our families are homeless as Barbecue runs around everywhere talking about his “revolution.’”

Beginning in 2018, Viv Ansanm and its predecessor, the G-9 gang alliance, have targeted and invaded neighborhoods that had long been bulwarks of popular resistance agains the interests of big capital and foreign domination. The numbers speak for themselves. Armed groups murdered more than 5,600 civilians in 2024, and at least 4,026 in the first five months of 2025. The police are no better. The corrupt and fractured National Haitian Police (Police Nationale d’Haïti, PNH), aided by a contingent of U.S.-financed mercenaries, prey upon the same populations as Viv Ansanm. According to one UN study, the police were responsible for 64 percent of the violence in a three-month period between April and June of this year.

On September 30, the UN Security Council approved the deployment of a Gang Suppression Force to Haiti, replacing the Kenya-led Multinational Security Support Mission that had been in the country since June 2024. There are concerns that the latest mission will replicate the failures of the 2004 to 2018 UN Stabilization Mission, failing to address the root causes of the violence while targeting  more ti solda (low-ranking soldiers) and civilians.

This dance of death is all these young “soldiers” have ever known. Traumatized and desensitized, they have been indoctrinated to believe they are fighting a formidable “enemy,”—one that often consists of peaceful communities like Solino, Kafou Fèy, or Nazon, neighborhoods that have long formed the social fabric of the capital. 

UNICEF estimates that over half of the country’s gang members are children. Additionally, children represent half of the more than 1.3 million Haitians displaced by conflict, ensuring a constant reservoir of cannon fodder for a paramilitary army that has now rebranded itself as a political party.

In the most unequal society in the hemisphere, violence robs children of childhood and dehumanizes them to the point that they are capable of the most phantasmic acts. These children are the colonial boomerang of violence hurled back against their own communities and the society that failed to protect them.

From Revolt To Despair

On August 22, 2018, Haiti exploded into open rebellion with millions of Haitians taking to the streets. The impetus was the revelation that the corrupt Tèt Kale Party (PHTK) government had stolen an estimated $3.8 billion dollars from the PetroCaribbean fund set up by the Venezuelan government to provide subsidized oil and gas for the Haitian people. As protests rocked the country, Haiti became peyi lok (a country locked down), demanding the resignation of the corrupt kleptocracy and free elections.

Since this mass uprising, the oligarchs and their U.S. accomplices have armed and unleashed paramilitary gangs to crush the popular movement. In September 2023, the gangs confederated into one criminal alliance called “Viv Ansanm” led by Barbecue, a former police officer. The paramilitaries have since been waging war on local neighborhoods to make sure no one can oppose their reign of kidnapping, sexual violence, and the burning of oppressed communities. Professor Henry Boisrolen breaks down the class dynamics of the gang alliance and project: “The social decomposition caused by so many decades of foreign domination, exploitation, and occupation explain how we arrived at this place.”

Tens of thousands of children make up Viv Ansanm’s rank-and-file of  because they have no other choice. Children do not go to school in the Haitian capital. By January of 2024, the violence had caused 900 schools to shut down in Pòtoprens, denying education to more than 200,000 children. From the cracked screen of his 2020 Motorola Stylus, Lucson Charles, a displaced elementary school teacher, explains just how dire the situation is: “Two hundred and twenty-seven schools in the Ouest department have a 0% success rate [in the latest baccalaureate exam]. Zero admissions. Zero prospects. Zero dreams realized.”

Charles himself, like so many teachers and professionals, is a victim of the orgy of violence. Last year, Viv Ansanm attacked his school. “They stole my HP computer, all of my belongings and burned my house, alleyway, and neighborhood down,” he recalled. “They left us with nothing. This prevents us from fighting back in any effective way.”

Stefan, another displaced teacher, explained that 90 percent of Haitian schools are created by the private sector and churches. The state has completely abandoned investing the national budget in the people, while NGOs throw some disjointed crumbs of charity into the ocean of manufactured want. Who can the population turn to if, as Charles says, “governing seems to boil down to looking the other way while the house collapses?”

Growing Up A Solda

Barbecue claims to be leading an armed revolution, despite a grisly track record of massacres against his own people. Understanding the role of his paramilitary coalition helps connect the dots between the massive influx of U.S. guns, drug running, and a social media cover-up campaign, where the warlords present themselves as revolutionaries fighting the oligarchs.

Barbecue is an enforcer, a hustler, and the top spokesperson of the gangs whose economic and political interests are diametrically opposed to any prospect of peace. He is the epitome of the law of the jungle—the capitalist jungle—that has given birth to many Ti Babecue yo (Little Barbecues).

At the top of the gang hierarchy一below the oligarchs and their intermediaries一Barbecue preaches a sense of belonging and describes the ghettos beyond Viv Ansanm’s control as “the enemy.” His bosses, part of a complex web of power and influence, tell him that the neighborhoods they attack, loot, and burn are “police bases.” This is the only Haiti they know. It is a world of hunger, humiliation, and hell. Young solda, seeking to imitate their social media heroes, can access highly-coveted consumer objects previously out of reach, such as kleren (moonshine), weapons, clothes, sneakers, iPhones, and even girls. Higher-up members may earn a motorbike. This system ensures that, in the context of deepening deprivation in Haiti, there will always be fresh recruits.

Makenson, a longtime friend and community leader, told me about his 16-year-old little brother who was a gang soldier killed by the PNH. Joderson, nicknamed Ti Lanmò (Little or Young Death), “joined [a gang] to protect himself. He joined to gain access.” Impacted by the absence of their parents and the constant grangou (hunger), tire (shootouts), and bal mawon (stray bullets), his brother saw no other choice.  “After a lot of Lanmò San Jou’s guys got killed, some local gangsters asked Joderson if he’d help carry packages and be a lookout from the front of the neighborhood,” he recalls. As his brother became more important to the gang, he acquired money and weapons. “I no longer recognized him,” Makenson said. The brothers lost communication and Makenson was eventually forced to leave his home. Joderson was killed during a police raid in 2024.

Displaced and refusing to embrace the paramilitary project, Makenson worries about future conflicts sparked by these gang invasions. In his home commune of Kwadèbouke, neighboring communities once stood united against the corrupt PNH and the kleptocracy that runs Haiti. Now, reflecting on the system that killed his little brother and so many like him, he wonders what future is possible in a country that is thirsty for revenge. “After being burned out of homes, forgiveness is foreign to our people right now,” he remarked. “When they see Lamo San Jou or Barbecue boasting and celebrating on TikTok, they want blood.”

The Wretched Of The Earth

A piece of propaganda used by the paramilitaries to justify and glorify their use of child soldiers shows several children holding automatic weapons. Below them the text reads: “You created another spirit in a young man the day you chose to murder his family because of the ghettos they are from. You made him live without love, without his mother, older brother and older sister. His revenge will be even worse.” Its creator, Jeff Kanara Larose, is Viv Ansanm’s “Taliban” gang boss in Kanara, a sprawling neighborhood formed by refugees after the 2010 earthquake in Site Soley. Like Barbecue and Lamò San Jou, he has a million dollar FBI bounty on his head and a massive stock of U.S.-made automatic weapons.

It is not clear who the target of revenge is in Kanara’s propaganda. The paramilitaries have not targeted oligarchs or imperialists. Instead, they target the poorest ghettos, home to those that Martinican philosopher Frantz Fanon called “the wretched of the Earth.” These are the effects of colonial processes of dehumanization on the colonized: internalizing and turning the violence towards their own people.

Even amid the violence, the displaced and clear-eyed Haitian intelligentsia and their skeleton of community organizations refuse to demonize these children. Some, like Patrick, a displaced lawyer from Kafou Fèy who now lives packed in a school classroom with his family and hundreds of others, points to the continuous intervention of western powers in the country. “This is the result and continuation of the 1915 U.S. occupation of Haiti,” he said.

Others like Erika, a Haitian mother of two whose entire extended family was burned out of Delmas 31, highlight the need to build alternatives to militarization. “These children are the orphans of the 2010 earthquake and the harsh neoliberal economy,” she said. ”They have a lot of blood on their hands, they have raped many of us and our daughters. But there are better solutions than a superior force coming into Haiti and murdering them all.”

Unfortunately, Haiti’s elites and western powers continue to send foreign soldiers, who do not speak Kreyòl or understand anything about the country, to face the gangs. Two armies, both armed to the teeth with U.S. guns, are squaring off, with the Haitian people hopelessly trapped in the middle.

Editor’s Note: Some names and details have been changed to protect the safety of the Haitian social leaders and journalists.

EDITOR’S NOTE: Danny Shaw is an International Affairs analyst with TeleSUR, HispanTV, and other international media outlets. He teaches Latin American and Caribbean studies at the City University of New York and has worked with Haitian social movements and studied Kreyòl since 1998. His work can be found at @profdannyshaw.

Credit Line: This is syndicated in partnership with the North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA).

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Bolivian President Rodrigo Paz on Tuesday denounced the existence of an international ring dedicated to stealing and adulterating gasoline and diesel imported into the country, with operations detected in Chile, Argentina, and Paraguay. According to the president, the scheme originated under the previous management of Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB), the state-owned fuel supply company.

On March 27, El Salvador’s legislative assembly approved legislation allowing those under the age of 18 to serve life sentences for murder, rape and terrorism. 

The move came just weeks after the Nayib Bukele regime amended the constitution to permit life sentences for adults, part of its hallmark iron fist approach to crime. 

The extension of penalties marks a significant escalation in the severity of the country’s punitive policy, raising a number of ethical and legal concerns, according to rights groups.

The reform to the Juvenile Criminal Law provides for “the inapplicability of the special juvenile procedure” which formerly saw children and adolescents held in separate, secure centres designed to provide a more nurturing environment for younger inmates. 

With the support of the Salvadoran Institute for the Comprehensive Development of Children and Adolescents, child-friendly court-procedures and age-appropriate prisons which prioritized education, vocational training, psychological support and social reintegration were once foregrounded. 

