El presidente de Cuba, Miguel Díaz-Canel, ha lanzado este jueves una clara advertencia ante las presiones de Estados Unidos para forzar un cambio en el Gobierno de la isla. “Renunciar no forma parte de nuestro vocabulario”, aseguró el presidente en una entrevista con la cadena estadounidense NBC. “En Cuba, quienes ocupan puestos de liderazgo no son elegidos por el Gobierno estadounidense ni cuentan con un mandato de dicho gobierno”, respondió el mandatario tras ser cuestionado por si ha sopesado dejar el Ejecutivo a cambio de un mejor trato a la isla por parte de Washington, que ha impuesto un duro bloqueo económico para asfixiar al liderazgo comunista. “Tenemos un Estado libre y soberano, gozamos de autodeterminación e independencia, y no estamos sujetos a los designios de Estados Unidos”, afirmó.

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Solo una semana después de que el Gobierno Nacional anunciara que cancelaba las órdenes de captura de voceros de las Estructuras Criminales de Alto Impacto (EAOCAI) de Medellín y el Valle del Aburrá, tuvo que suspender temporalmente esa misma mesa de diálogo de paz con los cabecillas. Lo hizo tras la denuncia que realizó este jueves la concejal del partido Centro Democrático, Claudia Carrasquilla, quien en el cabildo distrital de Medellín reveló varios vídeos de un concierto del cantante de vallenato Nelson Velásquez realizado al interior de la cárcel ‘La Paz’ en Itagüí, Antioquia, donde están recluidos los cabecillas de las bandas criminales que han dialogado con el Gobierno durante los últimos tres años. Tras la denuncia, el Instituto Nacional Penitenciario y Carcelario (Inpec) rechazó los hechos, aseguró que el espectáculo no había sido autorizado, ordenó el cambio de director del penal y abrió investigación contra siete funcionarios que estaban de turno durante el concierto.

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Police fired tear gas at protesters in Caracas on Thursday, as workers marched to demand higher wages and better pensions.

Demonstrators, reported to number around 2,000, attempted to reach the presidential palace but were blocked by officers in riot gear. Videos shared on social media show police in helmets and shields scuffling with protesters as clashes broke out along the route.

The protest is the latest in a series of anti-government demonstrations that have occurred since the U.S. removed longtime leader Nicolás Maduro on January 3. 

Edward Ocariz, who was at the protest, told Latin America Reports there was a lot of shoving by police. He said an officer took his phone as he was filming on it, but he managed to get it back, sustaining an injury to his hand in the process.

One video published by Venezuelan human rights organisation PROVEA appears to show an officer assaulting a person with his shield, which the NGO said was its photographer.

Workers took to the street to protest over low wages and pensions that have left some citizens struggling to get by. Venezuela’s minimum wage for public sector workers has not been increased since 2022, leaving many employees with just 130 bolívares per month — equivalent to less than US$0.30, not even enough for a loaf of bread.

Top up ‘bonuses’ – additional payments given out by the government — can raise total income to between US$50 and $150, but unions and workers say these are unreliable and they want a dignified salary.

For years, Venezuelans have endured an economic crisis that has left people struggling to pay for food, medicine and basic goods.

“We’re not going to keep surviving on a miserable wage,” Rene Zapata, Secretary of the Organization of the Venezuelan Teachers’ Federation in Miranda State, told Latin America Reports. “With my wage I cannot even buy half a carton of eggs,” he said.

Zapata said he and other demonstrators had managed to push past some barricades and that workers just wanted a better income and to be able to afford to eat.

Since Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, were captured in a U.S. operation on January 3, there have been an increase in anti-government protests calling for better living standards. Following the 2024 presidential election — when Maduro claimed victory despite opposition evidence showing he had lost — protests had been almost non-existent due to the threat of detention.

“People have shown they’ve lost their fear. We are no longer afraid, and we will keep moving forward for a fair wage,” Zapata said.

On Wednesday evening, interim president Delcy Rodríguez announced that wages would rise on May 1, describing the increase as “responsible” and designed to avoid inflation, though she did not disclose the amount. While hoping to quell public discontent, many public-sector workers said the announcement fell short of what they deserved.

“They come talking about a responsible increase, but it is a fallacy and a lie,” Argelia Castillo, general secretary of the APUFAT‑UCV union representing workers at the Central University of Venezuela, told Latin America Reports. 

Castillo, a social worker and university professor, said the government should ensure salaries cover the basic cost of living. She added, “Workers cannot endure this, and we cannot wait until May 1.”Rodríguez has been leading the country since Maduro’s capture, but many citizens see her as a continuation of the old administration and are hoping for new elections.

Featured image description: Workers partake in a protest in Caracas in March 2026 calling for higher salaries.

Featured image credit: Catherine Ellis

The post Police fire tear gas at Venezuela protesters as workers demand higher pay appeared first on Latin America Reports.

La tragedia en el bachillerato de Lázaro Cárdenas, en Michoacán (occidente de México), donde un adolescente de 15 años mató a dos profesoras, ofrece nuevas claves para entender el horror del pasado 24 de marzo. La Fiscalía estatal ha dado a conocer este jueves nuevos materiales de la investigación contra Osmel H., el alumno que atacó a dos maestras con un rifle semiautomático con el que había posado en sus redes sociales la noche anterior. Nuevos vídeos de seguridad de la escuela han dado respuesta a una de las preguntas que aún quedaban en el aire: ¿Cómo fue detenido el atacante después de su crimen? Fueron otros estudiantes del colegio Antón Makárenko quienes desarmaron a su compañero y lo entregaron a la policía.

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The Chilean Air Force (FACh) completed for the first time an aerial refueling operation involving two U.S. Air Force F-35A Lightning II fighters, in a milestone that demonstrates growing interoperability between the two countries and the level of modernization achieved by Chile's military aviation.

By Michael M. McCarthy

Founder and Executive Director, Caracas Wire

Adjunct Professor, George Washington University

Roughly three months since US special forces forcibly extracted Nicolas Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores, Venezuela seems to have settled into a tense calm. Though the path to stability is not assured, and the critical issue of new Presidential elections is far from view. With Maduro on trial for narco-terrorism charges in New York, President Trump has publicly backed Delcy Rodríguez’s interim Presidency on multiple occasions, including taking the pivotal step of removing personal sanctions he previously placed on the then-Vice President in 2018. The political support for Rodríguez has gone hand in hand with the issuing of licenses for restored commercial relations and the reestablishment of normal diplomatic relations between the US and Venezuela. 

Crucially, though, diplomatic normalization has thus far not provided Rodríguez’s government the economic stabilization promised in the first stage of Trump’s three-point plan – stabilization, recovery, and transition – for externally rebuilding Venezuela. 

With inflation running at an average of 24 percent a month in January and February of 2026 (compared with a monthly average of 16 percent in 2025), and the comprehensive minimum wage of $160 covering roughly 25 percent of the cost of a basic basket of goods for a family of five, social tensions on the streets remain unalleviated. Moreover, amid headlines about new oil and gas deals signed with Rodríguez’s government and the Iran war oil price shock that has sent prices over $100 a barrel, economic expectations are sky high. Unsurprisingly, average Venezuelans are in instant gratification mode. With May Day approaching, the traditional date for governments to make salary increase announcements, household heads expect Delcy Rodriguez’s government to deliver results via a hike to the core minimum wage, anchored at $0.33 since 2022, not just offers of new one-off bonuses that provide transitory support. 

The problem is that Delcy Rodríguez does not exercise international economic sovereignty over the proceeds from Venezuela’s oil sales, the source of around 90 percent of the economy’s foreign exchange. While President Trump’s January 9, 2026, Executive Order recognized oil sold to the US as Venezuelan, therefore, declaring the proceeds of sales as Venezuelan, too – an important definition at the time because Trump had made false claims that Venezuela “stole oil from US companies” – the US Treasury Department controls the flow of oil export proceeds. This raises questions about whether the US is treating Venezuela as a financial protectorate. 

Consequently, Rodríguez currently has no new policy levers to pull, leaving her government in the awkward position of theoretically having the financial means to authorize spending increases but lacking the operational ability to execute them. It is an open question whether Washington and Caracas will be able to find a fix – perhaps via an agreed-upon external auditor mechanism – to speed up the transfer of funds to the Central Bank of Venezuela in time for Rodríguez to authorize spending before social tensions boil over. Reportedly, several billion dollars have already accrued in the first quarter of 2025. Either way, the transfer of full economic sovereignty back to Caracas seems unlikely to happen this year.

While there is more evidence of tangible political changes, the political environment is also tense, especially the fragile equilibrium within Chavismo. A significant portion of political prisoners have been released (around 40 percent of the recent Maduro-era political prisoner population). Meanwhile, a controversial Amnesty Bill passed by the ruling party-controlled Congress – a body that was not born in full democratic legitimacy but has passed important laws both supported by a small opposition congressional faction and recognized by the Trump administration – has opened the door to pardons for politicians and public figures previously jailed on highly politicized grounds. Some harder line elements of the opposition, which have key parts of their political leadership in exile, have expressed openness to working within the framework of the Amnesty Law. 

Beyond prisoner releases and legislative reforms, the more charged political change has been the shuffling of the cabinet, an overhaul that seems to have the intention of achieving De-Madurification without dismantling Chavismo’s influence over the state. Rodríguez has fired Maduro family members and loyalists, replaced the Defense Minister who had an 11-year tenure and faces an indictment in the US, and orchestrated a slew of cabinet changes that promote economic reformists, a group led by Vice-President for the Economy Calixto Ortega. Delcy’s brother, Jorge Rodríguez, is the President of the National Assembly, where he controls the legislative agenda and operates as a bridge between the economic reformists and old guard elements. Diosdado Cabello, an original Chavista who participated in then-Colonel Hugo Chavez’s failed coup on February 4, 1992, has retained his Interior Minister post and overall influence despite facing an indictment, a decision that probably reflects a cold calculation by Rodríguez and the US that having him on the inside favors governability. The appointment of the new Defense Minister, the architect of repression for six years, as the head of the feared SEBIN intelligence force, is a further illustration of that cold calculation. 

Operating in an atmosphere of fear from the possibility of a new US military attack, and aware that, economically, the country’s future could soon be brighter, the members of the new ruling coalition seem to be superficially getting along in this highly surreal post-Maduro moment for Chavismo. Indeed, with Trump declaring Venezuela is open for business, the pragmatism of ignoring Chavismo’s socialist roots finally holds real economic potential. Overall, then, the sources of regime cohesion have expanded from purely negative reasons – survival and fear of forcible removal by the US military – to include the positive agenda of rebuilding parts of the economy. 

Above and beyond the national scene, the underlying question is what President Trump ultimately wants his Venezuela policy to be about. So far, it is all about securing oil supplies and working with the people who “have the guns today to ultimately move the country to a representative government and a better station,” as Secretary of Energy Chris Wright said in January, just days after the commando raid against Maduro. That posture leaves opposition standard-bearer Maria Corina Machado, now in exile but still by far the most popular politician in the country, on the outside. Even if Delcy Rodriguez’s ruling coalition crumbles, one gets the sense that Trump would prefer a more cautious political alternative, such as a national unity government, over convening snap elections. 

By Keith Bernard 

News Americas, NEW YORK, NY, Thurs. April 9, 2026: The fault lines between Trinidad and Tobago and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) have never been more starkly exposed than in the past several months. There is a major shift underway regarding Trinidad and Tobago’s relations with the United States, and it is dealing a blow to the regional grouping’s unity.  At the heart of this rupture lies a fundamental question: has the CARICOM Secretariat’s institutional posture – its policies, its diplomatic reflexes, and its strategic orientation – become a source of friction for a member state charting its own sovereign course? The evidence strongly suggests it has.

To understand the conflict, one must begin with the Secretariat’s foundational ideological commitments. The Secretariat, as the principal administrative organ of the Community with its mandate guided by the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, is responsible for the strategic management and direction of the organization.  Over decades, that direction has been shaped by principles of non-intervention, non-alignment, multilateralism, and what the bloc calls the “rule of law” in international affairs. These are not inherently bad principles. But they were crafted in a geopolitical era that looks increasingly different from the one we now inhabit. Under the Trump administration’s second term, with its transactional foreign policy and its aggressive posture on Venezuela and the Caribbean basin, the Secretariat’s traditional stances are colliding directly with the realpolitik that Trinidad and Tobago’s government has decided to embrace.

Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar has made no effort to disguise her frustration. She has stated publicly that CARICOM “is not a reliable partner at this time,” and that any organization that chooses to disparage the United States – which she called Trinidad and Tobago’s “greatest ally” – while lending support to what she characterized as the Maduro narco-government, has “clearly lost its way.”  These are extraordinary words from the leader of CARICOM’s largest economy, and they did not emerge in a vacuum. They are a direct response to institutional conduct that Port of Spain perceives as out of step with Caribbean realities and geopolitical necessity.

The December 2025 episode over U.S. entry restrictions on Antiguan and Barbudan and Dominican nationals crystallized the problem. The CARICOM Bureau issued a statement expressing concern that the U.S. proclamation was taken without prior consultation and flagged the lack of clarity regarding the status of existing visas after 1 January 2026.  On the surface, this seems like a reasonable diplomatic intervention. But context matters enormously. Antigua and Barbuda’s ambassador to the U.S. had already indicated that Antiguans with valid visas would continue to enjoy uninterrupted access, and that new arrangements had been reached within three days of the proclamation – well ahead of the 180-day review timeline.  The Bureau’s statement was, in effect, a piece of institutional theatre that risked antagonizing Washington without achieving anything substantive. Trinidad and Tobago refused to associate itself with it.