But under the reformed law children and adolescents could now be condemned to a lifetime in prison.

Rights groups warn that the reform risks disproportionately targeting children and adolescents from lower socio-economic backgrounds, many of whom are already vulnerable to coercion and exploitation by organised crime.

The United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF) and the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) said in a joint statement that the reforms “constitute a contradiction of the standards enshrined in the Convention on the Rights of the Child.” These standards say that children in conflict with the law must be treated in a manner that “prioritizes their rehabilitation and reintegration, and that deprivation of liberty be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest, appropriate time.”

Since being elected as president in 2019, Bukele has been a divisive figure in El Salvador. In a bid to tackle gang violence, he introduced a state of emergency in March 2022, granting authorities broad-based authority to arrest and detain individuals suspected of gang affiliation without warrants.

The state of emergency, intended to last no longer than 30 days, has been extended more than 20 times as Bukele continues his crusade against criminal networks, groups, individuals and affiliates. 

As of March 2026, approximately 91,500 people have been arrested under the state of emergency, according to official government figures. 

While the policy has been credited with reducing homicide rates and improving public safety, its implementation has been deeply controversial. Reports suggest that many individuals, and even young people and adolescents, have been detained based on tenuous evidence, including their socio-economic status. 

This raises the alarming possibility that minors could face life imprisonment not on the basis of proven criminal activity, but on suspicion alone.

However, Bukele seems an unstoppable force, frequently polling above other Latin American leaders in popularity during his term.

Minors face arrests under repeated states of emergency

The precedents set by President Bukele’s mano duro policy are particularly concerning with the new reformed juvenile penal code on the horizon.

Salvadoran security forces have already detained more than 3,300 children, many of whom had no apparent connection to gangs’ criminal activities, according to this Human Rights Watch report.

The risk of condemning a young person to a lifetime in prison based on flawed evidence or coerced confessions is a significant concern for NGOs and analysts. 

“The legislative changes place children under the authority of El Salvador’s adult prison administration, which has been responsible for torture and other grave abuses,” noted Juanita Goebertus, Americas director at Human Rights Watch.

While the reform promises to hold “periodic reviews” for life sentences, it still raises questions about the availability of the alternative of rehabilitation programs within the prison system.

Previous amendments to the Criminal Code which determine that criminal courts will have “exclusive jurisdiction” to hear proceedings “against adults and minors” involved in crimes punishable by life sentences equally raises concern about the adequacy of legal representation for minors.

If the repercussions of the “Bukele Method” continue to be enacted so stringently, young people will likely continue to face undue arrest.

Minors transferred to adult prisons

Equally concerning are the precedents set by the “Bukele Method”, demonstrating a tendency that juvenile offenders may be absorbed into an already overburdened prison system. 

UNICEF and CRC have similarly argued that “detention is not only harmful to children, but also highly costly and ineffective in preventing crime”.

Juanita Goebertus explained that there is a risk of children experiencing mistreatment in adult prison systems and that “transferring children into detention facilities designed and operated for adults, even if they are placed in nominally separate areas, is a massive regression for children’s rights in El Salvador.”

Evidence demonstrates that young children and adolescents imprisoned for “collaborating” with organised crime groups or low-level crimes are more likely to reoffend or become more closely affiliated with criminal groups during their time in prison. 

While many Salvadorans credit Bukele’s hardline policies with delivering safer streets and a dramatic reduction in violence, international bodies such as UNICEF caution that security gains may prove fragile unless “the specialized nature of the juvenile justice system” and the rights of all children are fully upheld.

Failing to invest in rehabilitation, education and social reintegration risks entrenching the very cycles of crime these policies seek to eliminate. Prioritizing punitive measures over children’s rights may ultimately undermine both long-term public safety and the wellbeing of future generations.

Featured image description: (From left to right) Minister of Defense René Merino Monroy, General Director of Penal Centers Osiris Luna Meza, President Nayib Bukele, Minister of Public Works Romeo Herrera, and Director of the National Civil Police Mauricio Arriaza Chicas touring the Terrorism Confinement Center (CECOT) in January 2023.

Featured image credit: President’s Office of El Salvador.

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One year after the Trump administration launched its tariff offensive against more than 180 countries, Latin America presents a mixed picture: some economies lost competitiveness in the U.S. market, while others redirected exports or negotiated agreements to cushion the blow.

The United States authorized the passage of a Russian oil tanker loaded with crude bound for Cuba, in the first easing of the de facto energy blockade Washington has imposed on the island since the start of the year, The New York Times reported, citing a U.S. official.

By Josse Martinez and Danjha León Martinez

When the United States ended Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for more than 57,000 Hondurans in July 2025 (effective September 8), the U.S. government framed it as a routine administrative update. But in humanitarian terms, it was something else entirely: the deliberate withdrawal of a critical protection mechanism in the middle of an ongoing emergency. The U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants warned that the decision “withdraws stability, security, and dignity” from families who have depended on TPS for over two decades. 

TPS is often discussed as an immigration category, but it functions more accurately as an emergency humanitarian protection tool deployed when a state cannot safeguard the lives of its own citizens. The TPS termination for Honduras nationals therefore does not simply change legal status; it actively produces a new humanitarian crisis. The move comes as Honduras faces extreme violence, institutional fragility, climate-driven displacement, and femicides. Sending tens of thousands back now is dangerous and morally indefensible. 

A protection mechanism withdrawn at the worst possible moment 

TPS provides temporary legal status and work authorization to people whose home countries face extraordinary and unsafe conditions. The humanitarian purpose is straightforward: people cannot be returned to danger. Yet the United States now argues that “conditions have improved.” Evidence shows the opposite. Honduras continues to be one of the most violent countries in the hemisphere, combining: 

• widespread gang control and territorial governance 
• an overburdened and under-resourced justice system 
• climate-driven food insecurity 
• and staggering levels of violence against women and girls 

According to the UN Sustainable Development Group, Honduras has long faced another “pandemic” of gender-based violence, registering femicide rates of 6.2 per 100,000 women. Terminating TPS while these conditions persist is a humanitarian miscalculation that potentially places civilians directly in harm’s way. 

A humanitarian crisis manufactured by policy 

Humanitarian frameworks define crisis as a situation in which civilians cannot survive without external protection. Honduras clearly meets this definition: 1.6 million people require humanitarian aid, the state cannot guarantee basic safety, and threats such as gang violence and femicide operate with near-total impunity. Under international norms, especially the principle of non-refoulement, governments must not return people to countries where their lives or freedom are threatened. 

The U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants warns that ending TPS will “force people deeper into uncertainty and fear,” including individuals who originally fled death threats, extortion, or gender-based violence. In response to the decision, Honduran TPS holders and national advocacy groups have pushed back. The National TPS Alliance, along with the ACLU and other immigrant-rights organizations, filed a federal complaint challenging the termination of TPS for Honduras. The lawsuit argues that the decision was “arbitrary and capricious,” ignored unmistakable evidence of ongoing danger, and violated the government’s humanitarian obligations. This legal action shows that the crisis caused by ending TPS is so severe that civil society had to mobilize in court simply to protect Hondurans from being returned to life-threatening conditions. 

Femicide: The central context of forced return 

Femicide is not peripheral to TPS; it is one of the main reasons Hondurans fled. In 2023, Honduras reached a femicide rate of 7.2 per 100,000 women, one of the highest in Latin America. Organizations like Cattrachas document how gender-based killings intersect with policing failures, institutional corruption, and gang control. 

Many Honduran women losing TPS originally fled because they were being hunted by abusive partners, traffickers, or armed criminal groups. Ending TPS is therefore not simply deportation. It will force women to return to an environment where they are deliberately targeted and where the state fails to protect them. As the Women’s Refugee Commission notes, gender-based violence is a leading driver of forced migration. Repatriation under these conditions directly increases the risk of femicide. 

Community resilience: Art as resistance 

Even as institutions fail, communities in Honduras have built their own forms of protection. One of the most powerful is art-activism (“artivism”). Public art challenges the normalization of violence and preserves memory in ways formal systems often fail to do. The UN Spotlight Initiative has supported art-based gender-violence prevention in 17 Honduran municipalities, using murals, sculptures, and theater to create community dialogue and challenge harmful norms. 

The feminist graffiti duo Dolls Clan (Mayki Graff Ortega and Suam Fonseca) creates public murals honoring victims of femicide and amplifying feminist resistance. Their work turns public walls into spaces of collective mourning and political demand. Public art is a form of humanitarian response: it educates, resists, and keeps victims’ stories alive when formal justice systems fail. But art cannot replace systemic protection. 

The immediate human cost of ending TPS 

Ending TPS triggers four immediate humanitarian harms: 

1. Family separation: Thousands of U.S.-born children have Honduran parents with TPS. Families now face the devastating choice between separation or relocating to a country many children have never known. 
2. Economic instability and re-poverty: TPS holders have spent decades building careers, homes, and businesses in the U.S. Forced return pushes them into an already unstable Honduran economy. 
3. A rise in irregular migration: History shows that ending legal pathways does not reduce migration; it increases undocumented migration as people seek safety through more dangerous routes. 
4. Exposure to direct violence: Returnees become immediate targets of gangs, extortion networks, police corruption, and gender-based violence. TPS termination does not fix migration. It makes it deadlier. 

A crisis created by political choice 

Ending TPS for Honduras is not a neutral administrative action, it is a political decision with profound humanitarian consequences. It forces thousands back into a country facing intersecting emergencies: femicide, gang rule, climate disaster, and institutional collapse. While communities fight to maintain dignity and memory, the U.S. is withdrawing one of the only forms of international protection Hondurans have left. It abandons a protection promise the United States upheld for more than two decades. If the United States seeks to honor its humanitarian commitments, it must extend TPS or redesign it as a pathway to long-term stability, not dismantle it. Protection should never depend on political cycles. Lives depend on it. 

Josse Martinez is a Global Governance, Politics, and Security (GGPS) graduate student at American University. He is of Honduran and Guatemalan descent.

Danjha Leon Martinez is a Research Assistant for the Immigration Lab at the Center for Latin American & Latino Studies. She is a Development Management graduate student at American University with a focus on humanitarian aid and global migration

When heading to South America, you don’t have the wide range of choices you’ll find for Europe. You’ve got the US carriers, three main South American ones, then a few serving just one or two countries. The largest one is of those is LATAM Airlines, based in Chile. Unlike Avianca, it has kept the...

The post Latin American Airlines: LATAM appeared first on Luxury Latin America Blog.

A UN expert group on mercenaries warned on Friday of a significant increase in the recruitment of Colombian mercenaries, driven by the proliferation of armed conflicts worldwide. After an 11-day visit to Colombia, the body estimated that more than 10,000 citizens — nearly all former military and police personnel — have been recruited abroad over the past decade, with offers ranging from $2,000 to $6,000 per month.

 Luiz Inazio Lula de Silva is not just another President of Brazil. He is the first one to rise from abject  poverty, breaking a long tradition of leadership dominated by political and economic elites.

We were fortunate enough to spend some time at Pueblo Bonito Vantage Hotel in San Miguel de Allende the same month it opened. This is run by the same company that has long operated resorts on the coast, so they weren’t starting from scratch on the systems and management. It’s a gorgeous hotel that...

The post Tour San Miguel’s Newest Large Hotel: Pueblo Bonito Vantage appeared first on Luxury Latin America Blog.

By Maggie McMahon   

Sexual violence during migration journeys is rarely addressed in the current political climate. Yet this issue is rampant for many migrants, especially those making the journey from Latin America to the United States. The personal experiences and testimonies from those who completed this journey provide valuable insight into the dangers that migrants face in this region. This problem demands more attention, as it is one of the many dangers that migrants face while attempting to reach the U.S. 

In her late 20’s and from Ecuador, Verónica details her lengthy and dangerous journey to the United States, where she walked many miles to the US-Mexico border and experienced rough traveling conditions, including falling off a train.

Ay me están esperando llorar. Bueno, sufrí mucho, pasé mucha hambre, dormí en parque—muchas cosas feas…Bueno, después de eso, yo cambié de tren y me subí a otro tren que ese sí era el que me traía, pero ese tren se quedó 3 días en el desierto. Ahí entonces yo como que le daba gracias a Dios de no haberme subido a ese tren porque yo me pude subir, pero me dio miedo y no me subí, pero mucha gente se subió y algunos se cayeron, incluidos niños. Bueno, ese tren me avanzó hasta la frontera, de ahí yo me bajé y camine bastante. Yo llegué a este país con los pies podridos ensangrentados porque yo caminé artístico.[1]

Oh, this is making me want to cry. Well, I suffered a lot. I went very hungry, slept in a park—many ugly things… Well, after that, I changed trains and got on another one, the one that was supposed to bring me here. But that train stayed stranded in the desert for three days. At that point, I felt like thanking God for not getting on the earlier train. I could have boarded it, but I was scared and didn’t. Many people did get on, and some fell off, including children. Well, that train took me to the border, from there I got off and walked a lot. I arrived in this country with rotten feet, bloodied because I walked a tremendous amount. 

When asked if she felt in danger during her trip, Verónica shared her experience in Guatemala:

Uh no yo siempre diré que Guatemala es el peor país que yo pude conocer ahí, así que no te digo. A mi en bus me tocaron los senos, las partes íntimas. Me sacaron todo el dinero.

Oh no, I will always say that Guatemala is the worst country I could have known there, so I tell you. They touched my breasts and private parts on the bus. They took all my money.

After arriving in the United States, Verónica’s friend provided her a place to stay and food for a few weeks. She now works as a delivery driver.

Another woman, Mariana, also shared her experience with sexual violence during her journey. In her fifties and from El Salvador, she has been in the US for over two decades. During her journey from El Salvador, she recalls that:

Fíjese que yo fui víctima de eso. No llegar al acto sexual porque gracias a Dios no me llegaron a violar, pero en el camino para acá si fui tocada por los hombres. Puedo recordar de que no sé si todas percibirán eso, pero yo sí lo viví. Sí. Sería porque yo cuando venía ya venía …, pero yo parecía… yo era bien delgadita, parecía una niña de 14 años. No sé si por eso es que abusaron de mí de esa manera. Pero sí pudeir tocada por más de 2 hombres en el camino. 

I remember that I was a victim of that. Not in a sexual act, thanks to God, they did not rape me, but on the way here I was touched by men. I can remember that I didn’t know if anyone else sees that, but I did experience that…it must have been because when I came…I seemed to be very thin, I looked like a 14-year-old girl. I don’t know if that’s why they abused me in that way. But I was touched by more than 2 men on the way.

Mariana’s story demonstrates how persistent the dangers of migration have been for women over the years. 

These instances of sexual assault are not isolated. Samuel, born in Colombia in the late 1990s, migrated to Venezuela as a child due to political violence and the unfavorable economic situation. He moved to Brazil as a young teen to work in the mines after his parents separated and migrated to the US in 2024. 

While traversing the Darién Gap, a remote thick jungle crossing between Colombia and Panama, David witnessed many violent situations. The Darien Gap is known for its dangerous and difficult conditions, with many people experiencing gang violence, crime, sexual violence, disease, and death. 

David reported that while on the Panamanian side of the Darien Gap, he witnessed a group of Indigenous men rape a woman traversing the crossing. He also saw this group of men shoot the woman’s husband. 

Hay indios que agarraron a una mujer y se la violaron. Y al esposo… viendo que están pasando eso, el esposo se le baten o se levanta, le pegan un tiro. El indio agarró con una escopeta y le pegó el tiro. Puso, se lo pegó aquí… Así, puff, le pegó el tiro aquí …. Ahí quedaron los dos y salieron los indios. Antes habían robado y todo, pero después estaban violando a la mujer ahí ante el grupo. 

There are Indians who grabbed a woman and they raped her. And the husband … seeing that they are going through that, the husband fights him or gets up, they shoot him. The Indian grabbed a shotgun and shot him. He put it, he stuck it here… So, poof, he shot him here…. The two of them laid there and the Indians left…Before, they had robbed and everything, but after they were raping the woman there in front of the group.

Sexual violence is unfortunately a common experience in the Darién Gap. Other migrants we interviewed also reported witnessing instances of it, as with the case of Mauricio. Born in Venezuela, Mauricio migrated to the US four years ago to find better opportunities for his three young children. He traveled to Caracas, Venezuela and then on to Colombia and Peru. During his migration, Mauricio faced many dangerous situations, such as sleeping on the streets and crossing the jungle. As he recounts: 

En Panama fui testigo una violencia que pasó pero eso fue ya entrando en la selva. Violaron una niña y alguna mujer. Entonces yo estuve ahí, o sea, fui vi todo con mis ojos y fui testigo de eso.

In Panama I witnessed violence that happened, but that was already deep in the jungle. They raped a girl and a woman. So, I was there, that is, I saw everything with my eyes and witnessed that. 

Instances of sexual violence were then increasing in the Darién Gap since Panamanian authorities were not monitoring the crossing. Additionally, many instances of sexual violence go unreported due to stigma and shame. With the absence of policing in these remote largely uninhabited areas, armed criminal groups are able to take advantage of vulnerable people traversing the crossing.  Though lately, the Panamanian government has mobilized the army to patrol those areas, as movement north has decreased and now many people are heading south.

Sexual violence have long-term psychological and physical impacts for those who experience and witness it. Victims of rape can suffer sexually transmitted infections, unwanted pregnancies, and physical trauma. Sexual violence can also cause feelings of depression, anxiety, PTSD, and social isolation, as well as heighten an individual’s risk of substance abuse.

Given the ongoing instability faced by many Latin American countries, migration through the Darién Gap is likely to increase. Panamanian authorities must take further action to closely monitor the dangerous conditions in the crossing and provide support for the vulnerable populations crossing it. Greater support for the physical, psychological, and financial needs of migrants should also be implemented in the United States. 

Maggie McMahon is a research intern at the Immigration Lab. She is a senior majoring in international studies. 

Edited by Elizabeth Angione and Vincent Iannuzzi-Sucich

[1] This and the following accounts have been taken from interviews conducted with recent arrivals to the Washington DC-metro region and New York City as part of an ongoing research project of the Immigration Lab in American University’s Center for Latin American and Latino Studies. This project received IRB approval. Given the vulnerability of this population, we have taken steps to ensure the human subjects involved are protected, including eliciting the consent of all research subjects, the use of pseudonyms, and elimination of any individually identifying information.

MIAMI – Eugenio Suárez flung his head back and looked up into the rafters. The sound bouncing off loanDepot park’s steel roof washed over the Venezuelan designated hitter as he held out his arms and motioned for more. Suárez’s RBI double in the top of the ninth gave Venezuela the go-ahead run in an electric […]

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Siamara, the founder of the Argentine Fashion brand this year, starts with this story, ”The brand reflects my personal story and the intersection of the cultures that shaped me. Through Siamara, I combine Indian textiles, craftsmanship, and color with Argentine silhouettes and contemporary style. The result is a collection of distinctive pieces that celebrate cultural fusion, individuality, and the beauty of textile traditions".



After a morning session of birdwatching then a hearty breakfast, I hiked through jungle foliage to a waterfall. The next day we rappelled down the face of it from the summit, then went ziplining from a tower in the afternoon. Day Three onward was completely different though: we were kayaking through the warm waters...

The post Belize Jungle and Beach Packages for a Varied Vacation appeared first on Luxury Latin America Blog.

By Juan A. Bogliaccini, Professor of Political Science, Universidad Católica del Uruguay

This small South American country is seeking new markets and investment while remaining anchored to MERCOSUR and balancing ties with the United States and China.