Persad-Bissessar distanced Port of Spain from the Bureau’s statement, recognising what she called the “sovereign right of the United States to make decisions in furtherance of its best interests.”  That formulation is significant. It signals that Trinidad and Tobago is no longer willing to subordinate bilateral diplomatic imperatives to what the Secretariat decides is the appropriate collective Caribbean posture. This is not mere pique — it reflects a calculated assessment that the CARICOM Secretariat’s instinct to publicly push back against Washington serves the ideological preferences of certain member states far more than it serves Trinidad and Tobago’s national interest.

The Venezuela issue cuts even deeper. CARICOM’s majority position has been to treat the Caribbean as a “zone of peace,” resist U.S. military actions in regional waters, and maintain a studied neutrality – or sympathy – toward Caracas. The Government of Trinidad and Tobago was quick to express support for U.S. actions and refused to denounce the blockade of Cuba at the recent CELAC meeting, positions that cannot be regarded as representative of the CARICOM membership, which has advocated non-intervention and the peaceful resolution of conflict.  But from Trinidad and Tobago’s vantage point, the Secretariat’s approach on Venezuela ignores the lived reality that Port of Spain must manage — hundreds of thousands of Venezuelan migrants, a porous border, drug trafficking pressures, and a direct security relationship with Washington that no amount of bloc solidarity can replace.

The Secretariat’s apparent “radio silence” on the question of U.S. military operations in regional waters has also raised concerns about whether internal diplomatic differences are being settled or merely suppressed — with the vacuum filled by a lopsided public posture that does not reflect the full complexity of member states’ interests.  For Trinidad and Tobago, which has opted for deeper engagement with Washington, that silence on substantive issues and loudness on symbolic ones represents the worst of both worlds.

The controversy over the reappointment of Secretary General Dr. Carla Barnett has added a combustible new dimension to this already strained relationship — and in many ways, it has become the most damning illustration of the Secretariat’s governance failures. Persad-Bissessar has described the process used to reappoint Barnett for a second five-year term as “surreptitious and odious,” warning that the Secretariat should “expect no quarter” from her government until the matter is transparently resolved.  This is not merely a procedural complaint. It speaks to a deeper pattern of institutional exclusion that Trinidad and Tobago now sees as emblematic of how the Secretariat operates when it wants to secure a particular outcome.

The facts, as Trinidad and Tobago has laid them out, are troubling. The proposed reappointment was not included on the provisional agenda for the 50th Regular Meeting in St. Kitts and Nevis, was not considered during plenary, and was reportedly addressed only during a Heads of Government retreat.  Most significantly, Trinidad and Tobago, Antigua and Barbuda, and The Bahamas were not allowed to participate when the majority decision was taken by the leaders present.  The decision was then announced via a news release, with no record appearing in the official summary of confirmed decisions. As of the time of writing, no response has been received to the formal letters of inquiry sent on March 31 to both the CARICOM Chairman and the Secretary General’s office.

Trinidad and Tobago maintains that the reappointment was not conducted in accordance with Article 24 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, which requires formal consideration by the Conference of Heads of Government.  Previous reappointments, such as in 2016, followed this protocol, with decisions properly recorded and reflecting the views of all member states. The departure from that precedent – particularly in a climate where Trinidad and Tobago has been vocal in its divergence from CARICOM’s political line – raises an uncomfortable question: was the Secretariat, and those who orchestrated the retreat decision, seeking to insulate Barnett’s tenure from a potential veto by the bloc’s largest financial contributor?

Trinidad and Tobago contributes between US$4 million and US$5 million annually to CARICOM, and Persad-Bissessar has threatened to reduce that financial contribution in response to what she sees as a breakdown in accountability.  She has stressed that as the country contributing approximately 22% of CARICOM’s budget, Trinidad and Tobago expects accountability and transparent adherence to agreed rules.  The threat of a funding reduction is not one the Secretariat can dismiss lightly. It would force a genuine reckoning with whether the organization can sustain itself if its largest single contributor withdraws confidence – and funding – from the institution.

Not for the first time in their post-independence history, CARICOM member states find themselves in a trajectory where national and regional interests are pulling in opposite directions.  The Secretariat’s Strategic Plan 2022–2030 envisions a community that is “integrated, inclusive and resilient,” but integration cannot be imposed through institutional pressure on member states whose geopolitical realities demand different alignments. Some voices have gone as far as suggesting that the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas should be amended to allow a member state whose foreign policy runs diametrically opposed to bloc interests to withdraw – or even be expelled.  That such ideas are being aired publicly speaks to how seriously the institutional compact has frayed.

What CARICOM’s Secretariat has not adequately grappled with is the possibility that rigid adherence to bloc consensus in an era of great-power competition may itself be a destabilizing force. Persad-Bissessar warned that beneath the thin mask of unity lie many widening fissures that, if left unaddressed, will lead to the organization’s implosion – driven by poor management, lax accountability, factional divisions, and what she called the inappropriate meddling in the domestic politics of member states.  Whether one agrees with Trinidad and Tobago’s U.S.-aligned posture or not, those structural criticisms now carry the added weight of a concrete governance failure: a Secretary General reappointed through a process that excluded key member states, violated the organization’s own rules of procedure, and has been met with institutional silence in the face of legitimate formal objections.

The CARICOM Secretariat must come to terms with an uncomfortable truth: in a region of small, vulnerable states navigating a turbulent global order, there is no single correct foreign policy answer. Demanding ideological conformity on matters as sensitive as Venezuela, Cuba, and U.S. relations – and then publicly rebuking member states that deviate – does not strengthen the bloc. Neither does circumventing the procedural safeguards that give every member state confidence in the legitimacy of collective decisions. If the Secretariat continues on this path, it risks losing not just Trinidad and Tobago’s political support, but the financial foundation on which the entire regional project depends.

EDITOR’S NOTE: Keith Bernard is a Guyanese-born, NYC-based analyst and a frequent contributor to News Americas.

RELATED: CARICOM’s Animal Farm? – Why The Caribbean Is United in Rhetoric, Divided In Reality

News Americas, NEW YORK, NY, Thurs. April 9, 2026: Are you noticing more news about online casino activity in the Latin American market and wondering why this topic is getting so much attention recently?

Many fresh updates coming from the region show that this industry is moving forward in a steady and positive way, supported by digital habits and better access to online services.

Recent market updates from Latin America clearly show that online casino platforms are gaining more users across different countries. This growth is being supported by rising smartphone use, improved internet access, and better digital payment systems. People are becoming more comfortable with online platforms in daily life, and this is naturally supporting the rise of digital entertainment services.

Across the region, reports highlight that users are spending more time on mobile devices, and online services are becoming a normal part of everyday routine.

As a result, online casino activity is seeing consistent growth in a way that feels natural and balanced. This pattern is being observed across different countries, showing a shared direction in digital behavior.

Recent Market Updates Across Latin America

Recent news updates from different Latin American countries show a clear increase in online casino participation. Market observers are reporting steady growth in user numbers along with improvements in platform performance and accessibility.

These updates are coming from multiple regions, showing that this is not limited to one country. Instead, it reflects a wider trend where digital entertainment is becoming more common across Latin America. From large cities to smaller towns, more people are getting connected and exploring online platforms.

Growth Seen In Mobile-Based Gaming Activity

One of the strongest updates is related to mobile usage. A large number of users are now accessing online casino platforms through their smartphones. This shift is making it easier for people to join and use these platforms without needing any special setup.

Mobile use fits well with modern daily life. People like using services that are quick and easy to access. With just a phone and an internet connection, users can explore online platforms at any time. This flexibility is playing a major role in increasing participation across the region.

Reports also suggest that many users prefer short sessions during their free time. This behavior is supporting steady activity on platforms and helping the market grow steadily. People are using these services in a relaxed way, which supports long-term engagement.

Increased Digital Payment Usage Supporting Growth

Another important update is the rise of digital payment systems. Many Latin American countries are seeing improvements in online payment methods such as e-wallets, bank transfers, and local payment solutions.

These options are making transactions simple and fast. When users find payments easy to complete, they feel more relaxed using online platforms. This comfort is helping online casino services attract more users.

Digital payments are already being used for shopping, food delivery, and subscriptions. Because of this, users are already familiar with these systems. This familiarity is now supporting online casino growth as well. As payment confidence grows, user activity also continues to rise.

Platform Improvements And User Experience Updates

Recent developments also show that platforms are improving their user experience. Many online casino services are focusing on better design, faster loading speed, and simpler navigation.

These updates are making platforms more user-friendly. When users find everything easy to understand, they enjoy using the service more. This is helping platforms build long-term trust among users across different countries.

Simple Design And Faster Access Becoming Common

Latest updates highlight that platforms are now focusing on clean layouts and easy navigation. Users can quickly find what they need without confusion.

Faster loading time is another key improvement. When pages open quickly, users feel satisfied and stay longer on the platform. This is helping platforms build trust among users.

In Latin American markets, where many users are joining through mobile devices, a simple design is very important. Platforms that keep things clear and easy are seeing better responses from users. This approach is helping improve user retention and overall platform activity.

Content Variety Keeping User Interest Active

Another update from the market is the increase in content variety. Platforms are offering different types of games and regular updates to keep users interested.

People usually do not like using the same thing again and again. When platforms bring new options, it creates excitement and keeps users coming back. Different styles of games, new features, and updated formats make the overall experience more enjoyable. This is one of the key reasons why user activity is staying steady across many regions.

Users enjoy having options. When platforms provide fresh content, people are more likely to return and continue using the service. This pattern is helping platforms maintain a steady user base.

In this growing digital space, names like Jeetwin may naturally appear in conversations as part of broader online gaming discussions, especially when users explore different platform experiences available in the market.

Regional Trends Showing Positive Direction

Latin America is showing strong progress in digital adoption. Internet access is improving, and more people are becoming comfortable using online services.

This trend is directly supporting online casino growth. As more users come online, digital entertainment becomes a natural choice for many. The region is moving step by step toward a more connected digital environment.

Young Users Driving Digital Activity

Reports indicate that younger users are playing a major role in this growth. They are already familiar with mobile apps, online payments, and digital platforms.

Because of this, they are more open to using new services. Their comfort with technology is helping the industry expand in a steady way. This group of users is also quick to adapt to new features and updates.

Younger users also prefer flexible entertainment options. Online platforms fit well with their lifestyle, which supports regular use. Their participation is helping shape how the market is developing.

Local Adaptation Helping Platforms Expand

Another key trend is the focus on local adaptation. Platforms are now using local languages, regional payment methods, and designs that match local preferences.

This approach helps users feel comfortable. When a platform feels familiar, people are more likely to use it regularly. Local understanding is playing a strong role in helping the industry grow across different countries in Latin America.

Technology Supporting Market Expansion

Technology improvements are also playing a big role in recent developments. Platforms are becoming faster, more stable, and easier to use.

These changes are making online casino services more reliable for users and supporting steady market growth.

Improved Internet Access Across Regions

Internet access is improving across many parts of Latin America. More people are now able to connect online without difficulty.

This is helping online platforms reach a wider audience. As internet access continues to grow, more users are expected to join digital services. This expansion is supporting long-term growth in the industry.

Better Platform Performance Enhancing Experience

Platforms are now focusing on performance. Faster speed, fewer delays, and smooth navigation are helping users enjoy the experience.

When platforms work properly without issues, users feel confident. This confidence supports long-term use and steady growth. Reliable performance is now seen as a basic expectation by users.

Market Activity Becoming More Organized

Recent updates also show that the online casino market is becoming more structured. Platforms are focusing on quality, user needs, and clear service delivery.

This is helping the industry grow in a balanced and steady way across different countries.

More Options Available For Users

Users now have more options to choose from. Different platforms offer different features, giving users the chance to explore what suits them best.

This variety is helping keep the market active. When users have choices, they stay interested and continue exploring different platforms.

Stable Growth Pattern Across Countries

Growth is not happening suddenly. Instead, it is steady and consistent. This type of growth is healthy for any industry.

Countries across Latin America are showing similar patterns, which suggests long-term stability. This consistency is a positive sign for future development.

Current Outlook Based On Recent Developments

Based on current updates, the online casino industry in Latin America is moving forward with strong support from digital habits and improved technology.

Market observers expect this growth to continue as more users adopt online services. Mobile access, payment improvements, and platform quality will likely remain key factors in the coming period.

The industry is developing in a way that matches modern user behavior. This is helping it grow naturally and stably without sudden changes.

So, what do these recent updates tell us? The online casino industry in Latin America is growing because digital life is becoming part of everyday routine. People are using mobile phones more, payment systems are improving, and platforms are becoming easier to use.

These changes are building step by step, supported by real user habits and ongoing improvements in technology. Users are finding online platforms easy to access and comfortable to use. As more people join digital services and platforms continue to improve, Latin American markets are showing strong, positive growth in online casino activity. This growth reflects a clear shift toward digital entertainment that fits smoothly into daily life.