For more than three decades, Uruguay’s strategy for international economic integration has revolved around the Southern Common Market, MERCOSUR. Founded in 1991 by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, the bloc emerged at the end of the Cold War with the goal of deepening regional economic integration and strengthening trade among its members. For Uruguay, a small country of just over three million people located between two regional giants, the bloc initially proved highly beneficial. During the 1990s, MERCOSUR became the main engine of Uruguayan exports and foreign investment.

That dynamic began to shift at the end of the decade. Brazil’s currency devaluation in 1998 and Argentina’s financial collapse in 2001 exposed the vulnerabilities of Uruguay’s economic dependence on its neighbors. At the time, a majority of the country’s exports was destined for these two markets, and the crises had profound effects on Uruguay’s economy.

These events triggered a long-running debate within the country’s political and economic elites about the future of Uruguay’s international trade strategy. At the center of the discussion was one of MERCOSUR’s key institutional rules: member states cannot negotiate individual free trade agreements outside the bloc. Critics argued that this constraint limited Uruguay’s ability to diversify its economic partnerships in an increasingly globalized world.

For many years, much of the political center-right advocated a strategy similar to that pursued by Chile—signing bilateral free trade agreements across multiple regions of the world. The center-left generally defended remaining firmly within the regional framework, emphasizing the importance of political and economic integration with neighboring countries.

Over time, however, both sides gradually converged toward a more pragmatic position. Today there is broad consensus that Uruguay should remain in MERCOSUR while pushing for greater flexibility within the bloc allowing for members to pursue complementary trade agreements. In practice, leaving MERCOSUR has never been a realistic option. Brazil and Argentina remain crucial trading partners, particularly for exports linked to regional value chains and cross-border production networks.

At the same time, the bloc itself has increasingly sought to expand outward. In recent years, MERCOSUR has concluded trade agreements with Singapore and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which includes Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland. In 2026, after more than twenty-five years of negotiations, MERCOSUR also finalized a landmark trade agreement with the European Union. Across successive governments representing different political parties, Uruguay has consistently supported these negotiations as part of a long-term strategy of gradual trade opening.

Meanwhile, Uruguay’s broader trade relationships have evolved significantly. Over the past two decades, China has become the country’s principal destination for goods exports, particularly agricultural commodities such as soybeans and forestry products like cellulose pulp. At the same time, the United States has become the main market for Uruguay’s rapidly growing service sector, especially software development and business services.

These trends have positioned Uruguay within a complex global landscape shaped by growing geopolitical competition between the world’s two largest economies. Rather than aligning strongly with either side, successive Uruguayan governments have sought to maintain a careful balance between Washington and Beijing while preserving strong ties with their regional partners.

Recent administrations have also attempted to broaden the country’s commercial horizons. During the presidency of Luis Lacalle Pou (2020–2025), Uruguay applied to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), one of the world’s most significant multilateral trade agreements. Although accession negotiations are only beginning, the move signaled Uruguay’s intention to deepen economic ties with Asia-Pacific markets.

The Lacalle Pou government also explored the possibility of negotiating a bilateral free trade agreement with China. While the initiative ultimately did not move forward—largely because Beijing made clear it preferred negotiations with MERCOSUR as a whole—the effort served an important political purpose. Alongside the negotiations with the CPTPP, it signaled to Uruguay’s regional partners that the country was determined to pursue broader trade opportunities.

The current administration of President Yamandú Orsi has continued this strategy of balanced engagement. Diplomatic outreach to both the United States and China reflects Uruguay’s pragmatic approach in an increasingly multipolar global economy. Promoting exports has become particularly important as the strength of the Uruguayan peso makes international competitiveness more challenging for domestic producers.

Despite these global ambitions, Uruguay’s integration into international value chains remains heavily regional. Much of the country’s participation in global trade occurs through “import-to-export” production models, particularly in agro-industrial sectors that rely on imported inputs and regional processing networks. A large share of these exports continues to be destined for MERCOSUR markets, reflecting the enduring importance of regional economic integration.

This structural reality explains why Uruguay’s leaders have consistently pursued a dual strategy: maintaining strong economic ties with Argentina and Brazil while simultaneously seeking new markets and investment partners around the world.

The recently concluded trade agreement between MERCOSUR and the European Union may represent an important step in that direction. Together with the agreements with Singapore and EFTA—and the expected accession of Bolivia to MERCOSUR—the deal could gradually expand the economic horizons of a country that remains heavily dependent on a limited number of export sectors.

For Uruguay, the stakes are significant. Since the end of the global commodity boom in the early 2010s, economic growth has slowed. As a result, it has become more difficult to reduce a fiscal deficit that hovers around 4 percent of GDP while public debt continues to rise gradually. Expanding exports and attracting foreign investment have therefore become central priorities for policymakers.

Yet Uruguay’s small domestic market inevitably limits its appeal to international investors. The country’s greatest economic asset lies instead in its potential role as a stable regional hub within the much larger South American market. With strong institutions, political stability, and relatively high levels of human capital, Uruguay often presents itself as a reliable gateway for companies seeking access to the region.

Realizing that potential, however, will require more than trade agreements alone. Expanding Uruguay’s global economic presence will depend on developing new productive sectors, increasing productivity in existing industries, and moving gradually toward exports with higher value added.

For a small country navigating between two regional giants and competing global powers, this is no simple task. But Uruguay’s strategy remains clear: maintain its regional anchor while steadily expanding its reach into the global economy.

By Ilka Treminio-Sánchez, Political Scientist of the University of Costa Rica.  

The national elections held in Costa Rica on February 1, 2026, marked a turning point in the country’s recent political trajectory. Contrary to expectations of a runoff—common in a highly fragmented party system—the ruling party candidate, Laura Fernández, won in the first round with 48.3 percent of votes counted. This result not only ensured the continuity of the political project championed by President Rodrigo Chaves but also consolidated a deeper transformation of the Costa Rican political system. 

The election saw a 69 percent voter turnout, the highest since 2010. This increase can be interpreted as a sign of civic revitalization, but also as a consequence of growing polarization. During the campaign, two distinct blocs emerged: on one side, the ruling party, organized around Chaves’s personalistic leadership; on the other, a fragmented opposition that, despite its ideological differences, shared concerns about the country’s institutional direction, and which ultimately consolidated most of its votes around the National Liberation Party. In the run up to the election, supporters of traditional and emerging parties came together. Concerned about the country’s democracy, they spontaneously organized various forms of collective action outside event venues. These activities culminated in the so-called “multicolored caravans,” named for the diversity of party flags displayed under the unifying slogan: “Out with Chaves!” But, despite such mobilizations, and in line with poll results, the opposition did not advance to a runoff. 

From an organizational standpoint, the process was impeccable. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal once again demonstrated high standards of transparency and efficiency, reaffirming the technical soundness of the Costa Rican electoral system. However, this procedural strength contrasts sharply with the political tensions that accumulated during Chaves’s presidency, characterized by a confrontational discourse toward oversight bodies and the judiciary. 

The Ruling Party and the Construction of Continuity 

Fernández’s victory cannot be understood without considering the central role of the outgoing president. Although constitutionally barred from immediate reelection, Chaves devised a succession strategy based on personal loyalty and the symbolic transfer of his leadership. The official campaign revolved around the slogan “continuity of change,” presenting Fernández as the custodian of the president’s political mandate and as its guarantor of continued power. 

The electoral vehicle was the Sovereign People’s Party (PPSO), created after Chaves fell out with the leadership of the Social Democratic Progress Party, with which he rose to power in 2022. The reorganization allowed it to concentrate the vote and achieve not only the presidency, but also 31 of the 57 legislative seats, an absolute majority unprecedented in recent decades. 

This result substantially alters the conditions for governance. While previous administrations had to govern with small and fragmented factions, the new government will have a robust parliamentary group, although of late some friction has emerged among its leaders. Nevertheless, only the National Liberation Party – historically the most dominant political force in Costa Rica – had achieved a similar number of representatives in 1982, during an exceptional economic crisis. 

This legislative majority opens the door to the possibility of far-reaching political reforms. During his presidency, Chaves repeatedly expressed interest in expanding the executive branch’s powers, limiting oversight bodies’ authority, and promoting a transformation of the state that his supporters call the “Third Republic,” a successive step in the destruction of the Second Republic inherited after the 1948 Civil War, whose foundations were laid by the liberationist José Figueres Ferrer. Without a supermajority, such reforms were not feasible. Today, the balance of power looks different. 

During the transition period, two unprecedented decisions were announced. First, the president-elect expressed her intention to appoint Rodrigo Chaves as Minister of the Presidency, the sole responsible for coordinating actions between the executive and legislative branches. Second, the outgoing president appointed Laura Fernández as Minister of the Presidency for the remaining months of the administration. Chaves also stated that, in his future role, he would seek to bring on board members of the National Liberation Party to form the supermajority necessary to approve constitutional reforms.

Populism, Leadership, and Institutional Tensions 

Rodrigo Chaves’s governing style represented a break with traditional Costa Rican political patterns. His confrontational rhetoric, directed against media outlets, public universities, judges, and opposition members of parliament, reinforced an anti-establishment narrative that resonated with sectors disillusioned with the status quo.  His rhetoric fits into the political model followed by other populist presidents on the continent. 

Surveys conducted by the Center for Political Research and Studies (CIEP) at the University of Costa Rica showed that his supporters primarily valued his ability to “impose order” and “produce results.” These attributes reflect a social demand for strong leadership and swift decisions, even if such an approach creates tension with the deliberative procedures inherent in liberal democracy. 

In this sense, the Costa Rican case fits into a broader regional trend. The political and inspirational affinity with Salvadorian President Nayib Bukele’s influence was evident throughout the campaign, particularly regarding public safety and proposals to toughen the prison system. Likewise, the first congratulatory messages to Fernández came from far-right figures such as Chilean president-elect Antonio Kast, and Mexican media figure Eduardo Verástegui, suggesting the integration of Costa Rica’s new leadership into transnational conservative-right networks. This realignment does not necessarily imply a break with traditional partners, but it does signal an ideological shift that redefines the country’s international standing. 