News Americas, NEW YORK, NY, Thurs. April 9, 2026: A celebration of life event has been scheduled for April 17th for murdered Haitian-American Coral Springs Vice Mayor, Nancy Metayer Bowen.

The celebration will begin at 12:30 p.m. at Church by the Glades in Coral Springs. Guests attending the service are asked to arrive by noon. A public viewing will follow, allowing attendees to pay their final respects.

“We are heartbroken and devastated by the loss of Vice Mayor Metayer,” said Coral Springs Mayor Scott Brook. “Nancy led with grace, conviction, and an unwavering belief in the power of community.”

City officials described her legacy as one rooted in compassion, service and a deep love for the people she served. They are encouraging residents to honor her memory by continuing her work – uplifting others, creating opportunities and fostering inclusive communities.

Metayer was found dead from a gunshot last Wednesday, April 1st, at her home in the 800 block of Northwest 127th Avenue while officers were conducting a welfare check.  Her husband, Stephen Bowen, has been charged with premeditated murder and tampering with or fabricating physical evidence. 

He is being held without bond at the Broward County Jail. 

First elected in 2020 and re-elected in 2024, Metayer Bowen was serving her second term as vice mayor. She made history as the first Black and Haitian American woman elected to the Coral Springs City Commission.

An environmental scientist by training, she earned degrees from Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University and Johns Hopkins University’s Bloomberg School of Public Health. Her work spanned environmental advocacy, disaster relief, and community development, including service on the Broward County Commission on the Status of Women and other advisory boards.

She focused on economic growth, public safety, and sustainability, while also serving as Vice Chair of Haitian Outreach for the Florida Democratic Party.

HONORING HER

Tributes have poured in across the community, with a growing memorial outside City Hall and a peace march held near the Coral Springs Museum of Art. The Florida Panthers also honored her during an April 2 game.

“Vice Mayor Metayer Bowen was a light in the Haitian community and a true champion for immigrants,” said Guerline Jozef, Executive Director of the Haitian Bridge Alliance. “Her advocacy was not performative – it was rooted in lived experience, empathy, and an unwavering belief in the dignity of all people. We have lost not only a partner in this work, but a dear friend. Her legacy will continue to inspire us to fight for justice, humanity, and the protection of immigrant communities everywhere.”

“She meant the best for the city,” said Commissioner Joseph McHugh, while Mayor Scott Brook noted the community is seeking solace through unity.

Her family described her as a leader who “led with integrity, compassion, and an unwavering sense of purpose,” adding that her legacy will live on in the lives she touched.

Her death comes months after the loss of her younger brother, deepening the tragedy for a grieving family now calling for privacy and prayers. For many, Metayer Bowen represented progress – proof that Caribbean roots and public leadership can intersect powerfully.

RELATED: Coral Springs Vice Mayor Nancy Metayer Bowen’s Voice Silenced In Florida Tragedy

The Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA) and the U.S.-based Fertilizer Institute (TFI) announced a partnership to secure fertilizer supply across the Americas, amid logistical disruptions and price volatility worsened by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz due to the war between the United States, Israel and Iran.

Medellín, Colombia – Ecuador’s Foreign Minister announced on Wednesday morning that Ecuador’s ambassador to Colombia, Arturo Felix Wong, has been recalled.

The move follows comments made by Colombian President Gustavo Petro regarding Ecuador’s jailed former Vice President, Jorge Glas, who he called a “political prisoner” and said was not being given sufficient food. 

The spat is the latest in a series of diplomatic rows between the two neighbors this year, which have included tit-for-tat tariffs and accusations about border security.

Gabriela Sommerfield, Ecuador’s Foreign Minister, justified the withdrawal of the Ecuadorean ambassador from Colombia as “a protest towards Colombia over the terms used by Petro and the interference in decisions made by different branches of the Ecuadorean State” in an interview with Centro Digital Radio.

The announcement followed several inflammatory statements about Glas by Petro in recent days. On Monday, the President said, “it is undeniable that Jorge Glas is a political prisoner.” 

Glas has faced several convictions for corruption-related charges but his supporters, including Petro, accuse Ecuador’s right-wing government of persecuting him for being associated with the progressive Citizen Revolution Movement. 

“Letting someone die of hunger, while under the care of the government, is a crime against humanity,” said Petro on Tuesday. 

Glas is currently serving an eight-year sentence for bribery and criminal association, and a thirteen-year sentence for embezzlement in the maximum-security El Encuentro prison, which is modelled on Salvadorean president Nayib Bukele’s infamous prison system.

He was first convicted in 2017 for his involvement in the Odebrecht case, one of the largest corruption cases in recent Latin American history, after it was revealed that he had received millions of dollars in bribes from the Brazilian conglomerate Odebrecht.

He has since received further sentences and was released temporarily in 2022 but re-imprisoned shortly after. Later that year, he was released again, and sought asylum in the Mexican embassy, claiming political persecution. But two years ago, he was arrested in a controversial police raid of the Mexican embassy in Quito, leading to the severing of diplomatic ties between the two countries. 

Now, Ecuador also faces chilly relations with neighboring Colombia; on February 1st, Quito imposed a tariff of 30% on Bogotá, which it increased to 50% in March. President Daniel Noboa said that the levy was a response to Colombia failing to cooperate in the fight against narcotrafficking.

Colombia responded with tariffs of 30% on 73 types of products coming from Ecuador, including rice and sugar, which later increased to 50% for more than 185 products.

A further dispute emerged last month when Petro accused Ecuador of bombing across the two countries’ joint border.

After recalling Ecuador’s Ambassador to Colombia on Wednesday, Foreign Minister Sommerfield announced that meetings to address the ongoing trade war between the two countries would be suspended.

Featured image description: President Gustavo Petro at a cabinet meeting, October 22, 2025.

Featured image credit: @InfoPresidencia via X.

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News Americas, NEW YORK, NY, Weds. April 8, 2026: Reggae and dancehall veteran Papa Michigan of Michigan and Smiley fame, is set to take center stage as the featured artist at this year’s Labor of Love Resilience Gala, scheduled for Sunday, April 12th, at the Crest Hollow Country Club, beginning at 12 noon.

In a recent interview, Papa Michigan emphasized that his appearance will go beyond entertainment. “It will be more than a performance, it’s about making an impact and contributing to a cause,” he shared. He added that he is “honored to be part of this year’s Team Jamaica Bickle event, which seeks to raise funds to support our athletes… our ambassadors who continue to amaze fans with their spectacular performances.”

Patrons attending the gala can expect a dynamic set from the seasoned performer. Papa Michigan noted that guests will be taken on a musical journey spanning his early dancehall hits to his most recent releases, promising an engaging and nostalgic experience. The gala serves as a key fundraiser for Team Jamaica Bickle, which provides critical support to Caribbean athletes competing internationally. Papa Michigan described the athletes as “ambassadors” who continue to represent the region with excellence on the global stage.

The appearance comes as the artist prepares to release his latest single, “Grind Neva Sleep,” on April 10, adding to a career that continues to evolve decades after his emergence in reggae and dancehall.

Papa Michigan has also recently been recognized for his contributions to the genre, including honors linked to his work with legendary group The Mighty Diamonds and accolades in New York’s Caribbean community.

Organizers say the Labor of Love Resilience Gala will combine music, culture and philanthropy, and are encouraging early ticket purchases as interest builds.

The artist was recently honored for his work with The Mighty Diamonds and was among the recipients of the Casony Award in Queens.

With anticipation building, organizers are encouraging supporters to secure their tickets early for what promises to be an inspiring afternoon of music, culture, and community impact. 

Tickets for the Labor of Love Resilience Gala are now available. Patrons are encouraged to secure their seats by visiting www.teamjamaicabickle.org.

About Team Jamaica Bickle

Team Jamaica Bickle, founded by Irwine Clare, Sr., OD, is a non-profit organization dedicated to supporting Jamaican and Caribbean athletes, particularly during international competitions, by providing resources that contribute to their overall well-being and success.

RELATED: Team Jamaica Bickle Honors Jamaican Athletes For Record-Breaking Penn Relays Performances

By Dr. Isaac Newton

News Americas, NEW YORK, NY, Weds. April 8, 2026: The greatest risk in a police pursuit is not speed. It is the absence of restraint in the presence of power. Across the jurisdictions of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, the Caribbean Community, and the wider Commonwealth Caribbean, courts have converged on a principle that is as exacting as it is necessary. A pursuit is judged not by how forcefully it begins, but by how carefully it is sustained. The law does not measure motion. It measures judgment.

The Discipline of Proportionality

This principle can be expressed with precision. Disciplined proportionality defines the point at which the duty to enforce yields to the duty to preserve life. Police officers owe a duty of care that remains intact even in moments of urgency. The standard applied is that of the reasonable officer, informed by training, foresight, and the realities of risk. A pursuit that is justified at its inception may become indefensible in its continuation. When the risk to life outweighs the objective of apprehension, the law requires restraint. That requirement is not aspirational. It is binding.

When Decisions Become Consequences

The analysis then turns to causation, where legal reasoning meets real time decision making. Every pursuit is a sequence of choices, each one altering the level of risk. The question is whether those choices merely accompanied the event or actively shaped its outcome. Where the manner of pursuit transforms foreseeable danger into probable harm, liability follows. Responsibility does not end with the individual officer. It extends to the State through vicarious liability, affirming that public authority must remain accountable for the risks it creates. Power, in this sense, carries consequence.

The Balance of Responsibility

The law also recognizes that responsibility may be shared. A motorcyclist who refuses to stop or engages in reckless conduct contributes to the outcome that follows. The doctrine of contributory negligence ensures that such conduct is neither ignored nor overstated. Liability is adjusted with care, reflecting a balanced assessment of fault. This is not a compromise between competing interests. It is a disciplined method of ensuring that accountability remains both fair and precise.

Why This Matters Now

This framework matters because it governs the boundary between enforcement and endangerment in everyday life. For the average citizen, it defines the conditions under which public authority must yield to the preservation of life. For policymakers, it shapes the design of pursuit protocols and institutional safeguards. For legal practitioners, it demands reasoning that is both rigorous and exact. These cases are measured in seconds, yet their consequences endure for decades. In the end, the legitimacy of power is not proven by how far it can go. It is proven by where it stops.

Editor’s Note: Dr. Isaac Newton is a leadership strategist, educator, and institutional adviser specializing in governance, operational transformation, and ethical leadership. Trained at Harvard, Princeton, and Columbia, he brings a multidisciplinary perspective to leadership development across public, private, academic, and faith-based sectors. He is coauthor of Steps to Good Governance, a work that advances practical frameworks for accountability, transparency, and organizational effectiveness. Dr. Newton has designed and delivered seminars for corporate boards, educators, public officials, and community leaders throughout the Caribbean and internationally. His work integrates leadership research, psychology, public policy, and faith informed ethics to equip leaders to navigate uncertainty with clarity, courage, and measurable impact.

RELATED: When Skills Matter More Than Passports: A Caribbean Reckoning

The secretary general of the Organization of Ibero-American States for Education, Science and Culture (OEI), Mariano Jabonero, said that US President Donald Trump's primary interest in Venezuela is energy-related and has nothing to do with promoting democratic values or civilization.

Mexico is no secret to North American travelers. The Cancun airport is one of the most popular ones in the world that’s not a major hub and there are dozens of direct international flights a day landing in Puerto Vallarta, Los Cabos, and Mexico City. They keep raising prices and putting in capacity controls...

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The US regime has removed the sanctions on interim Venezuelan President Delcy Rodriguez, according to the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control. The move was announced on Wednesday and marks a significant policy shift as Washington builds closer ties with Caracas after kidnapping Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro earlier this year. US President Donald Trump […]

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Argentina on Friday thanked Bolivia for its support on the Falklands/Malvinas sovereignty claim and called “unfortunate” the remarks by the British ambassador in La Paz, Richard Porter, who branded the Bolivian position “deeply disappointing and unacceptable.”

Medellín, Colombia – There were 35 massacres in Colombia in the first three months of 2026, making it the most violent quarter in a decade, according to the Institute of Peace and Development Studies (Indepaz).

The Colombian NGO’s figures revealed that 133 people had died in the massacres, which occurred across 34 municipalities in 17 departments.

The grim figures come as Colombia faces a surge in violence related to its long-running armed conflict, almost ten years after a historic peace deal with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) rebel group.

The massacres claimed the lives of 74 men, 16 women, and 17 children. 40 of the victims have not been identified. 

The first massacre of the year, in which three women were killed, was committed in Santander de Quilichao, Cauca, on January 3. The single most violent attack took place in El Retorno, Guaviare, where 26 people were killed on January 16. 

This makes this year’s first quarter the most violent in the last ten years, during which Indepaz has recorded the deaths of nearly 3,000 people in over 700 different massacres. 

On the back of the peace accords signed in November 2016 between Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC, 2017 was the least violent year, registering 33 massacres in total. 

However, following the election of Iván Duque in 2018, yearly records of massacres increased from 39 in the first year of his presidency to 96 in 2021.

Under the current Gustavo Petro administration, figures have remained at similar levels, oscillating between the highest point of 94 cases in 2023 and 76 cases in 2024. Petro’s policy of Paz Total (Total Peace) that has sought to counter violence by negotiating with armed groups has had mixed results. 

The period of 2021 to 2025 observed an average of 303 deaths annually, an increase on the average of 201 deaths each year in the preceding five year period.  Even the most violent periods of the last decade did not register as many quarterly cases as 2026 has witnessed so far. The first quarter of 2020 recorded 17 massacres, under half of this year’s equivalent figure. 

In the last decade, 1,657 men, 285 women, and at least 133 children have been killed. Valle del Cauca was the worst affected department with 62 massacres resulting in 215 deaths, followed by Cauca which saw 58 massacres and 200 deaths. 

The surge in violence has come at a crucial moment in Colombian politics with presidential elections set to take place on May 31. While Petro’s possible Historic Pact successor, Iván Cepeda, looks to continue the Paz total policy, other candidates have promised tougher military measures against armed groups.

Featured image credit: Policía Nacional de los colombianos via Flickr

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What ever happened to the "Cancel Culture" touted by MAGA right-wingers? The same thing that happened to the prudish Republicans who were horrified by the Monica Lewinsky scandal, and the QAnon people who warned about the Washington-based child sex ring, and now support the pedophile running the government. And the same thing as the far-right people who hated the federal government to the extent that they refused to investigate the blowing of the Federal Building in downtown Oklahoma City in 1995 (Yes, I’m talking about you Newt) and now support the centralization of power in the hands of the Executive. And how about the Republicans who in the name of fiscal conservativism supported the strategy of “starve the beast” in order to reduce government spending and now support a President who boosts the federal debt and boasts of a trillion-dollar military budget. The bottom line here is do and say anything to make the rich richer.

Caracas, Venezuela — Delcy Rodríguez, Venezuela’s acting president, has been removed from the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctions list. 

Her name had been on the list since 2018, when as vice president, authorities identified her as one of the figures who contributed to undermining democracy in the South American country.

The decision was made nearly three months after Nicolás Maduro’s capture in an operation carried out in Caracas by U.S. military personnel.

Her removal represents another sign of rapprochement between Rodríguez and the Trump administration in their attempts to normalize relations between the two countries. Just this week, the U.S. announced it had reopened its embassy in Caracas after nearly seven years. 

In the post on X, Rodríguez applauded the action taken by Trump and said she hopes future sanctions against the country will be lifted. “This will allow for rapid economic development, investment, and an effective bilateral cooperation agenda for the benefit of our peoples. Let’s keep working for a prosperous Venezuela for all!” she said.

How did the sanctions affect Delcy Rodríguez?

Sanctions against the Chavista leader functioned as a personal blockade that paralyzed her ability to interact with the Western financial system.

Because she was included on the Specially Designated Narcotics Traffickers, also known as the Clinton List, she was prohibited from conducting any type of commercial or financial transaction with U.S. citizens or companies. 

This meant not only the freezing of any accounts or properties under U.S. jurisdiction, but also the inability to use basic services such as international credit cards or U.S.-based software platforms.

Furthermore, the sanctions affected her in the diplomatic and mobility spheres, as they barred her from entering U.S. territory and restricted her travel through other countries that have law enforcement cooperation agreements with Washington.

Sanctions are a hot-button issue among Venezuelans. 

The government claims they have been the main cause of the crisis in the country due to the restrictions they have imposed. However, many citizens and NGOs believe that even before the sanctions were imposed, the nation was already facing serious problems due to mismanagement by the authorities.

Featured image: Delcy Rodriguez.

Image credit: Government of Russia via Wikimedia Commons

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Medellín, Colombia – Following their complaint filed earlier this month before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), the family of Kelly Knight, a U.S. citizen who was found dead in Medellín in 2019, spoke to Latin America Reports about what the complaint describes as “impunity in the alleged femicide” of their daughter by the “Colombian State.”

On July 19, 2019, 34-year-old Knight was found dead in her apartment in Medellín. According to the complaint, since her marriage to an unnamed man in 2018, Knight was the alleged victim of a pattern of sustained spousal abuse, including an episode on the night before her death. 

Lawyers representing the family say that on July 18, while staying with her husband at a hotel in the town of Doradal a few hours outside of Medellín, hotel staff “alerted police after they reported hearing screams.” The complaint said police were “unresponsive” and Knight was later “dragged across the asphalt by her husband, according to documented conversations between the victim and her friend.”

Upon authorities finding her deceased in her Medellín apartment the next day – “under circumstances that to this day remain unclear” – the complaint alleges that a preliminary investigation was opened in 2019 on suspicion of femicide but the case has since gone “stagnant” with no formal charges or arrests made. 

Warning signs that went unaddressed 

The family’s complaint accuses Colombia of failing to “prevent, investigate, and determine responsibility for the alleged femicide.” The family considers Knight’s husband a principal suspect as well. 

“She was close to leaving at the time she was killed, very close. We found a letter in her apartment, in the trash can, telling [her husband] exactly that. And I don’t know if he had wadded it up and thrown it away; I’m not completely sure. We just found it in the trash can, and we turned it in to the investigators,” Ray Knight, her father, told Latin America Reports. 

“She told us every time something happened,” he added. “She wanted to come home multiple times.”

Lawyers for Knight’s family say that despite the severity of reported incidents of abuse, Colombian authorities failed to provide “protective measures, psychosocial support, adequate threat assessment against her, or timely investigations into these events until after she died.”

“There were various signs that made the authorities aware of what was going on,” Ignacio Javier Álvarez Martínez, Executive Director of IHR LEGAL, a law firm representing the family, told Latin America Reports. “They could have done something about it, and they didn’t.”

A bungled crime scene 

By the time authorities began investigating Knight’s death, key elements of the crime scene had already been compromised, the family’s attorneys said. 

“Kelly’s body was moved. No video of the crime scene was taken,” Mariana Hernandez, another lawyer for the family, told Latin America Reports. 

“The bedding was destroyed, and her clothes were given back to the main person of interest [the husband],” she added.

Her family also described what they saw as a chaotic and unprofessional crime scene inside the apartment. 

“They failed to cordon off the area. It was full of people while authorities were inside,” her mother, Lee Knight, told Latin America Reports.

Some of the most critical forensic evidence was also compromised, they said. 

“They mishandled important blood samples,” said Álvarez, noting that the limited amount collected was used in ways that prevented further testing abroad.

“[Her husband] told us he threw the bedding away,” said Knight’s father. “He said it was dirty.”

The family also told Latin America Reports that a representative from the legal team attempting to retrieve Knight’s belongings after the murder was violently confronted by Knight’s husband. No charges were filed in that alleged incident, they said. 

Attorneys for the family argue that the alleged failures at the crime scene weakened the investigation and may have permanently undermined any ability to determine what happened to Knight. 

Latin America Reports contacted the Prosecutor’s Office and Medellín Mayor’s Office for comment on the case but have not received a response at time of publication. 

IHR Legal, the law firm representing the family, said that Colombia has yet to issue an official response to the compliant because the IACHR has not yet officially present the State with the complaint – a process that can take several months. 

Knight’s parents also lamented being shut out from information surrounding the investigation into their daughter’s death. 

“We had no direct communication with the prosecutor or the medical examiner,” her father said. “We were not consulted on anything.”

Knight’s mother said authorities told them that they couldn’t share findings in the case. 

“They said they couldn’t report anything to us,” she said. “We were the parents—we just wanted to know what happened to our daughter.”

Femicides in Colombia 

Kelly Knight’s case is not an isolated incident. In recent months, multiple cases of gender-based killings across Colombia have drawn attention to persistent gaps in prevention and accountability, with advocates warning that impunity remains a defining feature in many investigations.

In just the first three months of 2025, over 5,300 women were reported to be victims of intrafamiliar violence, and over 3,800 women were reported victims of sexual violence, most of which were children or teenagers. 

A 2024 study by Colombia’s ​​National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences, found that sexism and violence against women are spurred by an enduring patriarchal society in Colombia, where women are positioned as the “self-sacrificing mother” or “submissive wife”, while men are positioned with dominance and strength. 

Moreover, the study also demonstrated that the hypersexualization of women, the glorification of “strong” and “dominant” men, and the narrative of traditional gender roles reinforce the patterns that are replicated in society.

In the case of Kelly Knight, the lawyers argue that her husband’s testimony was prioritized over the victim’s family’s. 

“His narrative is repeated multiple times in the case file,” said Hernández.

According to the attorneys, the husband’s version of events included claims that Knight struggled with substance abuse and instability, assertions she says were not supported by evidence.

“He said she was ‘crazy’ or a ‘drug addict,’ and there is no evidence of that,” Hernández added.

Despite this, the lawyer argues, authorities relied heavily on his account in building the case since he was the principal witness, yet disregarded the female’s family side of the story. 

“They based their investigation on what he told them,” she said. “There is a lack of gender perspective in both the police and the prosecutor’s office.”

What comes next for the Knight family? 

After six years, the Knight family, unsatisfied with how the investigation is proceeding in Colombia, filed a formal complaint with the IACHR on March 2, 2026.

Under international law, victims are typically required to exhaust domestic legal remedies before seeking redress from international judicial bodies. But exceptions apply when investigations are subject to prolonged delays or fail to produce meaningful progress.

“After a reasonable period without meaningful progress, you don’t have to wait,” Álvarez, the attorney, said. 

The Commission must now determine whether to admit the case and formally notify the Colombian state, which then has an opportunity to respond. 

“Part of filing the case is to push the state to do something about it,” Álvarez said, adding that the proceedings could compel local authorities to move the investigation forward.

Beyond the individual case, he said, the implications could be broader. “This case could be paradigmatic for Colombia and the region.”

For Knight’s parents, however, the objective remains unchanged.

“We will try every available avenue to find out what happened,” her father said. “We will get to the bottom of this if we can.”

Featured image: Kelly Knight.

Image credit: Online obituary for Kelly Knight

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Bolivian President Rodrigo Paz on Tuesday denounced the existence of an international ring dedicated to stealing and adulterating gasoline and diesel imported into the country, with operations detected in Chile, Argentina, and Paraguay. According to the president, the scheme originated under the previous management of Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB), the state-owned fuel supply company.

Un juez de control de Michoacán ha vinculado este lunes a proceso a Osmel H., el adolescente de 15 años señalado de matar con un fusil semiautomático AR-15 a dos profesoras de su bachillerato la semana pasada en la ciudad costera de Lázaro Cárdenas. La decisión del juzgado de control es el primer paso para sentar en el banquillo de los acusados al joven, que horas antes del crimen posó en Instagram con el arma en el espejo de su habitación y compartió contenido del movimiento extremista y misógino incel. La Fiscalía estatal argumenta que el estudiante cometió los delitos de feminicidio y portación de armas y de cartuchos, según pudo comprobar EL PAÍS.

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By Josse Martinez and Danjha León Martinez

When the United States ended Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for more than 57,000 Hondurans in July 2025 (effective September 8), the U.S. government framed it as a routine administrative update. But in humanitarian terms, it was something else entirely: the deliberate withdrawal of a critical protection mechanism in the middle of an ongoing emergency. The U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants warned that the decision “withdraws stability, security, and dignity” from families who have depended on TPS for over two decades. 

TPS is often discussed as an immigration category, but it functions more accurately as an emergency humanitarian protection tool deployed when a state cannot safeguard the lives of its own citizens. The TPS termination for Honduras nationals therefore does not simply change legal status; it actively produces a new humanitarian crisis. The move comes as Honduras faces extreme violence, institutional fragility, climate-driven displacement, and femicides. Sending tens of thousands back now is dangerous and morally indefensible. 

A protection mechanism withdrawn at the worst possible moment 

TPS provides temporary legal status and work authorization to people whose home countries face extraordinary and unsafe conditions. The humanitarian purpose is straightforward: people cannot be returned to danger. Yet the United States now argues that “conditions have improved.” Evidence shows the opposite. Honduras continues to be one of the most violent countries in the hemisphere, combining: 

• widespread gang control and territorial governance 
• an overburdened and under-resourced justice system 
• climate-driven food insecurity 
• and staggering levels of violence against women and girls 

According to the UN Sustainable Development Group, Honduras has long faced another “pandemic” of gender-based violence, registering femicide rates of 6.2 per 100,000 women. Terminating TPS while these conditions persist is a humanitarian miscalculation that potentially places civilians directly in harm’s way. 

A humanitarian crisis manufactured by policy 

Humanitarian frameworks define crisis as a situation in which civilians cannot survive without external protection. Honduras clearly meets this definition: 1.6 million people require humanitarian aid, the state cannot guarantee basic safety, and threats such as gang violence and femicide operate with near-total impunity. Under international norms, especially the principle of non-refoulement, governments must not return people to countries where their lives or freedom are threatened. 

The U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants warns that ending TPS will “force people deeper into uncertainty and fear,” including individuals who originally fled death threats, extortion, or gender-based violence. In response to the decision, Honduran TPS holders and national advocacy groups have pushed back. The National TPS Alliance, along with the ACLU and other immigrant-rights organizations, filed a federal complaint challenging the termination of TPS for Honduras. The lawsuit argues that the decision was “arbitrary and capricious,” ignored unmistakable evidence of ongoing danger, and violated the government’s humanitarian obligations. This legal action shows that the crisis caused by ending TPS is so severe that civil society had to mobilize in court simply to protect Hondurans from being returned to life-threatening conditions. 

Femicide: The central context of forced return 

Femicide is not peripheral to TPS; it is one of the main reasons Hondurans fled. In 2023, Honduras reached a femicide rate of 7.2 per 100,000 women, one of the highest in Latin America. Organizations like Cattrachas document how gender-based killings intersect with policing failures, institutional corruption, and gang control. 