Security, Social Cohesion, and a Democratic Future 

The new government’s main challenge will be public security. The sustained increase in homicides and expansion of organized crime have eroded Costa Rica’s reputation as a peaceful exception in Central America. Policies implemented so far have been lax and ineffective, to the point that candidates labeled them permissive during the campaign debates. 

Added to this are structural problems: the deterioration of the education system, the strain on the healthcare system, and the weakening of environmental policies that historically formed part of a national consensus. These issues not only affect social well-being but also undermine the legitimacy of a democratic system seemingly unable to improve the situation. 

The 2026 elections do not simply represent a change or continuity of political parties. They reflect a reconfiguration of the political system around a personalistic leadership that combines right-wing populism, social conservatism, an evangelical agenda, and challenges to institutional checks and balances. The electoral strength of the ruling party is undeniable; so too is the broad-based support it received. 

The underlying concern is undoubtedly that the new continuity government could further the trajectory of democratic erosion. When anti-institutional rhetoric is legitimized by those in power and the political concentration of that power is presented as a condition for effective governance, the risk is not an abrupt collapse but rather an incremental erosion. 

For a society with a long tradition of stability and the rule of law, the central challenge will be to rebuild a minimal consensus around respect for horizontal checks and balances and pluralistic deliberation. The continuity of Chaves’s political project opens a new cycle. Its outcome will depend not only on the Executive and its legislative majority, but also on the capacity of the citizenry and institutions to maintain the balances that have historically defined Costa Rican democracy. 

Source: Wikimedia Commons

By Felipe Rezende, Research Fellow and Visiting Scholar in Residence at American University’s Center for Latin American and Latino Studies (AU-CLALS), from the University of Brasília (UnB), Brazil. 

In the current context of jingoistic nationalisms and divisive political projects, particularly in the United States, where the current Trump administration has intensified a political agenda anchored in anti-immigration discourse and practices, reflecting upon the challenges and opportunities for re-imagining what people across the America’s might have in common, in terms of identity, culture and shared belong, is at present particularly important. Contemporary cultural developments such as Bad Bunny’s performance at the Super Bowl LX and Brazil’s global awarded film industry illustrate how notions of “American” belonging can also be culturally and politically contentious.

Hemispheric Myths of National Assimilation

At first glance, imagining a unitary cultural identity across the Americas appears challenging. Although Latin American nation-states might share similar colonial and post-colonial histories, their different national and subnational cultural commitments have also been forged in dynamic relation with cultural assets from elsewhere influencing what is now recognized as latino culture. Similarly, the idea of a North American identity does not emerge as an empirically verifiable cultural synthesis, but rather as the contingent result of ongoing symbolic disputes marked by racial hierarchies, power asymmetries, and competing projects of belonging.

Mid-twentieth century notions such as the melting pot in the United and the myth of the so-called cosmic race or mestizaje in Latin America, offer different but comparable assimilationist narratives for the nation, narratives which obscure persistent structural conflicts within post-colonial American societies. Such accounts function largely as ideological constructs aimed at producing one or another sort of unified national identity. In this sense, contemporary debates about pluri- or multiculturalism in the Americas carry an inherent ambiguity: cultural diversity is recognized rhetorically but also regulated through mechanisms that posit and reproduce racial and other social asymmetries.

This multicultural dilemma in the Americas, therefore, derives from the tension between the political recognition of plural identities, on the one hand, and the impulse to preserve national identity as previously imagined, on the other. In this context, artistic and cultural production and its diffusion emerge as privileged arenas of symbolic mediation, contestation of meaning, and negotiation of belonging, which often seek to transcend closed assumptions of national identity. We might understand the hemispheric and global diffusion of national artistic production from Latin American countries as more than just cultural industry content, and as helping to circulate diverse cultural perspectives.

Latin American Pop Culture is Having a Moment

Recently, numerous products of Latin American popular culture have achieved global recognition, potentially serving as pillars for re-imagining a broader and more cohesive sense of identity across the Americas, and in ways increasingly independent from taken-for-granted nationalist mythologies across the continent. Especially in times of growing international fragmentation, authoritarian threats to democratic systems, and dysfunctional global regimes that fail to produce international cooperation the cases below illustrate new opportunities for re-imagining identity, culture, and belonging in the Americas.

In recent years musical artists like the Colombian Karol G and Puerto Rican Bad Bunny have come to exemplify the consolidation of Latin urban pop as a transnational cultural phenomenon, with a strong presence in the global music industry and recurring visibility through numerous nominations and awards in the GRAMMY and Latin GRAMMY circuits. Bad Bunny won the 68th GRAMMY Awards in the following categories: Best Música Urbana Album and Best Album Cover, for DeBÍ TiRAR MáS FotoS, and Best Global Music Performance for EoO. Also, his 2026 Super Bowl LX halftime performance made history as the first solo Latino artist to headline the show, bringing renewed attention to discussions about what it means to be “American.”

Also in music, Liniker, a Black Brazilian trans woman songwriter, won three categories at the 26th Latin GRAMMY Awards: Best Portuguese-Language Contemporary Pop Album, and Portuguese-Language Urban Performance for Caju, as well as Best Portuguese-Language Song for Veludo Marrom. In addition, the album Milton + esperanza (2024), a collaboration between the acclaimed North American jazz artist Esperanza Spalding and the Brazilian master Milton Nascimento, was nominated for the 67th GRAMMY Award in the category Best Jazz Vocal Album.

In cinema, Brazilian audiovisual productions have undeniably entered the global mainstream, particularly through films addressing the memory of political tragedies such as that country’s military dictatorship. “I’m Still Here” (2024) won the 2025 Academy Award for Best International Feature Film, the 2025 Golden Globe for Best Actress in a Motion Picture – Drama (Fernanda Torres), and more than 70 additional international awards. “The Secret Agent”(2025) won Best Director (Kleber Mendonça Filho) and Best Actor (Wagner Moura) at the 2025 Cannes Film Festival, and later won the 2026 Golden Globe for Best Non-English Language Film and Best Actor in a Motion Picture – Drama (Wagner Moura). The film is also nominated for the 2026 Academy Awards in the categories Best Picture, Best Actor, Best International Feature Film, and Achievement in Casting.

In literature, the growing presence of Latin American authors within global circuits of recognition can also be observed through the wider international circulation of their books, increasing number of translations, and their selection for prestigious literary prizes. For example, the Brazilian novelist Itamar Vieira Junior, author of Torto Arado (2019), saw the 2023 English translation shortlisted for the 2024 International Booker Prize.

Each Latin American cultural producer mentioned here successfully transformed historically localized experiences – often addressing political violence, state terrorism, racism, and patriarchy, among other challenging topics – into aesthetically communicable narratives accessible at a transnational scale. But it is important to note that these recent successes in music, film and literature cannot be explained solely by the artistic genius of their creators. Beyond their evident creative excellence, also important has been the existence of public policies supporting the production and diffusion of national cultural assets, which have also contributed to the international success of Latin American popular culture.

Take the case of Brazil, which put in place a set of public policies that directly incentivize and support contributions to the country’s cultural economy. These include the so-called Rouanet Law, providing tax incentives to support the completion and circulation cultural projects. In the audiovisual field specifically, the Audiovisual Sector Fund (FSA) ensures public resources for film production and distribution. They also include the National Aldir Blanc Policy (PNAB), which established a continuous and decentralized state-funding model strengthening cultural infrastructure and expanding access to cultural rights at the local level. The international reach of works such as “I’m Still Here” (2024) and “The Secret Agent” (2025) should also be understood as the result of a public infrastructure that sustains the competitiveness and global insertion of Brazilian audiovisual products.

What Hemispheric Cultural Diplomacy Has to Offer

Whether through voluntary cultural cooperation, institutional support from domestic cultural public policies, or efforts of public and cultural diplomacy, the growing presence of Latin American artistic production in the hemisphere is neither accidental nor merely the result of its exoticization by Global North audiences. Despite long-standing legacies of stereotyping and archetypal representations of Latin American peoples and cultures, contemporary Latin American cultural products, which circulate throughout the hemisphere and beyond, help us to reconfigure the hemisphere’s identity in new and pluricultural ways.

Even amid the challenges posed by a context of fragmentation, competition, and new threats of geopolitical violence, the aesthetic innovations and moral premises foregrounded by contemporary Latin American artists, and informed by expressions of human rights, peaceful coexistence, and American belonging, present rich opportunities for new imaginaries of hemispheric identity and culture. In this sense, imagining what people across the Americas might have in common can cease to be just an idealistic abstraction and become one critical horizon for revitalizing mutual respect and democratic coexistence in the hemisphere.

Since I’m based in Mexico and the country seems to grow lots of sugar cane, it has been a mystery to me why they don’t produce more rum. So when I see a Mexican rum brand on the shelf I don’t recognize, I almost always buy it. So when I saw Ron La Gloria...

The post Ron La Gloria Rum From Veracruz, Mexico appeared first on Luxury Latin America Blog.

The Pantanal is a land of superlatives. The largest tropical wetland in the world. A biodiversity hot spot. Home to South America’s “Big Five”: Jaguar, Giant Anteater, Giant River Otter, Maned Wolf & Brazilian Tapir. Not to mention the Pantaneira culture, shaped by an unforgiving landscape. What the floodplain landscape lacks in elevation it holds […]

The post The Pantanal hotspot of Biodiversity appeared first on New Jetpack Site.

You’ve bought your plane ticket, booked your hotels, lined up tours, and you’ll be heading to a country in Latin America on vacation. Great! You’re not quite done yet though. Make sure you’re prepared for what can go wrong along the way by getting a few extra travel apps on your phone or laptop....