Many Honduran women losing TPS originally fled because they were being hunted by abusive partners, traffickers, or armed criminal groups. Ending TPS is therefore not simply deportation. It will force women to return to an environment where they are deliberately targeted and where the state fails to protect them. As the Women’s Refugee Commission notes, gender-based violence is a leading driver of forced migration. Repatriation under these conditions directly increases the risk of femicide. 

Community resilience: Art as resistance 

Even as institutions fail, communities in Honduras have built their own forms of protection. One of the most powerful is art-activism (“artivism”). Public art challenges the normalization of violence and preserves memory in ways formal systems often fail to do. The UN Spotlight Initiative has supported art-based gender-violence prevention in 17 Honduran municipalities, using murals, sculptures, and theater to create community dialogue and challenge harmful norms. 

The feminist graffiti duo Dolls Clan (Mayki Graff Ortega and Suam Fonseca) creates public murals honoring victims of femicide and amplifying feminist resistance. Their work turns public walls into spaces of collective mourning and political demand. Public art is a form of humanitarian response: it educates, resists, and keeps victims’ stories alive when formal justice systems fail. But art cannot replace systemic protection. 

The immediate human cost of ending TPS 

Ending TPS triggers four immediate humanitarian harms: 

1. Family separation: Thousands of U.S.-born children have Honduran parents with TPS. Families now face the devastating choice between separation or relocating to a country many children have never known. 
2. Economic instability and re-poverty: TPS holders have spent decades building careers, homes, and businesses in the U.S. Forced return pushes them into an already unstable Honduran economy. 
3. A rise in irregular migration: History shows that ending legal pathways does not reduce migration; it increases undocumented migration as people seek safety through more dangerous routes. 
4. Exposure to direct violence: Returnees become immediate targets of gangs, extortion networks, police corruption, and gender-based violence. TPS termination does not fix migration. It makes it deadlier. 

A crisis created by political choice 

Ending TPS for Honduras is not a neutral administrative action, it is a political decision with profound humanitarian consequences. It forces thousands back into a country facing intersecting emergencies: femicide, gang rule, climate disaster, and institutional collapse. While communities fight to maintain dignity and memory, the U.S. is withdrawing one of the only forms of international protection Hondurans have left. It abandons a protection promise the United States upheld for more than two decades. If the United States seeks to honor its humanitarian commitments, it must extend TPS or redesign it as a pathway to long-term stability, not dismantle it. Protection should never depend on political cycles. Lives depend on it. 

Josse Martinez is a Global Governance, Politics, and Security (GGPS) graduate student at American University. He is of Honduran and Guatemalan descent.

Danjha Leon Martinez is a Research Assistant for the Immigration Lab at the Center for Latin American & Latino Studies. She is a Development Management graduate student at American University with a focus on humanitarian aid and global migration

When heading to South America, you don’t have the wide range of choices you’ll find for Europe. You’ve got the US carriers, three main South American ones, then a few serving just one or two countries. The largest one is of those is LATAM Airlines, based in Chile. Unlike Avianca, it has kept the...

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 Luiz Inazio Lula de Silva is not just another President of Brazil. He is the first one to rise from abject  poverty, breaking a long tradition of leadership dominated by political and economic elites.

Nueve horas antes del ataque, Osmer H., de 15 años, se grabó frente al espejo vestido de negro con un fusil AR-15 en mano. Publicó en sus redes sociales un mensaje: “Hoy es el día”. Después compartió en Instagram un video con referencias al odio hacia las mujeres y los tiroteos escolares. Más tarde entró a la preparatoria privada Antón Makárenko, donde es estudiante, en el municipio costero de Lázaro Cárdenas, Michoacán, y mató a dos de sus maestras, María del Rosario y Tatiana, de 36 y 37 años, respectivamente.

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We were fortunate enough to spend some time at Pueblo Bonito Vantage Hotel in San Miguel de Allende the same month it opened. This is run by the same company that has long operated resorts on the coast, so they weren’t starting from scratch on the systems and management. It’s a gorgeous hotel that...

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By Maggie McMahon   

Sexual violence during migration journeys is rarely addressed in the current political climate. Yet this issue is rampant for many migrants, especially those making the journey from Latin America to the United States. The personal experiences and testimonies from those who completed this journey provide valuable insight into the dangers that migrants face in this region. This problem demands more attention, as it is one of the many dangers that migrants face while attempting to reach the U.S. 

In her late 20’s and from Ecuador, Verónica details her lengthy and dangerous journey to the United States, where she walked many miles to the US-Mexico border and experienced rough traveling conditions, including falling off a train.

Ay me están esperando llorar. Bueno, sufrí mucho, pasé mucha hambre, dormí en parque—muchas cosas feas…Bueno, después de eso, yo cambié de tren y me subí a otro tren que ese sí era el que me traía, pero ese tren se quedó 3 días en el desierto. Ahí entonces yo como que le daba gracias a Dios de no haberme subido a ese tren porque yo me pude subir, pero me dio miedo y no me subí, pero mucha gente se subió y algunos se cayeron, incluidos niños. Bueno, ese tren me avanzó hasta la frontera, de ahí yo me bajé y camine bastante. Yo llegué a este país con los pies podridos ensangrentados porque yo caminé artístico.[1]

Oh, this is making me want to cry. Well, I suffered a lot. I went very hungry, slept in a park—many ugly things… Well, after that, I changed trains and got on another one, the one that was supposed to bring me here. But that train stayed stranded in the desert for three days. At that point, I felt like thanking God for not getting on the earlier train. I could have boarded it, but I was scared and didn’t. Many people did get on, and some fell off, including children. Well, that train took me to the border, from there I got off and walked a lot. I arrived in this country with rotten feet, bloodied because I walked a tremendous amount. 

When asked if she felt in danger during her trip, Verónica shared her experience in Guatemala:

Uh no yo siempre diré que Guatemala es el peor país que yo pude conocer ahí, así que no te digo. A mi en bus me tocaron los senos, las partes íntimas. Me sacaron todo el dinero.

Oh no, I will always say that Guatemala is the worst country I could have known there, so I tell you. They touched my breasts and private parts on the bus. They took all my money.

After arriving in the United States, Verónica’s friend provided her a place to stay and food for a few weeks. She now works as a delivery driver.

Another woman, Mariana, also shared her experience with sexual violence during her journey. In her fifties and from El Salvador, she has been in the US for over two decades. During her journey from El Salvador, she recalls that:

Fíjese que yo fui víctima de eso. No llegar al acto sexual porque gracias a Dios no me llegaron a violar, pero en el camino para acá si fui tocada por los hombres. Puedo recordar de que no sé si todas percibirán eso, pero yo sí lo viví. Sí. Sería porque yo cuando venía ya venía …, pero yo parecía… yo era bien delgadita, parecía una niña de 14 años. No sé si por eso es que abusaron de mí de esa manera. Pero sí pudeir tocada por más de 2 hombres en el camino. 

I remember that I was a victim of that. Not in a sexual act, thanks to God, they did not rape me, but on the way here I was touched by men. I can remember that I didn’t know if anyone else sees that, but I did experience that…it must have been because when I came…I seemed to be very thin, I looked like a 14-year-old girl. I don’t know if that’s why they abused me in that way. But I was touched by more than 2 men on the way.

Mariana’s story demonstrates how persistent the dangers of migration have been for women over the years. 

These instances of sexual assault are not isolated. Samuel, born in Colombia in the late 1990s, migrated to Venezuela as a child due to political violence and the unfavorable economic situation. He moved to Brazil as a young teen to work in the mines after his parents separated and migrated to the US in 2024. 

While traversing the Darién Gap, a remote thick jungle crossing between Colombia and Panama, David witnessed many violent situations. The Darien Gap is known for its dangerous and difficult conditions, with many people experiencing gang violence, crime, sexual violence, disease, and death. 

David reported that while on the Panamanian side of the Darien Gap, he witnessed a group of Indigenous men rape a woman traversing the crossing. He also saw this group of men shoot the woman’s husband. 

Hay indios que agarraron a una mujer y se la violaron. Y al esposo… viendo que están pasando eso, el esposo se le baten o se levanta, le pegan un tiro. El indio agarró con una escopeta y le pegó el tiro. Puso, se lo pegó aquí… Así, puff, le pegó el tiro aquí …. Ahí quedaron los dos y salieron los indios. Antes habían robado y todo, pero después estaban violando a la mujer ahí ante el grupo. 

There are Indians who grabbed a woman and they raped her. And the husband … seeing that they are going through that, the husband fights him or gets up, they shoot him. The Indian grabbed a shotgun and shot him. He put it, he stuck it here… So, poof, he shot him here…. The two of them laid there and the Indians left…Before, they had robbed and everything, but after they were raping the woman there in front of the group.

Sexual violence is unfortunately a common experience in the Darién Gap. Other migrants we interviewed also reported witnessing instances of it, as with the case of Mauricio. Born in Venezuela, Mauricio migrated to the US four years ago to find better opportunities for his three young children. He traveled to Caracas, Venezuela and then on to Colombia and Peru. During his migration, Mauricio faced many dangerous situations, such as sleeping on the streets and crossing the jungle. As he recounts: 

En Panama fui testigo una violencia que pasó pero eso fue ya entrando en la selva. Violaron una niña y alguna mujer. Entonces yo estuve ahí, o sea, fui vi todo con mis ojos y fui testigo de eso.

In Panama I witnessed violence that happened, but that was already deep in the jungle. They raped a girl and a woman. So, I was there, that is, I saw everything with my eyes and witnessed that. 

Instances of sexual violence were then increasing in the Darién Gap since Panamanian authorities were not monitoring the crossing. Additionally, many instances of sexual violence go unreported due to stigma and shame. With the absence of policing in these remote largely uninhabited areas, armed criminal groups are able to take advantage of vulnerable people traversing the crossing.  Though lately, the Panamanian government has mobilized the army to patrol those areas, as movement north has decreased and now many people are heading south.

Sexual violence have long-term psychological and physical impacts for those who experience and witness it. Victims of rape can suffer sexually transmitted infections, unwanted pregnancies, and physical trauma. Sexual violence can also cause feelings of depression, anxiety, PTSD, and social isolation, as well as heighten an individual’s risk of substance abuse.

Given the ongoing instability faced by many Latin American countries, migration through the Darién Gap is likely to increase. Panamanian authorities must take further action to closely monitor the dangerous conditions in the crossing and provide support for the vulnerable populations crossing it. Greater support for the physical, psychological, and financial needs of migrants should also be implemented in the United States. 

Maggie McMahon is a research intern at the Immigration Lab. She is a senior majoring in international studies. 

Edited by Elizabeth Angione and Vincent Iannuzzi-Sucich

[1] This and the following accounts have been taken from interviews conducted with recent arrivals to the Washington DC-metro region and New York City as part of an ongoing research project of the Immigration Lab in American University’s Center for Latin American and Latino Studies. This project received IRB approval. Given the vulnerability of this population, we have taken steps to ensure the human subjects involved are protected, including eliciting the consent of all research subjects, the use of pseudonyms, and elimination of any individually identifying information.

MIAMI – Eugenio Suárez flung his head back and looked up into the rafters. The sound bouncing off loanDepot park’s steel roof washed over the Venezuelan designated hitter as he held out his arms and motioned for more. Suárez’s RBI double in the top of the ninth gave Venezuela the go-ahead run in an electric […]

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Siamara, the founder of the Argentine Fashion brand this year, starts with this story, ”The brand reflects my personal story and the intersection of the cultures that shaped me. Through Siamara, I combine Indian textiles, craftsmanship, and color with Argentine silhouettes and contemporary style. The result is a collection of distinctive pieces that celebrate cultural fusion, individuality, and the beauty of textile traditions".



After a morning session of birdwatching then a hearty breakfast, I hiked through jungle foliage to a waterfall. The next day we rappelled down the face of it from the summit, then went ziplining from a tower in the afternoon. Day Three onward was completely different though: we were kayaking through the warm waters...

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By Juan A. Bogliaccini, Professor of Political Science, Universidad Católica del Uruguay

This small South American country is seeking new markets and investment while remaining anchored to MERCOSUR and balancing ties with the United States and China.

For more than three decades, Uruguay’s strategy for international economic integration has revolved around the Southern Common Market, MERCOSUR. Founded in 1991 by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, the bloc emerged at the end of the Cold War with the goal of deepening regional economic integration and strengthening trade among its members. For Uruguay, a small country of just over three million people located between two regional giants, the bloc initially proved highly beneficial. During the 1990s, MERCOSUR became the main engine of Uruguayan exports and foreign investment.

That dynamic began to shift at the end of the decade. Brazil’s currency devaluation in 1998 and Argentina’s financial collapse in 2001 exposed the vulnerabilities of Uruguay’s economic dependence on its neighbors. At the time, a majority of the country’s exports was destined for these two markets, and the crises had profound effects on Uruguay’s economy.

These events triggered a long-running debate within the country’s political and economic elites about the future of Uruguay’s international trade strategy. At the center of the discussion was one of MERCOSUR’s key institutional rules: member states cannot negotiate individual free trade agreements outside the bloc. Critics argued that this constraint limited Uruguay’s ability to diversify its economic partnerships in an increasingly globalized world.

For many years, much of the political center-right advocated a strategy similar to that pursued by Chile—signing bilateral free trade agreements across multiple regions of the world. The center-left generally defended remaining firmly within the regional framework, emphasizing the importance of political and economic integration with neighboring countries.

Over time, however, both sides gradually converged toward a more pragmatic position. Today there is broad consensus that Uruguay should remain in MERCOSUR while pushing for greater flexibility within the bloc allowing for members to pursue complementary trade agreements. In practice, leaving MERCOSUR has never been a realistic option. Brazil and Argentina remain crucial trading partners, particularly for exports linked to regional value chains and cross-border production networks.

At the same time, the bloc itself has increasingly sought to expand outward. In recent years, MERCOSUR has concluded trade agreements with Singapore and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which includes Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland. In 2026, after more than twenty-five years of negotiations, MERCOSUR also finalized a landmark trade agreement with the European Union. Across successive governments representing different political parties, Uruguay has consistently supported these negotiations as part of a long-term strategy of gradual trade opening.

Meanwhile, Uruguay’s broader trade relationships have evolved significantly. Over the past two decades, China has become the country’s principal destination for goods exports, particularly agricultural commodities such as soybeans and forestry products like cellulose pulp. At the same time, the United States has become the main market for Uruguay’s rapidly growing service sector, especially software development and business services.

These trends have positioned Uruguay within a complex global landscape shaped by growing geopolitical competition between the world’s two largest economies. Rather than aligning strongly with either side, successive Uruguayan governments have sought to maintain a careful balance between Washington and Beijing while preserving strong ties with their regional partners.

Recent administrations have also attempted to broaden the country’s commercial horizons. During the presidency of Luis Lacalle Pou (2020–2025), Uruguay applied to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), one of the world’s most significant multilateral trade agreements. Although accession negotiations are only beginning, the move signaled Uruguay’s intention to deepen economic ties with Asia-Pacific markets.

The Lacalle Pou government also explored the possibility of negotiating a bilateral free trade agreement with China. While the initiative ultimately did not move forward—largely because Beijing made clear it preferred negotiations with MERCOSUR as a whole—the effort served an important political purpose. Alongside the negotiations with the CPTPP, it signaled to Uruguay’s regional partners that the country was determined to pursue broader trade opportunities.

The current administration of President Yamandú Orsi has continued this strategy of balanced engagement. Diplomatic outreach to both the United States and China reflects Uruguay’s pragmatic approach in an increasingly multipolar global economy. Promoting exports has become particularly important as the strength of the Uruguayan peso makes international competitiveness more challenging for domestic producers.

Despite these global ambitions, Uruguay’s integration into international value chains remains heavily regional. Much of the country’s participation in global trade occurs through “import-to-export” production models, particularly in agro-industrial sectors that rely on imported inputs and regional processing networks. A large share of these exports continues to be destined for MERCOSUR markets, reflecting the enduring importance of regional economic integration.

This structural reality explains why Uruguay’s leaders have consistently pursued a dual strategy: maintaining strong economic ties with Argentina and Brazil while simultaneously seeking new markets and investment partners around the world.

The recently concluded trade agreement between MERCOSUR and the European Union may represent an important step in that direction. Together with the agreements with Singapore and EFTA—and the expected accession of Bolivia to MERCOSUR—the deal could gradually expand the economic horizons of a country that remains heavily dependent on a limited number of export sectors.

For Uruguay, the stakes are significant. Since the end of the global commodity boom in the early 2010s, economic growth has slowed. As a result, it has become more difficult to reduce a fiscal deficit that hovers around 4 percent of GDP while public debt continues to rise gradually. Expanding exports and attracting foreign investment have therefore become central priorities for policymakers.

Yet Uruguay’s small domestic market inevitably limits its appeal to international investors. The country’s greatest economic asset lies instead in its potential role as a stable regional hub within the much larger South American market. With strong institutions, political stability, and relatively high levels of human capital, Uruguay often presents itself as a reliable gateway for companies seeking access to the region.

Realizing that potential, however, will require more than trade agreements alone. Expanding Uruguay’s global economic presence will depend on developing new productive sectors, increasing productivity in existing industries, and moving gradually toward exports with higher value added.

For a small country navigating between two regional giants and competing global powers, this is no simple task. But Uruguay’s strategy remains clear: maintain its regional anchor while steadily expanding its reach into the global economy.

By Ilka Treminio-Sánchez, Political Scientist of the University of Costa Rica.  

The national elections held in Costa Rica on February 1, 2026, marked a turning point in the country’s recent political trajectory. Contrary to expectations of a runoff—common in a highly fragmented party system—the ruling party candidate, Laura Fernández, won in the first round with 48.3 percent of votes counted. This result not only ensured the continuity of the political project championed by President Rodrigo Chaves but also consolidated a deeper transformation of the Costa Rican political system. 

The election saw a 69 percent voter turnout, the highest since 2010. This increase can be interpreted as a sign of civic revitalization, but also as a consequence of growing polarization. During the campaign, two distinct blocs emerged: on one side, the ruling party, organized around Chaves’s personalistic leadership; on the other, a fragmented opposition that, despite its ideological differences, shared concerns about the country’s institutional direction, and which ultimately consolidated most of its votes around the National Liberation Party. In the run up to the election, supporters of traditional and emerging parties came together. Concerned about the country’s democracy, they spontaneously organized various forms of collective action outside event venues. These activities culminated in the so-called “multicolored caravans,” named for the diversity of party flags displayed under the unifying slogan: “Out with Chaves!” But, despite such mobilizations, and in line with poll results, the opposition did not advance to a runoff. 

From an organizational standpoint, the process was impeccable. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal once again demonstrated high standards of transparency and efficiency, reaffirming the technical soundness of the Costa Rican electoral system. However, this procedural strength contrasts sharply with the political tensions that accumulated during Chaves’s presidency, characterized by a confrontational discourse toward oversight bodies and the judiciary. 

The Ruling Party and the Construction of Continuity 

Fernández’s victory cannot be understood without considering the central role of the outgoing president. Although constitutionally barred from immediate reelection, Chaves devised a succession strategy based on personal loyalty and the symbolic transfer of his leadership. The official campaign revolved around the slogan “continuity of change,” presenting Fernández as the custodian of the president’s political mandate and as its guarantor of continued power. 

The electoral vehicle was the Sovereign People’s Party (PPSO), created after Chaves fell out with the leadership of the Social Democratic Progress Party, with which he rose to power in 2022. The reorganization allowed it to concentrate the vote and achieve not only the presidency, but also 31 of the 57 legislative seats, an absolute majority unprecedented in recent decades. 

This result substantially alters the conditions for governance. While previous administrations had to govern with small and fragmented factions, the new government will have a robust parliamentary group, although of late some friction has emerged among its leaders. Nevertheless, only the National Liberation Party – historically the most dominant political force in Costa Rica – had achieved a similar number of representatives in 1982, during an exceptional economic crisis. 

This legislative majority opens the door to the possibility of far-reaching political reforms. During his presidency, Chaves repeatedly expressed interest in expanding the executive branch’s powers, limiting oversight bodies’ authority, and promoting a transformation of the state that his supporters call the “Third Republic,” a successive step in the destruction of the Second Republic inherited after the 1948 Civil War, whose foundations were laid by the liberationist José Figueres Ferrer. Without a supermajority, such reforms were not feasible. Today, the balance of power looks different. 

During the transition period, two unprecedented decisions were announced. First, the president-elect expressed her intention to appoint Rodrigo Chaves as Minister of the Presidency, the sole responsible for coordinating actions between the executive and legislative branches. Second, the outgoing president appointed Laura Fernández as Minister of the Presidency for the remaining months of the administration. Chaves also stated that, in his future role, he would seek to bring on board members of the National Liberation Party to form the supermajority necessary to approve constitutional reforms.

Populism, Leadership, and Institutional Tensions 

Rodrigo Chaves’s governing style represented a break with traditional Costa Rican political patterns. His confrontational rhetoric, directed against media outlets, public universities, judges, and opposition members of parliament, reinforced an anti-establishment narrative that resonated with sectors disillusioned with the status quo.  His rhetoric fits into the political model followed by other populist presidents on the continent. 

Surveys conducted by the Center for Political Research and Studies (CIEP) at the University of Costa Rica showed that his supporters primarily valued his ability to “impose order” and “produce results.” These attributes reflect a social demand for strong leadership and swift decisions, even if such an approach creates tension with the deliberative procedures inherent in liberal democracy. 

In this sense, the Costa Rican case fits into a broader regional trend. The political and inspirational affinity with Salvadorian President Nayib Bukele’s influence was evident throughout the campaign, particularly regarding public safety and proposals to toughen the prison system. Likewise, the first congratulatory messages to Fernández came from far-right figures such as Chilean president-elect Antonio Kast, and Mexican media figure Eduardo Verástegui, suggesting the integration of Costa Rica’s new leadership into transnational conservative-right networks. This realignment does not necessarily imply a break with traditional partners, but it does signal an ideological shift that redefines the country’s international standing. 

Security, Social Cohesion, and a Democratic Future 

The new government’s main challenge will be public security. The sustained increase in homicides and expansion of organized crime have eroded Costa Rica’s reputation as a peaceful exception in Central America. Policies implemented so far have been lax and ineffective, to the point that candidates labeled them permissive during the campaign debates. 

Added to this are structural problems: the deterioration of the education system, the strain on the healthcare system, and the weakening of environmental policies that historically formed part of a national consensus. These issues not only affect social well-being but also undermine the legitimacy of a democratic system seemingly unable to improve the situation. 

The 2026 elections do not simply represent a change or continuity of political parties. They reflect a reconfiguration of the political system around a personalistic leadership that combines right-wing populism, social conservatism, an evangelical agenda, and challenges to institutional checks and balances. The electoral strength of the ruling party is undeniable; so too is the broad-based support it received. 

The underlying concern is undoubtedly that the new continuity government could further the trajectory of democratic erosion. When anti-institutional rhetoric is legitimized by those in power and the political concentration of that power is presented as a condition for effective governance, the risk is not an abrupt collapse but rather an incremental erosion. 

For a society with a long tradition of stability and the rule of law, the central challenge will be to rebuild a minimal consensus around respect for horizontal checks and balances and pluralistic deliberation. The continuity of Chaves’s political project opens a new cycle. Its outcome will depend not only on the Executive and its legislative majority, but also on the capacity of the citizenry and institutions to maintain the balances that have historically defined Costa Rican democracy. 

Since I’m based in Mexico and the country seems to grow lots of sugar cane, it has been a mystery to me why they don’t produce more rum. So when I see a Mexican rum brand on the shelf I don’t recognize, I almost always buy it. So when I saw Ron La Gloria...

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The Pantanal is a land of superlatives. The largest tropical wetland in the world. A biodiversity hot spot. Home to South America’s “Big Five”: Jaguar, Giant Anteater, Giant River Otter, Maned Wolf & Brazilian Tapir. Not to mention the Pantaneira culture, shaped by an unforgiving landscape. What the floodplain landscape lacks in elevation it holds […]

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In the face of Trump’s steady decline in approval ratings, White House spokesman Davis Ingle claimed: “The ultimate poll was November 5th 2024 when nearly 80 million Americans overwhelmingly elected President Trump to deliver on his popular and commonsense agenda.” OVERWHELMINGLY? Trump received under 50% of the popular vote and only 1.5% more than Kamala Harris. Does that make his triumph “overwhelming?” Of course not, but that doesn’t deter Trump and his allies from constantly conflating the popular vote and the electoral college vote in order to claim that 2024 was a landslide victory.

Mérida, February 23, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Venezuelan National Assembly passed the Amnesty Law for Democratic Coexistence on Thursday, January 19. The government, led by Acting President Delcy Rodríguez, immediately enacted the legislation and presented it as a step toward “peace and tolerance.” The law establishes mechanisms that aim to promote political reconciliation through a […]

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Momentum is building for the March 28 massive nation-wide No Kings rally. But as reflected in this sign “No War on Venezuela,” the protests should focus as much on the aggressive regime-change moves by the U.S. and the resultant death and destruction, as on issues on the domestic front. These photos are from today’s protest in Germantown MD, which are taking place every Saturday and are getting positive, enthusiastic responses from cars passing by at this busy intersection. 

US President Donald Trump is considering a visit to Venezuela, though he did not specify when the trip might take place or what agenda it would entail. I’m going to make a visit to Venezuela, Trump told reporters outside the White House on Friday. The US President addressed the press ahead of a trip to […]

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The U.S. embargo (really a blockade) on Cuba is a “humanitarian threat.” Those aren’t my words. They’re Trump’s very words. Basically, what Trump is saying amounts to this: Someone puts a gun to some else’s head and tells the person to pull down their pants. He then says, if you don’t do what I'm telling you to do, I’m going to kill you and it’ll be your fault.

What has happened in Venezuela is not a surprise to those who have read the Magical Realism stories of Gabriel Garcia Marquez and the other famous Latin American writers. In this signature genre of Latin American literature, the writers blur the line between fantasy and facts, weaving magic into reality.