The post Download These Travel Apps Before Your Latin America Trip appeared first on Luxury Latin America Blog.

In the face of Trump’s steady decline in approval ratings, White House spokesman Davis Ingle claimed: “The ultimate poll was November 5th 2024 when nearly 80 million Americans overwhelmingly elected President Trump to deliver on his popular and commonsense agenda.” OVERWHELMINGLY? Trump received under 50% of the popular vote and only 1.5% more than Kamala Harris. Does that make his triumph “overwhelming?” Of course not, but that doesn’t deter Trump and his allies from constantly conflating the popular vote and the electoral college vote in order to claim that 2024 was a landslide victory.

Mérida, February 23, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Venezuelan National Assembly passed the Amnesty Law for Democratic Coexistence on Thursday, January 19. The government, led by Acting President Delcy Rodríguez, immediately enacted the legislation and presented it as a step toward “peace and tolerance.” The law establishes mechanisms that aim to promote political reconciliation through a […]

The post Venezuela offers Amnesty and pardon for Political Prisoners appeared first on New Jetpack Site.

Momentum is building for the March 28 massive nation-wide No Kings rally. But as reflected in this sign “No War on Venezuela,” the protests should focus as much on the aggressive regime-change moves by the U.S. and the resultant death and destruction, as on issues on the domestic front. These photos are from today’s protest in Germantown MD, which are taking place every Saturday and are getting positive, enthusiastic responses from cars passing by at this busy intersection. 

US President Donald Trump is considering a visit to Venezuela, though he did not specify when the trip might take place or what agenda it would entail. I’m going to make a visit to Venezuela, Trump told reporters outside the White House on Friday. The US President addressed the press ahead of a trip to […]

The post USA demands Venezuela to change Labor Laws, Court & Banking Systems appeared first on New Jetpack Site.

The U.S. embargo (really a blockade) on Cuba is a “humanitarian threat.” Those aren’t my words. They’re Trump’s very words. Basically, what Trump is saying amounts to this: Someone puts a gun to some else’s head and tells the person to pull down their pants. He then says, if you don’t do what I'm telling you to do, I’m going to kill you and it’ll be your fault.

Caracas, February 4, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Chavista supporters filled the streets of Caracas on Tuesday to demand the release of President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady and Deputy Cilia Flores. The rally marked one month from their kidnapping on January 3 as part of a US military attack against Venezuela. Heavy gunfire erupts near Presidential […]

The post Venezuela stages Massive Rally demanding Maduro Liberation & Return to Caracas appeared first on New Jetpack Site.

What has happened in Venezuela is not a surprise to those who have read the Magical Realism stories of Gabriel Garcia Marquez and the other famous Latin American writers. In this signature genre of Latin American literature, the writers blur the line between fantasy and facts, weaving magic into reality.

The Mexican writer Octavio Paz was the most prominent Latin American to understand, analyze, interpret and promote India intellectually and culturally  from a Latin American perspective in the twentieth century. He had first hand experience of India as a diplomat posted in New Delhi for seven years. He has written numerous poems and articles on India. His book "Vislumbres de la India" (In the light of India) is regarded as one of the best introductions to India among Latin American thinkers.  Some cultural visitors from the Spanish-speaking world travel around the country with Paz’s book as an ‘intimate guide’. They see India through his eyes, trying to grasp the immense complexity of India. 

 Nicaragua, the “Republic of Poets” has become a “Republic of Clandestine Poets.”

Our present, however, is one of spiraling crises. Since the financial crash of 2008, the economic crisis converges with ecological collapse and the exhaustion of liberal democratic forms, reaching civilizational dimensions. In this context, the pandemic laid bare how, instead of disappearing, the divide between the center and periphery of the world system is as sharp and as meaningful as ever. 

With neoliberal hegemony fractured, other ways of thinking and practicing politics have reemerged from their intellectual exiles. Among these, dependency theory stands out as an original and revolutionary contribution of Latin American critical thought, offering tools for understanding uneven capitalist development and imperialism both historically and today. For an introduction to this unique framework, we turn to Dr. Jaime Osorio. 

When a military coup d’état in Chile overthrew the democratically elected government of Salvador Allende on September 11, 1973, Osorio had already been accepted to begin his doctoral studies at the University of Chile’s Center for Socio-Economic Studies (CESO, in Spanish). The dictatorship’s advance brought him instead to Mexico, where today he ranks as Distinguished Professor at the Autonomous Metropolitan University (UAM) in Xochimilico and as Researcher Emeritus by the National Council of Science and Technology (CONACYT). He is the author of many books, including Fundamentos del análsis social. La realidad social y su conocimiento and Sistema mundial. Intercambio Desigual y renta de la tierra. 

In this interview, Osorio speaks with Jacobin contributing editor Hilary Goodfriend about the Marxist school of dependency theory, its origins and principles, and its present-day applications.  

Dependency theory and its Marxist strain emerged from debates and dialogues about development, underdevelopment, and imperialism in the context of decolonization and the national liberation struggles of the twentieth century. What were the main positions and strategies in dispute, and how did Marxist dependency theorists position themselves in these arguments?

At the theoretical level, Marxist dependency theory [TMD, in Spanish] is the result of the Cuban Revolution’s victory in 1959. Latin American Marxism was moved by the island’s gesture. All the main theses about the nature of Latin American societies and the character of revolution came into question. 

A little over a decade after that event, which sharpened the debates, TMD reached maturity. In those years, some of the proposals that fed theories of dependency emphasized the role of trade relations, such as the “deterioration of the terms of trade” thesis put forward by the [Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean] CEPAL, which referred to the cheapening of primary goods against the rising prices of industrial products in the world market.

Orthodox Marxists highlighted the presence of internal “obstacles” that impeded development, like idle terrain in the hands of landowners, which also blocked the expansion of wage relations. Generally, in these proposals, capitalism wasn’t to blame. In fact, it was necessary to accelerate its spread so that its inherent contradictions would heighten. Only then could a socialist revolution be proposed, according to this stage-based perspective prevalent in the Communist Parties.

For the Cepalinos, their horizon was achieving advanced capitalism, which would be possible by means of a process of industrialization. This would allow the region to cease exporting primary goods and food products and importing secondary goods, which would now be produced internally, sparking technological development and stemming the outflow of resources. 

In both proposals, the industrial bourgeoisie had a positive role to play, be it in the medium or long term.

For Marxist dependency theory, the region’s so-called economic “backwardness” was a result of the formation and expansion of the capitalist world system, whose course produced development and underdevelopment simultaneously. Therefore, these divergent economic histories are not independent processes, nor are they connected tangentially. From this perspective, the fundamental theoretical and historical problem required explaining the processes that generated both development and underdevelopment in the same movement. 

This problem demanded, furthermore, a response that accounted for how this process is reproduced over time since civilization and barbarism are constantly made anew by the world system. 

Many of the acclaimed Marxist dependency theorists—Ruy Mauro Marini, Theotonio Dos Santos, Vania Bambirra—share a trajectory of flight from South American dictatorships and exile in Mexico. You were also subject to this forced displacement. How did these experiences of revolution and counterrevolution influence the construction of TMD?

Four names stand out in the development of TMD: André Gunder Fank, Theotonio Dos Santos, Vania Vambirra, and Ruy Mauro Marini. The first was a German-U.S. economist and the other three Brazilians, who shared readings and discussions in Brazil before the 1964 coup in that country. Subsequently, they found each other in Chile in the late 1960s in the Center for Socio-Economic Studies, until the military coup of 1973. During this period—at least in the case of the Brazilians—they produced their principals works with regards to TMD. I had the fortune of meeting and working with Marini in Mexico in the mid-1970s, before his return to Brazil. 

TMD offers no concessions to the local ruling classes, holding them responsible for the prevailing conditions in which they manage to reap enormous profits in collusion with international capitals, despite [international] value transfers. For this reason, it was hard for these theorists to find spaces for their knowledge in the academic world.

The 1973 military coup in Chile meant that the principal creators of TMD appeared on the search lists of the military forces and their intelligence apparatus. And this coup in Chile, which was preceded by the coup in Brazil in 1964, was followed by many more in the Southern part of the continent, which dispersed and disbanded working groups and closed important spaces in those societies. 

At the same time, this long counterrevolutionary phase, which was not limited to military governments, favored sweeping transformations in the social sciences, where neoliberal theories and methodological individualism came to reign supreme. TMD emerged in an exceptional period of recent history. However, subsequently and in general—saving certain moments and countries in the region—ideal conditions for its development and dissemination have not existed.

In his classic work, The Dialectics of Dependency, Marini defines dependency as a “relation of subordination between formally independent nations, in whose framework the relations of production of the subordinate nation are modified or recreated in order to ensure the expanded production of dependency.” What are the mechanisms of this expanded production, and how have they changed since Marini formulated his proposal in the 1970s?

When we talk about the processes generated by dependent capitalism, the “dependent” qualifier isn’t redundant. We’re talking about another way of being capitalist. That is to say that in the world system, diverse forms of capitalism coexist and are integrated, and they feed off each other and deepen their particular forms within the global unity of capital. 

The heterogeneity of the system can be explained, then, not by the backwardness of some economies, not as prior states [of development], not as deficiencies.  Each constitutes its full, mature form of capitalism possible in this system. 

In this way, with the stroke of a pen, TMD destroyed the hopes of the developmentalists, who supposed that the dependent economies could achieve higher states of welfare and development within this order constituted by capital. For them, it was just a matter of taking advantage of windows that regularly open. There is nothing in the prevailing dynamic to suggest that things are moving in that direction. To the contrary, what is produced and continues to emerge is the “development of underdevelopment,” so long as capitalist social relations prevail. 

The gap between underdeveloped and developed capitalism, or between imperialist and dependent capitalism is ever widening. Dependency deepens and more acute modalities are generated. In a world in which digital capitalism is gaining ground—the internet of things, artificial intelligence, robotics, as an example—this isn’t hard to understand. 