The Mexican writer Octavio Paz was the most prominent Latin American to understand, analyze, interpret and promote India intellectually and culturally  from a Latin American perspective in the twentieth century. He had first hand experience of India as a diplomat posted in New Delhi for seven years. He has written numerous poems and articles on India. His book "Vislumbres de la India" (In the light of India) is regarded as one of the best introductions to India among Latin American thinkers.  Some cultural visitors from the Spanish-speaking world travel around the country with Paz’s book as an ‘intimate guide’. They see India through his eyes, trying to grasp the immense complexity of India. 

 Nicaragua, the “Republic of Poets” has become a “Republic of Clandestine Poets.”

Our present, however, is one of spiraling crises. Since the financial crash of 2008, the economic crisis converges with ecological collapse and the exhaustion of liberal democratic forms, reaching civilizational dimensions. In this context, the pandemic laid bare how, instead of disappearing, the divide between the center and periphery of the world system is as sharp and as meaningful as ever. 

With neoliberal hegemony fractured, other ways of thinking and practicing politics have reemerged from their intellectual exiles. Among these, dependency theory stands out as an original and revolutionary contribution of Latin American critical thought, offering tools for understanding uneven capitalist development and imperialism both historically and today. For an introduction to this unique framework, we turn to Dr. Jaime Osorio. 

When a military coup d’état in Chile overthrew the democratically elected government of Salvador Allende on September 11, 1973, Osorio had already been accepted to begin his doctoral studies at the University of Chile’s Center for Socio-Economic Studies (CESO, in Spanish). The dictatorship’s advance brought him instead to Mexico, where today he ranks as Distinguished Professor at the Autonomous Metropolitan University (UAM) in Xochimilico and as Researcher Emeritus by the National Council of Science and Technology (CONACYT). He is the author of many books, including Fundamentos del análsis social. La realidad social y su conocimiento and Sistema mundial. Intercambio Desigual y renta de la tierra. 

In this interview, Osorio speaks with Jacobin contributing editor Hilary Goodfriend about the Marxist school of dependency theory, its origins and principles, and its present-day applications.  

Dependency theory and its Marxist strain emerged from debates and dialogues about development, underdevelopment, and imperialism in the context of decolonization and the national liberation struggles of the twentieth century. What were the main positions and strategies in dispute, and how did Marxist dependency theorists position themselves in these arguments?

At the theoretical level, Marxist dependency theory [TMD, in Spanish] is the result of the Cuban Revolution’s victory in 1959. Latin American Marxism was moved by the island’s gesture. All the main theses about the nature of Latin American societies and the character of revolution came into question. 

A little over a decade after that event, which sharpened the debates, TMD reached maturity. In those years, some of the proposals that fed theories of dependency emphasized the role of trade relations, such as the “deterioration of the terms of trade” thesis put forward by the [Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean] CEPAL, which referred to the cheapening of primary goods against the rising prices of industrial products in the world market.

Orthodox Marxists highlighted the presence of internal “obstacles” that impeded development, like idle terrain in the hands of landowners, which also blocked the expansion of wage relations. Generally, in these proposals, capitalism wasn’t to blame. In fact, it was necessary to accelerate its spread so that its inherent contradictions would heighten. Only then could a socialist revolution be proposed, according to this stage-based perspective prevalent in the Communist Parties.

For the Cepalinos, their horizon was achieving advanced capitalism, which would be possible by means of a process of industrialization. This would allow the region to cease exporting primary goods and food products and importing secondary goods, which would now be produced internally, sparking technological development and stemming the outflow of resources. 

In both proposals, the industrial bourgeoisie had a positive role to play, be it in the medium or long term.

For Marxist dependency theory, the region’s so-called economic “backwardness” was a result of the formation and expansion of the capitalist world system, whose course produced development and underdevelopment simultaneously. Therefore, these divergent economic histories are not independent processes, nor are they connected tangentially. From this perspective, the fundamental theoretical and historical problem required explaining the processes that generated both development and underdevelopment in the same movement. 

This problem demanded, furthermore, a response that accounted for how this process is reproduced over time since civilization and barbarism are constantly made anew by the world system. 

Many of the acclaimed Marxist dependency theorists—Ruy Mauro Marini, Theotonio Dos Santos, Vania Bambirra—share a trajectory of flight from South American dictatorships and exile in Mexico. You were also subject to this forced displacement. How did these experiences of revolution and counterrevolution influence the construction of TMD?

Four names stand out in the development of TMD: André Gunder Fank, Theotonio Dos Santos, Vania Vambirra, and Ruy Mauro Marini. The first was a German-U.S. economist and the other three Brazilians, who shared readings and discussions in Brazil before the 1964 coup in that country. Subsequently, they found each other in Chile in the late 1960s in the Center for Socio-Economic Studies, until the military coup of 1973. During this period—at least in the case of the Brazilians—they produced their principals works with regards to TMD. I had the fortune of meeting and working with Marini in Mexico in the mid-1970s, before his return to Brazil. 

TMD offers no concessions to the local ruling classes, holding them responsible for the prevailing conditions in which they manage to reap enormous profits in collusion with international capitals, despite [international] value transfers. For this reason, it was hard for these theorists to find spaces for their knowledge in the academic world.

The 1973 military coup in Chile meant that the principal creators of TMD appeared on the search lists of the military forces and their intelligence apparatus. And this coup in Chile, which was preceded by the coup in Brazil in 1964, was followed by many more in the Southern part of the continent, which dispersed and disbanded working groups and closed important spaces in those societies. 

At the same time, this long counterrevolutionary phase, which was not limited to military governments, favored sweeping transformations in the social sciences, where neoliberal theories and methodological individualism came to reign supreme. TMD emerged in an exceptional period of recent history. However, subsequently and in general—saving certain moments and countries in the region—ideal conditions for its development and dissemination have not existed.

In his classic work, The Dialectics of Dependency, Marini defines dependency as a “relation of subordination between formally independent nations, in whose framework the relations of production of the subordinate nation are modified or recreated in order to ensure the expanded production of dependency.” What are the mechanisms of this expanded production, and how have they changed since Marini formulated his proposal in the 1970s?

When we talk about the processes generated by dependent capitalism, the “dependent” qualifier isn’t redundant. We’re talking about another way of being capitalist. That is to say that in the world system, diverse forms of capitalism coexist and are integrated, and they feed off each other and deepen their particular forms within the global unity of capital. 

The heterogeneity of the system can be explained, then, not by the backwardness of some economies, not as prior states [of development], not as deficiencies.  Each constitutes its full, mature form of capitalism possible in this system. 

In this way, with the stroke of a pen, TMD destroyed the hopes of the developmentalists, who supposed that the dependent economies could achieve higher states of welfare and development within this order constituted by capital. For them, it was just a matter of taking advantage of windows that regularly open. There is nothing in the prevailing dynamic to suggest that things are moving in that direction. To the contrary, what is produced and continues to emerge is the “development of underdevelopment,” so long as capitalist social relations prevail. 

The gap between underdeveloped and developed capitalism, or between imperialist and dependent capitalism is ever widening. Dependency deepens and more acute modalities are generated. In a world in which digital capitalism is gaining ground—the internet of things, artificial intelligence, robotics, as an example—this isn’t hard to understand. 

Experiences like that of South Korea can’t be repeated at will. They are, instead, exceptions to the rule. Why did the IMF cut off and suffocate the Argentine economy and not extend its hand like imperialist capital did for South Korea after the 1952 war on the peninsula? It was the latter’s exceptional position in a strategic space, which was disrupted by the triumph of Mao’s revolution in China and the need to construct a barrier to prevent the expansion of socialism in Korea, that turned on the faucet of enormous resources, at least for Japan and the United States, and put blinders on those defenders of democracy and the free market when South Korea was governed by a succession of military dictatorships that ferociously applied state intervention, not the free market, to define plans and programs to define priorities for investment and loans. 

Today, all a government in the dependent world has to do is establish some rules for foreign capital, and the whole clamor and propaganda of transnational media demand that communism be stopped, impeding international loans, blocking access to markets, and seeking to suffocate those alleged subversives. 

The concept of superexploitation as a mechanism by which dependent capitalists compensate for their subordinate insertion in the international division of labor is perhaps Marini’s most original and polemic proposal. Some Marxists, for example, protest the possibility of the systematic violation of the law of value. This is a theme that you take up in your debate with the Argentinian researcher Claudio Katz. How do you define superexploitation, and why, or in what terms, do you defend its validity today?

With Marini’s short book, The Dialectics of Dependency, whose central body was written in 1972 and would be published in 1973, TMD reaches its point of greatest maturity. We can synthesize the nucleus of Marini’s thesis in the question: How is the reproduction of a capitalism that regularly transfers value to imperialist economies possible?

It’s possible because in dependent capitalism, a particular form of exploitation is imposed which means that capital isn’t just appropriating surplus value, but also part of workers’ consumption fund, which ought to correspond to their salaries, in order to transfer it to their accumulation fund. That’s what the category of superexploitation accounts for. If all capital eventually ends up being unpaid labor, in dependent capitalism, all capital is unpaid labor and the appropriated life fund [of the working class].

Marini’s response is theoretically and politically brilliant, because it allows us to explain the reasons for the multiplication of misery and the devastation of the workers in the dependent world, but also the reasons for which capital is unable to establish stable forms of domination in these regions, regularly expelling huge contingents of workers from its civilizational promises, thrusting them into barbarism and converting them into contingents that resist, revolt, and rise up against the projects of the powerful. 

Superexploitation has consequences at all levels of Latin American societies. For now, we can emphasize that it accompanies the formation of economies oriented to foreign markets. Following the processes of independence in the nineteenth century, and under the guidance of local capitals, the region’s economies advanced on the basis of exports, initially of primary materials and foodstuffs, to which we can add, recently, the production and assembly of luxury industrial goods like cars, televisions, state-of-the-art cell phones—products equally distant from the general consumption needs of most of the working population. This is compatible with the dominant modality of exploitation, which seriously impacts salaries, reducing workers’ consumption power and reducing their participation in the formation of a dynamic internal market. 

It’s relevant here to consider a significant difference with capitalism in the developed world. There, as capitalism advanced in the nineteenth century, it faced the dilemma that in order to keep expanding, which implied the multiplication of the mass of goods and products, it would need to incorporate workers into consumption. That was achieved by paying salaries with the purchasing power for basic goods such as clothing, shoes, utensils, and home furnishings. This balance was accomplished by introducing improved production techniques, which reduced the pressure to extend the working day by multiplying the mass of products thrown into the market. From there, we can understand the weight of relative surplus value in developed capitalism. 

But in Latin America, things worked differently. Nineteenth-century capitalism didn’t see the need to create markets, because they had been available since the colonial period in the imperialist centers. In addition, English capitalism’s takeoff increased the demand for primary materials and foodstuffs. For this reason, there wasn’t any hurry to change the kind of use values and products put on the market. They continued to be foodstuffs and primary goods. In this way, the emergent capitalism in our region was under no pressure to do something qualitatively different. The mass of salaried laborers expanded, but they don’t comprise the principal demand for the goods being produced, which was in Europe, the United States, and Asia.  

Through their insertion in the world market and when it comes time to sell products, Latin American economies transfer value [abroad] for the simple reason that the capitals that operate here have lower compositions and productivities than the capitals in economies that spend more on new machinery, equipment, and technology, allowing them greater productivity and the ability to appropriate value created in other parts of the world. This process is called unequal exchange. 

It's important to note that unequal exchange occurs in the market, at the moment of the purchase and sale of commodities. Apart from their low organic composition, this concept doesn’t tell us much about how these commodities were produced, and above all, what allows for a capitalist process to be reproduced over time in such conditions. That’s where super-exploitation comes in. 

That is the secret that makes dependent capitalism viable. And this calls all the more attention to the errors of people like Claudio Katz, who have formulated proposals that try to eliminate this concept and do so, furthermore, with grotesque arguments, like that Marx never mentioned it in Capital – he refers to [superexploitaiton] many times, in a variety of ways – because that would imply a dilution or a direct attack on his theoretical proposition since capitalism can’t annihilate its workforce. 

I’m not going to repeat those debates with Katz. I will simply reiterate that Marx’s Capital is a book that is central to the study of capitalism and its contradictions. But no one can claim that it accounts for everything, or that capitalism, in its spread over time, can’t exhibit theoretical or historical novelties of any kind. That is a religious reading, but Capital is not a sacred text. Such a position, furthermore, is an attack on a central dimension of Marxism as a theory able to explain not only what has existed, but also that which is new. For this reason, the only orthodoxy Marxism can claim is its mode of reflection.

It's also argued that the spread of superexploitation to the central economies following globalized neoliberal restructuring invalidates its character as a process unique to dependent capitalism. 

Superexploitation can be present anywhere that capital operates, be that in the developed or underdeveloped world, just like forms of relative surplus value and absolute surplus value. Of course, there is superexploitation in Brazil and Guatemala, just as there is in Germany and South Korea. 

But that’s not the problem. What’s relevant is to elucidate the weight of these forms of exploitation, which can be present in any capitalist space, in capital’s reproduction. So the central issue is different, and so are the economic, social, and political consequences. 

Setting aside periods of crisis, when the most brutal forms of exploitation can be exacerbated everywhere, can capitalism operate in the medium and long term without a market that generates salaries, or with extremely low salaries? Something like if, in Germany, the average salary of the Armenians and Turks was generalized for the entire working population, or if the salaries of Mexican and Central American workers in the United States were predominant there. I don’t think so. 