Experiences like that of South Korea can’t be repeated at will. They are, instead, exceptions to the rule. Why did the IMF cut off and suffocate the Argentine economy and not extend its hand like imperialist capital did for South Korea after the 1952 war on the peninsula? It was the latter’s exceptional position in a strategic space, which was disrupted by the triumph of Mao’s revolution in China and the need to construct a barrier to prevent the expansion of socialism in Korea, that turned on the faucet of enormous resources, at least for Japan and the United States, and put blinders on those defenders of democracy and the free market when South Korea was governed by a succession of military dictatorships that ferociously applied state intervention, not the free market, to define plans and programs to define priorities for investment and loans. 

Today, all a government in the dependent world has to do is establish some rules for foreign capital, and the whole clamor and propaganda of transnational media demand that communism be stopped, impeding international loans, blocking access to markets, and seeking to suffocate those alleged subversives. 

The concept of superexploitation as a mechanism by which dependent capitalists compensate for their subordinate insertion in the international division of labor is perhaps Marini’s most original and polemic proposal. Some Marxists, for example, protest the possibility of the systematic violation of the law of value. This is a theme that you take up in your debate with the Argentinian researcher Claudio Katz. How do you define superexploitation, and why, or in what terms, do you defend its validity today?

With Marini’s short book, The Dialectics of Dependency, whose central body was written in 1972 and would be published in 1973, TMD reaches its point of greatest maturity. We can synthesize the nucleus of Marini’s thesis in the question: How is the reproduction of a capitalism that regularly transfers value to imperialist economies possible?

It’s possible because in dependent capitalism, a particular form of exploitation is imposed which means that capital isn’t just appropriating surplus value, but also part of workers’ consumption fund, which ought to correspond to their salaries, in order to transfer it to their accumulation fund. That’s what the category of superexploitation accounts for. If all capital eventually ends up being unpaid labor, in dependent capitalism, all capital is unpaid labor and the appropriated life fund [of the working class].

Marini’s response is theoretically and politically brilliant, because it allows us to explain the reasons for the multiplication of misery and the devastation of the workers in the dependent world, but also the reasons for which capital is unable to establish stable forms of domination in these regions, regularly expelling huge contingents of workers from its civilizational promises, thrusting them into barbarism and converting them into contingents that resist, revolt, and rise up against the projects of the powerful. 

Superexploitation has consequences at all levels of Latin American societies. For now, we can emphasize that it accompanies the formation of economies oriented to foreign markets. Following the processes of independence in the nineteenth century, and under the guidance of local capitals, the region’s economies advanced on the basis of exports, initially of primary materials and foodstuffs, to which we can add, recently, the production and assembly of luxury industrial goods like cars, televisions, state-of-the-art cell phones—products equally distant from the general consumption needs of most of the working population. This is compatible with the dominant modality of exploitation, which seriously impacts salaries, reducing workers’ consumption power and reducing their participation in the formation of a dynamic internal market. 

It’s relevant here to consider a significant difference with capitalism in the developed world. There, as capitalism advanced in the nineteenth century, it faced the dilemma that in order to keep expanding, which implied the multiplication of the mass of goods and products, it would need to incorporate workers into consumption. That was achieved by paying salaries with the purchasing power for basic goods such as clothing, shoes, utensils, and home furnishings. This balance was accomplished by introducing improved production techniques, which reduced the pressure to extend the working day by multiplying the mass of products thrown into the market. From there, we can understand the weight of relative surplus value in developed capitalism. 

But in Latin America, things worked differently. Nineteenth-century capitalism didn’t see the need to create markets, because they had been available since the colonial period in the imperialist centers. In addition, English capitalism’s takeoff increased the demand for primary materials and foodstuffs. For this reason, there wasn’t any hurry to change the kind of use values and products put on the market. They continued to be foodstuffs and primary goods. In this way, the emergent capitalism in our region was under no pressure to do something qualitatively different. The mass of salaried laborers expanded, but they don’t comprise the principal demand for the goods being produced, which was in Europe, the United States, and Asia.  

Through their insertion in the world market and when it comes time to sell products, Latin American economies transfer value [abroad] for the simple reason that the capitals that operate here have lower compositions and productivities than the capitals in economies that spend more on new machinery, equipment, and technology, allowing them greater productivity and the ability to appropriate value created in other parts of the world. This process is called unequal exchange. 

It's important to note that unequal exchange occurs in the market, at the moment of the purchase and sale of commodities. Apart from their low organic composition, this concept doesn’t tell us much about how these commodities were produced, and above all, what allows for a capitalist process to be reproduced over time in such conditions. That’s where super-exploitation comes in. 

That is the secret that makes dependent capitalism viable. And this calls all the more attention to the errors of people like Claudio Katz, who have formulated proposals that try to eliminate this concept and do so, furthermore, with grotesque arguments, like that Marx never mentioned it in Capital – he refers to [superexploitaiton] many times, in a variety of ways – because that would imply a dilution or a direct attack on his theoretical proposition since capitalism can’t annihilate its workforce. 

I’m not going to repeat those debates with Katz. I will simply reiterate that Marx’s Capital is a book that is central to the study of capitalism and its contradictions. But no one can claim that it accounts for everything, or that capitalism, in its spread over time, can’t exhibit theoretical or historical novelties of any kind. That is a religious reading, but Capital is not a sacred text. Such a position, furthermore, is an attack on a central dimension of Marxism as a theory able to explain not only what has existed, but also that which is new. For this reason, the only orthodoxy Marxism can claim is its mode of reflection.

It's also argued that the spread of superexploitation to the central economies following globalized neoliberal restructuring invalidates its character as a process unique to dependent capitalism. 

Superexploitation can be present anywhere that capital operates, be that in the developed or underdeveloped world, just like forms of relative surplus value and absolute surplus value. Of course, there is superexploitation in Brazil and Guatemala, just as there is in Germany and South Korea. 

But that’s not the problem. What’s relevant is to elucidate the weight of these forms of exploitation, which can be present in any capitalist space, in capital’s reproduction. So the central issue is different, and so are the economic, social, and political consequences. 

Setting aside periods of crisis, when the most brutal forms of exploitation can be exacerbated everywhere, can capitalism operate in the medium and long term without a market that generates salaries, or with extremely low salaries? Something like if, in Germany, the average salary of the Armenians and Turks was generalized for the entire working population, or if the salaries of Mexican and Central American workers in the United States were predominant there. I don’t think so. 

Finally, what tools or perspectives does Marxist dependency theory offer us in the face of today’s crises?

In its eagerness to deal with the acute and prolonged capitalist crisis, capital in every region seeks to accentuate forms of exploitation, including superexploitation. It seeks, once again, to reduce rights and benefits. With the war in Ukraine, it has found a good excuse to justify the increase in the price of food, housing, and energy, and its shameless return to the use of fuels that intensify pollution and environmental barbarism, as well as the increase in military budgets at the expense of wages and jobs. 

The great imperial powers expect the subordination of economies and states to their decisions in periods of this sort. But the current crisis is also accelerating the crisis of hegemony in the world system, which opens spaces for greater degrees of autonomy—which does not put an end to dependency. This is evident in Washington’s difficulties with disciplining the Latin American and African states to support their position in the conflict in Europe. 

The scenario in Latin America over the last few decades reveals processes of enormous interest. We have witnessed significant popular mobilization in almost every country in the region, questioning various aspects of the neoliberal tsunami, be it jobs, salaries, retirements, healthcare and education, as well as rights like abortion, recognition of gender identities, lands, water, and much more. 

On this deeply fractured terrain that capital generates in the dependent world, class disputes tend to intensify. This explains the regular social and political outbursts in our societies. It’s the result of the barbarity that capitalism imposes on regions like ours. 

One expression of this social force is manifested in the electoral terrain. But just as quickly as there have been victories, there have been defeats. These comings and goings can be naturalized, but why haven’t the victories allowed for lasting processes of change? 

Of course, this is not to deny that there have been violent coups of a new sort that have managed to unseat governments. But even then, there were already signs of exhaustion that limited the protests, with the clear exception of Bolivia. There is an enormous gap between the leftist voter and the person who occasionally votes for left projects. The neoliberal triumph was not only in the economic policies and transformations it achieved, but also in its installment of a vision and interpretation of the world, its problems, and its solutions.

The struggle against neoliberalism today involves dismantling privatization of every kind and putting a stop to the conversion of social services and policies into private businesses. That means taking on the most economic and politically powerful sectors of capital, with control over state institutions where legislators, judges, and military members operate, together with the main media, schools, and churches. We can add that these are the sectors of capital with the strongest ties to imperialist capitals and their assemblage of supranational institutions, media, and states. 

It's a powerful social bloc. It’s hard to think about attacking it without having to attack capitalism itself.  

Publicado em Revista Rosa, Vol. 6, No. 1 Septembro 2022. 

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News Briefs

A Brazilian Supreme Court judge rejected a complaint filed by President Jair Bolsonaro in which he accused another justice of abusing his authority, the latest in an ongoing battle between Brazil's executive and judicial branches ahead of October's presidential elections. 

• Covid-19 cases in the Americas surged 27.2 percent last week over the prior one. Central America saw the largest percentage rise in cases, with infections soaring by 80%. The Pan American Health Organization warned that Covid is on the rise again in the region as many countries have abandoned measures like masking and social distancing and many lag in vaccination rates. (Reuters)
  
  
• Experts who track Conti -- the Russia-based ransomware gang that has held Costa Rica's tax collection and export systems hostage for over a month -- said the group had recently begun to shift its focus from the United States and Europe to countries in Central and South America, perhaps to retaliate against nations that have supported Ukraine, reports the New York Times.