Finally, what tools or perspectives does Marxist dependency theory offer us in the face of today’s crises?

In its eagerness to deal with the acute and prolonged capitalist crisis, capital in every region seeks to accentuate forms of exploitation, including superexploitation. It seeks, once again, to reduce rights and benefits. With the war in Ukraine, it has found a good excuse to justify the increase in the price of food, housing, and energy, and its shameless return to the use of fuels that intensify pollution and environmental barbarism, as well as the increase in military budgets at the expense of wages and jobs. 

The great imperial powers expect the subordination of economies and states to their decisions in periods of this sort. But the current crisis is also accelerating the crisis of hegemony in the world system, which opens spaces for greater degrees of autonomy—which does not put an end to dependency. This is evident in Washington’s difficulties with disciplining the Latin American and African states to support their position in the conflict in Europe. 

The scenario in Latin America over the last few decades reveals processes of enormous interest. We have witnessed significant popular mobilization in almost every country in the region, questioning various aspects of the neoliberal tsunami, be it jobs, salaries, retirements, healthcare and education, as well as rights like abortion, recognition of gender identities, lands, water, and much more. 

On this deeply fractured terrain that capital generates in the dependent world, class disputes tend to intensify. This explains the regular social and political outbursts in our societies. It’s the result of the barbarity that capitalism imposes on regions like ours. 

One expression of this social force is manifested in the electoral terrain. But just as quickly as there have been victories, there have been defeats. These comings and goings can be naturalized, but why haven’t the victories allowed for lasting processes of change? 

Of course, this is not to deny that there have been violent coups of a new sort that have managed to unseat governments. But even then, there were already signs of exhaustion that limited the protests, with the clear exception of Bolivia. There is an enormous gap between the leftist voter and the person who occasionally votes for left projects. The neoliberal triumph was not only in the economic policies and transformations it achieved, but also in its installment of a vision and interpretation of the world, its problems, and its solutions.

The struggle against neoliberalism today involves dismantling privatization of every kind and putting a stop to the conversion of social services and policies into private businesses. That means taking on the most economic and politically powerful sectors of capital, with control over state institutions where legislators, judges, and military members operate, together with the main media, schools, and churches. We can add that these are the sectors of capital with the strongest ties to imperialist capitals and their assemblage of supranational institutions, media, and states. 

It's a powerful social bloc. It’s hard to think about attacking it without having to attack capitalism itself.  

Publicado em Revista Rosa, Vol. 6, No. 1 Septembro 2022. 

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News Briefs

A Brazilian Supreme Court judge rejected a complaint filed by President Jair Bolsonaro in which he accused another justice of abusing his authority, the latest in an ongoing battle between Brazil's executive and judicial branches ahead of October's presidential elections. 

• Covid-19 cases in the Americas surged 27.2 percent last week over the prior one. Central America saw the largest percentage rise in cases, with infections soaring by 80%. The Pan American Health Organization warned that Covid is on the rise again in the region as many countries have abandoned measures like masking and social distancing and many lag in vaccination rates. (Reuters)
  
  
• Experts who track Conti -- the Russia-based ransomware gang that has held Costa Rica's tax collection and export systems hostage for over a month -- said the group had recently begun to shift its focus from the United States and Europe to countries in Central and South America, perhaps to retaliate against nations that have supported Ukraine, reports the New York Times.

The U.S. Biden administration has slightly eased restrictions on Chevron's ability to negotiate with Venezuela's government. Senior administration officials said the move was intended to support talks between the government of President Nicolás Maduro and the U.S.-backed opposition, reports the Washington Post. 

 by LAP Editor, Steve Ellner

by LAP Editor, Jeffery R. Webber

Posted by SPECTRE Journal

With seven opposition presidential candidates imprisoned and held incommunicado in the months leading up to the vote and all the remaining contenders but one from miniscule parties closely allied with President Daniel Ortega and his Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), the results of Nicaragua’s November 7 presidential elections were a foregone conclusion. The government declared after polls closed that Ortega won 75 percent of the vote and that 65 percent of voters cast ballots. The independent voting rights organization Urnas Abiertas, meanwhile, reported an abstention rate of approximately 80 percent and widespread irregularities at polling stations around the country.

The vote was carried out in a climate of fear and intimidation, with a total absence of safeguards against fraud.The vote was carried out in a climate of fear and intimidation, with a total absence of safeguards against fraud. In a complete breakdown of the rule of law, Ortega carried out a wave of repression from May to October, leading the opposition to issue a joint statement on October 7 calling for a boycott of the election. Several dozen opposition figures—among them, presidential candidates, peasant, labor, and student leaders, journalists, and environmentalists—were arrested and detained without trial, while several hundred others were forced into exile or underground.

Among those exiled were celebrated novelist Sergio Ramirez, who served as Ortega’s vice president during the 1980s revolution. While the government charged Ramirez with “conspiracy to undermine national integrity,” his crime was provoking the ire of the regime by publishing his latest novel, Tongolele No Sabía Bailar, a fictionalized account of the 2018 mass protests that marked the onset of the current political crisis and the degeneration of the regime into dictatorship. The book was promptly banned in the country, with customs authorities ordered to block shipments at ports of entry.

The repression particularly decimated the left-leaning opposition party Democratic Renovation Union (UNAMOS), formerly called the Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS). The MRS was formed in 1995 by Ortega’s former comrades in arms who either left the FSLN after the failure of their efforts to democratize it or were expelled for challenging Ortega’s leadership of the party. Among those UNAMOS leaders arrested and to date held incommunicado are legendary guerrilla commanders Dora María Téllez and Hugo Torres, as well as deputy foreign minister in the 1980s, Victor Hugo Tinoco, and party president Ana Margarita Vigil. Amnesty International condemned such detentions and incommunicado conditions as “enforced disappearance as a strategy of repression.”

As part of the crackdown the government also banned 24 civic organizations and professional associations—in addition to some 30 that it had previously banned, including three opposition political parties. The majority of these 24 organizations were professional medical guilds that had come under fire for criticizing the regime’s handling of the Covid-19 pandemic, including reporting that the government had concealed the number of infections and deaths. Vice President Rosario Murillo accused doctors of “health terrorism” and of spreading “false outlooks and news” on the impact of the contagion. During the early months of the pandemic the government convened mass public events under the banner of “Love in Times of Covid.” Nicaragua, together with Haiti, has the lowest rate of vaccination in Latin America, with only 4.9 percent of the population inoculated as of October.

In late 2020, the Sandinistas decreed a spate of laws that allows authorities to criminalize anyone who speaks out against the government. Among these are a Cybercrime Law that allows fines and imprisonment of anyone who publishes in the press or on social media what the government deems to be “false news.” Meanwhile, a “hate crimes” law allows life sentences for anyone considered to have carried out “hate crimes,” as defined by the government. Among the varied offenses listed by Sandinista prosecutors for the recent wave of detentions are “conspiracy to undermine national integrity,” “ideological falsehood,” “demanding, exalting, or applauding the imposition of sanctions against the Nicaraguan state and its citizens,” and “using international funding to create organizations, associations, and foundations to channel funds, through projects or programs that deal with sensitive issues such as sexual diversity groups, the rights of Indigenous communities, or through political marketing on topics such as free expression or democracy.”

A week before the vote, Ortega proclaimed that his wife, Vice President Rosario Murillo, was henceforth the “co-president” of the country. While his bizarre declaration has no legal basis or constitutional legitimacy, it was widely seen as a move to anoint her as his successor—the 76-year-old Ortega is known to be in ill health—and a further step towards the rule of a family dynasty. The ruling couple’s eight children already serve as advisors to the presidency and manage the family’s empire of private and ostensibly public media outlets, investment funds, and family businesses.

A mid-October poll by CID-Gallup—an independent pollster that has been conducting political opinion surveys in the country since 2011—found that 76 percent of the country’s electorate believed the country was moving in the wrong direction. The poll reported that 19 percent of the electorate planned to vote for Ortega, 65 percent stated they would favor an opposition candidate, and 16 percent remained undecided. A rival pollster contracted by the FSLN, M&R, showed Ortega with nearly 80 percent support. While all polls should be assessed with caution given the methodological limitations to surveys conducted amid political instability and civil conflict, it is noteworthy that Ortega’s support dropped to 19 from the 33 percent support reported by a CID-Gallup survey conducted in May of this year, which in turn was down from the high point of popular support for Ortega, 54 percent, registered in CID-Gallup’s 2012 poll.

Now that the votes have been cast, it is impossible to get accurate figures for the results given that the Sandinistas control the Supreme Electoral Council and exercise a near absolute control over reporting on the results. In addition, independent foreign observers were banned, and the threat of repression has dissuaded journalists and civic organizations from speaking out.

Ortega will now start his fourth consecutive term in office since the FSLN returned to power in 2007 in the midst of economic and political crisis. With its legitimacy shattered in the aftermath of the 2018 mass uprising and its violent repression, the regime has to rely more on direct coercion to maintain control. After the economy contracted each year from 2018 to 2020, the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America estimates a 2.0 percent growth rate for the current year and 1.8 percent for 2022—not enough for the economy to recover from the three-year tumble. As the crisis has intensified, the number of Nicaraguans trying to cross the U.S.-Mexico border climbed to historically unprecedented levels to exceed 50,000 this year, compared to just a few thousand in 2020. These numbers are in addition to the 140,000 who had already fled into exile since 2018, mostly to Costa Rica.

The International Left Remains Divided on Nicaragua

The international left remains divided on the Nicaraguan crisis, with some among it arguing that the Ortega-Murillo regime represents a continuation of the 1980s revolution and that the United States has been attempting to overthrow it. However, as I showed in an earlier NACLA article, there is little evidence to corroborate the claim that the 2018 mass uprising was instigated by Washington in an attempt to carry out a coup d’état against the government, or that the United States has since carried out a destabilization campaign aimed at overthrowing the regime.

It was not until the mass protests of 2018 that the co-government pact that Ortega had negotiated with the capitalist class, organized into the Superior Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP), broke down.The Ortega inner circle hacked its way into the ranks of the country’s elite in the aftermath of the 1980s revolution and launched a new round of capitalist development starting in 2007. During this period, the Sandinista bourgeoisie set about to vastly expand its wealth. Leading Sandinistas grouped around Ortega heavily invested in tourism, agroindustry, finance, import-export, and subcontracting for the maquiladoras. Ortega and Murillo championed a program—dressed in a quasi-leftist discourse of “Christian, Socialist, and Solidarity”— of constructing a populist multiclass alliance under the firm hegemony of capital and Sandinista state elites. This model did improve material conditions until the economy began to tank in 2015. It was not until the mass protests of 2018 that the co-government pact that Ortega had negotiated with the capitalist class, organized into the Superior Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP), broke down.

Washington would have liked to have a more pliant regime in place from the start, and the recent events have upped the ante in U.S.-Nicaragua relations. Nonetheless, successive U.S. administrations accommodated themselves since 2007 to the Ortega government, which cooperated closely with the U.S. Southern Command, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and U.S. immigration policies. Although the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has supplied several million dollars to opposition civic organizations through the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), USAID also granted several hundred million dollars directly to the Ortega government from 2007 until 2018.

On the eve of the Nicaraguan vote, the U.S. Congress passed the RENACER Act, which calls for targeted sanctions on Nicaraguan government officials found guilty of human rights violations and corruption. It also requires the executive branch to determine if Nicaragua should be expelled from the Central American Free Trade Agreement and to “expand oversight” of lending to Nicaragua by international financial agencies. In 2017 the U.S. government passed almost identical legislation, the NICA Act, which to date has resulted in sanctions slapped on several dozen top Nicaraguan government officials, affecting the assets they hold in the United States.

Apart from these sanctions on individuals, however, Washington did not enforce the NICA Act. It did not apply trade sanctions and has not blocked Nicaragua from receiving billions of dollars in credits from international agencies. From 2017 to 2021, Nicaragua received a whopping $2.2 billion in aid from the Central American Bank of Economic Integration (BCIE), and in 2020-2021 it received several hundred million in credits from the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund.

Some among the international Left condemn calls for sanctions on Ortega. Yet the U.S. and international Left broadly mobilized (unsuccessfully) in 1978 and 1979 to force Washington to impose sanctions on the Somoza dictatorship and block international financing because of the regime’s gross human rights violations. The worldwide Left similarly demanded sanctions against apartheid South Africa, sought to block U.S. and international financing for the Pinochet dictatorship, and currently calls for “boycott, divestment, and sanctions” against Israel.

Grassroots opponents of the Ortega-Murillo regime find themselves between the rock of an Ortega-Murillo dictatorship and the hard place of the capitalist class and its political agents among the traditional conservative parties. The Right—just as disturbed as Ortega by the outburst of popular protest from below in the 2018 uprising—tried to hitch mass discontent to its own agenda of recovering direct political power and assuring there would be no threat to its control over the Nicaraguan economy.

It was the government’s repression of the popular uprising of students, workers, feminists, and environmentalists that paved the way for the Right’s current hegemony over the anti-Sandinista opposition. The mass of Nicaraguans—beyond the Sandinistas’ secure base in some 20 percent of the population—have not shown any enthusiasm for the traditional conservative parties and businessmen that dominate the opposition and have no real political representation. Indeed, the October CID-Gallup poll found that 77 percent of the country’s electoral does not feel represented by any political party.