The U.S. Biden administration has slightly eased restrictions on Chevron's ability to negotiate with Venezuela's government. Senior administration officials said the move was intended to support talks between the government of President Nicolás Maduro and the U.S.-backed opposition, reports the Washington Post. 

 by LAP Editor, Steve Ellner

by LAP Editor, Jeffery R. Webber

Posted by SPECTRE Journal

With seven opposition presidential candidates imprisoned and held incommunicado in the months leading up to the vote and all the remaining contenders but one from miniscule parties closely allied with President Daniel Ortega and his Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), the results of Nicaragua’s November 7 presidential elections were a foregone conclusion. The government declared after polls closed that Ortega won 75 percent of the vote and that 65 percent of voters cast ballots. The independent voting rights organization Urnas Abiertas, meanwhile, reported an abstention rate of approximately 80 percent and widespread irregularities at polling stations around the country.

The vote was carried out in a climate of fear and intimidation, with a total absence of safeguards against fraud.The vote was carried out in a climate of fear and intimidation, with a total absence of safeguards against fraud. In a complete breakdown of the rule of law, Ortega carried out a wave of repression from May to October, leading the opposition to issue a joint statement on October 7 calling for a boycott of the election. Several dozen opposition figures—among them, presidential candidates, peasant, labor, and student leaders, journalists, and environmentalists—were arrested and detained without trial, while several hundred others were forced into exile or underground.

Among those exiled were celebrated novelist Sergio Ramirez, who served as Ortega’s vice president during the 1980s revolution. While the government charged Ramirez with “conspiracy to undermine national integrity,” his crime was provoking the ire of the regime by publishing his latest novel, Tongolele No Sabía Bailar, a fictionalized account of the 2018 mass protests that marked the onset of the current political crisis and the degeneration of the regime into dictatorship. The book was promptly banned in the country, with customs authorities ordered to block shipments at ports of entry.

The repression particularly decimated the left-leaning opposition party Democratic Renovation Union (UNAMOS), formerly called the Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS). The MRS was formed in 1995 by Ortega’s former comrades in arms who either left the FSLN after the failure of their efforts to democratize it or were expelled for challenging Ortega’s leadership of the party. Among those UNAMOS leaders arrested and to date held incommunicado are legendary guerrilla commanders Dora María Téllez and Hugo Torres, as well as deputy foreign minister in the 1980s, Victor Hugo Tinoco, and party president Ana Margarita Vigil. Amnesty International condemned such detentions and incommunicado conditions as “enforced disappearance as a strategy of repression.”

As part of the crackdown the government also banned 24 civic organizations and professional associations—in addition to some 30 that it had previously banned, including three opposition political parties. The majority of these 24 organizations were professional medical guilds that had come under fire for criticizing the regime’s handling of the Covid-19 pandemic, including reporting that the government had concealed the number of infections and deaths. Vice President Rosario Murillo accused doctors of “health terrorism” and of spreading “false outlooks and news” on the impact of the contagion. During the early months of the pandemic the government convened mass public events under the banner of “Love in Times of Covid.” Nicaragua, together with Haiti, has the lowest rate of vaccination in Latin America, with only 4.9 percent of the population inoculated as of October.

In late 2020, the Sandinistas decreed a spate of laws that allows authorities to criminalize anyone who speaks out against the government. Among these are a Cybercrime Law that allows fines and imprisonment of anyone who publishes in the press or on social media what the government deems to be “false news.” Meanwhile, a “hate crimes” law allows life sentences for anyone considered to have carried out “hate crimes,” as defined by the government. Among the varied offenses listed by Sandinista prosecutors for the recent wave of detentions are “conspiracy to undermine national integrity,” “ideological falsehood,” “demanding, exalting, or applauding the imposition of sanctions against the Nicaraguan state and its citizens,” and “using international funding to create organizations, associations, and foundations to channel funds, through projects or programs that deal with sensitive issues such as sexual diversity groups, the rights of Indigenous communities, or through political marketing on topics such as free expression or democracy.”

A week before the vote, Ortega proclaimed that his wife, Vice President Rosario Murillo, was henceforth the “co-president” of the country. While his bizarre declaration has no legal basis or constitutional legitimacy, it was widely seen as a move to anoint her as his successor—the 76-year-old Ortega is known to be in ill health—and a further step towards the rule of a family dynasty. The ruling couple’s eight children already serve as advisors to the presidency and manage the family’s empire of private and ostensibly public media outlets, investment funds, and family businesses.

A mid-October poll by CID-Gallup—an independent pollster that has been conducting political opinion surveys in the country since 2011—found that 76 percent of the country’s electorate believed the country was moving in the wrong direction. The poll reported that 19 percent of the electorate planned to vote for Ortega, 65 percent stated they would favor an opposition candidate, and 16 percent remained undecided. A rival pollster contracted by the FSLN, M&R, showed Ortega with nearly 80 percent support. While all polls should be assessed with caution given the methodological limitations to surveys conducted amid political instability and civil conflict, it is noteworthy that Ortega’s support dropped to 19 from the 33 percent support reported by a CID-Gallup survey conducted in May of this year, which in turn was down from the high point of popular support for Ortega, 54 percent, registered in CID-Gallup’s 2012 poll.

Now that the votes have been cast, it is impossible to get accurate figures for the results given that the Sandinistas control the Supreme Electoral Council and exercise a near absolute control over reporting on the results. In addition, independent foreign observers were banned, and the threat of repression has dissuaded journalists and civic organizations from speaking out.

Ortega will now start his fourth consecutive term in office since the FSLN returned to power in 2007 in the midst of economic and political crisis. With its legitimacy shattered in the aftermath of the 2018 mass uprising and its violent repression, the regime has to rely more on direct coercion to maintain control. After the economy contracted each year from 2018 to 2020, the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America estimates a 2.0 percent growth rate for the current year and 1.8 percent for 2022—not enough for the economy to recover from the three-year tumble. As the crisis has intensified, the number of Nicaraguans trying to cross the U.S.-Mexico border climbed to historically unprecedented levels to exceed 50,000 this year, compared to just a few thousand in 2020. These numbers are in addition to the 140,000 who had already fled into exile since 2018, mostly to Costa Rica.

The International Left Remains Divided on Nicaragua

The international left remains divided on the Nicaraguan crisis, with some among it arguing that the Ortega-Murillo regime represents a continuation of the 1980s revolution and that the United States has been attempting to overthrow it. However, as I showed in an earlier NACLA article, there is little evidence to corroborate the claim that the 2018 mass uprising was instigated by Washington in an attempt to carry out a coup d’état against the government, or that the United States has since carried out a destabilization campaign aimed at overthrowing the regime.

It was not until the mass protests of 2018 that the co-government pact that Ortega had negotiated with the capitalist class, organized into the Superior Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP), broke down.The Ortega inner circle hacked its way into the ranks of the country’s elite in the aftermath of the 1980s revolution and launched a new round of capitalist development starting in 2007. During this period, the Sandinista bourgeoisie set about to vastly expand its wealth. Leading Sandinistas grouped around Ortega heavily invested in tourism, agroindustry, finance, import-export, and subcontracting for the maquiladoras. Ortega and Murillo championed a program—dressed in a quasi-leftist discourse of “Christian, Socialist, and Solidarity”— of constructing a populist multiclass alliance under the firm hegemony of capital and Sandinista state elites. This model did improve material conditions until the economy began to tank in 2015. It was not until the mass protests of 2018 that the co-government pact that Ortega had negotiated with the capitalist class, organized into the Superior Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP), broke down.

Washington would have liked to have a more pliant regime in place from the start, and the recent events have upped the ante in U.S.-Nicaragua relations. Nonetheless, successive U.S. administrations accommodated themselves since 2007 to the Ortega government, which cooperated closely with the U.S. Southern Command, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and U.S. immigration policies. Although the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has supplied several million dollars to opposition civic organizations through the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), USAID also granted several hundred million dollars directly to the Ortega government from 2007 until 2018.

On the eve of the Nicaraguan vote, the U.S. Congress passed the RENACER Act, which calls for targeted sanctions on Nicaraguan government officials found guilty of human rights violations and corruption. It also requires the executive branch to determine if Nicaragua should be expelled from the Central American Free Trade Agreement and to “expand oversight” of lending to Nicaragua by international financial agencies. In 2017 the U.S. government passed almost identical legislation, the NICA Act, which to date has resulted in sanctions slapped on several dozen top Nicaraguan government officials, affecting the assets they hold in the United States.

Apart from these sanctions on individuals, however, Washington did not enforce the NICA Act. It did not apply trade sanctions and has not blocked Nicaragua from receiving billions of dollars in credits from international agencies. From 2017 to 2021, Nicaragua received a whopping $2.2 billion in aid from the Central American Bank of Economic Integration (BCIE), and in 2020-2021 it received several hundred million in credits from the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund.

Some among the international Left condemn calls for sanctions on Ortega. Yet the U.S. and international Left broadly mobilized (unsuccessfully) in 1978 and 1979 to force Washington to impose sanctions on the Somoza dictatorship and block international financing because of the regime’s gross human rights violations. The worldwide Left similarly demanded sanctions against apartheid South Africa, sought to block U.S. and international financing for the Pinochet dictatorship, and currently calls for “boycott, divestment, and sanctions” against Israel.

Grassroots opponents of the Ortega-Murillo regime find themselves between the rock of an Ortega-Murillo dictatorship and the hard place of the capitalist class and its political agents among the traditional conservative parties. The Right—just as disturbed as Ortega by the outburst of popular protest from below in the 2018 uprising—tried to hitch mass discontent to its own agenda of recovering direct political power and assuring there would be no threat to its control over the Nicaraguan economy.

It was the government’s repression of the popular uprising of students, workers, feminists, and environmentalists that paved the way for the Right’s current hegemony over the anti-Sandinista opposition. The mass of Nicaraguans—beyond the Sandinistas’ secure base in some 20 percent of the population—have not shown any enthusiasm for the traditional conservative parties and businessmen that dominate the opposition and have no real political representation. Indeed, the October CID-Gallup poll found that 77 percent of the country’s electoral does not feel represented by any political party.